external/boringssl: Sync to 8459d0659920ab8c99bd300b8a989d4cda251118.
This includes the following changes:
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/f21650709a6f76e829ddcc77fe221c9d6a5c12de..8459d0659920ab8c99bd300b8a989d4cda251118
Test: BoringSSL CTS Presubmits.
Change-Id: I5745e86549d938f384e5de73a8fabb2405ed9b56
diff --git a/src/ssl/handshake_server.cc b/src/ssl/handshake_server.cc
index 2d5b85e..f196db0 100644
--- a/src/ssl/handshake_server.cc
+++ b/src/ssl/handshake_server.cc
@@ -4,21 +4,21 @@
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -33,10 +33,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
*
- * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*
* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
@@ -172,284 +172,29 @@
namespace bssl {
-static int ssl3_read_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_select_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_select_parameters(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_send_server_hello_done(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_send_server_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-
-int ssl3_accept(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- int ret = -1;
-
- assert(ssl->handshake_func == ssl3_accept);
- assert(ssl->server);
-
- for (;;) {
- int state = hs->state;
-
- switch (hs->state) {
- case SSL_ST_INIT:
- ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
- ret = ssl3_read_client_hello(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
- ret = ssl3_select_certificate(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- if (hs->state != SSL_ST_TLS13) {
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
- ret = ssl3_select_parameters(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
- ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- if (ssl->session != NULL) {
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
- } else {
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
- ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
- if (hs->server_params_len > 0) {
- ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- }
-
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
- ret = ssl3_send_server_hello_done(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- hs->next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
- if (hs->cert_request) {
- ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- }
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_VERIFY_CLIENT_CERT;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_VERIFY_CLIENT_CERT:
- if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs) > 0) {
- switch (ssl_verify_peer_cert(hs)) {
- case ssl_verify_ok:
- break;
- case ssl_verify_invalid:
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- case ssl_verify_retry:
- ssl->rwstate = SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- }
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
- ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
- ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
-
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE:
- ret = ssl->method->read_change_cipher_spec(ssl);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(hs, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
- if (hs->next_proto_neg_seen) {
- ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- }
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A:
- if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
- ret = ssl3_get_channel_id(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- }
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
- ret = ssl3_get_finished(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (ssl->session != NULL) {
- hs->state = SSL_ST_OK;
- } else {
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
- }
-
- /* If this is a full handshake with ChannelID then record the handshake
- * hashes in |hs->new_session| in case we need them to verify a
- * ChannelID signature on a resumption of this session in the future. */
- if (ssl->session == NULL && ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
- ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
- ret = ssl3_send_server_finished(hs);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- if (ssl->session != NULL) {
- hs->next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE;
- } else {
- hs->next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
- ret = ssl->method->flush_flight(ssl);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
-
- hs->state = hs->next_state;
- break;
-
- case SSL_ST_TLS13: {
- int early_return = 0;
- ret = tls13_handshake(hs, &early_return);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (early_return) {
- ret = 1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- hs->state = SSL_ST_OK;
- break;
- }
-
- case SSL_ST_OK:
- ssl->method->on_handshake_complete(ssl);
-
- /* If we aren't retaining peer certificates then we can discard it
- * now. */
- if (hs->new_session != NULL &&
- ssl->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) {
- sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(hs->new_session->certs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
- hs->new_session->certs = NULL;
- ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_clear(hs->new_session.get());
- }
-
- SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->s3->established_session);
- if (ssl->session != NULL) {
- SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ssl->session);
- ssl->s3->established_session = ssl->session;
- } else {
- ssl->s3->established_session = hs->new_session.release();
- ssl->s3->established_session->not_resumable = 0;
- }
-
- ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete = 1;
- ssl_update_cache(hs, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
-
- ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
- ret = 1;
- goto end;
-
- default:
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (hs->state != state) {
- ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
- }
- }
-
-end:
- ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
- return ret;
-}
+enum ssl_server_hs_state_t {
+ state_start_accept = 0,
+ state_read_client_hello,
+ state_select_certificate,
+ state_tls13,
+ state_select_parameters,
+ state_send_server_hello,
+ state_send_server_certificate,
+ state_send_server_key_exchange,
+ state_send_server_hello_done,
+ state_read_client_certificate,
+ state_verify_client_certificate,
+ state_read_client_key_exchange,
+ state_read_client_certificate_verify,
+ state_read_change_cipher_spec,
+ state_process_change_cipher_spec,
+ state_read_next_proto,
+ state_read_channel_id,
+ state_read_client_finished,
+ state_send_server_finished,
+ state_finish_server_handshake,
+ state_done,
+};
int ssl_client_cipher_list_contains_cipher(const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello,
uint16_t id) {
@@ -486,18 +231,18 @@
return 0;
}
} else {
- /* Convert the ClientHello version to an equivalent supported_versions
- * extension. */
+ // Convert the ClientHello version to an equivalent supported_versions
+ // extension.
static const uint8_t kTLSVersions[] = {
- 0x03, 0x03, /* TLS 1.2 */
- 0x03, 0x02, /* TLS 1.1 */
- 0x03, 0x01, /* TLS 1 */
- 0x03, 0x00, /* SSL 3 */
+ 0x03, 0x03, // TLS 1.2
+ 0x03, 0x02, // TLS 1.1
+ 0x03, 0x01, // TLS 1
+ 0x03, 0x00, // SSL 3
};
static const uint8_t kDTLSVersions[] = {
- 0xfe, 0xfd, /* DTLS 1.2 */
- 0xfe, 0xff, /* DTLS 1.0 */
+ 0xfe, 0xfd, // DTLS 1.2
+ 0xfe, 0xff, // DTLS 1.0
};
size_t versions_len = 0;
@@ -528,11 +273,11 @@
return 0;
}
- /* At this point, the connection's version is known and |ssl->version| is
- * fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version. */
- ssl->s3->have_version = 1;
+ // At this point, the connection's version is known and |ssl->version| is
+ // fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version.
+ ssl->s3->have_version = true;
- /* Handle FALLBACK_SCSV. */
+ // Handle FALLBACK_SCSV.
if (ssl_client_cipher_list_contains_cipher(client_hello,
SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xffff) &&
ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < hs->max_version) {
@@ -574,10 +319,10 @@
return sk;
}
-/* ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers determines the key exchange and
- * authentication cipher suite masks compatible with the server configuration
- * and current ClientHello parameters of |hs|. It sets |*out_mask_k| to the key
- * exchange mask and |*out_mask_a| to the authentication mask. */
+// ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers determines the key exchange and
+// authentication cipher suite masks compatible with the server configuration
+// and current ClientHello parameters of |hs|. It sets |*out_mask_k| to the key
+// exchange mask and |*out_mask_a| to the authentication mask.
static void ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
uint32_t *out_mask_k,
uint32_t *out_mask_a) {
@@ -592,13 +337,13 @@
}
}
- /* Check for a shared group to consider ECDHE ciphers. */
+ // Check for a shared group to consider ECDHE ciphers.
uint16_t unused;
if (tls1_get_shared_group(hs, &unused)) {
mask_k |= SSL_kECDHE;
}
- /* PSK requires a server callback. */
+ // PSK requires a server callback.
if (ssl->psk_server_callback != NULL) {
mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
@@ -613,13 +358,13 @@
const struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *server_pref) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *prio, *allow;
- /* in_group_flags will either be NULL, or will point to an array of bytes
- * which indicate equal-preference groups in the |prio| stack. See the
- * comment about |in_group_flags| in the |ssl_cipher_preference_list_st|
- * struct. */
+ // in_group_flags will either be NULL, or will point to an array of bytes
+ // which indicate equal-preference groups in the |prio| stack. See the
+ // comment about |in_group_flags| in the |ssl_cipher_preference_list_st|
+ // struct.
const uint8_t *in_group_flags;
- /* group_min contains the minimal index so far found in a group, or -1 if no
- * such value exists yet. */
+ // group_min contains the minimal index so far found in a group, or -1 if no
+ // such value exists yet.
int group_min = -1;
UniquePtr<STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)> client_pref =
@@ -645,17 +390,17 @@
const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio, i);
size_t cipher_index;
- if (/* Check if the cipher is supported for the current version. */
+ if (// Check if the cipher is supported for the current version.
SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(c) <= ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) &&
ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) <= SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(c) &&
- /* Check the cipher is supported for the server configuration. */
+ // Check the cipher is supported for the server configuration.
(c->algorithm_mkey & mask_k) &&
(c->algorithm_auth & mask_a) &&
- /* Check the cipher is in the |allow| list. */
+ // Check the cipher is in the |allow| list.
sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow, &cipher_index, c)) {
if (in_group_flags != NULL && in_group_flags[i] == 1) {
- /* This element of |prio| is in a group. Update the minimum index found
- * so far and continue looking. */
+ // This element of |prio| is in a group. Update the minimum index found
+ // so far and continue looking.
if (group_min == -1 || (size_t)group_min > cipher_index) {
group_min = cipher_index;
}
@@ -668,8 +413,8 @@
}
if (in_group_flags != NULL && in_group_flags[i] == 0 && group_min != -1) {
- /* We are about to leave a group, but we found a match in it, so that's
- * our answer. */
+ // We are about to leave a group, but we found a match in it, so that's
+ // our answer.
return sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow, group_min);
}
}
@@ -677,191 +422,200 @@
return nullptr;
}
-static int ssl3_read_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_start_accept(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ ssl_do_info_callback(hs->ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
+ hs->state = state_read_client_hello;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
SSLMessage msg;
- int ret = ssl_read_message(ssl, &msg);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- return ret;
+ if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+ return ssl_hs_read_message;
}
+
if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) {
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
SSL_CLIENT_HELLO client_hello;
if (!ssl_client_hello_init(ssl, &client_hello, msg)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
- /* Run the early callback. */
+ // Run the early callback.
if (ssl->ctx->select_certificate_cb != NULL) {
switch (ssl->ctx->select_certificate_cb(&client_hello)) {
case ssl_select_cert_retry:
- ssl->rwstate = SSL_CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING;
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_certificate_selection_pending;
case ssl_select_cert_error:
- /* Connection rejected. */
+ // Connection rejected.
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
default:
/* fallthrough */;
}
}
- /* Freeze the version range after the early callback. */
+ // Freeze the version range after the early callback.
if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &hs->min_version, &hs->max_version)) {
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
if (!negotiate_version(hs, &alert, &client_hello)) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
hs->client_version = client_hello.version;
if (client_hello.random_len != SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->client_random, client_hello.random,
client_hello.random_len);
- /* Only null compression is supported. TLS 1.3 further requires the peer
- * advertise no other compression. */
+ // Only null compression is supported. TLS 1.3 further requires the peer
+ // advertise no other compression.
if (OPENSSL_memchr(client_hello.compression_methods, 0,
client_hello.compression_methods_len) == NULL ||
(ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION &&
client_hello.compression_methods_len != 1)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_LIST);
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
- /* TLS extensions. */
+ // TLS extensions.
if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(hs, &client_hello)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
- return 1;
+ hs->state = state_select_certificate;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
}
-static int ssl3_select_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_select_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
SSLMessage msg;
- int ret = ssl_read_message(ssl, &msg);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- return ret;
+ if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+ return ssl_hs_read_message;
}
- /* Call |cert_cb| to update server certificates if required. */
+ // Call |cert_cb| to update server certificates if required.
if (ssl->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
int rv = ssl->cert->cert_cb(ssl, ssl->cert->cert_cb_arg);
if (rv == 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
if (rv < 0) {
- ssl->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_x509_lookup;
}
}
if (!ssl_on_certificate_selected(hs)) {
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
- /* Jump to the TLS 1.3 state machine. */
- hs->state = SSL_ST_TLS13;
- hs->do_tls13_handshake = tls13_server_handshake;
- return 1;
+ // Jump to the TLS 1.3 state machine.
+ hs->state = state_tls13;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
}
SSL_CLIENT_HELLO client_hello;
if (!ssl_client_hello_init(ssl, &client_hello, msg)) {
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
- /* Negotiate the cipher suite. This must be done after |cert_cb| so the
- * certificate is finalized. */
+ // Negotiate the cipher suite. This must be done after |cert_cb| so the
+ // certificate is finalized.
hs->new_cipher =
ssl3_choose_cipher(hs, &client_hello, ssl_get_cipher_preferences(ssl));
if (hs->new_cipher == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
- return 1;
+ hs->state = state_select_parameters;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
}
-static int ssl3_select_parameters(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- SSLMessage msg;
- int ret = ssl_read_message(ssl, &msg);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- return ret;
- }
- SSL_CLIENT_HELLO client_hello;
- if (!ssl_client_hello_init(ssl, &client_hello, msg)) {
- return -1;
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_tls13(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ enum ssl_hs_wait_t wait = tls13_server_handshake(hs);
+ if (wait == ssl_hs_ok) {
+ hs->state = state_finish_server_handshake;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
}
- /* Determine whether we are doing session resumption. */
+ return wait;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_select_parameters(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+ SSLMessage msg;
+ if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+ return ssl_hs_read_message;
+ }
+
+ SSL_CLIENT_HELLO client_hello;
+ if (!ssl_client_hello_init(ssl, &client_hello, msg)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ // Determine whether we are doing session resumption.
UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session;
- int tickets_supported = 0, renew_ticket = 0;
- switch (ssl_get_prev_session(ssl, &session, &tickets_supported, &renew_ticket,
- &client_hello)) {
- case ssl_session_success:
- break;
- case ssl_session_error:
- return -1;
- case ssl_session_retry:
- ssl->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_SESSION;
- return -1;
- case ssl_session_ticket_retry:
- ssl->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_TICKET;
- return -1;
+ bool tickets_supported = false, renew_ticket = false;
+ enum ssl_hs_wait_t wait = ssl_get_prev_session(
+ ssl, &session, &tickets_supported, &renew_ticket, &client_hello);
+ if (wait != ssl_hs_ok) {
+ return wait;
}
if (session) {
if (session->extended_master_secret && !hs->extended_master_secret) {
- /* A ClientHello without EMS that attempts to resume a session with EMS
- * is fatal to the connection. */
+ // A ClientHello without EMS that attempts to resume a session with EMS
+ // is fatal to the connection.
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_EMS_SESSION_WITHOUT_EMS_EXTENSION);
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
if (!ssl_session_is_resumable(hs, session.get()) ||
- /* If the client offers the EMS extension, but the previous session
- * didn't use it, then negotiate a new session. */
+ // If the client offers the EMS extension, but the previous session
+ // didn't use it, then negotiate a new session.
hs->extended_master_secret != session->extended_master_secret) {
session.reset();
}
}
if (session) {
- /* Use the old session. */
+ // Use the old session.
hs->ticket_expected = renew_ticket;
ssl->session = session.release();
- ssl->s3->session_reused = 1;
+ ssl->s3->session_reused = true;
} else {
hs->ticket_expected = tickets_supported;
ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL);
if (!ssl_get_new_session(hs, 1 /* server */)) {
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
- /* Clear the session ID if we want the session to be single-use. */
+ // Clear the session ID if we want the session to be single-use.
if (!(ssl->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)) {
hs->new_session->session_id_length = 0;
}
@@ -869,85 +623,87 @@
if (ssl->ctx->dos_protection_cb != NULL &&
ssl->ctx->dos_protection_cb(&client_hello) == 0) {
- /* Connection rejected for DOS reasons. */
+ // Connection rejected for DOS reasons.
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
if (ssl->session == NULL) {
hs->new_session->cipher = hs->new_cipher;
- /* On new sessions, stash the SNI value in the session. */
+ // On new sessions, stash the SNI value in the session.
if (hs->hostname != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(hs->new_session->tlsext_hostname);
hs->new_session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(hs->hostname.get());
if (hs->new_session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
}
- /* Determine whether to request a client certificate. */
+ // Determine whether to request a client certificate.
hs->cert_request = !!(ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER);
- /* Only request a certificate if Channel ID isn't negotiated. */
+ // Only request a certificate if Channel ID isn't negotiated.
if ((ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER_IF_NO_OBC) &&
ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
- hs->cert_request = 0;
+ hs->cert_request = false;
}
- /* CertificateRequest may only be sent in certificate-based ciphers. */
+ // CertificateRequest may only be sent in certificate-based ciphers.
if (!ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
- hs->cert_request = 0;
+ hs->cert_request = false;
}
if (!hs->cert_request) {
- /* OpenSSL returns X509_V_OK when no certificates are requested. This is
- * classed by them as a bug, but it's assumed by at least NGINX. */
+ // OpenSSL returns X509_V_OK when no certificates are requested. This is
+ // classed by them as a bug, but it's assumed by at least NGINX.
hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
}
}
- /* HTTP/2 negotiation depends on the cipher suite, so ALPN negotiation was
- * deferred. Complete it now. */
+ // HTTP/2 negotiation depends on the cipher suite, so ALPN negotiation was
+ // deferred. Complete it now.
uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
if (!ssl_negotiate_alpn(hs, &alert, &client_hello)) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
- /* Now that all parameters are known, initialize the handshake hash and hash
- * the ClientHello. */
+ // Now that all parameters are known, initialize the handshake hash and hash
+ // the ClientHello.
if (!hs->transcript.InitHash(ssl3_protocol_version(ssl), hs->new_cipher) ||
!ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
- /* Release the handshake buffer if client authentication isn't required. */
+ // Release the handshake buffer if client authentication isn't required.
if (!hs->cert_request) {
hs->transcript.FreeBuffer();
}
ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
- return 1;
+
+ hs->state = state_send_server_hello;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
}
-static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- /* We only accept ChannelIDs on connections with ECDHE in order to avoid a
- * known attack while we fix ChannelID itself. */
+ // We only accept ChannelIDs on connections with ECDHE in order to avoid a
+ // known attack while we fix ChannelID itself.
if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid &&
(hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kECDHE) == 0) {
- ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
+ ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = false;
}
- /* If this is a resumption and the original handshake didn't support
- * ChannelID then we didn't record the original handshake hashes in the
- * session and so cannot resume with ChannelIDs. */
+ // If this is a resumption and the original handshake didn't support
+ // ChannelID then we didn't record the original handshake hashes in the
+ // session and so cannot resume with ChannelIDs.
if (ssl->session != NULL &&
ssl->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) {
- ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
+ ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = false;
}
struct OPENSSL_timeval now;
@@ -957,11 +713,11 @@
ssl->s3->server_random[2] = now.tv_sec >> 8;
ssl->s3->server_random[3] = now.tv_sec;
if (!RAND_bytes(ssl->s3->server_random + 4, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - 4)) {
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
- /* TODO(davidben): Implement the TLS 1.1 and 1.2 downgrade sentinels once TLS
- * 1.3 is finalized and we are not implementing a draft version. */
+ // TODO(davidben): Implement the TLS 1.1 and 1.2 downgrade sentinels once TLS
+ // 1.3 is finalized and we are not implementing a draft version.
const SSL_SESSION *session = hs->new_session.get();
if (ssl->session != NULL) {
@@ -981,24 +737,29 @@
!ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(hs, &body) ||
!ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
- return 1;
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+ hs->state = state_send_server_finished;
+ } else {
+ hs->state = state_send_server_certificate;
+ }
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
}
-static int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
ScopedCBB cbb;
if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(ssl)) {
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
if (hs->certificate_status_expected) {
@@ -1012,107 +773,114 @@
CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(ssl->cert->ocsp_response)) ||
!ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
}
}
- /* Assemble ServerKeyExchange parameters if needed. */
+ // Assemble ServerKeyExchange parameters if needed.
uint32_t alg_k = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
uint32_t alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(hs->new_cipher) ||
((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && ssl->psk_identity_hint)) {
- /* Pre-allocate enough room to comfortably fit an ECDHE public key. Prepend
- * the client and server randoms for the signing transcript. */
+ // Pre-allocate enough room to comfortably fit an ECDHE public key. Prepend
+ // the client and server randoms for the signing transcript.
CBB child;
if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2 + 128) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(cbb.get(), ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(cbb.get(), ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
- /* PSK ciphers begin with an identity hint. */
+ // PSK ciphers begin with an identity hint.
if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
size_t len =
(ssl->psk_identity_hint == NULL) ? 0 : strlen(ssl->psk_identity_hint);
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &child) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&child, (const uint8_t *)ssl->psk_identity_hint,
len)) {
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
}
if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
- /* Determine the group to use. */
+ // Determine the group to use.
uint16_t group_id;
if (!tls1_get_shared_group(hs, &group_id)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
hs->new_session->group_id = group_id;
- /* Set up ECDH, generate a key, and emit the public half. */
+ // Set up ECDH, generate a key, and emit the public half.
hs->key_share = SSLKeyShare::Create(group_id);
if (!hs->key_share ||
!CBB_add_u8(cbb.get(), NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) ||
!CBB_add_u16(cbb.get(), group_id) ||
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &child) ||
!hs->key_share->Offer(&child)) {
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
} else {
assert(alg_k & SSL_kPSK);
}
if (!CBB_finish(cbb.get(), &hs->server_params, &hs->server_params_len)) {
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
}
- return 1;
+ hs->state = state_send_server_key_exchange;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
}
-static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_server_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+ if (hs->server_params_len == 0) {
+ hs->state = state_send_server_hello_done;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+ }
+
ScopedCBB cbb;
CBB body, child;
if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
- /* |hs->server_params| contains a prefix for signing. */
+ // |hs->server_params| contains a prefix for signing.
hs->server_params_len < 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&body, hs->server_params + 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
hs->server_params_len - 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
- /* Add a signature. */
+ // Add a signature.
if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
if (!ssl_has_private_key(ssl)) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
- /* Determine the signature algorithm. */
+ // Determine the signature algorithm.
uint16_t signature_algorithm;
if (!tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(hs, &signature_algorithm)) {
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
if (!CBB_add_u16(&body, signature_algorithm)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
}
- /* Add space for the signature. */
+ // Add space for the signature.
const size_t max_sig_len = EVP_PKEY_size(hs->local_pubkey.get());
uint8_t *ptr;
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
!CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, max_sig_len)) {
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
size_t sig_len;
@@ -1121,30 +889,31 @@
hs->server_params_len)) {
case ssl_private_key_success:
if (!CBB_did_write(&child, sig_len)) {
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
break;
case ssl_private_key_failure:
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
case ssl_private_key_retry:
- ssl->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION;
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_private_key_operation;
}
}
if (!ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
OPENSSL_free(hs->server_params);
hs->server_params = NULL;
hs->server_params_len = 0;
- return 1;
+ hs->state = state_send_server_hello_done;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
}
-static int ssl3_send_server_hello_done(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_server_hello_done(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
ScopedCBB cbb;
CBB body;
@@ -1162,7 +931,7 @@
!ssl_add_client_CA_list(ssl, &body) ||
!ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
}
@@ -1170,46 +939,51 @@
SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) ||
!ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
- return 1;
+ hs->state = state_read_client_certificate;
+ return ssl_hs_flush;
}
-static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- assert(hs->cert_request);
+
+ if (!hs->cert_request) {
+ hs->state = state_verify_client_certificate;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+ }
SSLMessage msg;
- int ret = ssl_read_message(ssl, &msg);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- return ret;
+ if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+ return ssl_hs_read_message;
}
if (msg.type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION &&
msg.type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
- /* In SSL 3.0, the Certificate message is omitted to signal no
- * certificate. */
+ // In SSL 3.0, the Certificate message is omitted to signal no
+ // certificate.
if (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
- /* OpenSSL returns X509_V_OK when no certificates are received. This is
- * classed by them as a bug, but it's assumed by at least NGINX. */
+ // OpenSSL returns X509_V_OK when no certificates are received. This is
+ // classed by them as a bug, but it's assumed by at least NGINX.
hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
- return 1;
+ hs->state = state_verify_client_certificate;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
}
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
if (!ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
CBS certificate_msg = msg.body;
@@ -1221,7 +995,7 @@
: NULL,
&certificate_msg, ssl->ctx->pool)) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(hs->new_session->certs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
hs->new_session->certs = chain.release();
@@ -1230,66 +1004,84 @@
!ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_cache_objects(hs->new_session.get())) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs) == 0) {
- /* No client certificate so the handshake buffer may be discarded. */
+ // No client certificate so the handshake buffer may be discarded.
hs->transcript.FreeBuffer();
- /* In SSL 3.0, sending no certificate is signaled by omitting the
- * Certificate message. */
+ // In SSL 3.0, sending no certificate is signaled by omitting the
+ // Certificate message.
if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
if (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) {
- /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
+ // Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
- /* OpenSSL returns X509_V_OK when no certificates are received. This is
- * classed by them as a bug, but it's assumed by at least NGINX. */
+ // OpenSSL returns X509_V_OK when no certificates are received. This is
+ // classed by them as a bug, but it's assumed by at least NGINX.
hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
} else if (ssl->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) {
- /* The hash will have been filled in. */
+ // The hash will have been filled in.
hs->new_session->peer_sha256_valid = 1;
}
ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
- return 1;
+ hs->state = state_verify_client_certificate;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
}
-static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_verify_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs) > 0) {
+ switch (ssl_verify_peer_cert(hs)) {
+ case ssl_verify_ok:
+ break;
+ case ssl_verify_invalid:
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ case ssl_verify_retry:
+ return ssl_hs_certificate_verify;
+ }
+ }
+
+ hs->state = state_read_client_key_exchange;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_client_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+ ssl_hs_wait_t ret = ssl_hs_error;
uint8_t *premaster_secret = NULL;
size_t premaster_secret_len = 0;
uint8_t *decrypt_buf = NULL;
SSLMessage msg;
- int ret = ssl_read_message(ssl, &msg);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- return ret;
+ if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+ return ssl_hs_read_message;
}
if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
CBS client_key_exchange = msg.body;
uint32_t alg_k = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
uint32_t alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- /* If using a PSK key exchange, parse the PSK identity. */
+ // If using a PSK key exchange, parse the PSK identity.
if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
CBS psk_identity;
- /* If using PSK, the ClientKeyExchange contains a psk_identity. If PSK,
- * then this is the only field in the message. */
+ // If using PSK, the ClientKeyExchange contains a psk_identity. If PSK,
+ // then this is the only field in the message.
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &psk_identity) ||
((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
@@ -1311,8 +1103,8 @@
}
}
- /* Depending on the key exchange method, compute |premaster_secret| and
- * |premaster_secret_len|. */
+ // Depending on the key exchange method, compute |premaster_secret| and
+ // |premaster_secret_len|.
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
CBS encrypted_premaster_secret;
if (ssl->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
@@ -1327,7 +1119,7 @@
encrypted_premaster_secret = client_key_exchange;
}
- /* Allocate a buffer large enough for an RSA decryption. */
+ // Allocate a buffer large enough for an RSA decryption.
const size_t rsa_size = EVP_PKEY_size(hs->local_pubkey.get());
decrypt_buf = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
if (decrypt_buf == NULL) {
@@ -1335,8 +1127,8 @@
goto err;
}
- /* Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of the
- * timing-sensitive code below. */
+ // Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of the
+ // timing-sensitive code below.
size_t decrypt_len;
switch (ssl_private_key_decrypt(hs, decrypt_buf, &decrypt_len, rsa_size,
CBS_data(&encrypted_premaster_secret),
@@ -1346,7 +1138,7 @@
case ssl_private_key_failure:
goto err;
case ssl_private_key_retry:
- ssl->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION;
+ ret = ssl_hs_private_key_operation;
goto err;
}
@@ -1356,8 +1148,8 @@
goto err;
}
- /* Prepare a random premaster, to be used on invalid padding. See RFC 5246,
- * section 7.4.7.1. */
+ // Prepare a random premaster, to be used on invalid padding. See RFC 5246,
+ // section 7.4.7.1.
premaster_secret_len = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
premaster_secret = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(premaster_secret_len);
if (premaster_secret == NULL) {
@@ -1368,15 +1160,15 @@
goto err;
}
- /* The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys are
- * publicly invalid. */
+ // The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys are
+ // publicly invalid.
if (decrypt_len < 11 + premaster_secret_len) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
+ // Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2.
size_t padding_len = decrypt_len - premaster_secret_len;
uint8_t good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_buf[0], 0) &
constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_buf[1], 2);
@@ -1385,15 +1177,15 @@
}
good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(decrypt_buf[padding_len - 1]);
- /* The premaster secret must begin with |client_version|. This too must be
- * checked in constant time (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/). */
+ // The premaster secret must begin with |client_version|. This too must be
+ // checked in constant time (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/).
good &= constant_time_eq_8(decrypt_buf[padding_len],
(unsigned)(hs->client_version >> 8));
good &= constant_time_eq_8(decrypt_buf[padding_len + 1],
(unsigned)(hs->client_version & 0xff));
- /* Select, in constant time, either the decrypted premaster or the random
- * premaster based on |good|. */
+ // Select, in constant time, either the decrypted premaster or the random
+ // premaster based on |good|.
for (size_t i = 0; i < premaster_secret_len; i++) {
premaster_secret[i] = constant_time_select_8(
good, decrypt_buf[padding_len + i], premaster_secret[i]);
@@ -1402,7 +1194,7 @@
OPENSSL_free(decrypt_buf);
decrypt_buf = NULL;
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
- /* Parse the ClientKeyExchange. */
+ // Parse the ClientKeyExchange.
CBS peer_key;
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &peer_key) ||
CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0) {
@@ -1411,7 +1203,7 @@
goto err;
}
- /* Compute the premaster. */
+ // Compute the premaster.
uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
if (!hs->key_share->Finish(&premaster_secret, &premaster_secret_len, &alert,
CBS_data(&peer_key), CBS_len(&peer_key))) {
@@ -1419,7 +1211,7 @@
goto err;
}
- /* The key exchange state may now be discarded. */
+ // The key exchange state may now be discarded.
hs->key_share.reset();
} else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -1427,8 +1219,8 @@
goto err;
}
- /* For a PSK cipher suite, the actual pre-master secret is combined with the
- * pre-shared key. */
+ // For a PSK cipher suite, the actual pre-master secret is combined with the
+ // pre-shared key.
if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
if (ssl->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -1436,7 +1228,7 @@
goto err;
}
- /* Look up the key for the identity. */
+ // Look up the key for the identity.
uint8_t psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
unsigned psk_len = ssl->psk_server_callback(
ssl, hs->new_session->psk_identity, psk, sizeof(psk));
@@ -1445,15 +1237,15 @@
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
} else if (psk_len == 0) {
- /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
+ // PSK related to the given identity not found.
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
goto err;
}
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
- /* In plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same length as the
- * pre-shared key. */
+ // In plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same length as the
+ // pre-shared key.
premaster_secret_len = psk_len;
premaster_secret = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(premaster_secret_len);
if (premaster_secret == NULL) {
@@ -1488,7 +1280,7 @@
goto err;
}
- /* Compute the master secret */
+ // Compute the master secret.
hs->new_session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(
hs, hs->new_session->master_key, premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
if (hs->new_session->master_key_length == 0) {
@@ -1496,10 +1288,9 @@
}
hs->new_session->extended_master_secret = hs->extended_master_secret;
- OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
- OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
- return 1;
+ hs->state = state_read_client_certificate_verify;
+ ret = ssl_hs_ok;
err:
if (premaster_secret != NULL) {
@@ -1508,70 +1299,70 @@
}
OPENSSL_free(decrypt_buf);
- return -1;
+ return ret;
+
}
-static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_client_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- /* Only RSA and ECDSA client certificates are supported, so a
- * CertificateVerify is required if and only if there's a client certificate.
- * */
+ // Only RSA and ECDSA client certificates are supported, so a
+ // CertificateVerify is required if and only if there's a client certificate.
if (!hs->peer_pubkey) {
hs->transcript.FreeBuffer();
- return 1;
+ hs->state = state_read_change_cipher_spec;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
}
SSLMessage msg;
- int ret = ssl_read_message(ssl, &msg);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- return ret;
+ if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+ return ssl_hs_read_message;
}
if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)) {
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
CBS certificate_verify = msg.body, signature;
- /* Determine the signature algorithm. */
+ // Determine the signature algorithm.
uint16_t signature_algorithm = 0;
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
if (!CBS_get_u16(&certificate_verify, &signature_algorithm)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(ssl, &alert, signature_algorithm)) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
hs->new_session->peer_signature_algorithm = signature_algorithm;
} else if (!tls1_get_legacy_signature_algorithm(&signature_algorithm,
hs->peer_pubkey.get())) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
- /* Parse and verify the signature. */
+ // Parse and verify the signature.
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_verify, &signature) ||
CBS_len(&certificate_verify) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
int sig_ok;
- /* The SSL3 construction for CertificateVerify does not decompose into a
- * single final digest and signature, and must be special-cased. */
+ // The SSL3 construction for CertificateVerify does not decompose into a
+ // single final digest and signature, and must be special-cased.
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) == SSL3_VERSION) {
uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t digest_len;
if (!hs->transcript.GetSSL3CertVerifyHash(
digest, &digest_len, hs->new_session.get(), signature_algorithm)) {
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY_CTX> pctx(
@@ -1594,33 +1385,51 @@
if (!sig_ok) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
- /* The handshake buffer is no longer necessary, and we may hash the current
- * message.*/
+ // The handshake buffer is no longer necessary, and we may hash the current
+ // message.
hs->transcript.FreeBuffer();
if (!ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
- return 1;
+ hs->state = state_read_change_cipher_spec;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
}
-/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
- * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
-static int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_change_cipher_spec(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ hs->state = state_process_change_cipher_spec;
+ return ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(hs, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ hs->state = state_read_next_proto;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_next_proto(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+ if (!hs->next_proto_neg_seen) {
+ hs->state = state_read_channel_id;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+ }
+
SSLMessage msg;
- int ret = ssl_read_message(ssl, &msg);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- return ret;
+ if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+ return ssl_hs_read_message;
}
if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) ||
!ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
CBS next_protocol = msg.body, selected_protocol, padding;
@@ -1629,52 +1438,83 @@
CBS_len(&next_protocol) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
if (!CBS_stow(&selected_protocol, &ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated,
&ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated_len)) {
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
- return 1;
+ hs->state = state_read_channel_id;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
}
-/* ssl3_get_channel_id reads and verifies a ClientID handshake message. */
-static int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+ if (!ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
+ hs->state = state_read_client_finished;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+ }
+
SSLMessage msg;
- int ret = ssl_read_message(ssl, &msg);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- return ret;
+ if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+ return ssl_hs_read_message;
}
if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_CHANNEL_ID) ||
!tls1_verify_channel_id(hs, msg) ||
!ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
+
ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
- return 1;
+ hs->state = state_read_client_finished;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
}
-static int ssl3_send_server_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_client_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ enum ssl_hs_wait_t wait = ssl_get_finished(hs);
+ if (wait != ssl_hs_ok) {
+ return wait;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+ hs->state = state_finish_server_handshake;
+ } else {
+ hs->state = state_send_server_finished;
+ }
+
+ // If this is a full handshake with ChannelID then record the handshake
+ // hashes in |hs->new_session| in case we need them to verify a
+ // ChannelID signature on a resumption of this session in the future.
+ if (ssl->session == NULL && ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid &&
+ !tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(hs)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_server_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
if (hs->ticket_expected) {
const SSL_SESSION *session;
UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session_copy;
if (ssl->session == NULL) {
- /* Fix the timeout to measure from the ticket issuance time. */
+ // Fix the timeout to measure from the ticket issuance time.
ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, hs->new_session.get());
session = hs->new_session.get();
} else {
- /* We are renewing an existing session. Duplicate the session to adjust
- * the timeout. */
+ // We are renewing an existing session. Duplicate the session to adjust
+ // the timeout.
session_copy = SSL_SESSION_dup(ssl->session, SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH);
if (!session_copy) {
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, session_copy.get());
@@ -1689,16 +1529,186 @@
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &ticket) ||
!ssl_encrypt_ticket(ssl, &ticket, session) ||
!ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
- return -1;
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
}
if (!ssl->method->add_change_cipher_spec(ssl) ||
- !tls1_change_cipher_state(hs, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
- return -1;
+ !tls1_change_cipher_state(hs, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE) ||
+ !ssl3_send_finished(hs)) {
+ return ssl_hs_error;
}
- return ssl3_send_finished(hs);
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+ hs->state = state_read_change_cipher_spec;
+ } else {
+ hs->state = state_finish_server_handshake;
+ }
+ return ssl_hs_flush;
}
-} // namespace bssl
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_finish_server_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+ ssl->method->on_handshake_complete(ssl);
+
+ // If we aren't retaining peer certificates then we can discard it now.
+ if (hs->new_session != NULL && ssl->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) {
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(hs->new_session->certs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+ hs->new_session->certs = NULL;
+ ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_clear(hs->new_session.get());
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->s3->established_session);
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+ SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ssl->session);
+ ssl->s3->established_session = ssl->session;
+ } else {
+ ssl->s3->established_session = hs->new_session.release();
+ ssl->s3->established_session->not_resumable = 0;
+ }
+
+ hs->handshake_finalized = true;
+ ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete = true;
+ ssl_update_cache(hs, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+
+ hs->state = state_done;
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_server_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ while (hs->state != state_done) {
+ enum ssl_hs_wait_t ret = ssl_hs_error;
+ enum ssl_server_hs_state_t state =
+ static_cast<enum ssl_server_hs_state_t>(hs->state);
+ switch (state) {
+ case state_start_accept:
+ ret = do_start_accept(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_read_client_hello:
+ ret = do_read_client_hello(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_select_certificate:
+ ret = do_select_certificate(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_tls13:
+ ret = do_tls13(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_select_parameters:
+ ret = do_select_parameters(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_send_server_hello:
+ ret = do_send_server_hello(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_send_server_certificate:
+ ret = do_send_server_certificate(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_send_server_key_exchange:
+ ret = do_send_server_key_exchange(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_send_server_hello_done:
+ ret = do_send_server_hello_done(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_read_client_certificate:
+ ret = do_read_client_certificate(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_verify_client_certificate:
+ ret = do_verify_client_certificate(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_read_client_key_exchange:
+ ret = do_read_client_key_exchange(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_read_client_certificate_verify:
+ ret = do_read_client_certificate_verify(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_read_change_cipher_spec:
+ ret = do_read_change_cipher_spec(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_process_change_cipher_spec:
+ ret = do_process_change_cipher_spec(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_read_next_proto:
+ ret = do_read_next_proto(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_read_channel_id:
+ ret = do_read_channel_id(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_read_client_finished:
+ ret = do_read_client_finished(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_send_server_finished:
+ ret = do_send_server_finished(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_finish_server_handshake:
+ ret = do_finish_server_handshake(hs);
+ break;
+ case state_done:
+ ret = ssl_hs_ok;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (hs->state != state) {
+ ssl_do_info_callback(hs->ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
+ }
+
+ if (ret != ssl_hs_ok) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ssl_do_info_callback(hs->ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
+ return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+const char *ssl_server_handshake_state(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ enum ssl_server_hs_state_t state =
+ static_cast<enum ssl_server_hs_state_t>(hs->state);
+ switch (state) {
+ case state_start_accept:
+ return "TLS server start_accept";
+ case state_read_client_hello:
+ return "TLS server read_client_hello";
+ case state_select_certificate:
+ return "TLS server select_certificate";
+ case state_tls13:
+ return tls13_server_handshake_state(hs);
+ case state_select_parameters:
+ return "TLS server select_parameters";
+ case state_send_server_hello:
+ return "TLS server send_server_hello";
+ case state_send_server_certificate:
+ return "TLS server send_server_certificate";
+ case state_send_server_key_exchange:
+ return "TLS server send_server_key_exchange";
+ case state_send_server_hello_done:
+ return "TLS server send_server_hello_done";
+ case state_read_client_certificate:
+ return "TLS server read_client_certificate";
+ case state_verify_client_certificate:
+ return "TLS server verify_client_certificate";
+ case state_read_client_key_exchange:
+ return "TLS server read_client_key_exchange";
+ case state_read_client_certificate_verify:
+ return "TLS server read_client_certificate_verify";
+ case state_read_change_cipher_spec:
+ return "TLS server read_change_cipher_spec";
+ case state_process_change_cipher_spec:
+ return "TLS server process_change_cipher_spec";
+ case state_read_next_proto:
+ return "TLS server read_next_proto";
+ case state_read_channel_id:
+ return "TLS server read_channel_id";
+ case state_read_client_finished:
+ return "TLS server read_client_finished";
+ case state_send_server_finished:
+ return "TLS server send_server_finished";
+ case state_finish_server_handshake:
+ return "TLS server finish_server_handshake";
+ case state_done:
+ return "TLS server done";
+ }
+
+ return "TLS server unknown";
+}
+
+}