external/boringssl: Sync to 8459d0659920ab8c99bd300b8a989d4cda251118.
This includes the following changes:
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/f21650709a6f76e829ddcc77fe221c9d6a5c12de..8459d0659920ab8c99bd300b8a989d4cda251118
Test: BoringSSL CTS Presubmits.
Change-Id: I5745e86549d938f384e5de73a8fabb2405ed9b56
diff --git a/src/ssl/s3_both.cc b/src/ssl/s3_both.cc
index f51af69..dfa8bfa 100644
--- a/src/ssl/s3_both.cc
+++ b/src/ssl/s3_both.cc
@@ -132,76 +132,9 @@
namespace bssl {
-SSL_HANDSHAKE::SSL_HANDSHAKE(SSL *ssl_arg)
- : ssl(ssl_arg),
- scts_requested(0),
- needs_psk_binder(0),
- received_hello_retry_request(0),
- received_custom_extension(0),
- accept_psk_mode(0),
- cert_request(0),
- certificate_status_expected(0),
- ocsp_stapling_requested(0),
- should_ack_sni(0),
- in_false_start(0),
- in_early_data(0),
- early_data_offered(0),
- can_early_read(0),
- can_early_write(0),
- next_proto_neg_seen(0),
- ticket_expected(0),
- extended_master_secret(0),
- pending_private_key_op(0) {
-}
-
-SSL_HANDSHAKE::~SSL_HANDSHAKE() {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(early_traffic_secret, sizeof(early_traffic_secret));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(client_handshake_secret, sizeof(client_handshake_secret));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(server_handshake_secret, sizeof(server_handshake_secret));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(client_traffic_secret_0, sizeof(client_traffic_secret_0));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(server_traffic_secret_0, sizeof(server_traffic_secret_0));
- OPENSSL_free(cookie);
- OPENSSL_free(key_share_bytes);
- OPENSSL_free(ecdh_public_key);
- OPENSSL_free(peer_sigalgs);
- OPENSSL_free(peer_supported_group_list);
- OPENSSL_free(peer_key);
- OPENSSL_free(server_params);
- ssl->ctx->x509_method->hs_flush_cached_ca_names(this);
- OPENSSL_free(certificate_types);
-
- if (key_block != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(key_block, key_block_len);
- OPENSSL_free(key_block);
- }
-}
-
-SSL_HANDSHAKE *ssl_handshake_new(SSL *ssl) {
- UniquePtr<SSL_HANDSHAKE> hs = MakeUnique<SSL_HANDSHAKE>(ssl);
- if (!hs ||
- !hs->transcript.Init()) {
- return nullptr;
- }
- return hs.release();
-}
-
-void ssl_handshake_free(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { Delete(hs); }
-
-int ssl_check_message_type(SSL *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg, int type) {
- if (msg.type != type) {
- ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- ERR_add_error_dataf("got type %d, wanted type %d", msg.type, type);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
static int add_record_to_flight(SSL *ssl, uint8_t type, const uint8_t *in,
size_t in_len) {
- /* We'll never add a flight while in the process of writing it out. */
+ // We'll never add a flight while in the process of writing it out.
assert(ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset == 0);
if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == NULL) {
@@ -231,7 +164,7 @@
}
int ssl3_init_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, CBB *body, uint8_t type) {
- /* Pick a modest size hint to save most of the |realloc| calls. */
+ // Pick a modest size hint to save most of the |realloc| calls.
if (!CBB_init(cbb, 64) ||
!CBB_add_u8(cbb, type) ||
!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, body)) {
@@ -254,8 +187,8 @@
}
int ssl3_add_message(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *msg, size_t len) {
- /* Add the message to the current flight, splitting into several records if
- * needed. */
+ // Add the message to the current flight, splitting into several records if
+ // needed.
int ret = 0;
size_t added = 0;
do {
@@ -279,8 +212,8 @@
} while (added < len);
ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, msg, len);
- /* TODO(svaldez): Move this up a layer to fix abstraction for SSLTranscript on
- * hs. */
+ // TODO(svaldez): Move this up a layer to fix abstraction for SSLTranscript on
+ // hs.
if (ssl->s3->hs != NULL &&
!ssl->s3->hs->transcript.Update(msg, len)) {
goto err;
@@ -316,17 +249,6 @@
return 1;
}
-int ssl_add_message_cbb(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) {
- uint8_t *msg;
- size_t len;
- if (!ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, cbb, &msg, &len) ||
- !ssl->method->add_message(ssl, msg, len)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
int ssl3_flush_flight(SSL *ssl) {
if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == NULL) {
return 1;
@@ -338,8 +260,8 @@
return -1;
}
- /* If there is pending data in the write buffer, it must be flushed out before
- * any new data in pending_flight. */
+ // If there is pending data in the write buffer, it must be flushed out before
+ // any new data in pending_flight.
if (ssl_write_buffer_is_pending(ssl)) {
int ret = ssl_write_buffer_flush(ssl);
if (ret <= 0) {
@@ -348,7 +270,7 @@
}
}
- /* Write the pending flight. */
+ // Write the pending flight.
while (ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset < ssl->s3->pending_flight->length) {
int ret = BIO_write(
ssl->wbio,
@@ -380,23 +302,23 @@
uint8_t finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t finished_len;
if (!hs->transcript.GetFinishedMAC(finished, &finished_len, session,
- ssl->server, ssl3_protocol_version(ssl))) {
+ ssl->server)) {
return 0;
}
- /* Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. */
+ // Log the master secret, if logging is enabled.
if (!ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_RANDOM",
session->master_key,
session->master_key_length)) {
return 0;
}
- /* Copy the Finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks. */
+ // Copy the Finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks.
if (ssl->version != SSL3_VERSION) {
if (finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished) ||
finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
+ return 0;
}
if (ssl->server) {
@@ -414,65 +336,12 @@
!CBB_add_bytes(&body, finished, finished_len) ||
!ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
+ return 0;
}
return 1;
}
-int ssl3_get_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- SSLMessage msg;
- int ret = ssl_read_message(ssl, &msg);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- return ret;
- }
-
- if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_FINISHED)) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Snapshot the finished hash before incorporating the new message. */
- uint8_t finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- size_t finished_len;
- if (!hs->transcript.GetFinishedMAC(finished, &finished_len,
- SSL_get_session(ssl), !ssl->server,
- ssl3_protocol_version(ssl)) ||
- !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- int finished_ok = CBS_mem_equal(&msg.body, finished, finished_len);
-#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
- finished_ok = 1;
-#endif
- if (!finished_ok) {
- ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Copy the Finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks. */
- if (ssl->version != SSL3_VERSION) {
- if (finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished) ||
- finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (ssl->server) {
- OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, finished, finished_len);
- ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len;
- } else {
- OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, finished, finished_len);
- ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len;
- }
- }
-
- ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
- return 1;
-}
-
int ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *ssl) {
ScopedCBB cbb;
CBB body;
@@ -486,46 +355,6 @@
return 1;
}
-size_t ssl_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *ssl) {
- /* kMaxMessageLen is the default maximum message size for handshakes which do
- * not accept peer certificate chains. */
- static const size_t kMaxMessageLen = 16384;
-
- if (SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
- if ((!ssl->server || (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) &&
- kMaxMessageLen < ssl->max_cert_list) {
- return ssl->max_cert_list;
- }
- return kMaxMessageLen;
- }
-
- if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
- /* In TLS 1.2 and below, the largest acceptable post-handshake message is
- * a HelloRequest. */
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (ssl->server) {
- /* The largest acceptable post-handshake message for a server is a
- * KeyUpdate. We will never initiate post-handshake auth. */
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* Clients must accept NewSessionTicket and CertificateRequest, so allow the
- * default size. */
- return kMaxMessageLen;
-}
-
-int ssl_read_message(SSL *ssl, SSLMessage *out) {
- while (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, out)) {
- int ret = ssl->method->read_message(ssl);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- return ret;
- }
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
static int extend_handshake_buffer(SSL *ssl, size_t length) {
if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->init_buf, length)) {
return -1;
@@ -543,18 +372,18 @@
}
static int read_v2_client_hello(SSL *ssl) {
- /* Read the first 5 bytes, the size of the TLS record header. This is
- * sufficient to detect a V2ClientHello and ensures that we never read beyond
- * the first record. */
+ // Read the first 5 bytes, the size of the TLS record header. This is
+ // sufficient to detect a V2ClientHello and ensures that we never read beyond
+ // the first record.
int ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
if (ret <= 0) {
return ret;
}
const uint8_t *p = ssl_read_buffer(ssl);
- /* Some dedicated error codes for protocol mixups should the application wish
- * to interpret them differently. (These do not overlap with ClientHello or
- * V2ClientHello.) */
+ // Some dedicated error codes for protocol mixups should the application wish
+ // to interpret them differently. (These do not overlap with ClientHello or
+ // V2ClientHello.)
if (strncmp("GET ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0 ||
strncmp("POST ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 ||
strncmp("HEAD ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 ||
@@ -569,25 +398,25 @@
if ((p[0] & 0x80) == 0 || p[2] != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO ||
p[3] != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
- /* Not a V2ClientHello. */
+ // Not a V2ClientHello.
return 1;
}
- /* Determine the length of the V2ClientHello. */
+ // Determine the length of the V2ClientHello.
size_t msg_length = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1];
if (msg_length > (1024 * 4)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
return -1;
}
if (msg_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 2) {
- /* Reject lengths that are too short early. We have already read
- * |SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH| bytes, so we should not attempt to process an
- * (invalid) V2ClientHello which would be shorter than that. */
+ // Reject lengths that are too short early. We have already read
+ // |SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH| bytes, so we should not attempt to process an
+ // (invalid) V2ClientHello which would be shorter than that.
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return -1;
}
- /* Read the remainder of the V2ClientHello. */
+ // Read the remainder of the V2ClientHello.
ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, 2 + msg_length);
if (ret <= 0) {
return ret;
@@ -596,9 +425,9 @@
CBS v2_client_hello;
CBS_init(&v2_client_hello, ssl_read_buffer(ssl) + 2, msg_length);
- /* The V2ClientHello without the length is incorporated into the handshake
- * hash. This is only ever called at the start of the handshake, so hs is
- * guaranteed to be non-NULL. */
+ // The V2ClientHello without the length is incorporated into the handshake
+ // hash. This is only ever called at the start of the handshake, so hs is
+ // guaranteed to be non-NULL.
if (!ssl->s3->hs->transcript.Update(CBS_data(&v2_client_hello),
CBS_len(&v2_client_hello))) {
return -1;
@@ -623,11 +452,11 @@
return -1;
}
- /* msg_type has already been checked. */
+ // msg_type has already been checked.
assert(msg_type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO);
- /* The client_random is the V2ClientHello challenge. Truncate or
- * left-pad with zeros as needed. */
+ // The client_random is the V2ClientHello challenge. Truncate or left-pad with
+ // zeros as needed.
size_t rand_len = CBS_len(&challenge);
if (rand_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) {
rand_len = SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
@@ -637,7 +466,7 @@
OPENSSL_memcpy(random + (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - rand_len), CBS_data(&challenge),
rand_len);
- /* Write out an equivalent SSLv3 ClientHello. */
+ // Write out an equivalent SSLv3 ClientHello.
size_t max_v3_client_hello = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 /* version */ +
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 /* session ID length */ +
2 /* cipher list length */ +
@@ -652,14 +481,14 @@
!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(client_hello.get(), &hello_body) ||
!CBB_add_u16(&hello_body, version) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&hello_body, random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
- /* No session id. */
+ // No session id.
!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&hello_body, &cipher_suites)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
- /* Copy the cipher suites. */
+ // Copy the cipher suites.
while (CBS_len(&cipher_specs) > 0) {
uint32_t cipher_spec;
if (!CBS_get_u24(&cipher_specs, &cipher_spec)) {
@@ -667,7 +496,7 @@
return -1;
}
- /* Skip SSLv2 ciphers. */
+ // Skip SSLv2 ciphers.
if ((cipher_spec & 0xff0000) != 0) {
continue;
}
@@ -677,7 +506,7 @@
}
}
- /* Add the null compression scheme and finish. */
+ // Add the null compression scheme and finish.
if (!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 1) ||
!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
!CBB_finish(client_hello.get(), NULL, &ssl->init_buf->length)) {
@@ -685,16 +514,16 @@
return -1;
}
- /* Consume and discard the V2ClientHello. */
+ // Consume and discard the V2ClientHello.
ssl_read_buffer_consume(ssl, 2 + msg_length);
ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl);
- ssl->s3->is_v2_hello = 1;
+ ssl->s3->is_v2_hello = true;
return 1;
}
-/* TODO(davidben): Remove |out_bytes_needed| and inline into |ssl3_get_message|
- * when the entire record is copied into |init_buf|. */
+// TODO(davidben): Remove |out_bytes_needed| and inline into |ssl3_get_message|
+// when the entire record is copied into |init_buf|.
static bool parse_message(SSL *ssl, SSLMessage *out, size_t *out_bytes_needed) {
if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) {
*out_bytes_needed = 4;
@@ -724,7 +553,7 @@
ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
CBS_data(&out->raw), CBS_len(&out->raw));
}
- ssl->s3->has_message = 1;
+ ssl->s3->has_message = true;
}
return true;
}
@@ -742,14 +571,14 @@
return -1;
}
- /* Enforce the limit so the peer cannot force us to buffer 16MB. */
+ // Enforce the limit so the peer cannot force us to buffer 16MB.
if (bytes_needed > 4 + ssl_max_handshake_message_len(ssl)) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
return -1;
}
- /* Re-create the handshake buffer if needed. */
+ // Re-create the handshake buffer if needed.
if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) {
ssl->init_buf = BUF_MEM_new();
if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) {
@@ -757,11 +586,11 @@
}
}
- /* Bypass the record layer for the first message to handle V2ClientHello. */
+ // Bypass the record layer for the first message to handle V2ClientHello.
if (ssl->server && !ssl->s3->v2_hello_done) {
int ret = read_v2_client_hello(ssl);
if (ret > 0) {
- ssl->s3->v2_hello_done = 1;
+ ssl->s3->v2_hello_done = true;
}
return ret;
}
@@ -769,15 +598,6 @@
return extend_handshake_buffer(ssl, bytes_needed);
}
-bool ssl_hash_message(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg) {
- /* V2ClientHello messages are pre-hashed. */
- if (msg.is_v2_hello) {
- return true;
- }
-
- return hs->transcript.Update(CBS_data(&msg.raw), CBS_len(&msg.raw));
-}
-
void ssl3_next_message(SSL *ssl) {
SSLMessage msg;
if (!ssl3_get_message(ssl, &msg) ||
@@ -790,165 +610,15 @@
OPENSSL_memmove(ssl->init_buf->data, ssl->init_buf->data + CBS_len(&msg.raw),
ssl->init_buf->length - CBS_len(&msg.raw));
ssl->init_buf->length -= CBS_len(&msg.raw);
- ssl->s3->is_v2_hello = 0;
- ssl->s3->has_message = 0;
+ ssl->s3->is_v2_hello = false;
+ ssl->s3->has_message = false;
- /* Post-handshake messages are rare, so release the buffer after every
- * message. During the handshake, |on_handshake_complete| will release it. */
+ // Post-handshake messages are rare, so release the buffer after every
+ // message. During the handshake, |on_handshake_complete| will release it.
if (!SSL_in_init(ssl) && ssl->init_buf->length == 0) {
BUF_MEM_free(ssl->init_buf);
ssl->init_buf = NULL;
}
}
-int ssl_parse_extensions(const CBS *cbs, uint8_t *out_alert,
- const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE *ext_types,
- size_t num_ext_types, int ignore_unknown) {
- /* Reset everything. */
- for (size_t i = 0; i < num_ext_types; i++) {
- *ext_types[i].out_present = 0;
- CBS_init(ext_types[i].out_data, NULL, 0);
- }
-
- CBS copy = *cbs;
- while (CBS_len(©) != 0) {
- uint16_t type;
- CBS data;
- if (!CBS_get_u16(©, &type) ||
- !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(©, &data)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE *ext_type = NULL;
- for (size_t i = 0; i < num_ext_types; i++) {
- if (type == ext_types[i].type) {
- ext_type = &ext_types[i];
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if (ext_type == NULL) {
- if (ignore_unknown) {
- continue;
- }
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Duplicate ext_types are forbidden. */
- if (*ext_type->out_present) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DUPLICATE_EXTENSION);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- return 0;
- }
-
- *ext_type->out_present = 1;
- *ext_type->out_data = data;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static void set_crypto_buffer(CRYPTO_BUFFER **dest, CRYPTO_BUFFER *src) {
- /* TODO(davidben): Remove this helper once |SSL_SESSION| can use |UniquePtr|
- * and |UniquePtr| has up_ref helpers. */
- CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(*dest);
- *dest = src;
- if (src != nullptr) {
- CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(src);
- }
-}
-
-enum ssl_verify_result_t ssl_verify_peer_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- const SSL_SESSION *prev_session = ssl->s3->established_session;
- if (prev_session != NULL) {
- /* If renegotiating, the server must not change the server certificate. See
- * https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE. We never resume on renegotiation,
- * so this check is sufficient to ensure the reported peer certificate never
- * changes on renegotiation. */
- assert(!ssl->server);
- if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(prev_session->certs) !=
- sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_CERT_CHANGED);
- ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
- return ssl_verify_invalid;
- }
-
- for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs); i++) {
- const CRYPTO_BUFFER *old_cert =
- sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(prev_session->certs, i);
- const CRYPTO_BUFFER *new_cert =
- sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(hs->new_session->certs, i);
- if (CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(old_cert) != CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(new_cert) ||
- OPENSSL_memcmp(CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(old_cert),
- CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(new_cert),
- CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(old_cert)) != 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_CERT_CHANGED);
- ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
- return ssl_verify_invalid;
- }
- }
-
- /* The certificate is identical, so we may skip re-verifying the
- * certificate. Since we only authenticated the previous one, copy other
- * authentication from the established session and ignore what was newly
- * received. */
- set_crypto_buffer(&hs->new_session->ocsp_response,
- prev_session->ocsp_response);
- set_crypto_buffer(&hs->new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list,
- prev_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
- hs->new_session->verify_result = prev_session->verify_result;
- return ssl_verify_ok;
- }
-
- uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
- enum ssl_verify_result_t ret;
- if (ssl->custom_verify_callback != nullptr) {
- ret = ssl->custom_verify_callback(ssl, &alert);
- switch (ret) {
- case ssl_verify_ok:
- hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
- break;
- case ssl_verify_invalid:
- hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION;
- break;
- case ssl_verify_retry:
- break;
- }
- } else {
- ret = ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_verify_cert_chain(
- hs->new_session.get(), ssl, &alert)
- ? ssl_verify_ok
- : ssl_verify_invalid;
- }
-
- if (ret == ssl_verify_invalid) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
- ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
- }
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-uint16_t ssl_get_grease_value(const SSL *ssl, enum ssl_grease_index_t index) {
- /* Use the client_random or server_random for entropy. This both avoids
- * calling |RAND_bytes| on a single byte repeatedly and ensures the values are
- * deterministic. This allows the same ClientHello be sent twice for a
- * HelloRetryRequest or the same group be advertised in both supported_groups
- * and key_shares. */
- uint16_t ret = ssl->server ? ssl->s3->server_random[index]
- : ssl->s3->client_random[index];
- /* The first four bytes of server_random are a timestamp prior to TLS 1.3, but
- * servers have no fields to GREASE until TLS 1.3. */
- assert(!ssl->server || ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION);
- /* This generates a random value of the form 0xωaωa, for all 0 ≤ ω < 16. */
- ret = (ret & 0xf0) | 0x0a;
- ret |= ret << 8;
- return ret;
-}
-
} // namespace bssl