external/boringssl: Sync to aa2485.
This includes the following changes:
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/171b5403ee767fa0f3aecd377867db6533c3eb8f..aa24851515d6280aa1d6a8b1548fe74691df3136
Bug: 29744850
Change-Id: Id4e4a9e7a19c2f0badbaead2c39a51037ba182ed
diff --git a/src/ssl/handshake_server.c b/src/ssl/handshake_server.c
index 68a013e..4e7aae2 100644
--- a/src/ssl/handshake_server.c
+++ b/src/ssl/handshake_server.c
@@ -165,16 +165,12 @@
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/nid.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "../crypto/internal.h"
-#include "../crypto/dh/internal.h"
-static int ssl3_get_initial_bytes(SSL *ssl);
-static int ssl3_get_v2_client_hello(SSL *ssl);
static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *ssl);
static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *ssl);
static int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *ssl);
@@ -190,7 +186,6 @@
static int ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(SSL *ssl);
int ssl3_accept(SSL *ssl) {
- BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
uint32_t alg_a;
int ret = -1;
int state, skip = 0;
@@ -205,16 +200,11 @@
case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
- if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) {
- buf = BUF_MEM_new();
- if (!buf || !BUF_MEM_reserve(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- ssl->init_buf = buf;
- buf = NULL;
+ ssl->s3->hs = ssl_handshake_new(tls13_server_handshake);
+ if (ssl->s3->hs == NULL) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
}
- ssl->init_num = 0;
/* Enable a write buffer. This groups handshake messages within a flight
* into a single write. */
@@ -229,36 +219,17 @@
goto end;
}
- if (!ssl->s3->have_version && !SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
- ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_INITIAL_BYTES;
- } else {
- ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_INITIAL_BYTES:
- assert(!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl));
- ret = ssl3_get_initial_bytes(ssl);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- /* ssl3_get_initial_bytes sets ssl->state to one of
- * SSL3_ST_SR_V2_CLIENT_HELLO or SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A on success. */
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_V2_CLIENT_HELLO:
- assert(!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl));
- ret = ssl3_get_v2_client_hello(ssl);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(ssl);
+ if (ssl->state == SSL_ST_TLS13) {
+ break;
+ }
if (ret <= 0) {
goto end;
}
@@ -272,12 +243,8 @@
if (ret <= 0) {
goto end;
}
- if (ssl->hit) {
- if (ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
- ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
- } else {
- ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
- }
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+ ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
} else {
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
}
@@ -290,22 +257,21 @@
if (ret <= 0) {
goto end;
}
- if (ssl->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected) {
- ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
- } else {
- ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
- }
} else {
skip = 1;
- ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
+ ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_certificate_status(ssl);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
+ if (ssl->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected) {
+ ret = ssl3_send_certificate_status(ssl);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ } else {
+ skip = 1;
}
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
break;
@@ -381,7 +347,7 @@
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE:
- ret = ssl->method->ssl_read_change_cipher_spec(ssl);
+ ret = ssl->method->read_change_cipher_spec(ssl);
if (ret <= 0) {
goto end;
}
@@ -391,31 +357,29 @@
goto end;
}
- if (ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
- ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
- } else if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
- ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
- } else {
- ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
- }
+ ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
- ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(ssl);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
- ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
+ if (ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
+ ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(ssl);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
} else {
- ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ skip = 1;
}
+ ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A:
- ret = ssl3_get_channel_id(ssl);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
+ if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
+ ret = ssl3_get_channel_id(ssl);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ } else {
+ skip = 1;
}
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
break;
@@ -427,18 +391,16 @@
}
ssl->method->received_flight(ssl);
- if (ssl->hit) {
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
ssl->state = SSL_ST_OK;
- } else if (ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
- ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
} else {
- ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
}
- /* If this is a full handshake with ChannelID then record the hashshake
- * hashes in |ssl->session| in case we need them to verify a ChannelID
- * signature on a resumption of this session in the future. */
- if (!ssl->hit && ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
+ /* If this is a full handshake with ChannelID then record the handshake
+ * hashes in |ssl->s3->new_session| in case we need them to verify a
+ * ChannelID signature on a resumption of this session in the future. */
+ if (ssl->session == NULL && ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(ssl);
if (ret <= 0) {
goto end;
@@ -448,17 +410,19 @@
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(ssl);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
+ if (ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+ ret = ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(ssl);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ } else {
+ skip = 1;
}
- ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE;
break;
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
- ret = ssl->method->send_change_cipher_spec(ssl, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,
- SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE:
+ ret = ssl->method->send_change_cipher_spec(ssl);
if (ret <= 0) {
goto end;
}
@@ -478,7 +442,7 @@
goto end;
}
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- if (ssl->hit) {
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE;
} else {
ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
@@ -498,37 +462,44 @@
}
break;
- case SSL_ST_OK:
- /* clean a few things up */
- ssl3_cleanup_key_block(ssl);
+ case SSL_ST_TLS13:
+ ret = tls13_handshake(ssl);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ ssl->state = SSL_ST_OK;
+ break;
- /* In DTLS, |init_buf| cannot be released because post-handshake
- * retransmit relies on that buffer being available as scratch space.
- *
- * TODO(davidben): Fix this. */
- if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
- BUF_MEM_free(ssl->init_buf);
- ssl->init_buf = NULL;
- ssl->init_num = 0;
+ case SSL_ST_OK:
+ /* Clean a few things up. */
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(ssl);
+ ssl->method->release_current_message(ssl, 1 /* free_buffer */);
+
+ /* If we aren't retaining peer certificates then we can discard it
+ * now. */
+ if (ssl->s3->new_session != NULL &&
+ ssl->ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) {
+ X509_free(ssl->s3->new_session->peer);
+ ssl->s3->new_session->peer = NULL;
+ sk_X509_pop_free(ssl->s3->new_session->cert_chain, X509_free);
+ ssl->s3->new_session->cert_chain = NULL;
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->s3->established_session);
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+ SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ssl->session);
+ ssl->s3->established_session = ssl->session;
+ } else {
+ ssl->s3->established_session = ssl->s3->new_session;
+ ssl->s3->established_session->not_resumable = 0;
+ ssl->s3->new_session = NULL;
}
/* remove buffering on output */
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(ssl);
- /* If we aren't retaining peer certificates then we can discard it
- * now. */
- if (ssl->ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) {
- X509_free(ssl->session->peer);
- ssl->session->peer = NULL;
- sk_X509_pop_free(ssl->session->cert_chain, X509_free);
- ssl->session->cert_chain = NULL;
- }
-
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
- ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
- ssl->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
- ssl->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
- }
+ ssl_handshake_free(ssl->s3->hs);
+ ssl->s3->hs = NULL;
ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete = 1;
@@ -555,448 +526,254 @@
}
end:
- BUF_MEM_free(buf);
ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
return ret;
}
-static int ssl3_get_initial_bytes(SSL *ssl) {
- /* Read the first 5 bytes, the size of the TLS record header. This is
- * sufficient to detect a V2ClientHello and ensures that we never read beyond
- * the first record. */
- int ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- return ret;
- }
- assert(ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
- const uint8_t *p = ssl_read_buffer(ssl);
+int ssl_client_cipher_list_contains_cipher(
+ const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *client_hello, uint16_t id) {
+ CBS cipher_suites;
+ CBS_init(&cipher_suites, client_hello->cipher_suites,
+ client_hello->cipher_suites_len);
- /* Some dedicated error codes for protocol mixups should the application wish
- * to interpret them differently. (These do not overlap with ClientHello or
- * V2ClientHello.) */
- if (strncmp("GET ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0 ||
- strncmp("POST ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 ||
- strncmp("HEAD ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 ||
- strncmp("PUT ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
- return -1;
- }
- if (strncmp("CONNE", (const char *)p, 5) == 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
- return -1;
+ while (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) {
+ uint16_t got_id;
+ if (!CBS_get_u16(&cipher_suites, &got_id)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (got_id == id) {
+ return 1;
+ }
}
- /* Determine if this is a V2ClientHello. */
- if ((p[0] & 0x80) && p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO &&
- p[3] >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
- /* This is a V2ClientHello. */
- ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_V2_CLIENT_HELLO;
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* Fall through to the standard logic. */
- ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
- return 1;
+ return 0;
}
-static int ssl3_get_v2_client_hello(SSL *ssl) {
- const uint8_t *p;
- int ret;
- CBS v2_client_hello, cipher_specs, session_id, challenge;
- size_t msg_length, rand_len;
- uint8_t msg_type;
- uint16_t version, cipher_spec_length, session_id_length, challenge_length;
- CBB client_hello, hello_body, cipher_suites;
- uint8_t random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
-
- /* Determine the length of the V2ClientHello. */
- assert(ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
- p = ssl_read_buffer(ssl);
- msg_length = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1];
- if (msg_length > (1024 * 4)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
- return -1;
- }
- if (msg_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 2) {
- /* Reject lengths that are too short early. We have already read
- * |SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH| bytes, so we should not attempt to process an
- * (invalid) V2ClientHello which would be shorter than that. */
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- return -1;
+static int negotiate_version(
+ SSL *ssl, int *out_alert,
+ const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *client_hello) {
+ uint16_t min_version, max_version;
+ if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ return 0;
}
- /* Read the remainder of the V2ClientHello. */
- ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, 2 + msg_length);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- return ret;
- }
- assert(ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) == msg_length + 2);
- CBS_init(&v2_client_hello, ssl_read_buffer(ssl) + 2, msg_length);
+ uint16_t client_version =
+ ssl->method->version_from_wire(client_hello->version);
+ ssl->client_version = client_hello->version;
- /* The V2ClientHello without the length is incorporated into the handshake
- * hash. */
- if (!ssl3_update_handshake_hash(ssl, CBS_data(&v2_client_hello),
- CBS_len(&v2_client_hello))) {
- return -1;
+ /* Select the version to use. */
+ uint16_t version = client_version;
+ if (version > max_version) {
+ version = max_version;
}
- ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL2_VERSION, 0,
- CBS_data(&v2_client_hello), CBS_len(&v2_client_hello));
-
- if (!CBS_get_u8(&v2_client_hello, &msg_type) ||
- !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &version) ||
- !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_spec_length) ||
- !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &session_id_length) ||
- !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &challenge_length) ||
- !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_specs, cipher_spec_length) ||
- !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &session_id, session_id_length) ||
- !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &challenge, challenge_length) ||
- CBS_len(&v2_client_hello) != 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- return -1;
+ if (version < min_version) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ return 0;
}
- /* msg_type has already been checked. */
- assert(msg_type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO);
-
- /* The client_random is the V2ClientHello challenge. Truncate or
- * left-pad with zeros as needed. */
- memset(random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- rand_len = CBS_len(&challenge);
- if (rand_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) {
- rand_len = SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
- }
- memcpy(random + (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - rand_len), CBS_data(&challenge),
- rand_len);
-
- /* Write out an equivalent SSLv3 ClientHello. */
- CBB_zero(&client_hello);
- if (!CBB_init_fixed(&client_hello, (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data,
- ssl->init_buf->max) ||
- !CBB_add_u8(&client_hello, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) ||
- !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &hello_body) ||
- !CBB_add_u16(&hello_body, version) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(&hello_body, random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
- /* No session id. */
- !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
- !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&hello_body, &cipher_suites)) {
- CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return -1;
+ /* Handle FALLBACK_SCSV. */
+ if (ssl_client_cipher_list_contains_cipher(client_hello,
+ SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xffff) &&
+ version < max_version) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ *out_alert = SSL3_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
+ return 0;
}
- /* Copy the cipher suites. */
- while (CBS_len(&cipher_specs) > 0) {
- uint32_t cipher_spec;
- if (!CBS_get_u24(&cipher_specs, &cipher_spec)) {
- CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
+ ssl->version = ssl->method->version_to_wire(version);
+ ssl->s3->enc_method = ssl3_get_enc_method(version);
+ assert(ssl->s3->enc_method != NULL);
- /* Skip SSLv2 ciphers. */
- if ((cipher_spec & 0xff0000) != 0) {
- continue;
- }
- if (!CBB_add_u16(&cipher_suites, cipher_spec)) {
- CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- /* Add the null compression scheme and finish. */
- if (!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 1) || !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
- !CBB_finish(&client_hello, NULL, &ssl->init_buf->length)) {
- CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Mark the message for "re"-use by the version-specific method. */
- ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
- ssl->s3->tmp.message_type = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
- ssl->s3->tmp.message_complete = 1;
-
- /* Consume and discard the V2ClientHello. */
- ssl_read_buffer_consume(ssl, 2 + msg_length);
- ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl);
+ /* At this point, the connection's version is known and |ssl->version| is
+ * fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version. */
+ ssl->s3->have_version = 1;
return 1;
}
static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *ssl) {
- int ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
- long n;
- const SSL_CIPHER *c;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
- struct ssl_early_callback_ctx early_ctx;
- CBS client_hello;
- uint16_t client_version;
- CBS client_random, session_id, cipher_suites, compression_methods;
+ int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
SSL_SESSION *session = NULL;
- /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are TLSv1
- * and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down switching should
- * be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we will respond with
- * SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1. */
- switch (ssl->state) {
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
- n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
- ssl_hash_message, &ok);
+ if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
+ /* The first time around, read the ClientHello. */
+ int msg_ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ ssl_hash_message);
+ if (msg_ret <= 0) {
+ return msg_ret;
+ }
- if (!ok) {
- return n;
+ ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+ }
+
+ struct ssl_early_callback_ctx client_hello;
+ if (!ssl_early_callback_init(ssl, &client_hello, ssl->init_msg,
+ ssl->init_num)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B) {
+ /* Unlike other callbacks, the early callback is not run a second time if
+ * paused. */
+ ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
+
+ /* Run the early callback. */
+ if (ssl->ctx->select_certificate_cb != NULL) {
+ switch (ssl->ctx->select_certificate_cb(&client_hello)) {
+ case 0:
+ ssl->rwstate = SSL_CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING;
+ goto err;
+
+ case -1:
+ /* Connection rejected. */
+ al = SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
+ goto f_err;
+
+ default:
+ /* fallthrough */;
}
+ }
+ }
- ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
- /* fallthrough */
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
- /* We have previously parsed the ClientHello message, and can't call
- * ssl_get_message again without hashing the message into the Finished
- * digest again. */
- n = ssl->init_num;
+ /* Negotiate the protocol version if we have not done so yet. */
+ if (!ssl->s3->have_version) {
+ if (!negotiate_version(ssl, &al, &client_hello)) {
+ goto f_err;
+ }
- memset(&early_ctx, 0, sizeof(early_ctx));
- early_ctx.ssl = ssl;
- early_ctx.client_hello = ssl->init_msg;
- early_ctx.client_hello_len = n;
- if (!ssl_early_callback_init(&early_ctx)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_PARSE_FAILED);
+ if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ ssl->state = SSL_ST_TLS13;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C) {
+ /* Load the client random. */
+ if (client_hello.random_len != SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memcpy(ssl->s3->client_random, client_hello.random,
+ client_hello.random_len);
+
+ /* Determine whether we are doing session resumption. */
+ int send_new_ticket = 0;
+ switch (
+ ssl_get_prev_session(ssl, &session, &send_new_ticket, &client_hello)) {
+ case ssl_session_success:
+ break;
+ case ssl_session_error:
+ goto err;
+ case ssl_session_retry:
+ ssl->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_SESSION;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected = send_new_ticket;
+
+ /* The EMS state is needed when making the resumption decision, but
+ * extensions are not normally parsed until later. This detects the EMS
+ * extension for the resumption decision and it's checked against the result
+ * of the normal parse later in this function. */
+ CBS ems;
+ int have_extended_master_secret =
+ ssl->version != SSL3_VERSION &&
+ ssl_early_callback_get_extension(&client_hello, &ems,
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) &&
+ CBS_len(&ems) == 0;
+
+ int has_session = 0;
+ if (session != NULL) {
+ if (session->extended_master_secret &&
+ !have_extended_master_secret) {
+ /* A ClientHello without EMS that attempts to resume a session with EMS
+ * is fatal to the connection. */
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_EMS_SESSION_WITHOUT_EMS_EXTENSION);
goto f_err;
}
- if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B &&
- ssl->ctx->select_certificate_cb != NULL) {
- ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
- switch (ssl->ctx->select_certificate_cb(&early_ctx)) {
- case 0:
- ssl->rwstate = SSL_CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING;
- goto err;
+ has_session =
+ /* Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
+ * version: most clients do not accept a mismatch. */
+ ssl->version == session->ssl_version &&
+ /* If the client offers the EMS extension, but the previous session
+ * didn't use it, then negotiate a new session. */
+ have_extended_master_secret == session->extended_master_secret;
+ }
- case -1:
- /* Connection rejected. */
- al = SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
- goto f_err;
-
- default:
- /* fallthrough */;
- }
+ if (has_session) {
+ /* Use the old session. */
+ ssl->session = session;
+ session = NULL;
+ ssl->verify_result = ssl->session->verify_result;
+ } else {
+ SSL_set_session(ssl, NULL);
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(ssl, 1 /* server */)) {
+ goto err;
}
- ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
- break;
- default:
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- CBS_init(&client_hello, ssl->init_msg, n);
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&client_hello, &client_version) ||
- !CBS_get_bytes(&client_hello, &client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
- !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id) ||
- CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may differ:
- * see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
- ssl->client_version = client_version;
-
- /* Load the client random. */
- memcpy(ssl->s3->client_random, CBS_data(&client_random), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
- CBS cookie;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie) ||
- CBS_len(&cookie) > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- /* Note: This codepath may run twice if |ssl_get_prev_session| completes
- * asynchronously.
- *
- * TODO(davidben): Clean up the order of events around ClientHello
- * processing. */
- if (!ssl->s3->have_version) {
- /* Select version to use */
- uint16_t version = ssl3_get_mutual_version(ssl, client_version);
- if (version == 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
- ssl->version = ssl->client_version;
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- }
- ssl->version = version;
- ssl->s3->enc_method = ssl3_get_enc_method(version);
- assert(ssl->s3->enc_method != NULL);
- /* At this point, the connection's version is known and |ssl->version| is
- * fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version. */
- ssl->s3->have_version = 1;
- } else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl) ? (ssl->client_version > ssl->version)
- : (ssl->client_version < ssl->version)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- ssl->hit = 0;
- int send_new_ticket = 0;
- switch (ssl_get_prev_session(ssl, &session, &send_new_ticket, &early_ctx)) {
- case ssl_session_success:
- break;
- case ssl_session_error:
- goto err;
- case ssl_session_retry:
- ssl->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_SESSION;
- goto err;
- }
- ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected = send_new_ticket;
-
- /* The EMS state is needed when making the resumption decision, but
- * extensions are not normally parsed until later. This detects the EMS
- * extension for the resumption decision and it's checked against the result
- * of the normal parse later in this function. */
- const uint8_t *ems_data;
- size_t ems_len;
- int have_extended_master_secret =
- ssl->version != SSL3_VERSION &&
- SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(&early_ctx,
- TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret,
- &ems_data, &ems_len) &&
- ems_len == 0;
-
- if (session != NULL) {
- if (session->extended_master_secret &&
- !have_extended_master_secret) {
- /* A ClientHello without EMS that attempts to resume a session with EMS
- * is fatal to the connection. */
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_EMS_SESSION_WITHOUT_EMS_EXTENSION);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- ssl->hit =
- /* Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated version:
- * most clients do not accept a mismatch. */
- ssl->version == session->ssl_version &&
- /* If the client offers the EMS extension, but the previous session
- * didn't use it, then negotiate a new session. */
- have_extended_master_secret == session->extended_master_secret;
- }
-
- if (ssl->hit) {
- /* Use the new session. */
- SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session);
- ssl->session = session;
- session = NULL;
-
- ssl->verify_result = ssl->session->verify_result;
- } else {
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(ssl, 1 /* server */)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Clear the session ID if we want the session to be single-use. */
- if (!(ssl->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)) {
- ssl->session->session_id_length = 0;
- }
- }
-
- if (ssl->ctx->dos_protection_cb != NULL &&
- ssl->ctx->dos_protection_cb(&early_ctx) == 0) {
- /* Connection rejected for DOS reasons. */
- al = SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites) ||
- CBS_len(&cipher_suites) == 0 ||
- CBS_len(&cipher_suites) % 2 != 0 ||
- !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &compression_methods) ||
- CBS_len(&compression_methods) == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- ciphers = ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(ssl, &cipher_suites);
- if (ciphers == NULL) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. */
- if (ssl->hit) {
- size_t j;
- int found_cipher = 0;
- uint32_t id = ssl->session->cipher->id;
-
- for (j = 0; j < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); j++) {
- c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, j);
- if (c->id == id) {
- found_cipher = 1;
- break;
+ /* Clear the session ID if we want the session to be single-use. */
+ if (!(ssl->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)) {
+ ssl->s3->new_session->session_id_length = 0;
}
}
- if (!found_cipher) {
- /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked to reuse
- * it */
+ if (ssl->ctx->dos_protection_cb != NULL &&
+ ssl->ctx->dos_protection_cb(&client_hello) == 0) {
+ /* Connection rejected for DOS reasons. */
+ al = SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Only null compression is supported. */
+ if (memchr(client_hello.compression_methods, 0,
+ client_hello.compression_methods_len) == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* TLS extensions. */
+ if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(ssl, &client_hello)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (have_extended_master_secret != ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EMS_STATE_INCONSISTENT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
+ }
+
+ /* Determine the remaining connection parameters. This is a separate state so
+ * |cert_cb| does not cause earlier logic to run multiple times. */
+ assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D);
+
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+ /* Check that the cipher is in the list. */
+ if (!ssl_client_cipher_list_contains_cipher(
+ &client_hello, (uint16_t)ssl->session->cipher->id)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
goto f_err;
}
- }
- /* Only null compression is supported. */
- if (memchr(CBS_data(&compression_methods), 0,
- CBS_len(&compression_methods)) == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* TLS extensions. */
- if (ssl->version >= SSL3_VERSION &&
- !ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(ssl, &client_hello)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* There should be nothing left over in the record. */
- if (CBS_len(&client_hello) != 0) {
- /* wrong packet length */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (have_extended_master_secret != ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EMS_STATE_INCONSISTENT);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* Given ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher */
- if (!ssl->hit) {
- if (ciphers == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
- if (ssl->cert->cert_cb) {
+ ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ssl->session->cipher;
+ ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
+ } else {
+ /* Call |cert_cb| to update server certificates if required. */
+ if (ssl->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
int rv = ssl->cert->cert_cb(ssl, ssl->cert->cert_cb_arg);
if (rv == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
@@ -1008,14 +785,16 @@
goto err;
}
}
- c = ssl3_choose_cipher(ssl, ciphers, ssl_get_cipher_preferences(ssl));
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c =
+ ssl3_choose_cipher(ssl, &client_hello, ssl_get_cipher_preferences(ssl));
if (c == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
- ssl->session->cipher = c;
+
+ ssl->s3->new_session->cipher = c;
ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
/* Determine whether to request a client certificate. */
@@ -1029,10 +808,6 @@
if (!ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
}
- } else {
- /* Session-id reuse */
- ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ssl->session->cipher;
- ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
}
/* Now that the cipher is known, initialize the handshake hash. */
@@ -1040,23 +815,11 @@
goto f_err;
}
- /* In TLS 1.2, client authentication requires hashing the handshake transcript
- * under a different hash. Otherwise, release the handshake buffer. */
- if (!ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request ||
- ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ /* Release the handshake buffer if client authentication isn't required. */
+ if (!ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl);
}
- /* we now have the following setup;
- * client_random
- * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
- * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
- * compression - basically ignored right now
- * ssl version is set - sslv3
- * ssl->session - The ssl session has been setup.
- * ssl->hit - session reuse flag
- * ssl->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. */
-
ret = 1;
if (0) {
@@ -1065,14 +828,13 @@
}
err:
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
SSL_SESSION_free(session);
return ret;
}
static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *ssl) {
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B) {
- return ssl_do_write(ssl);
+ return ssl->method->write_message(ssl);
}
assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A);
@@ -1087,94 +849,118 @@
/* If this is a resumption and the original handshake didn't support
* ChannelID then we didn't record the original handshake hashes in the
* session and so cannot resume with ChannelIDs. */
- if (ssl->hit && ssl->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) {
+ if (ssl->session != NULL &&
+ ssl->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) {
ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
}
- if (!ssl_fill_hello_random(ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- 1 /* server */)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ struct timeval now;
+ ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now);
+ ssl->s3->server_random[0] = now.tv_sec >> 24;
+ ssl->s3->server_random[1] = now.tv_sec >> 16;
+ ssl->s3->server_random[2] = now.tv_sec >> 8;
+ ssl->s3->server_random[3] = now.tv_sec;
+ if (!RAND_bytes(ssl->s3->server_random + 4, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - 4)) {
return -1;
}
- CBB cbb, session_id;
- size_t length;
- CBB_zero(&cbb);
- if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, ssl_handshake_start(ssl),
- ssl->init_buf->max - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl)) ||
- !CBB_add_u16(&cbb, ssl->version) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
- !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &session_id) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, ssl->session->session_id,
- ssl->session->session_id_length) ||
- !CBB_add_u16(&cbb, ssl_cipher_get_value(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) ||
- !CBB_add_u8(&cbb, 0 /* no compression */) ||
- !ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(ssl, &cbb) ||
- !CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &length) ||
- !ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, length)) {
+ /* Fill in the TLS 1.2 downgrade signal. See draft-ietf-tls-tls13-14.
+ *
+ * TODO(davidben): Also implement the TLS 1.1 sentinel when things have
+ * settled down. */
+ uint16_t min_version, max_version;
+ if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION &&
+ ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) <= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ static const uint8_t kDowngradeTLS12[8] = {0x44, 0x4f, 0x57, 0x4e,
+ 0x47, 0x52, 0x44, 0x01};
+ memcpy(ssl->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - 8, kDowngradeTLS12, 8);
+ }
+
+ const SSL_SESSION *session = ssl->s3->new_session;
+ if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+ session = ssl->session;
+ }
+
+ CBB cbb, body, session_id;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16(&body, ssl->version) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&body, ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &session_id) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, session->session_id,
+ session->session_id_length) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16(&body, ssl_cipher_get_value(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8(&body, 0 /* no compression */) ||
+ !ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(ssl, &body) ||
+ !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return -1;
}
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
- return ssl_do_write(ssl);
+ return ssl->method->write_message(ssl);
}
static int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *ssl) {
- if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
- if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(ssl)) {
- return 0;
- }
- ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
+ if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B) {
+ return ssl->method->write_message(ssl);
}
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
- return ssl_do_write(ssl);
+ if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(ssl)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
+ return ssl->method->write_message(ssl);
}
static int ssl3_send_certificate_status(SSL *ssl) {
- if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
- CBB out, ocsp_response;
- size_t length;
-
- CBB_zero(&out);
- if (!CBB_init_fixed(&out, ssl_handshake_start(ssl),
- ssl->init_buf->max - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl)) ||
- !CBB_add_u8(&out, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) ||
- !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&out, &ocsp_response) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(&ocsp_response, ssl->ctx->ocsp_response,
- ssl->ctx->ocsp_response_length) ||
- !CBB_finish(&out, NULL, &length) ||
- !ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, length)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- CBB_cleanup(&out);
- return -1;
- }
-
- ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
+ if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B) {
+ return ssl->method->write_message(ssl);
}
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
- return ssl_do_write(ssl);
+ CBB cbb, body, ocsp_response;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body,
+ SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8(&body, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) ||
+ !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&body, &ocsp_response) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&ocsp_response, ssl->ctx->ocsp_response,
+ ssl->ctx->ocsp_response_length) ||
+ !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
+ return ssl->method->write_message(ssl);
}
static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *ssl) {
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_C) {
- return ssl_do_write(ssl);
+ return ssl->method->write_message(ssl);
}
CBB cbb, child;
- if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, ssl_handshake_start(ssl),
- ssl->init_buf->max - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl))) {
- goto err;
- }
+ CBB_zero(&cbb);
+ /* Put together the parameters. */
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
- /* This is the first iteration, so write parameters. */
uint32_t alg_k = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
uint32_t alg_a = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ /* Pre-allocate enough room to comfortably fit an ECDHE public key. */
+ if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 128)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
/* PSK ciphers begin with an identity hint. */
if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
size_t len =
@@ -1197,7 +983,7 @@
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- ssl->session->key_exchange_info = DH_num_bits(params);
+ ssl->s3->new_session->key_exchange_info = DH_num_bits(params);
/* Set up DH, generate a key, and emit the public half. */
DH *dh = DHparams_dup(params);
@@ -1222,7 +1008,7 @@
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- ssl->session->key_exchange_info = group_id;
+ ssl->s3->new_session->key_exchange_info = group_id;
/* Set up ECDH, generate a key, and emit the public half. */
if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_init(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, group_id) ||
@@ -1233,8 +1019,8 @@
goto err;
}
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kCECPQ1) {
- if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_init(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, SSL_GROUP_CECPQ1) ||
- !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
+ SSL_ECDH_CTX_init_for_cecpq1(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx);
+ if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
!SSL_ECDH_CTX_offer(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, &child)) {
goto err;
}
@@ -1242,10 +1028,22 @@
assert(alg_k & SSL_kPSK);
}
- /* Otherwise, restore |cbb| from the previous iteration.
- * TODO(davidben): When |ssl->init_buf| is gone, come up with a simpler
- * pattern. Probably keep the |CBB| around in the handshake state. */
- } else if (!CBB_did_write(&cbb, ssl->init_num - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl))) {
+ size_t len;
+ if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, &ssl->s3->tmp.server_params, &len) ||
+ len > 0xffffffffu) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->tmp.server_params);
+ ssl->s3->tmp.server_params = NULL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ssl->s3->tmp.server_params_len = (uint32_t)len;
+ }
+
+ /* Assemble the message. */
+ CBB body;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body,
+ SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&body, ssl->s3->tmp.server_params,
+ ssl->s3->tmp.server_params_len)) {
goto err;
}
@@ -1256,63 +1054,53 @@
goto err;
}
+ /* Determine the signature algorithm. */
+ uint16_t signature_algorithm;
+ if (!tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(ssl, &signature_algorithm)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ if (!CBB_add_u16(&body, signature_algorithm)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Add space for the signature. */
const size_t max_sig_len = ssl_private_key_max_signature_len(ssl);
+ uint8_t *ptr;
+ if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
+ !CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, max_sig_len)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
size_t sig_len;
enum ssl_private_key_result_t sign_result;
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
- /* This is the first iteration, so set up the signature. Sample the
- * parameter length before adding a signature algorithm. */
- if (!CBB_flush(&cbb)) {
+ CBB transcript;
+ uint8_t *transcript_data;
+ size_t transcript_len;
+ if (!CBB_init(&transcript,
+ 2*SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + ssl->s3->tmp.server_params_len) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&transcript, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&transcript, ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&transcript, ssl->s3->tmp.server_params,
+ ssl->s3->tmp.server_params_len) ||
+ !CBB_finish(&transcript, &transcript_data, &transcript_len)) {
+ CBB_cleanup(&transcript);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- size_t params_len = CBB_len(&cbb);
- /* Determine signature algorithm. */
- const EVP_MD *md;
- if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- md = tls1_choose_signing_digest(ssl);
- if (!tls12_add_sigandhash(ssl, &cbb, md)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- } else if (ssl_private_key_type(ssl) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
- md = EVP_md5_sha1();
- } else {
- md = EVP_sha1();
- }
-
- /* Compute the digest and sign it. */
- uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned digest_len = 0;
- EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
- int digest_ret =
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) &&
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) &&
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) &&
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, CBB_data(&cbb), params_len) &&
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, digest, &digest_len);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- uint8_t *ptr;
- if (!digest_ret ||
- !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
- !CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, max_sig_len)) {
- goto err;
- }
- sign_result = ssl_private_key_sign(ssl, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len, md,
- digest, digest_len);
+ sign_result = ssl_private_key_sign(ssl, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len,
+ signature_algorithm, transcript_data,
+ transcript_len);
+ OPENSSL_free(transcript_data);
} else {
assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B);
-
- /* Retry the signature. */
- uint8_t *ptr;
- if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
- !CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, max_sig_len)) {
- goto err;
- }
- sign_result =
- ssl_private_key_sign_complete(ssl, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len);
+ sign_result = ssl_private_key_complete(ssl, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len);
}
switch (sign_result) {
@@ -1324,246 +1112,215 @@
case ssl_private_key_failure:
goto err;
case ssl_private_key_retry:
- /* Discard the unfinished signature and save the state of |cbb| for the
- * next iteration. */
- CBB_discard_child(&cbb);
- ssl->init_num = SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl) + CBB_len(&cbb);
ssl->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION;
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
goto err;
}
}
- size_t length;
- if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &length) ||
- !ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, length)) {
+ if (!ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) {
goto err;
}
+
+ OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->tmp.server_params);
+ ssl->s3->tmp.server_params = NULL;
+ ssl->s3->tmp.server_params_len = 0;
+
ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_C;
- return ssl_do_write(ssl);
+ return ssl->method->write_message(ssl);
err:
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return -1;
}
-static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *ssl) {
- uint8_t *p, *d;
+static int add_cert_types(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) {
+ /* Get configured signature algorithms. */
+ int have_rsa_sign = 0;
+ int have_ecdsa_sign = 0;
+ const uint16_t *sig_algs;
+ size_t sig_algs_len = tls12_get_psigalgs(ssl, &sig_algs);
size_t i;
- int j, nl, off, n;
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
- X509_NAME *name;
- BUF_MEM *buf;
+ for (i = 0; i < sig_algs_len; i++) {
+ switch (sig_algs[i]) {
+ case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512:
+ case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384:
+ case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256:
+ case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1:
+ have_rsa_sign = 1;
+ break;
- if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
- buf = ssl->init_buf;
-
- d = p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl);
-
- /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
- p++;
- n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(ssl, p);
- d[0] = n;
- p += n;
- n++;
-
- if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- const uint8_t *psigs;
- nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(ssl, &psigs);
- s2n(nl, p);
- memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
- p += nl;
- n += nl + 2;
+ case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512:
+ case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384:
+ case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256:
+ case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1:
+ have_ecdsa_sign = 1;
+ break;
}
-
- off = n;
- p += 2;
- n += 2;
-
- sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl);
- nl = 0;
- if (sk != NULL) {
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
- name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
- j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl) + n + j + 2)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl) + n;
- s2n(j, p);
- i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
- n += 2 + j;
- nl += 2 + j;
- }
- }
-
- /* else no CA names */
- p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl) + off;
- s2n(nl, p);
-
- if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {
- goto err;
- }
- ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
}
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
- return ssl_do_write(ssl);
+ if (have_rsa_sign && !CBB_add_u8(cbb, SSL3_CT_RSA_SIGN)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* ECDSA certs can be used with RSA cipher suites as well so we don't need to
+ * check for SSL_kECDH or SSL_kECDHE. */
+ if (ssl->version >= TLS1_VERSION && have_ecdsa_sign &&
+ !CBB_add_u8(cbb, TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *ssl) {
+ if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B) {
+ return ssl->method->write_message(ssl);
+ }
+
+ CBB cbb, body, cert_types, sigalgs_cbb;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body,
+ SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &cert_types) ||
+ !add_cert_types(ssl, &cert_types)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ const uint16_t *sigalgs;
+ size_t sigalgs_len = tls12_get_psigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs);
+ if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &sigalgs_cbb)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ size_t i;
+ for (i = 0; i < sigalgs_len; i++) {
+ if (!CBB_add_u16(&sigalgs_cbb, sigalgs[i])) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_add_client_CA_list(ssl, &body) ||
+ !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
+ return ssl->method->write_message(ssl);
err:
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return -1;
}
static int ssl3_send_server_hello_done(SSL *ssl) {
- if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
- if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE, 0)) {
- return -1;
- }
- ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
+ if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B) {
+ return ssl->method->write_message(ssl);
}
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
- return ssl_do_write(ssl);
+ CBB cbb, body;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) ||
+ !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
+ return ssl->method->write_message(ssl);
}
static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *ssl) {
- int ok, al, ret = -1;
- X509 *x = NULL;
- unsigned long n;
- STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
- SHA256_CTX sha256;
- CBS certificate_msg, certificate_list;
- int is_first_certificate = 1;
-
assert(ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request);
- n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, -1, ssl_hash_message, &ok);
- if (!ok) {
- return n;
+ int msg_ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, -1, ssl_hash_message);
+ if (msg_ret <= 0) {
+ return msg_ret;
}
if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION &&
ssl->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
/* In SSL 3.0, the Certificate message is omitted to signal no certificate. */
- if ((ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
- (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
+ if (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- goto f_err;
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
}
ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
return 1;
}
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- goto f_err;
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return -1;
}
- CBS_init(&certificate_msg, ssl->init_msg, n);
-
- sk = sk_X509_new_null();
- if (sk == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ CBS certificate_msg;
+ CBS_init(&certificate_msg, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
+ uint8_t alert;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain = ssl_parse_cert_chain(
+ ssl, &alert, ssl->ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs
+ ? ssl->s3->new_session->peer_sha256
+ : NULL,
+ &certificate_msg);
+ if (chain == NULL) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
goto err;
}
- if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_msg, &certificate_list) ||
- CBS_len(&certificate_msg) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ if (CBS_len(&certificate_msg) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
- while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) {
- CBS certificate;
- const uint8_t *data;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (is_first_certificate && ssl->ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) {
- /* If this is the first certificate, and we don't want to keep peer
- * certificates in memory, then we hash it right away. */
- SHA256_Init(&sha256);
- SHA256_Update(&sha256, CBS_data(&certificate), CBS_len(&certificate));
- SHA256_Final(ssl->session->peer_sha256, &sha256);
- ssl->session->peer_sha256_valid = 1;
- }
- is_first_certificate = 0;
-
- /* A u24 length cannot overflow a long. */
- data = CBS_data(&certificate);
- x = d2i_X509(NULL, &data, (long)CBS_len(&certificate));
- if (x == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (data != CBS_data(&certificate) + CBS_len(&certificate)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- x = NULL;
- }
-
- if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
+ if (sk_X509_num(chain) == 0) {
/* No client certificate so the handshake buffer may be discarded. */
ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl);
- /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
+ /* In SSL 3.0, sending no certificate is signaled by omitting the
+ * Certificate message. */
if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
- goto f_err;
- } else if ((ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
- (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) {
/* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- goto f_err;
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
}
} else {
- if (ssl_verify_cert_chain(ssl, sk) <= 0) {
- al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(ssl->verify_result);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
- goto f_err;
+ /* The hash would have been filled in. */
+ if (ssl->ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) {
+ ssl->s3->new_session->peer_sha256_valid = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_verify_cert_chain(ssl, chain)) {
+ goto err;
}
}
- X509_free(ssl->session->peer);
- ssl->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
- ssl->session->verify_result = ssl->verify_result;
+ X509_free(ssl->s3->new_session->peer);
+ ssl->s3->new_session->peer = sk_X509_shift(chain);
+ ssl->s3->new_session->verify_result = ssl->verify_result;
- sk_X509_pop_free(ssl->session->cert_chain, X509_free);
- ssl->session->cert_chain = sk;
+ sk_X509_pop_free(ssl->s3->new_session->cert_chain, X509_free);
+ ssl->s3->new_session->cert_chain = chain;
/* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
* certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
- sk = NULL;
-
- ret = 1;
-
- if (0) {
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- }
+ return 1;
err:
- X509_free(x);
- sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
- return ret;
+ sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
+ return -1;
}
static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *ssl) {
@@ -1579,11 +1336,10 @@
uint8_t psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A) {
- int ok;
- const long n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(
- ssl, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ssl_hash_message, &ok);
- if (!ok) {
- return n;
+ int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ssl_hash_message);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ return ret;
}
}
@@ -1617,15 +1373,15 @@
goto f_err;
}
- if (!CBS_strdup(&psk_identity, &ssl->session->psk_identity)) {
+ if (!CBS_strdup(&psk_identity, &ssl->s3->new_session->psk_identity)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
/* Look up the key for the identity. */
- psk_len = ssl->psk_server_callback(ssl, ssl->session->psk_identity, psk,
- sizeof(psk));
+ psk_len = ssl->psk_server_callback(ssl, ssl->s3->new_session->psk_identity,
+ psk, sizeof(psk));
if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
@@ -1653,7 +1409,7 @@
size_t decrypt_len;
if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A) {
if (!ssl_has_private_key(ssl) ||
- ssl_private_key_type(ssl) != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+ ssl_private_key_type(ssl) != NID_rsaEncryption) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
goto f_err;
@@ -1681,8 +1437,8 @@
} else {
assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B);
/* Complete async decrypt. */
- decrypt_result = ssl_private_key_decrypt_complete(
- ssl, decrypt_buf, &decrypt_len, rsa_size);
+ decrypt_result =
+ ssl_private_key_complete(ssl, decrypt_buf, &decrypt_len, rsa_size);
}
switch (decrypt_result) {
@@ -1812,12 +1568,14 @@
}
/* Compute the master secret */
- ssl->session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(
- ssl, ssl->session->master_key, premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
- if (ssl->session->master_key_length == 0) {
+ ssl->s3->new_session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(
+ ssl, ssl->s3->new_session->master_key, premaster_secret,
+ premaster_secret_len);
+ if (ssl->s3->new_session->master_key_length == 0) {
goto err;
}
- ssl->session->extended_master_secret = ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret;
+ ssl->s3->new_session->extended_master_secret =
+ ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret;
OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
@@ -1836,15 +1594,10 @@
}
static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *ssl) {
- int al, ok, ret = 0;
- long n;
+ int al, ret = 0;
CBS certificate_verify, signature;
- X509 *peer = ssl->session->peer;
+ X509 *peer = ssl->s3->new_session->peer;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
- uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- size_t digest_length;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
/* Only RSA and ECDSA client certificates are supported, so a
* CertificateVerify is required if and only if there's a client certificate.
@@ -1854,11 +1607,10 @@
return 1;
}
- n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
- ssl_dont_hash_message, &ok);
-
- if (!ok) {
- return n;
+ int msg_ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
+ ssl_dont_hash_message);
+ if (msg_ret <= 0) {
+ return msg_ret;
}
/* Filter out unsupported certificate types. */
@@ -1866,39 +1618,29 @@
if (pkey == NULL) {
goto err;
}
- if (!(X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey) & EVP_PKT_SIGN) ||
- (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA && pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- CBS_init(&certificate_verify, ssl->init_msg, n);
+ CBS_init(&certificate_verify, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
/* Determine the digest type if needbe. */
+ uint16_t signature_algorithm = 0;
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- uint8_t hash, signature_type;
- if (!CBS_get_u8(&certificate_verify, &hash) ||
- !CBS_get_u8(&certificate_verify, &signature_type)) {
+ if (!CBS_get_u16(&certificate_verify, &signature_algorithm)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
- if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(ssl, &md, &al, hash, signature_type, pkey)) {
+ if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(ssl, &al, signature_algorithm)) {
goto f_err;
}
- }
-
- /* Compute the digest. */
- if (!ssl3_cert_verify_hash(ssl, digest, &digest_length, &md, pkey->type)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* The handshake buffer is no longer necessary, and we may hash the current
- * message.*/
- ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl);
- if (!ssl3_hash_current_message(ssl)) {
- goto err;
+ ssl->s3->tmp.peer_signature_algorithm = signature_algorithm;
+ } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+ signature_algorithm = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1;
+ } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ signature_algorithm = SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1;
+ } else {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
}
/* Parse and verify the signature. */
@@ -1909,14 +1651,32 @@
goto f_err;
}
- pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
- if (pctx == NULL) {
- goto err;
+ int sig_ok;
+ /* The SSL3 construction for CertificateVerify does not decompose into a
+ * single final digest and signature, and must be special-cased. */
+ if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ size_t digest_len;
+ if (!ssl3_cert_verify_hash(ssl, &md, digest, &digest_len,
+ signature_algorithm)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
+ sig_ok = pctx != NULL &&
+ EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) &&
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) &&
+ EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature),
+ digest, digest_len);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ } else {
+ sig_ok = ssl_public_key_verify(
+ ssl, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature), signature_algorithm,
+ pkey, (const uint8_t *)ssl->s3->handshake_buffer->data,
+ ssl->s3->handshake_buffer->length);
}
- int sig_ok = EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) &&
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) &&
- EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature),
- digest, digest_length);
+
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
sig_ok = 1;
ERR_clear_error();
@@ -1927,6 +1687,13 @@
goto f_err;
}
+ /* The handshake buffer is no longer necessary, and we may hash the current
+ * message.*/
+ ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl);
+ if (!ssl->method->hash_current_message(ssl)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
ret = 1;
if (0) {
@@ -1935,7 +1702,6 @@
}
err:
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return ret;
@@ -1944,31 +1710,14 @@
/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
* sets the next_proto member in s if found */
static int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *ssl) {
- int ok;
- long n;
+ int ret =
+ ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, ssl_hash_message);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
CBS next_protocol, selected_protocol, padding;
-
- /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the extension
- * in their ClientHello */
- if (!ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
- return -1;
- }
-
- n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, ssl_hash_message,
- &ok);
-
- if (!ok) {
- return n;
- }
-
- CBS_init(&next_protocol, ssl->init_msg, n);
-
- /* The payload looks like:
- * uint8 proto_len;
- * uint8 proto[proto_len];
- * uint8 padding_len;
- * uint8 padding[padding_len]; */
+ CBS_init(&next_protocol, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&next_protocol, &selected_protocol) ||
!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&next_protocol, &padding) ||
CBS_len(&next_protocol) != 0 ||
@@ -1982,8 +1731,7 @@
/* ssl3_get_channel_id reads and verifies a ClientID handshake message. */
static int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL *ssl) {
- int ret = -1, ok;
- long n;
+ int ret = -1;
uint8_t channel_id_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t channel_id_hash_len;
const uint8_t *p;
@@ -1995,11 +1743,10 @@
BIGNUM x, y;
CBS encrypted_extensions, extension;
- n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_CHANNEL_ID_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
- ssl_dont_hash_message, &ok);
-
- if (!ok) {
- return n;
+ int msg_ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_CHANNEL_ID,
+ ssl_dont_hash_message);
+ if (msg_ret <= 0) {
+ return msg_ret;
}
/* Before incorporating the EncryptedExtensions message to the handshake
@@ -2009,24 +1756,15 @@
}
assert(channel_id_hash_len == SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- if (!ssl3_hash_current_message(ssl)) {
+ if (!ssl->method->hash_current_message(ssl)) {
return -1;
}
- CBS_init(&encrypted_extensions, ssl->init_msg, n);
+ CBS_init(&encrypted_extensions, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
/* EncryptedExtensions could include multiple extensions, but the only
- * extension that could be negotiated is ChannelID, so there can only be one
- * entry.
- *
- * The payload looks like:
- * uint16 extension_type
- * uint16 extension_len;
- * uint8 x[32];
- * uint8 y[32];
- * uint8 r[32];
- * uint8 s[32]; */
-
+ * extension that could be negotiated is Channel ID, so there can only be one
+ * entry. */
if (!CBS_get_u16(&encrypted_extensions, &extension_type) ||
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&encrypted_extensions, &extension) ||
CBS_len(&encrypted_extensions) != 0 ||
@@ -2092,134 +1830,27 @@
return ret;
}
-/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
static int ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(SSL *ssl) {
- int ret = -1;
- uint8_t *session = NULL;
- size_t session_len;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
- HMAC_CTX hctx;
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
-
- if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
- uint8_t *p, *macstart;
- int len;
- unsigned int hlen;
- SSL_CTX *tctx = ssl->initial_ctx;
- uint8_t iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- uint8_t key_name[16];
- /* The maximum overhead of encrypting the session is 16 (key name) + IV +
- * one block of encryption overhead + HMAC. */
- const size_t max_ticket_overhead =
- 16 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE;
-
- /* Serialize the SSL_SESSION to be encoded into the ticket. */
- if (!SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket(ssl->session, &session,
- &session_len)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* If the session is too long, emit a dummy value rather than abort the
- * connection. */
- if (session_len > 0xFFFF - max_ticket_overhead) {
- static const char kTicketPlaceholder[] = "TICKET TOO LARGE";
- const size_t placeholder_len = strlen(kTicketPlaceholder);
-
- OPENSSL_free(session);
- session = NULL;
-
- p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl);
- /* Emit ticket_lifetime_hint. */
- l2n(0, p);
- /* Emit ticket. */
- s2n(placeholder_len, p);
- memcpy(p, kTicketPlaceholder, placeholder_len);
- p += placeholder_len;
-
- len = p - ssl_handshake_start(ssl);
- if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, len)) {
- goto err;
- }
- ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
- return ssl_do_write(ssl);
- }
-
- /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as follows:
- * handshake_header_length + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
- * max_ticket_overhead + * session_length */
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(ssl->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl) + 6 +
- max_ticket_overhead + session_len)) {
- goto err;
- }
- p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl);
- /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does all the
- * work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. */
- if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
- if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(ssl, key_name, iv, &ctx, &hctx,
- 1 /* encrypt */) < 0) {
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- if (!RAND_bytes(iv, 16) ||
- !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
- tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv) ||
- !HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, tlsext_tick_md(),
- NULL)) {
- goto err;
- }
- memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
- }
-
- /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified for
- * resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for new
- * sessions will live as long as their sessions. */
- l2n(ssl->hit ? 0 : ssl->session->timeout, p);
-
- /* Skip ticket length for now */
- p += 2;
- /* Output key name */
- macstart = p;
- memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
- p += 16;
- /* output IV */
- memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
- p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
- /* Encrypt session data */
- if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, session, session_len)) {
- goto err;
- }
- p += len;
- if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &len)) {
- goto err;
- }
- p += len;
-
- if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart) ||
- !HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- p += hlen;
- /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
- /* Total length */
- len = p - ssl_handshake_start(ssl);
- /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
- p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl) + 4;
- s2n(len - 6, p);
- if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, len)) {
- goto err;
- }
- ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
+ if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B) {
+ return ssl->method->write_message(ssl);
}
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
- ret = ssl_do_write(ssl);
+ CBB cbb, body, ticket;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body,
+ SSL3_MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) ||
+ /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified for
+ * resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for new
+ * sessions will live as long as their sessions. */
+ !CBB_add_u32(&body,
+ ssl->session != NULL ? 0 : ssl->s3->new_session->timeout) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &ticket) ||
+ !ssl_encrypt_ticket(ssl, &ticket, ssl->session != NULL
+ ? ssl->session
+ : ssl->s3->new_session) ||
+ !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
-err:
- OPENSSL_free(session);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
- return ret;
+ ssl->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
+ return ssl->method->write_message(ssl);
}