external/boringssl: Sync to aa2485.
This includes the following changes:
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/171b5403ee767fa0f3aecd377867db6533c3eb8f..aa24851515d6280aa1d6a8b1548fe74691df3136
Bug: 29744850
Change-Id: Id4e4a9e7a19c2f0badbaead2c39a51037ba182ed
diff --git a/src/ssl/s3_both.c b/src/ssl/s3_both.c
index f081066..cb5d0da 100644
--- a/src/ssl/s3_both.c
+++ b/src/ssl/s3_both.c
@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
@@ -132,61 +133,118 @@
/* ssl3_do_write sends |ssl->init_buf| in records of type 'type'
* (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC). It returns 1 on success
* and <= 0 on error. */
-int ssl3_do_write(SSL *ssl, int type) {
- int ret = ssl3_write_bytes(ssl, type, ssl->init_buf->data, ssl->init_num);
+static int ssl3_do_write(SSL *ssl, int type, const uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
+ int ret = ssl3_write_bytes(ssl, type, data, len);
if (ret <= 0) {
return ret;
}
/* ssl3_write_bytes writes the data in its entirety. */
- assert(ret == ssl->init_num);
- ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, ssl->version, type,
- ssl->init_buf->data, (size_t)ssl->init_num);
- ssl->init_num = 0;
+ assert((size_t)ret == len);
+ ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, ssl->version, type, data, len);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_init_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, CBB *body, uint8_t type) {
+ CBB_zero(cbb);
+ if (ssl->s3->pending_message != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Pick a modest size hint to save most of the |realloc| calls. */
+ if (!CBB_init(cbb, 64) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8(cbb, type) ||
+ !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, body)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_finish_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) {
+ if (ssl->s3->pending_message != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t *msg = NULL;
+ size_t len;
+ if (!CBB_finish(cbb, &msg, &len) ||
+ len > 0xffffffffu) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_free(msg);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ssl3_update_handshake_hash(ssl, msg, len);
+
+ ssl->s3->pending_message = msg;
+ ssl->s3->pending_message_len = (uint32_t)len;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_write_message(SSL *ssl) {
+ if (ssl->s3->pending_message == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ int ret = ssl3_do_write(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, ssl->s3->pending_message,
+ ssl->s3->pending_message_len);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->pending_message);
+ ssl->s3->pending_message = NULL;
+ ssl->s3->pending_message_len = 0;
return 1;
}
int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *ssl, int a, int b) {
- uint8_t *p;
- int n;
-
- if (ssl->state == a) {
- p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl);
-
- n = ssl->s3->enc_method->final_finish_mac(ssl, ssl->server,
- ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md);
- if (n == 0) {
- return 0;
- }
- ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = n;
- memcpy(p, ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md, n);
-
- /* Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. */
- if (!ssl_log_master_secret(ssl, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- ssl->session->master_key,
- ssl->session->master_key_length)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */
- if (ssl->server) {
- assert(n <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
- memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md, n);
- ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = n;
- } else {
- assert(n <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
- memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md, n);
- ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = n;
- }
-
- if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, n)) {
- return 0;
- }
- ssl->state = b;
+ if (ssl->state == b) {
+ return ssl->method->write_message(ssl);
}
- /* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */
- return ssl_do_write(ssl);
+ int n = ssl->s3->enc_method->final_finish_mac(ssl, ssl->server,
+ ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md);
+ if (n == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = n;
+
+ /* Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. */
+ if (!ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_RANDOM",
+ SSL_get_session(ssl)->master_key,
+ SSL_get_session(ssl)->master_key_length)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */
+ if (ssl->server) {
+ assert(n <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md, n);
+ ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = n;
+ } else {
+ assert(n <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md, n);
+ ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = n;
+ }
+
+ CBB cbb, body;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_FINISHED) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&body, ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md,
+ ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) ||
+ !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ssl->state = b;
+ return ssl->method->write_message(ssl);
}
/* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
@@ -203,34 +261,28 @@
}
int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *ssl) {
- int al, finished_len, ok;
- long message_len;
- uint8_t *p;
-
- message_len = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_FINISHED,
- ssl_dont_hash_message, &ok);
-
- if (!ok) {
- return message_len;
+ int al;
+ int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_FINISHED,
+ ssl_dont_hash_message);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ return ret;
}
/* Snapshot the finished hash before incorporating the new message. */
ssl3_take_mac(ssl);
- if (!ssl3_hash_current_message(ssl)) {
+ if (!ssl->method->hash_current_message(ssl)) {
goto err;
}
- p = ssl->init_msg;
- finished_len = ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
-
- if (finished_len != message_len) {
+ size_t finished_len = ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
+ if (finished_len != ssl->init_num) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
int finished_ret =
- CRYPTO_memcmp(p, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, finished_len);
+ CRYPTO_memcmp(ssl->init_msg, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, finished_len);
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
finished_ret = 0;
#endif
@@ -261,31 +313,24 @@
return 0;
}
-int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl, int a, int b) {
- if (ssl->state == a) {
- *((uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data) = SSL3_MT_CCS;
- ssl->init_num = 1;
+int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) {
+ static const uint8_t kChangeCipherSpec[1] = {SSL3_MT_CCS};
- ssl->state = b;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
- return ssl3_do_write(ssl, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+ return ssl3_do_write(ssl, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, kChangeCipherSpec,
+ sizeof(kChangeCipherSpec));
}
int ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *ssl) {
- uint8_t *p;
- unsigned long l = 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl);
-
- if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(ssl, &l)) {
+ CBB cbb, body;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) ||
+ !ssl_add_cert_chain(ssl, &body) ||
+ !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return 0;
}
- l -= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl);
- p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl);
- l2n3(l, p);
- l += 3;
- return ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l);
+ return 1;
}
size_t ssl_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *ssl) {
@@ -293,10 +338,28 @@
* not accept peer certificate chains. */
static const size_t kMaxMessageLen = 16384;
- if ((!ssl->server || (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) &&
- kMaxMessageLen < ssl->max_cert_list) {
- return ssl->max_cert_list;
+ if (SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
+ if ((!ssl->server || (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) &&
+ kMaxMessageLen < ssl->max_cert_list) {
+ return ssl->max_cert_list;
+ }
+ return kMaxMessageLen;
}
+
+ if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ /* In TLS 1.2 and below, the largest acceptable post-handshake message is
+ * a HelloRequest. */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->server) {
+ /* The largest acceptable post-handshake message for a server is a
+ * KeyUpdate. We will never initiate post-handshake auth. */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Clients must accept NewSessionTicket and CertificateRequest, so allow the
+ * default size. */
return kMaxMessageLen;
}
@@ -305,10 +368,9 @@
return -1;
}
while (ssl->init_buf->length < length) {
- int ret =
- ssl3_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
- (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data + ssl->init_buf->length,
- length - ssl->init_buf->length, 0);
+ int ret = ssl3_read_handshake_bytes(
+ ssl, (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data + ssl->init_buf->length,
+ length - ssl->init_buf->length);
if (ret <= 0) {
return ret;
}
@@ -317,39 +379,201 @@
return 1;
}
-/* Obtain handshake message of message type |msg_type| (any if |msg_type| ==
- * -1). */
-long ssl3_get_message(SSL *ssl, int msg_type,
- enum ssl_hash_message_t hash_message, int *ok) {
- *ok = 0;
+static int read_v2_client_hello(SSL *ssl, int *out_is_v2_client_hello) {
+ /* Read the first 5 bytes, the size of the TLS record header. This is
+ * sufficient to detect a V2ClientHello and ensures that we never read beyond
+ * the first record. */
+ int ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ const uint8_t *p = ssl_read_buffer(ssl);
+
+ /* Some dedicated error codes for protocol mixups should the application wish
+ * to interpret them differently. (These do not overlap with ClientHello or
+ * V2ClientHello.) */
+ if (strncmp("GET ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0 ||
+ strncmp("POST ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 ||
+ strncmp("HEAD ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 ||
+ strncmp("PUT ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (strncmp("CONNE", (const char *)p, 5) == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if ((p[0] & 0x80) == 0 || p[2] != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO ||
+ p[3] != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+ /* Not a V2ClientHello. */
+ *out_is_v2_client_hello = 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Determine the length of the V2ClientHello. */
+ size_t msg_length = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1];
+ if (msg_length > (1024 * 4)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (msg_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 2) {
+ /* Reject lengths that are too short early. We have already read
+ * |SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH| bytes, so we should not attempt to process an
+ * (invalid) V2ClientHello which would be shorter than that. */
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Read the remainder of the V2ClientHello. */
+ ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, 2 + msg_length);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ CBS v2_client_hello;
+ CBS_init(&v2_client_hello, ssl_read_buffer(ssl) + 2, msg_length);
+
+ /* The V2ClientHello without the length is incorporated into the handshake
+ * hash. */
+ if (!ssl3_update_handshake_hash(ssl, CBS_data(&v2_client_hello),
+ CBS_len(&v2_client_hello))) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL2_VERSION, 0,
+ CBS_data(&v2_client_hello), CBS_len(&v2_client_hello));
+
+ uint8_t msg_type;
+ uint16_t version, cipher_spec_length, session_id_length, challenge_length;
+ CBS cipher_specs, session_id, challenge;
+ if (!CBS_get_u8(&v2_client_hello, &msg_type) ||
+ !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &version) ||
+ !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_spec_length) ||
+ !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &session_id_length) ||
+ !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &challenge_length) ||
+ !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_specs, cipher_spec_length) ||
+ !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &session_id, session_id_length) ||
+ !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &challenge, challenge_length) ||
+ CBS_len(&v2_client_hello) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* msg_type has already been checked. */
+ assert(msg_type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO);
+
+ /* The client_random is the V2ClientHello challenge. Truncate or
+ * left-pad with zeros as needed. */
+ size_t rand_len = CBS_len(&challenge);
+ if (rand_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) {
+ rand_len = SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+ }
+ uint8_t random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
+ memset(random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ memcpy(random + (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - rand_len), CBS_data(&challenge),
+ rand_len);
+
+ /* Write out an equivalent SSLv3 ClientHello. */
+ size_t max_v3_client_hello = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 /* version */ +
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 /* session ID length */ +
+ 2 /* cipher list length */ +
+ CBS_len(&cipher_specs) / 3 * 2 +
+ 1 /* compression length */ + 1 /* compression */;
+ CBB client_hello, hello_body, cipher_suites;
+ CBB_zero(&client_hello);
+ if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->init_buf, max_v3_client_hello) ||
+ !CBB_init_fixed(&client_hello, (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data,
+ ssl->init_buf->max) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8(&client_hello, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) ||
+ !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &hello_body) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16(&hello_body, version) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&hello_body, random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+ /* No session id. */
+ !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&hello_body, &cipher_suites)) {
+ CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy the cipher suites. */
+ while (CBS_len(&cipher_specs) > 0) {
+ uint32_t cipher_spec;
+ if (!CBS_get_u24(&cipher_specs, &cipher_spec)) {
+ CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Skip SSLv2 ciphers. */
+ if ((cipher_spec & 0xff0000) != 0) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!CBB_add_u16(&cipher_suites, cipher_spec)) {
+ CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Add the null compression scheme and finish. */
+ if (!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 1) || !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
+ !CBB_finish(&client_hello, NULL, &ssl->init_buf->length)) {
+ CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Consume and discard the V2ClientHello. */
+ ssl_read_buffer_consume(ssl, 2 + msg_length);
+ ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl);
+
+ *out_is_v2_client_hello = 1;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_message(SSL *ssl, int msg_type,
+ enum ssl_hash_message_t hash_message) {
+again:
+ /* Re-create the handshake buffer if needed. */
+ if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) {
+ ssl->init_buf = BUF_MEM_new();
+ if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->server && !ssl->s3->v2_hello_done) {
+ /* Bypass the record layer for the first message to handle V2ClientHello. */
+ assert(hash_message == ssl_hash_message);
+ int is_v2_client_hello = 0;
+ int ret = read_v2_client_hello(ssl, &is_v2_client_hello);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ if (is_v2_client_hello) {
+ /* V2ClientHello is hashed separately. */
+ hash_message = ssl_dont_hash_message;
+ }
+ ssl->s3->v2_hello_done = 1;
+ }
if (ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message) {
/* A ssl_dont_hash_message call cannot be combined with reuse_message; the
* ssl_dont_hash_message would have to have been applied to the previous
* call. */
assert(hash_message == ssl_hash_message);
- assert(ssl->s3->tmp.message_complete);
- ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0;
- if (msg_type >= 0 && ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != msg_type) {
- ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- return -1;
- }
- *ok = 1;
- assert(ssl->init_buf->length >= 4);
- ssl->init_msg = (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data + 4;
- ssl->init_num = (int)ssl->init_buf->length - 4;
- return ssl->init_num;
- }
+ assert(ssl->init_msg != NULL);
-again:
- if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_complete) {
- ssl->s3->tmp.message_complete = 0;
- ssl->init_buf->length = 0;
+ ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0;
+ hash_message = ssl_dont_hash_message;
+ } else {
+ ssl3_release_current_message(ssl, 0 /* don't free buffer */);
}
/* Read the message header, if we haven't yet. */
- int ret = extend_handshake_buffer(ssl, 4);
+ int ret = extend_handshake_buffer(ssl, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
if (ret <= 0) {
return ret;
}
@@ -365,97 +589,62 @@
}
/* Read the message body, if we haven't yet. */
- ret = extend_handshake_buffer(ssl, 4 + msg_len);
+ ret = extend_handshake_buffer(ssl, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + msg_len);
if (ret <= 0) {
return ret;
}
/* We have now received a complete message. */
- ssl->s3->tmp.message_complete = 1;
ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, ssl->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
ssl->init_buf->data, ssl->init_buf->length);
- static const uint8_t kHelloRequest[4] = {SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0, 0, 0};
- if (!ssl->server && ssl->init_buf->length == sizeof(kHelloRequest) &&
- memcmp(kHelloRequest, ssl->init_buf->data, sizeof(kHelloRequest)) == 0) {
- /* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- we are doing a
- * handshake anyway now, so ignore them if their format is correct. Does
- * not count for 'Finished' MAC. */
+ ssl->s3->tmp.message_type = ((const uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data)[0];
+ ssl->init_msg = (uint8_t*)ssl->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ ssl->init_num = ssl->init_buf->length - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+ /* Ignore stray HelloRequest messages in the handshake before TLS 1.3. Per RFC
+ * 5246, section 7.4.1.1, the server may send HelloRequest at any time. */
+ if (!ssl->server && SSL_in_init(ssl) &&
+ (!ssl->s3->have_version || ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) &&
+ ssl->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST &&
+ ssl->init_num == 0) {
goto again;
}
- uint8_t actual_type = ((const uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data)[0];
- if (msg_type >= 0 && actual_type != msg_type) {
+ if (msg_type >= 0 && ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != msg_type) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
return -1;
}
- ssl->s3->tmp.message_type = actual_type;
-
- ssl->init_msg = (uint8_t*)ssl->init_buf->data + 4;
- ssl->init_num = ssl->init_buf->length - 4;
/* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
if (hash_message == ssl_hash_message && !ssl3_hash_current_message(ssl)) {
return -1;
}
- *ok = 1;
- return ssl->init_num;
+ return 1;
}
int ssl3_hash_current_message(SSL *ssl) {
- /* The handshake header (different size between DTLS and TLS) is included in
- * the hash. */
- size_t header_len = ssl->init_msg - (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data;
return ssl3_update_handshake_hash(ssl, (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data,
- ssl->init_num + header_len);
+ ssl->init_buf->length);
}
-/* ssl3_cert_verify_hash is documented as needing EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE because that
- * is sufficient pre-TLS1.2 as well. */
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE > MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- combined_tls_hash_fits_in_max);
+void ssl3_release_current_message(SSL *ssl, int free_buffer) {
+ if (ssl->init_msg != NULL) {
+ /* |init_buf| never contains data beyond the current message. */
+ assert(SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + ssl->init_num == ssl->init_buf->length);
-int ssl3_cert_verify_hash(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
- const EVP_MD **out_md, int pkey_type) {
- /* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using
- * agreed digest and cached handshake records. Otherwise, use
- * SHA1 or MD5 + SHA1 depending on key type. */
- if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
- unsigned len;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
- if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, *out_md, NULL) ||
- !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, ssl->s3->handshake_buffer->data,
- ssl->s3->handshake_buffer->length) ||
- !EVP_DigestFinal(&mctx, out, &len)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
- return 0;
- }
- *out_len = len;
- } else if (pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
- if (ssl->s3->enc_method->cert_verify_mac(ssl, NID_md5, out) == 0 ||
- ssl->s3->enc_method->cert_verify_mac(ssl, NID_sha1,
- out + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) == 0) {
- return 0;
- }
- *out_len = MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
- *out_md = EVP_md5_sha1();
- } else if (pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
- if (ssl->s3->enc_method->cert_verify_mac(ssl, NID_sha1, out) == 0) {
- return 0;
- }
- *out_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
- *out_md = EVP_sha1();
- } else {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ /* Clear the current message. */
+ ssl->init_msg = NULL;
+ ssl->init_num = 0;
+ ssl->init_buf->length = 0;
}
- return 1;
+ if (free_buffer) {
+ BUF_MEM_free(ssl->init_buf);
+ ssl->init_buf = NULL;
+ }
}
int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) {
@@ -531,21 +720,3 @@
return al;
}
-
-int ssl_fill_hello_random(uint8_t *out, size_t len, int is_server) {
- if (is_server) {
- const uint32_t current_time = time(NULL);
- uint8_t *p = out;
-
- if (len < 4) {
- return 0;
- }
- p[0] = current_time >> 24;
- p[1] = current_time >> 16;
- p[2] = current_time >> 8;
- p[3] = current_time;
- return RAND_bytes(p + 4, len - 4);
- } else {
- return RAND_bytes(out, len);
- }
-}