Initial commit of BoringSSL for Android.
diff --git a/src/crypto/cipher/e_chacha20poly1305.c b/src/crypto/cipher/e_chacha20poly1305.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1cdcbca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/crypto/cipher/e_chacha20poly1305.c
@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <openssl/aead.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/chacha.h>
+#include <openssl/cipher.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/poly1305.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+#define POLY1305_TAG_LEN 16
+#define CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN 8
+
+struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx {
+ unsigned char key[32];
+ unsigned char tag_len;
+};
+
+static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
+ size_t key_len, size_t tag_len) {
+ struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx;
+
+ if (tag_len == 0) {
+ tag_len = POLY1305_TAG_LEN;
+ }
+
+ if (tag_len > POLY1305_TAG_LEN) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_chacha20_poly1305_init, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (key_len != sizeof(c20_ctx->key)) {
+ return 0; /* internal error - EVP_AEAD_CTX_init should catch this. */
+ }
+
+ c20_ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx));
+ if (c20_ctx == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(c20_ctx->key, key, key_len);
+ c20_ctx->tag_len = tag_len;
+ ctx->aead_state = c20_ctx;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void aead_chacha20_poly1305_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {
+ struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(c20_ctx->key, sizeof(c20_ctx->key));
+ OPENSSL_free(c20_ctx);
+}
+
+static void poly1305_update_with_length(poly1305_state *poly1305,
+ const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len) {
+ size_t j = data_len;
+ uint8_t length_bytes[8];
+ unsigned i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(length_bytes); i++) {
+ length_bytes[i] = j;
+ j >>= 8;
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, data, data_len);
+ CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, length_bytes, sizeof(length_bytes));
+}
+
+#if defined(__arm__)
+#define ALIGNED __attribute__((aligned(16)))
+#else
+#define ALIGNED
+#endif
+
+static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
+ size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
+ const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
+ const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+ const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+ const struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
+ uint8_t poly1305_key[32] ALIGNED;
+ poly1305_state poly1305;
+ const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len;
+
+ /* The underlying ChaCha implementation may not overflow the block
+ * counter into the second counter word. Therefore we disallow
+ * individual operations that work on more than 256GB at a time.
+ * |in_len_64| is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only
+ * 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false.
+ * Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop
+ * the warning. */
+ if (in_len_64 >= (1ull << 32) * 64 - 64) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (in_len + c20_ctx->tag_len < in_len) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (max_out_len < in_len + c20_ctx->tag_len) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal,
+ CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (nonce_len != CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal, CIPHER_R_IV_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key));
+ CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key, sizeof(poly1305_key),
+ c20_ctx->key, nonce, 0);
+
+ CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key);
+ poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, ad, ad_len);
+ CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, in_len, c20_ctx->key, nonce, 1);
+ poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, out, in_len);
+
+ uint8_t tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN] ALIGNED;
+ CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, tag);
+ memcpy(out + in_len, tag, c20_ctx->tag_len);
+ *out_len = in_len + c20_ctx->tag_len;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
+ size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
+ const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
+ const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+ const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+ const struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
+ uint8_t mac[POLY1305_TAG_LEN];
+ uint8_t poly1305_key[32] ALIGNED;
+ size_t plaintext_len;
+ poly1305_state poly1305;
+ const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len;
+
+ if (in_len < c20_ctx->tag_len) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_chacha20_poly1305_open, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* The underlying ChaCha implementation may not overflow the block
+ * counter into the second counter word. Therefore we disallow
+ * individual operations that work on more than 256GB at a time.
+ * |in_len_64| is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only
+ * 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false.
+ * Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop
+ * the warning. */
+ if (in_len_64 >= (1ull << 32) * 64 - 64) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_chacha20_poly1305_open, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (nonce_len != CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_chacha20_poly1305_open, CIPHER_R_IV_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ plaintext_len = in_len - c20_ctx->tag_len;
+
+ if (max_out_len < plaintext_len) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_chacha20_poly1305_open,
+ CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key));
+ CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key, sizeof(poly1305_key),
+ c20_ctx->key, nonce, 0);
+
+ CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key);
+ poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, ad, ad_len);
+ poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, in, plaintext_len);
+ CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, mac);
+
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, in + plaintext_len, c20_ctx->tag_len) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_chacha20_poly1305_open, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, plaintext_len, c20_ctx->key, nonce, 1);
+ *out_len = plaintext_len;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static const EVP_AEAD aead_chacha20_poly1305 = {
+ 32, /* key len */
+ CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN, /* nonce len */
+ POLY1305_TAG_LEN, /* overhead */
+ POLY1305_TAG_LEN, /* max tag length */
+ aead_chacha20_poly1305_init, aead_chacha20_poly1305_cleanup,
+ aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal, aead_chacha20_poly1305_open,
+};
+
+const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305(void) {
+ return &aead_chacha20_poly1305;
+}