Initial commit of BoringSSL for Android.
diff --git a/src/ssl/s3_both.c b/src/ssl/s3_both.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a34d221
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/ssl/s3_both.c
@@ -0,0 +1,699 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/obj.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+
+/* ssl3_do_write sends |s->init_buf| in records of type 'type'
+ * (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC). It returns -1 on error, 1
+ * on success or zero if the transmission is still incomplete. */
+int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) {
+ int n;
+
+ n = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], s->init_num);
+ if (n < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (n == s->init_num) {
+ if (s->msg_callback) {
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
+ (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ s->init_off += n;
+ s->init_num -= n;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen) {
+ uint8_t *p;
+ int n;
+
+ if (s->state == a) {
+ p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+
+ n = s->enc_method->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
+ if (n == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = n;
+ memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, n);
+
+ /* Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. */
+ if (!ssl_ctx_log_master_secret(s->ctx, s->s3->client_random,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->session->master_key,
+ s->session->master_key_length)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy the finished so we can use it for
+ * renegotiation checks */
+ if (s->server) {
+ assert(n <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, n);
+ s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = n;
+ } else {
+ assert(n <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, n);
+ s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = n;
+ }
+
+ ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, n);
+ s->state = b;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */
+ return ssl_do_write(s);
+}
+
+/* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen to
+ * far. */
+static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) {
+ const char *sender;
+ int slen;
+
+ /* If no new cipher setup then return immediately: other functions will set
+ * the appropriate error. */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) {
+ sender = s->enc_method->server_finished_label;
+ slen = s->enc_method->server_finished_label_len;
+ } else {
+ sender = s->enc_method->client_finished_label;
+ slen = s->enc_method->client_finished_label_len;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->enc_method->final_finish_mac(
+ s, sender, slen, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b) {
+ int al, finished_len, ok;
+ long message_len;
+ uint8_t *p;
+
+ message_len =
+ s->method->ssl_get_message(s, a, b, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE,
+ SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok) {
+ return message_len;
+ }
+
+ /* Snapshot the finished hash before incorporating the new message. */
+ ssl3_take_mac(s);
+ ssl3_hash_current_message(s);
+
+ /* If this occurs, we have missed a message.
+ * TODO(davidben): Is this check now redundant with SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS? */
+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_finished, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
+
+ p = s->init_msg;
+ finished_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
+
+ if (finished_len != message_len) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_finished, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, finished_len) != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_finished, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */
+ if (s->server) {
+ assert(finished_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, finished_len);
+ s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len;
+ } else {
+ assert(finished_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, finished_len);
+ s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* for these 2 messages, we need to
+ * ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init
+ * ssl->s3->read_sequence zero
+ * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init
+ * ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign
+ * ssl->session->read_compression assign
+ * ssl->session->read_hash assign */
+int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b) {
+ if (s->state == a) {
+ *((uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data) = SSL3_MT_CCS;
+ s->init_num = 1;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+
+ s->state = b;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
+ return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+}
+
+unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk) {
+ uint8_t *p;
+ unsigned long l = 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s);
+
+ if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, cpk, &l)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ l -= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s);
+ p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+ l2n3(l, p);
+ l += 3;
+ ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l);
+ return l + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s);
+}
+
+/* Obtain handshake message of message type |msg_type| (any if |msg_type| == -1),
+ * maximum acceptable body length |max|. The first four bytes (msg_type and
+ * length) are read in state |header_state|, the body is read in state |body_state|. */
+long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int header_state, int body_state, int msg_type,
+ long max, int hash_message, int *ok) {
+ uint8_t *p;
+ unsigned long l;
+ long n;
+ int al;
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) {
+ /* A SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE call cannot be combined with
+ * reuse_message; the SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE would have to have
+ * been applied to the previous call. */
+ assert(hash_message != SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE);
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0;
+ if (msg_type >= 0 && s->s3->tmp.message_type != msg_type) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_message, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ *ok = 1;
+ s->state = body_state;
+ s->init_msg = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data + 4;
+ s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
+ return s->init_num;
+ }
+
+ p = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+ if (s->state == header_state) {
+ assert(s->init_num < 4);
+
+ for (;;) {
+ while (s->init_num < 4) {
+ int bytes_read = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(
+ s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &p[s->init_num], 4 - s->init_num, 0);
+ if (bytes_read <= 0) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ *ok = 0;
+ return bytes_read;
+ }
+ s->init_num += bytes_read;
+ }
+
+ static const uint8_t kHelloRequest[4] = {SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0, 0, 0};
+ if (s->server || memcmp(p, kHelloRequest, sizeof(kHelloRequest)) != 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- we are doing
+ * a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if their format is correct.
+ * Does not count for 'Finished' MAC. */
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ if (s->msg_callback) {
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, p, 4, s,
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* s->init_num == 4 */
+
+ if (msg_type >= 0 && *p != msg_type) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_message, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
+
+ n2l3(p, l);
+ if (l > (unsigned long)max) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_message, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, l + 4)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_message, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
+ s->state = body_state;
+
+ s->init_msg = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data + 4;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* next state (body_state) */
+ p = s->init_msg;
+ n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
+ while (n > 0) {
+ int bytes_read =
+ s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &p[s->init_num], n, 0);
+ if (bytes_read <= 0) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ *ok = 0;
+ return bytes_read;
+ }
+ s->init_num += bytes_read;
+ n -= bytes_read;
+ }
+
+ /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
+ if (hash_message != SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE) {
+ ssl3_hash_current_message(s);
+ }
+ if (s->msg_callback) {
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
+ (size_t)s->init_num + 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ }
+ *ok = 1;
+ return s->init_num;
+
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+
+err:
+ *ok = 0;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+void ssl3_hash_current_message(SSL *s) {
+ /* The handshake header (different size between DTLS and TLS) is included in
+ * the hash. */
+ size_t header_len = s->init_msg - (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data;
+ ssl3_finish_mac(s, (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + header_len);
+}
+
+/* ssl3_cert_verify_hash is documented as needing EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE because that
+ * is sufficient pre-TLS1.2 as well. */
+OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE > MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ combined_tls_hash_fits_in_max);
+
+int ssl3_cert_verify_hash(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+ const EVP_MD **out_md, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+ /* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using
+ * agreed digest and cached handshake records. Otherwise, use
+ * SHA1 or MD5 + SHA1 depending on key type. */
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+ const uint8_t *hdata;
+ size_t hdatalen;
+ EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
+ unsigned len;
+
+ if (!BIO_mem_contents(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_cert_verify_hash, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, *out_md, NULL) ||
+ !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) ||
+ !EVP_DigestFinal(&mctx, out, &len)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_cert_verify_hash, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *out_len = len;
+ } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+ if (s->enc_method->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, out) == 0 ||
+ s->enc_method->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_sha1, out + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) ==
+ 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *out_len = MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ *out_md = EVP_md5_sha1();
+ } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ if (s->enc_method->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_sha1, out) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *out_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ *out_md = EVP_sha1();
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_cert_verify_hash, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+ switch (pkey->type) {
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+ return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
+ case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+ return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) {
+ int al;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
+ al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
+ break;
+
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
+ al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+ break;
+
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ break;
+
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
+ al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
+ break;
+
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
+ al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
+ break;
+
+ case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ break;
+
+ case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
+ case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
+ case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
+ case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
+ al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
+ break;
+
+ case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ break;
+
+ case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
+ al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return al;
+}
+
+int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s) {
+ uint8_t *p;
+ size_t len, align = 0, headerlen;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ } else {
+ headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
+ align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
+#endif
+
+ if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) {
+ len = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD +
+ headerlen + align;
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) {
+ s->s3->init_extra = 1;
+ len += SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
+ }
+ p = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->s3->rbuf.buf = p;
+ s->s3->rbuf.len = len;
+ }
+
+ s->packet = &s->s3->rbuf.buf[0];
+ return 1;
+
+err:
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_setup_read_buffer, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s) {
+ uint8_t *p;
+ size_t len, align = 0, headerlen;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1;
+ } else {
+ headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
+ align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
+#endif
+
+ if (s->s3->wbuf.buf == NULL) {
+ len = s->max_send_fragment + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD +
+ headerlen + align;
+ /* Account for 1/n-1 record splitting. */
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) {
+ len += headerlen + align + 1 + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD;
+ }
+
+ p = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->s3->wbuf.buf = p;
+ s->s3->wbuf.len = len;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+
+err:
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_setup_write_buffer, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+int ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s) {
+ if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s) ||
+ !ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_release_write_buffer(SSL *s) {
+ if (s->s3->wbuf.buf != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->wbuf.buf);
+ s->s3->wbuf.buf = NULL;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s) {
+ if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
+ s->s3->rbuf.buf = NULL;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* ssl_fill_hello_random fills a client_random or server_random field of length
+ * |len|. Returns 0 on failure or 1 on success. */
+int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, uint8_t *result, size_t len) {
+ int send_time = 0;
+
+ if (server) {
+ send_time = (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME) != 0;
+ } else {
+ send_time = (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME) != 0;
+ }
+
+ if (send_time) {
+ const uint32_t current_time = time(NULL);
+ uint8_t *p = result;
+
+ if (len < 4) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ p[0] = current_time >> 24;
+ p[1] = current_time >> 16;
+ p[2] = current_time >> 8;
+ p[3] = current_time;
+ return RAND_bytes(p + 4, len - 4);
+ } else {
+ return RAND_bytes(result, len);
+ }
+}