Initial commit of BoringSSL for Android.
diff --git a/src/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/src/ssl/s3_srvr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b346d14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2807 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
+ * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE. */
+
+#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/cipher.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/obj.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/dh/internal.h"
+
+
+/* INITIAL_SNIFF_BUFFER_SIZE is the number of bytes read in the initial sniff
+ * buffer. */
+#define INITIAL_SNIFF_BUFFER_SIZE 8
+
+int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) {
+ BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
+ unsigned long alg_a;
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
+ int ret = -1;
+ int new_state, state, skip = 0;
+
+ assert(s->handshake_func == ssl3_accept);
+ assert(s->server);
+ assert(!SSL_IS_DTLS(s));
+
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ ERR_clear_system_error();
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL) {
+ cb = s->info_callback;
+ } else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) {
+ cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+ }
+
+ s->in_handshake++;
+
+ if (s->cert == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ state = s->state;
+
+ switch (s->state) {
+ case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
+ /* This state is the renegotiate entry point. It sends a HelloRequest
+ * and nothing else. */
+ s->renegotiate = 1;
+
+ if (cb != NULL) {
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
+ }
+
+ if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
+ buf = BUF_MEM_new();
+ if (!buf || !BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->init_buf = buf;
+ buf = NULL;
+ }
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+ /* Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't support
+ * secure renegotiation. */
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept,
+ SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
+ s->shutdown = 0;
+ ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+ /* This state is the entry point for the handshake itself (initial and
+ * renegotiation). */
+ if (cb != NULL) {
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
+ }
+
+ if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
+ buf = BUF_MEM_new();
+ if (!buf || !BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->init_buf = buf;
+ buf = NULL;
+ }
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (!s->s3->have_version) {
+ /* This is the initial handshake. The record layer has not been
+ * initialized yet. Sniff for a V2ClientHello before reading a
+ * ClientHello normally. */
+ assert(s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL);
+ assert(s->s3->wbuf.buf == NULL);
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_INITIAL_BYTES;
+ } else {
+ /* Enable a write buffer. This groups handshake messages within a
+ * flight into a single write. */
+ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s) || !ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ }
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_INITIAL_BYTES:
+ ret = ssl3_get_initial_bytes(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ /* ssl3_get_initial_bytes sets s->state to one of
+ * SSL3_ST_SR_V2_CLIENT_HELLO or SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A on success. */
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_V2_CLIENT_HELLO:
+ ret = ssl3_get_v2_client_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
+ s->shutdown = 0;
+ ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
+ if (ret == PENDING_SESSION) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_SESSION;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (ret == CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->renegotiate = 2;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
+ ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (s->hit) {
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ } else {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ }
+ } else {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
+ }
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
+ if (ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+ ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected) {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
+ } else {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+ } else {
+ skip = 1;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+
+ /* Send a ServerKeyExchange message if:
+ * - The key exchange is ephemeral or anonymous
+ * Diffie-Hellman.
+ * - There is a PSK identity hint.
+ *
+ * TODO(davidben): This logic is currently duplicated in d1_srvr.c. Fix
+ * this. In the meantime, keep them in sync. */
+ if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ||
+ ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && s->psk_identity_hint)) {
+ ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ } else {
+ skip = 1;
+ }
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
+ if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
+ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
+ /* Don't request a certificate if an obc was presented */
+ ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER_IF_NO_OBC) &&
+ s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) ||
+ /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
+ * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
+ ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
+ (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
+ /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
+ * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
+ * and in RFC 2246): */
+ ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
+ /* ... except when the application insists on verification
+ * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
+ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
+ /* With normal PSK Certificates and
+ * Certificate Requests are omitted */
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ /* no cert request */
+ skip = 1;
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer &&
+ !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
+ ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+#else
+ /* ServerHelloDone was already sent in the
+ * previous record. */
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
+#endif
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
+ ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
+ /* This code originally checked to see if any data was pending using
+ * BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as documented
+ * in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
+ * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead
+ * we just flush unconditionally. */
+ s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+ if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+
+ s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+ ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE: {
+ char next_proto_neg = 0;
+ char channel_id = 0;
+ next_proto_neg = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
+ channel_id = s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid;
+
+ /* At this point, the next message must be entirely behind a
+ * ChangeCipherSpec. */
+ if (!ssl3_expect_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (next_proto_neg) {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+ } else if (channel_id) {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
+ } else {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
+ } else {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_channel_id(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
+ ret =
+ ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (s->hit) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
+ } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ } else {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ }
+ /* If this is a full handshake with ChannelID then record the hashshake
+ * hashes in |s->session| in case we need them to verify a ChannelID
+ * signature on a resumption of this session in the future. */
+ if (!s->hit && s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) {
+ ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
+ ret = ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
+ s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+ if (!s->enc_method->setup_key_block(s)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ if (!s->enc_method->change_cipher_state(
+ s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
+ ret =
+ ssl3_send_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
+ s->enc_method->server_finished_label,
+ s->enc_method->server_finished_label_len);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ if (s->hit) {
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE;
+ } else {
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
+ }
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ST_OK:
+ /* clean a few things up */
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+ BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+ s->init_buf = NULL;
+
+ /* remove buffering on output */
+ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ /* If we aren't retaining peer certificates then we can discard it
+ * now. */
+ if (s->session->peer && s->ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) {
+ X509_free(s->session->peer);
+ s->session->peer = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (s->renegotiate == 2) {
+ /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
+ s->renegotiate = 0;
+ s->new_session = 0;
+
+ ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
+
+ if (cb != NULL) {
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ goto end;
+
+ default:
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip && cb != NULL && s->state != state) {
+ new_state = s->state;
+ s->state = state;
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
+ s->state = new_state;
+ }
+ skip = 0;
+ }
+
+end:
+ s->in_handshake--;
+ if (buf != NULL) {
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+ }
+ if (cb != NULL) {
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int ssl3_read_sniff_buffer(SSL *s, size_t n) {
+ if (s->s3->sniff_buffer == NULL) {
+ s->s3->sniff_buffer = BUF_MEM_new();
+ }
+ if (s->s3->sniff_buffer == NULL || !BUF_MEM_grow(s->s3->sniff_buffer, n)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ while (s->s3->sniff_buffer_len < n) {
+ int ret;
+
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, s->s3->sniff_buffer->data + s->s3->sniff_buffer_len,
+ n - s->s3->sniff_buffer_len);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ s->s3->sniff_buffer_len += ret;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_initial_bytes(SSL *s) {
+ int ret;
+ const uint8_t *p;
+
+ /* Read the first 8 bytes. To recognize a ClientHello or V2ClientHello only
+ * needs the first 6 bytes, but 8 is needed to recognize CONNECT below. */
+ ret = ssl3_read_sniff_buffer(s, INITIAL_SNIFF_BUFFER_SIZE);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ assert(s->s3->sniff_buffer_len >= INITIAL_SNIFF_BUFFER_SIZE);
+ p = (const uint8_t *)s->s3->sniff_buffer->data;
+
+ /* Some dedicated error codes for protocol mixups should the application wish
+ * to interpret them differently. (These do not overlap with ClientHello or
+ * V2ClientHello.) */
+ if (strncmp("GET ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0 ||
+ strncmp("POST ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 ||
+ strncmp("HEAD ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 ||
+ strncmp("PUT ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_initial_bytes, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (strncmp("CONNECT ", (const char *)p, 8) == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_initial_bytes, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Determine if this is a ClientHello or V2ClientHello. */
+ if ((p[0] & 0x80) && p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO &&
+ p[3] >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+ /* This is a V2ClientHello. */
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_V2_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (p[0] == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && p[1] >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
+ p[5] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+ /* This is a ClientHello. Initialize the record layer with the already
+ * consumed data and continue the handshake. */
+ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s) || !ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ assert(s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_HEADER);
+ memcpy(s->s3->rbuf.buf, p, s->s3->sniff_buffer_len);
+ s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0;
+ s->s3->rbuf.left = s->s3->sniff_buffer_len;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+
+ BUF_MEM_free(s->s3->sniff_buffer);
+ s->s3->sniff_buffer = NULL;
+ s->s3->sniff_buffer_len = 0;
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_initial_bytes, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_v2_client_hello(SSL *s) {
+ const uint8_t *p;
+ int ret;
+ CBS v2_client_hello, cipher_specs, session_id, challenge;
+ size_t msg_length, rand_len, len;
+ uint8_t msg_type;
+ uint16_t version, cipher_spec_length, session_id_length, challenge_length;
+ CBB client_hello, hello_body, cipher_suites;
+ uint8_t random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
+
+ /* Read the remainder of the V2ClientHello. We have previously read 8 bytes
+ * in ssl3_get_initial_bytes. */
+ assert(s->s3->sniff_buffer_len >= INITIAL_SNIFF_BUFFER_SIZE);
+ p = (const uint8_t *)s->s3->sniff_buffer->data;
+ msg_length = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1];
+ if (msg_length > (1024 * 4)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_v2_client_hello, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (msg_length < INITIAL_SNIFF_BUFFER_SIZE - 2) {
+ /* Reject lengths that are too short early. We have already read 8 bytes,
+ * so we should not attempt to process an (invalid) V2ClientHello which
+ * would be shorter than that. */
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_v2_client_hello,
+ SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ret = ssl3_read_sniff_buffer(s, msg_length + 2);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ assert(s->s3->sniff_buffer_len == msg_length + 2);
+ CBS_init(&v2_client_hello, (const uint8_t *)s->s3->sniff_buffer->data + 2,
+ msg_length);
+
+ /* The V2ClientHello without the length is incorporated into the Finished
+ * hash. */
+ ssl3_finish_mac(s, CBS_data(&v2_client_hello), CBS_len(&v2_client_hello));
+ if (s->msg_callback) {
+ s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, CBS_data(&v2_client_hello),
+ CBS_len(&v2_client_hello), s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ }
+
+ if (!CBS_get_u8(&v2_client_hello, &msg_type) ||
+ !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &version) ||
+ !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_spec_length) ||
+ !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &session_id_length) ||
+ !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &challenge_length) ||
+ !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_specs, cipher_spec_length) ||
+ !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &session_id, session_id_length) ||
+ !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &challenge, challenge_length) ||
+ CBS_len(&v2_client_hello) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_v2_client_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* msg_type has already been checked. */
+ assert(msg_type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO);
+
+ /* The client_random is the V2ClientHello challenge. Truncate or
+ * left-pad with zeros as needed. */
+ memset(random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ rand_len = CBS_len(&challenge);
+ if (rand_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) {
+ rand_len = SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+ }
+ memcpy(random + (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - rand_len), CBS_data(&challenge),
+ rand_len);
+
+ /* Write out an equivalent SSLv3 ClientHello. */
+ if (!CBB_init_fixed(&client_hello, (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data,
+ s->init_buf->max)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_v2_client_hello, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (!CBB_add_u8(&client_hello, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) ||
+ !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &hello_body) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16(&hello_body, version) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&hello_body, random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+ /* No session id. */
+ !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&hello_body, &cipher_suites)) {
+ CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_v2_client_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy the cipher suites. */
+ while (CBS_len(&cipher_specs) > 0) {
+ uint32_t cipher_spec;
+ if (!CBS_get_u24(&cipher_specs, &cipher_spec)) {
+ CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_v2_client_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Skip SSLv2 ciphers. */
+ if ((cipher_spec & 0xff0000) != 0) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!CBB_add_u16(&cipher_suites, cipher_spec)) {
+ CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_v2_client_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Add the null compression scheme and finish. */
+ if (!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 1) || !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
+ !CBB_finish(&client_hello, NULL, &len)) {
+ CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_v2_client_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Mark the message for "re"-use by the version-specific method. */
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ s->s3->tmp.message_type = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ /* The handshake message header is 4 bytes. */
+ s->s3->tmp.message_size = len - 4;
+
+ /* Initialize the record layer. */
+ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s) || !ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Drop the sniff buffer. */
+ BUF_MEM_free(s->s3->sniff_buffer);
+ s->s3->sniff_buffer = NULL;
+ s->s3->sniff_buffer_len = 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) {
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
+ ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
+ return ssl_do_write(s);
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) {
+ int i, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
+ long n;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
+ struct ssl_early_callback_ctx early_ctx;
+ CBS client_hello;
+ uint16_t client_version;
+ CBS client_random, session_id, cipher_suites, compression_methods;
+
+ /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are TLSv1
+ * and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down switching should
+ * be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we will respond with
+ * SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1. */
+ switch (s->state) {
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(
+ s, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
+ SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
+ SSL_GET_MESSAGE_HASH_MESSAGE, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok) {
+ return n;
+ }
+
+ /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
+ * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
+ * cookie length... */
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
+ uint8_t cookie_length;
+
+ CBS_init(&client_hello, s->init_msg, n);
+ if (!CBS_skip(&client_hello, 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+ !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id) ||
+ !CBS_get_u8(&client_hello, &cookie_length)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (cookie_length == 0) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
+ /* fallthrough */
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
+ /* We have previously parsed the ClientHello message, and can't call
+ * ssl_get_message again without hashing the message into the Finished
+ * digest again. */
+ n = s->init_num;
+
+ memset(&early_ctx, 0, sizeof(early_ctx));
+ early_ctx.ssl = s;
+ early_ctx.client_hello = s->init_msg;
+ early_ctx.client_hello_len = n;
+ if (!ssl_early_callback_init(&early_ctx)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello,
+ SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_PARSE_FAILED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C &&
+ s->ctx->select_certificate_cb != NULL) {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
+ switch (s->ctx->select_certificate_cb(&early_ctx)) {
+ case 0:
+ return CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING;
+
+ case -1:
+ /* Connection rejected. */
+ al = SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello,
+ SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
+ goto f_err;
+
+ default:
+ /* fallthrough */;
+ }
+ }
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ CBS_init(&client_hello, s->init_msg, n);
+ if (!CBS_get_u16(&client_hello, &client_version) ||
+ !CBS_get_bytes(&client_hello, &client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+ !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id) ||
+ CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may differ:
+ * see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
+ s->client_version = client_version;
+
+ /* Load the client random. */
+ memcpy(s->s3->client_random, CBS_data(&client_random), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ CBS cookie;
+
+ if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie) ||
+ CBS_len(&cookie) > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
+ if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && CBS_len(&cookie) > 0) {
+ if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
+ if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, CBS_data(&cookie),
+ CBS_len(&cookie)) == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* else cookie verification succeeded */
+ } else if (!CBS_mem_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len)) {
+ /* default verification */
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 and don't send
+ * HelloVerifyRequest. */
+ ret = -2;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!s->s3->have_version) {
+ /* Select version to use */
+ uint16_t version = ssl3_get_mutual_version(s, client_version);
+ if (version == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+ s->version = s->client_version;
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->version = version;
+ s->enc_method = ssl3_get_enc_method(version);
+ assert(s->enc_method != NULL);
+ /* At this point, the connection's version is known and |s->version| is
+ * fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version. */
+ s->s3->have_version = 1;
+ } else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version)
+ : (s->client_version < s->version)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ s->hit = 0;
+ /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
+ * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
+ * ignore resumption requests with flag
+ * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather than
+ * a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for
+ * security won't even compile against older library versions).
+ *
+ * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
+ * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
+ * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
+ * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored. */
+ if (s->new_session &&
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &early_ctx);
+ if (i == PENDING_SESSION) {
+ ret = PENDING_SESSION;
+ goto err;
+ } else if (i == -1) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated version:
+ * most clients do not accept a mismatch. */
+ if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
+ s->hit = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* No session was found or it was unacceptable. */
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites) ||
+ !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &compression_methods) ||
+ CBS_len(&compression_methods) == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* TODO(davidben): Per spec, cipher_suites can never be empty (specified at
+ * the ClientHello structure level). This logic allows it to be empty if
+ * resuming a session. Can we always require non-empty? If a client sends
+ * empty cipher_suites because it's resuming a session, it could always fail
+ * to resume a session, so it's unlikely to actually work. */
+ if (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) == 0 && CBS_len(&session_id) != 0) {
+ /* We need a cipher if we are not resuming a session. */
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ ciphers = ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites);
+ if (ciphers == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. */
+ if (s->hit && CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) {
+ size_t j;
+ int found_cipher = 0;
+ unsigned long id = s->session->cipher->id;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); j++) {
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, j);
+ if (c->id == id) {
+ found_cipher = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!found_cipher) {
+ /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked to reuse
+ * it */
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello,
+ SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Only null compression is supported. */
+ if (memchr(CBS_data(&compression_methods), 0,
+ CBS_len(&compression_methods)) == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello,
+ SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* TLS extensions. */
+ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION &&
+ !ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &client_hello)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* There should be nothing left over in the record. */
+ if (CBS_len(&client_hello) != 0) {
+ /* wrong packet length */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Given ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher */
+ if (!s->hit) {
+ if (ciphers == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
+ if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
+ int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
+ if (rv == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (rv < 0) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ }
+ c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, ssl_get_cipher_preferences(s));
+
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
+ } else {
+ /* Session-id reuse */
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
+ }
+
+ if ((!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) &&
+ !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer)) {
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* we now have the following setup;
+ * client_random
+ * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
+ * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
+ * compression - basically ignored right now
+ * ssl version is set - sslv3
+ * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
+ * s->hit - session reuse flag
+ * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. */
+
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ ret = -ret;
+ }
+
+ if (0) {
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ }
+
+err:
+ if (ciphers != NULL) {
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) {
+ uint8_t *buf;
+ uint8_t *p, *d;
+ int sl;
+ unsigned long l;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
+ /* We only accept ChannelIDs on connections with ECDHE in order to avoid a
+ * known attack while we fix ChannelID itself. */
+ if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid &&
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kEECDH) == 0) {
+ s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* If this is a resumption and the original handshake didn't support
+ * ChannelID then we didn't record the original handshake hashes in the
+ * session and so cannot resume with ChannelIDs. */
+ if (s->hit && s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new &&
+ s->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) {
+ s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
+ }
+
+ buf = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data;
+ /* Do the message type and length last */
+ d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+
+ *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
+ *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
+
+ /* Random stuff */
+ if (!ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
+ * back in the server hello:
+ * - For session reuse from the session cache, we send back the old session
+ * ID.
+ * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) is successful, we
+ * send back the client's "session ID" (which doesn't actually identify
+ * the session).
+ * - If it is a new session, we send back the new session ID.
+ * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, we send back a
+ * 0-length session ID.
+ * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, so the following
+ * won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed to send back. */
+ if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) && !s->hit) {
+ s->session->session_id_length = 0;
+ }
+
+ sl = s->session->session_id_length;
+ if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *(p++) = sl;
+ memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
+ p += sl;
+
+ /* put the cipher */
+ s2n(ssl3_get_cipher_value(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), p);
+
+ /* put the compression method */
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_hello, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* do the header */
+ l = (p - d);
+ ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
+ return ssl_do_write(s);
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) {
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
+ ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
+ return ssl_do_write(s);
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) {
+ DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
+ EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
+ uint8_t *encodedPoint = NULL;
+ int encodedlen = 0;
+ uint16_t curve_id = 0;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+ const char *psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+ size_t psk_identity_hint_len = 0;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ uint8_t *p, *d;
+ int al, i;
+ unsigned long alg_k;
+ unsigned long alg_a;
+ int n;
+ CERT *cert;
+ BIGNUM *r[4];
+ int nr[4], kn;
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+ EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ cert = s->cert;
+
+ buf = s->init_buf;
+
+ r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
+ n = 0;
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
+ /* size for PSK identity hint */
+ psk_identity_hint = s->psk_identity_hint;
+ if (psk_identity_hint) {
+ psk_identity_hint_len = strlen(psk_identity_hint);
+ } else {
+ psk_identity_hint_len = 0;
+ }
+ n += 2 + psk_identity_hint_len;
+ }
+
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
+ dhp = cert->dh_tmp;
+ if (dhp == NULL && s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL) {
+ dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
+ }
+ if (dhp == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ dh = DHparams_dup(dhp);
+ if (dh == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
+ if (dhp->pub_key == NULL || dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)) {
+ if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
+ dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
+ if (dh->pub_key == NULL || dh->priv_key == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ r[0] = dh->p;
+ r[1] = dh->g;
+ r[2] = dh->pub_key;
+ } else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+
+ ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
+ if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
+ /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
+ int nid = tls1_get_shared_curve(s);
+ if (nid != NID_undef) {
+ ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+ }
+ } else if (ecdhp == NULL && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
+ ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
+ }
+ if (ecdhp == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
+ if (ecdhp == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
+ ecdh = ecdhp;
+ } else {
+ ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp);
+ if (ecdh == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
+ if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL ||
+ EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL ||
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
+ if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
+ if (group == NULL ||
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL ||
+ EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* We only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named (not generic) curves. */
+ if (!tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(&curve_id, EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange,
+ SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and allocate
+ * memory accordingly. */
+ encodedlen =
+ EC_POINT_point2oct(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+ encodedPoint = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(uint8_t));
+ bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (encodedPoint == NULL || bn_ctx == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
+
+ if (encodedlen == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ bn_ctx = NULL;
+
+ /* We only support named (not generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key
+ * exchanges. In this situation, we need four additional bytes to encode
+ * the entire ServerECDHParams structure. */
+ n += 4 + encodedlen;
+
+ /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we can set
+ * these to NULLs */
+ r[0] = NULL;
+ r[1] = NULL;
+ r[2] = NULL;
+ r[3] = NULL;
+ } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
+ n += 2 + nr[i];
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+ pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+ if (pkey == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+ } else {
+ pkey = NULL;
+ kn = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_LIB_BUF);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ s2n(nr[i], p);
+ BN_bn2bin(r[i], p);
+ p += nr[i];
+ }
+
+ /* Note: ECDHE PSK ciphersuites use SSL_kEECDH and SSL_aPSK. When one of
+ * them is used, the server key exchange record needs to have both the
+ * psk_identity_hint and the ServerECDHParams. */
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
+ /* copy PSK identity hint (if provided) */
+ s2n(psk_identity_hint_len, p);
+ if (psk_identity_hint_len > 0) {
+ memcpy(p, psk_identity_hint, psk_identity_hint_len);
+ p += psk_identity_hint_len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
+ /* We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
+ * serverKeyExchange message has:
+ * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
+ * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
+ * the actual encoded point itself. */
+ *(p++) = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
+ *(p++) = (uint8_t)(curve_id >> 8);
+ *(p++) = (uint8_t)(curve_id & 0xff);
+ *(p++) = encodedlen;
+ memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
+ p += encodedlen;
+ OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ encodedPoint = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* not anonymous */
+ if (pkey != NULL) {
+ /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p points to
+ * the space at the end. */
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ size_t sig_len = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+
+ /* Determine signature algorithm. */
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+ md = tls1_choose_signing_digest(s, pkey);
+ if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
+ /* Should never happen */
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ p += 2;
+ } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+ md = EVP_md5_sha1();
+ } else {
+ md = EVP_sha1();
+ }
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&md_ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) ||
+ !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->client_random,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+ !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->server_random,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+ !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) ||
+ !EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, &p[2], &sig_len)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_LIB_EVP);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s2n(sig_len, p);
+ n += sig_len + 2;
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+ n += 2;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
+ }
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ return ssl_do_write(s);
+
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+err:
+ if (encodedPoint != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ }
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) {
+ uint8_t *p, *d;
+ size_t i;
+ int j, nl, off, n;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *name;
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
+ buf = s->init_buf;
+
+ d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+
+ /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
+ p++;
+ n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
+ d[0] = n;
+ p += n;
+ n++;
+
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+ const uint8_t *psigs;
+ nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
+ s2n(nl, p);
+ memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
+ p += nl;
+ n += nl + 2;
+ }
+
+ off = n;
+ p += 2;
+ n += 2;
+
+ sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
+ nl = 0;
+ if (sk != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
+ name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
+ j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_certificate_request, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
+ s2n(j, p);
+ i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
+ n += 2 + j;
+ nl += 2 + j;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* else no CA names */
+ p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
+ s2n(nl, p);
+
+ ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
+
+#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
+ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ /* Prepare a ServerHelloDone in the same record. This is to workaround a
+ * hang in Netscape. */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_certificate_request, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
+ /* do the header */
+ *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ s->init_num += 4;
+ ssl3_finish_mac(s, p - 4, 4);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
+ return ssl_do_write(s);
+
+err:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) {
+ int al, ok;
+ long n;
+ CBS client_key_exchange;
+ unsigned long alg_k;
+ unsigned long alg_a;
+ uint8_t *premaster_secret = NULL;
+ size_t premaster_secret_len = 0;
+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
+ uint8_t *decrypt_buf = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *pub = NULL;
+ DH *dh_srvr;
+
+ EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+ unsigned int psk_len = 0;
+ uint8_t psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
+
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
+ SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, /* ??? */
+ SSL_GET_MESSAGE_HASH_MESSAGE, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok) {
+ return n;
+ }
+
+ CBS_init(&client_key_exchange, s->init_msg, n);
+
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+
+ /* If using a PSK key exchange, prepare the pre-shared key. */
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
+ CBS psk_identity;
+
+ /* If using PSK, the ClientKeyExchange contains a psk_identity. If PSK,
+ * then this is the only field in the message. */
+ if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &psk_identity) ||
+ ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+ SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (CBS_len(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN ||
+ CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (!CBS_strdup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Look up the key for the identity. */
+ psk_len =
+ s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity, psk, sizeof(psk));
+ if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ } else if (psk_len == 0) {
+ /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+ SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+ al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Depending on the key exchange method, compute |premaster_secret| and
+ * |premaster_secret_len|. */
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+ CBS encrypted_premaster_secret;
+ uint8_t rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ uint8_t good;
+ size_t rsa_size, decrypt_len, premaster_index, j;
+
+ pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
+ if (pkey == NULL || pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA || pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
+
+ /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
+ CBS copy = client_key_exchange;
+ if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange,
+ &encrypted_premaster_secret) ||
+ CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0) {
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+ SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else {
+ encrypted_premaster_secret = copy;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ encrypted_premaster_secret = client_key_exchange;
+ }
+
+ /* Reject overly short RSA keys because we want to be sure that the buffer
+ * size makes it safe to iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
+ * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The actual expected size is larger due to
+ * RSA padding, but the bound is sufficient to be safe. */
+ rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
+ if (rsa_size < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
+ * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
+ * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
+ * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt fails.
+ * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
+ if (!RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret))) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate a buffer large enough for an RSA decryption. */
+ decrypt_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
+ if (decrypt_buf == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of the
+ * timing-sensitive code below. */
+ if (!RSA_decrypt(rsa, &decrypt_len, decrypt_buf, rsa_size,
+ CBS_data(&encrypted_premaster_secret),
+ CBS_len(&encrypted_premaster_secret), RSA_NO_PADDING)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (decrypt_len != rsa_size) {
+ /* This should never happen, but do a check so we do not read
+ * uninitialized memory. */
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Remove the PKCS#1 padding and adjust |decrypt_len| as appropriate.
+ * |good| will be 0xff if the premaster is acceptable and zero otherwise.
+ * */
+ good =
+ constant_time_eq_int_8(RSA_message_index_PKCS1_type_2(
+ decrypt_buf, decrypt_len, &premaster_index),
+ 1);
+ decrypt_len = decrypt_len - premaster_index;
+
+ /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. */
+ good &= constant_time_eq_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
+
+ /* Copy over the unpadded premaster. Whatever the value of
+ * |decrypt_good_mask|, copy as if the premaster were the right length. It
+ * is important the memory access pattern be constant. */
+ premaster_secret =
+ BUF_memdup(decrypt_buf + (rsa_size - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH),
+ SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
+ if (premaster_secret == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(decrypt_buf);
+ decrypt_buf = NULL;
+
+ /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
+ * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
+ * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
+ * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number check as
+ * a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in constant time
+ * and are treated like any other decryption error. */
+ good &= constant_time_eq_8(premaster_secret[0],
+ (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
+ good &= constant_time_eq_8(premaster_secret[1],
+ (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
+
+ /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over premaster_secret using
+ * decrypt_good_mask. */
+ for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
+ premaster_secret[j] = constant_time_select_8(good, premaster_secret[j],
+ rand_premaster_secret[j]);
+ }
+
+ premaster_secret_len = sizeof(rand_premaster_secret);
+ } else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
+ CBS dh_Yc;
+ int dh_len;
+
+ if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &dh_Yc) ||
+ CBS_len(&dh_Yc) == 0 || CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+ SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+ al = SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
+
+ pub = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_Yc), CBS_len(&dh_Yc), NULL);
+ if (pub == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate a buffer for the premaster secret. */
+ premaster_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(DH_size(dh_srvr));
+ if (premaster_secret == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ dh_len = DH_compute_key(premaster_secret, pub, dh_srvr);
+ if (dh_len <= 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ BN_clear_free(pub);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
+ s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
+ BN_clear_free(pub);
+ pub = NULL;
+
+ premaster_secret_len = dh_len;
+ } else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
+ int field_size = 0, ecdh_len;
+ const EC_KEY *tkey;
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+ const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+ CBS ecdh_Yc;
+
+ /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
+ srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new();
+ if (srvr_ecdh == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the ServerKeyExchange
+ * msg. */
+ tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
+
+ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
+ priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
+
+ if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
+ !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Let's get client's public key */
+ clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group);
+ if (clnt_ecpoint == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Get client's public key from encoded point in the ClientKeyExchange
+ * message. */
+ if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &ecdh_Yc) ||
+ CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (bn_ctx == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, CBS_data(&ecdh_Yc),
+ CBS_len(&ecdh_Yc), bn_ctx)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate a buffer for both the secret and the PSK. */
+ field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
+ if (field_size <= 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ecdh_len = (field_size + 7) / 8;
+ premaster_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(ecdh_len);
+ if (premaster_secret == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
+ ecdh_len = ECDH_compute_key(premaster_secret, ecdh_len, clnt_ecpoint,
+ srvr_ecdh, NULL);
+ if (ecdh_len <= 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
+ clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
+ EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
+ clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
+ EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
+ srvr_ecdh = NULL;
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ bn_ctx = NULL;
+ EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
+ s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
+
+ premaster_secret_len = ecdh_len;
+ } else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+ /* For plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same length as the
+ * pre-shared key. */
+ premaster_secret_len = psk_len;
+ premaster_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(premaster_secret_len);
+ if (premaster_secret == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ memset(premaster_secret, 0, premaster_secret_len);
+ } else {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* For a PSK cipher suite, the actual pre-master secret is combined with the
+ * pre-shared key. */
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
+ CBB new_premaster, child;
+ uint8_t *new_data;
+ size_t new_len;
+
+ if (!CBB_init(&new_premaster, 2 + psk_len + 2 + premaster_secret_len)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&new_premaster, &child) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child, premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&new_premaster, &child) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child, psk, psk_len) ||
+ !CBB_finish(&new_premaster, &new_data, &new_len)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ CBB_cleanup(&new_premaster);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
+ OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
+ premaster_secret = new_data;
+ premaster_secret_len = new_len;
+ }
+
+ /* Compute the master secret */
+ s->session->master_key_length = s->enc_method->generate_master_secret(
+ s, s->session->master_key, premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
+ if (s->session->master_key_length == 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->session->extended_master_secret = s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret;
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
+ OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
+ return 1;
+
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+err:
+ if (premaster_secret) {
+ if (premaster_secret_len) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
+ }
+ if (decrypt_buf) {
+ OPENSSL_free(decrypt_buf);
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
+ EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
+ if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) {
+ EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
+ }
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) {
+ int al, ok, ret = 0;
+ long n;
+ CBS certificate_verify, signature;
+ X509 *peer = s->session->peer;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ size_t digest_length;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+
+ /* Only RSA and ECDSA client certificates are supported, so a
+ * CertificateVerify is required if and only if there's a client certificate.
+ * */
+ if (peer == NULL) {
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer &&
+ !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(
+ s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
+ SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
+ SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok) {
+ return n;
+ }
+
+ /* Filter out unsupported certificate types. */
+ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
+ if (!(X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey) & EVP_PKT_SIGN) ||
+ (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA && pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify,
+ SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ CBS_init(&certificate_verify, s->init_msg, n);
+
+ /* Determine the digest type if needbe. */
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
+ !tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, &al, s, &certificate_verify, pkey)) {
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Compute the digest. */
+ if (!ssl3_cert_verify_hash(s, digest, &digest_length, &md, pkey)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* The handshake buffer is no longer necessary, and we may hash the current
+ * message.*/
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer &&
+ !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ssl3_hash_current_message(s);
+
+ /* Parse and verify the signature. */
+ if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_verify, &signature) ||
+ CBS_len(&certificate_verify) != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
+ if (pctx == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) ||
+ !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) ||
+ !EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature), digest,
+ digest_length)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ if (0) {
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ }
+
+err:
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) {
+ int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ unsigned long n;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
+ SHA256_CTX sha256;
+ CBS certificate_msg, certificate_list;
+ int is_first_certificate = 1;
+
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, -1,
+ s->max_cert_list, SSL_GET_MESSAGE_HASH_MESSAGE,
+ &ok);
+
+ if (!ok) {
+ return n;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+ if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
+ (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate,
+ SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate,
+ SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ CBS_init(&certificate_msg, s->init_msg, n);
+
+ sk = sk_X509_new_null();
+ if (sk == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_msg, &certificate_list) ||
+ CBS_len(&certificate_msg) != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) {
+ CBS certificate;
+ const uint8_t *data;
+
+ if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (is_first_certificate && s->ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) {
+ /* If this is the first certificate, and we don't want to keep peer
+ * certificates in memory, then we hash it right away. */
+ SHA256_Init(&sha256);
+ SHA256_Update(&sha256, CBS_data(&certificate), CBS_len(&certificate));
+ SHA256_Final(s->session->peer_sha256, &sha256);
+ s->session->peer_sha256_valid = 1;
+ }
+ is_first_certificate = 0;
+
+ data = CBS_data(&certificate);
+ x = d2i_X509(NULL, &data, CBS_len(&certificate));
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (data != CBS_data(&certificate) + CBS_len(&certificate)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate,
+ SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ x = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
+ /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate,
+ SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
+ else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
+ (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate,
+ SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer &&
+ !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate,
+ SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->peer != NULL) {
+ /* This should not be needed */
+ X509_free(s->session->peer);
+ }
+
+ s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
+ s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
+
+ /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
+ * arrive here. */
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
+ s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) {
+ sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
+ }
+ s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
+ /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
+ * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
+
+ sk = NULL;
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ if (0) {
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ }
+
+err:
+ if (x != NULL) {
+ X509_free(x);
+ }
+ if (sk != NULL) {
+ sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
+ cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
+ if (cpk == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_certificate,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk);
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
+ return ssl_do_write(s);
+}
+
+/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
+int ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) {
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
+ uint8_t *session;
+ size_t session_len;
+ uint8_t *p, *macstart;
+ int len;
+ unsigned int hlen;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ HMAC_CTX hctx;
+ SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
+ uint8_t iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ uint8_t key_name[16];
+ /* The maximum overhead of encrypting the session is 16 (key name) + IV +
+ * one block of encryption overhead + HMAC. */
+ const size_t max_ticket_overhead =
+ 16 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE;
+
+ /* Serialize the SSL_SESSION to be encoded into the ticket. */
+ if (!SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket(s->session, &session, &session_len)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* If the session is too long, emit a dummy value rather than abort the
+ * connection. */
+ if (session_len > 0xFFFF - max_ticket_overhead) {
+ static const char kTicketPlaceholder[] = "TICKET TOO LARGE";
+ const size_t placeholder_len = strlen(kTicketPlaceholder);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(session);
+
+ p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+ /* Emit ticket_lifetime_hint. */
+ l2n(0, p);
+ /* Emit ticket. */
+ s2n(placeholder_len, p);
+ memcpy(p, kTicketPlaceholder, placeholder_len);
+ p += placeholder_len;
+
+ len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
+ ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
+ return ssl_do_write(s);
+ }
+
+ /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as follows:
+ * handshake_header_length + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
+ * max_ticket_overhead + * session_length */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 6 +
+ max_ticket_overhead + session_len)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(session);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+ /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does all the
+ * work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. */
+ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
+ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, &hctx, 1) < 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(session);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!RAND_bytes(iv, 16) ||
+ !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+ tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv) ||
+ !HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, tlsext_tick_md(),
+ NULL)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(session);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified for
+ * resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for new
+ * sessions will live as long as their sessions. */
+ l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
+
+ /* Skip ticket length for now */
+ p += 2;
+ /* Output key name */
+ macstart = p;
+ memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
+ p += 16;
+ /* output IV */
+ memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
+ p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+ /* Encrypt session data */
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, session, session_len);
+ p += len;
+ EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &len);
+ p += len;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+ HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
+ HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+
+ p += hlen;
+ /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
+ /* Total length */
+ len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
+ /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
+ p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
+ s2n(len - 6, p);
+ ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
+ OPENSSL_free(session);
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
+ return ssl_do_write(s);
+}
+
+/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
+ * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
+int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) {
+ int ok;
+ long n;
+ CBS next_protocol, selected_protocol, padding;
+
+ /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the extension
+ * in their ClientHello */
+ if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_next_proto,
+ SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
+ 514, /* See the payload format below */
+ SSL_GET_MESSAGE_HASH_MESSAGE, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok) {
+ return n;
+ }
+
+ /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
+ * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
+ * ssl3_get_finished).
+ *
+ * TODO(davidben): Is this check now redundant with
+ * SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS? */
+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_next_proto,
+ SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ CBS_init(&next_protocol, s->init_msg, n);
+
+ /* The payload looks like:
+ * uint8 proto_len;
+ * uint8 proto[proto_len];
+ * uint8 padding_len;
+ * uint8 padding[padding_len]; */
+ if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&next_protocol, &selected_protocol) ||
+ !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&next_protocol, &padding) ||
+ CBS_len(&next_protocol) != 0 ||
+ !CBS_stow(&selected_protocol, &s->next_proto_negotiated,
+ &s->next_proto_negotiated_len)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* ssl3_get_channel_id reads and verifies a ClientID handshake message. */
+int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL *s) {
+ int ret = -1, ok;
+ long n;
+ EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+ uint8_t channel_id_hash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned int channel_id_hash_len;
+ const uint8_t *p;
+ uint16_t extension_type, expected_extension_type;
+ EC_GROUP *p256 = NULL;
+ EC_KEY *key = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+ ECDSA_SIG sig;
+ BIGNUM x, y;
+ CBS encrypted_extensions, extension;
+
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(
+ s, SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B,
+ SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE,
+ SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok) {
+ return n;
+ }
+
+ /* Before incorporating the EncryptedExtensions message to the handshake
+ * hash, compute the hash that should have been signed. */
+ channel_id_hash_len = sizeof(channel_id_hash);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL) ||
+ !tls1_channel_id_hash(&md_ctx, s) ||
+ !EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, channel_id_hash, &channel_id_hash_len)) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ assert(channel_id_hash_len == SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+
+ ssl3_hash_current_message(s);
+
+ /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
+ * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
+ * ssl3_get_finished).
+ *
+ * TODO(davidben): Is this check now redundant with SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS? */
+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_channel_id,
+ SSL_R_GOT_CHANNEL_ID_BEFORE_A_CCS);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ CBS_init(&encrypted_extensions, s->init_msg, n);
+
+ /* EncryptedExtensions could include multiple extensions, but the only
+ * extension that could be negotiated is ChannelID, so there can only be one
+ * entry.
+ *
+ * The payload looks like:
+ * uint16 extension_type
+ * uint16 extension_len;
+ * uint8 x[32];
+ * uint8 y[32];
+ * uint8 r[32];
+ * uint8 s[32]; */
+ expected_extension_type = TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id;
+ if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) {
+ expected_extension_type = TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new;
+ }
+
+ if (!CBS_get_u16(&encrypted_extensions, &extension_type) ||
+ !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&encrypted_extensions, &extension) ||
+ CBS_len(&encrypted_extensions) != 0 ||
+ extension_type != expected_extension_type ||
+ CBS_len(&extension) != TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_channel_id, SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ p256 = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
+ if (!p256) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_channel_id, SSL_R_NO_P256_SUPPORT);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ BN_init(&x);
+ BN_init(&y);
+ sig.r = BN_new();
+ sig.s = BN_new();
+
+ p = CBS_data(&extension);
+ if (BN_bin2bn(p + 0, 32, &x) == NULL ||
+ BN_bin2bn(p + 32, 32, &y) == NULL ||
+ BN_bin2bn(p + 64, 32, sig.r) == NULL ||
+ BN_bin2bn(p + 96, 32, sig.s) == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ point = EC_POINT_new(p256);
+ if (!point || !EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(p256, point, &x, &y, NULL)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ key = EC_KEY_new();
+ if (!key || !EC_KEY_set_group(key, p256) ||
+ !EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* We stored the handshake hash in |tlsext_channel_id| the first time that we
+ * were called. */
+ if (!ECDSA_do_verify(channel_id_hash, channel_id_hash_len, &sig, key)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_channel_id,
+ SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVALID);
+ s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, p, 64);
+ ret = 1;
+
+err:
+ BN_free(&x);
+ BN_free(&y);
+ BN_free(sig.r);
+ BN_free(sig.s);
+ if (key) {
+ EC_KEY_free(key);
+ }
+ if (point) {
+ EC_POINT_free(point);
+ }
+ if (p256) {
+ EC_GROUP_free(p256);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}