Implement ScopedFD in terms of ScopedGeneric.
Move to a new file base/files/scoped_file.h. I will also add ScopedFILE to here (currently in file_util.h) later.
I think there is a crash in the old code in content/browser/zygote_host/zygote_host_impl_linux.cc that this patch should fix. The old ScopedFD took the address of something in a vector that is being modified.
I removed SafeScopedFD from content/common/sandbox_linux/sandbox_linux.cc since base's ScopedFD not CHECKs on close failure (this is a more recent addition).
Reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/191673003/
R=agl, viettrungluu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/202113004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@257473 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CrOS-Libchrome-Original-Commit: 42f558fdef03f1ec2261f554151d8a4d168919e4
diff --git a/base/files/scoped_file.cc b/base/files/scoped_file.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..39f064d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/base/files/scoped_file.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+// Copyright 2014 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+// found in the LICENSE file.
+
+#include "base/files/scoped_file.h"
+
+#include "base/logging.h"
+
+#if defined(OS_POSIX)
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "base/posix/eintr_wrapper.h"
+#endif
+
+namespace base {
+namespace internal {
+
+#if defined(OS_POSIX)
+
+// static
+void ScopedFDCloseTraits::Free(int fd) {
+ // It's important to crash here.
+ // There are security implications to not closing a file descriptor
+ // properly. As file descriptors are "capabilities", keeping them open
+ // would make the current process keep access to a resource. Much of
+ // Chrome relies on being able to "drop" such access.
+ // It's especially problematic on Linux with the setuid sandbox, where
+ // a single open directory would bypass the entire security model.
+ PCHECK(0 == IGNORE_EINTR(close(fd)));
+}
+
+#endif // OS_POSIX
+
+} // namespace internal
+} // namespace base