- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/25 00:05:41
[auth-bsdauth.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth2-chall.c channels.c]
[clientloop.c deattack.c gss-genr.c kex.c key.c misc.c moduli.c]
[monitor.c monitor_wrap.c packet.c scard.c sftp-server.c ssh-agent.c]
[ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c uuencode.c]
[xmalloc.c xmalloc.h]
introduce xcalloc() and xasprintf() failure-checked allocations
functions and use them throughout openssh
xcalloc is particularly important because malloc(nmemb * size) is a
dangerous idiom (subject to integer overflow) and it is time for it
to die
feedback and ok deraadt@
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index 85c6f8d..aa6d660 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -340,7 +340,8 @@
static char *
expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
{
- char *file, *ret;
+ char *file, ret[MAXPATHLEN];
+ int i;
file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
"u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
@@ -352,14 +353,11 @@
if (*file == '/')
return (file);
- ret = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
- if (strlcpy(ret, pw->pw_dir, MAXPATHLEN) >= MAXPATHLEN ||
- strlcat(ret, "/", MAXPATHLEN) >= MAXPATHLEN ||
- strlcat(ret, file, MAXPATHLEN) >= MAXPATHLEN)
+ i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file);
+ if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret))
fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
-
xfree(file);
- return (ret);
+ return (xstrdup(ret));
}
char *