Hopefully things did not get mixed around too much. It compiles under
Linux and works. So that is at least a good sign. =)
20010122
- (bal) OpenBSD Resync
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 12:45:26 GMT 2001 by markus
[servconf.c ssh.h sshd.c]
only auth-chall.c needs #ifdef SKEY
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 15:55:10 GMT 2001 by markus
[auth-krb4.c auth-options.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c
auth1.c auth2.c channels.c clientloop.c dh.c dispatch.c nchan.c
packet.c pathname.h readconf.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c
session.c ssh-add.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c ssh.h
ssh1.h sshconnect1.c sshd.c ttymodes.c]
move ssh1 definitions to ssh1.h, pathnames to pathnames.h
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 16:48:14
[sshd.8]
fix typo; from stevesk@
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 16:50:58
[ssh-dss.c]
clear and free digest, make consistent with other code (use dlen); from
stevesk@
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 15:55:20 GMT 2001 by markus
[auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c auth2.c]
pass the filename to auth_parse_options()
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 17:59:40 GMT 2001
[readconf.c]
fix SIGSEGV from -o ""; problem noted by jehsom@togetherweb.com
- stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 18:20:29
[sshconnect2.c]
dh_new_group() does not return NULL. ok markus@
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 21:33:42
[ssh-add.c]
do not loop forever if askpass does not exist; from
andrew@pimlott.ne.mediaone.net
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 23:00:56
[servconf.c]
Check for NULL return from strdelim; ok markus
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 23:02:07
[readconf.c]
KNF; ok markus
- jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/21 9:00:33
[ssh-keygen.1]
remove -R flag; ok markus@
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/21 19:05:40
[atomicio.c automicio.h auth-chall.c auth-krb4.c auth-options.c
auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c
auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2.c authfd.c authfile.c
bufaux.c bufaux.h buffer.c canahost.c canahost.h channels.c
cipher.c cli.c clientloop.c clientloop.h compat.c compress.c
deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c groupaccess.c hmac.c hostfile.c kex.c
key.c key.h log-client.c log-server.c log.c log.h login.c login.h
match.c misc.c misc.h nchan.c packet.c pty.c radix.h readconf.c
readpass.c readpass.h rsa.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c serverloop.h
session.c sftp-server.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c
ssh-keyscan.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h
sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c tildexpand.c tildexpand.h
ttysmodes.c uidswap.c xmalloc.c]
split ssh.h and try to cleanup the #include mess. remove unnecessary
#includes. rename util.[ch] -> misc.[ch]
- (bal) renamed 'PIDDIR' to '_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR' to match OpenBSD tree
- (bal) Moved #ifdef KRB4 in auth-krb4.c above the #include to resolve
conflict when compiling for non-kerb install
- (bal) removed the #ifdef SKEY in auth1.c to match Markus' changes
on 1/19.
diff --git a/auth-rsa.c b/auth-rsa.c
index 3daf4d1..ee71655 100644
--- a/auth-rsa.c
+++ b/auth-rsa.c
@@ -14,21 +14,23 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.34 2000/12/19 23:17:55 markus Exp $");
-
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "mpaux.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "match.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.38 2001/01/21 19:05:42 markus Exp $");
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "mpaux.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "auth.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
@@ -120,7 +122,7 @@
int
auth_rsa(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n)
{
- char line[8192], file[1024];
+ char line[8192], file[MAXPATHLEN];
int authenticated;
u_int bits;
FILE *f;
@@ -137,7 +139,7 @@
/* The authorized keys. */
snprintf(file, sizeof file, "%.500s/%.100s", pw->pw_dir,
- SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS);
+ _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS);
/* Fail quietly if file does not exist */
if (stat(file, &st) < 0) {
@@ -165,10 +167,10 @@
"bad ownership or modes for '%s'.", pw->pw_name, file);
fail = 1;
} else {
- /* Check path to SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS */
+ /* Check path to _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS */
int i;
static const char *check[] = {
- "", SSH_USER_DIR, NULL
+ "", _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR, NULL
};
for (i = 0; check[i]; i++) {
snprintf(line, sizeof line, "%.500s/%.100s", pw->pw_dir, check[i]);
@@ -235,9 +237,9 @@
/* Parse the key from the line. */
if (!auth_rsa_read_key(&cp, &bits, pk->e, pk->n)) {
debug("%.100s, line %lu: bad key syntax",
- SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS, linenum);
+ file, linenum);
packet_send_debug("%.100s, line %lu: bad key syntax",
- SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS, linenum);
+ file, linenum);
continue;
}
/* cp now points to the comment part. */
@@ -257,7 +259,7 @@
* If our options do not allow this key to be used,
* do not send challenge.
*/
- if (!auth_parse_options(pw, options, linenum))
+ if (!auth_parse_options(pw, options, file, linenum))
continue;
/* Perform the challenge-response dialog for this key. */