- More reformatting merged from OpenBSD CVS
- Merged OpenBSD CVS changes:
- [channels.c]
report from mrwizard@psu.edu via djm@ibs.com.au
- [channels.c]
set SO_REUSEADDR and SO_LINGER for forwarded ports.
chip@valinux.com via damien@ibs.com.au
- [nchan.c]
it's not an error() if shutdown_write failes in nchan.
- [readconf.c]
remove dead #ifdef-0-code
- [readconf.c servconf.c]
strcasecmp instead of tolower
- [scp.c]
progress meter overflow fix from damien@ibs.com.au
- [ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c]
SSH_ASKPASS support
- [ssh.1 ssh.c]
postpone fork_after_authentication until command execution,
request/patch from jahakala@cc.jyu.fi via damien@ibs.com.au
plus: use daemon() for backgrounding
diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
index 0657c37..0b1c090 100644
--- a/sshconnect.c
+++ b/sshconnect.c
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$Id: sshconnect.c,v 1.14 1999/11/24 13:26:23 damien Exp $");
+RCSID("$Id: sshconnect.c,v 1.15 1999/11/25 00:54:59 damien Exp $");
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/bn.h>
@@ -142,8 +142,10 @@
{
int sock;
- /* If we are running as root and want to connect to a privileged
- port, bind our own socket to a privileged port. */
+ /*
+ * If we are running as root and want to connect to a privileged
+ * port, bind our own socket to a privileged port.
+ */
if (privileged) {
int p = IPPORT_RESERVED - 1;
@@ -227,9 +229,11 @@
!anonymous && geteuid() == 0 &&
port < IPPORT_RESERVED);
- /* Connect to the host. We use the user's uid in
- the hope that it will help with the problems of
- tcp_wrappers showing the remote uid as root. */
+ /*
+ * Connect to the host. We use the user's uid in the
+ * hope that it will help with the problems of
+ * tcp_wrappers showing the remote uid as root.
+ */
temporarily_use_uid(original_real_uid);
if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) hostaddr, sizeof(*hostaddr))
>= 0) {
@@ -270,8 +274,12 @@
!anonymous && geteuid() == 0 &&
port < IPPORT_RESERVED);
- /* Connect to the host. We use the user's uid in the hope that
- it will help with tcp_wrappers showing the remote uid as root. */
+ /*
+ * Connect to the host. We use the user's
+ * uid in the hope that it will help with
+ * tcp_wrappers showing the remote uid as
+ * root.
+ */
temporarily_use_uid(original_real_uid);
if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) hostaddr,
sizeof(*hostaddr)) >= 0) {
@@ -282,8 +290,12 @@
debug("connect: %.100s", strerror(errno));
restore_uid();
- /* Close the failed socket; there appear to be some problems when
- reusing a socket for which connect() has already returned an error. */
+ /*
+ * Close the failed socket; there appear to
+ * be some problems when reusing a socket for
+ * which connect() has already returned an
+ * error.
+ */
shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR);
close(sock);
}
@@ -300,10 +312,11 @@
debug("Connection established.");
- /* Set socket options. We would like the socket to disappear as
- soon as it has been closed for whatever reason. */
- /* setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&on,
- sizeof(on)); */
+ /*
+ * Set socket options. We would like the socket to disappear as soon
+ * as it has been closed for whatever reason.
+ */
+ /* setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&on, sizeof(on)); */
setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, (void *) &on, sizeof(on));
linger.l_onoff = 1;
linger.l_linger = 5;
@@ -493,8 +506,10 @@
/* Wait for server's response. */
type = packet_read(&plen);
- /* The server responds with failure if it doesn\'t like our key or
- doesn\'t support RSA authentication. */
+ /*
+ * The server responds with failure if it doesn\'t like our key or
+ * doesn\'t support RSA authentication.
+ */
if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) {
debug("Server refused our key.");
xfree(comment);
@@ -514,8 +529,10 @@
debug("Received RSA challenge from server.");
private_key = RSA_new();
- /* Load the private key. Try first with empty passphrase; if it
- fails, ask for a passphrase. */
+ /*
+ * Load the private key. Try first with empty passphrase; if it
+ * fails, ask for a passphrase.
+ */
if (!load_private_key(authfile, "", private_key, NULL)) {
char buf[300];
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "Enter passphrase for RSA key '%.100s': ",
@@ -720,9 +737,11 @@
packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + auth.length, type);
- /* If his response isn't properly encrypted with the
- session key, and the decrypted checksum fails to match,
- he's bogus. Bail out. */
+ /*
+ * If his response isn't properly encrypted with the session
+ * key, and the decrypted checksum fails to match, he's
+ * bogus. Bail out.
+ */
r = krb_rd_priv(auth.dat, auth.length, schedule, &cred.session,
&foreign, &local, &msg_data);
if (r != KSUCCESS) {
@@ -894,8 +913,10 @@
}
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
- /* Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
- several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them. */
+ /*
+ * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
+ * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
+ */
if (sscanf(buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", &remote_major, &remote_minor,
remote_version) != 3)
fatal("Bad remote protocol version identification: '%.100s'", buf);
@@ -916,9 +937,11 @@
}
}
#if 0
- /* Removed for now, to permit compatibility with latter versions.
- The server will reject our version and disconnect if it doesn't
- support it. */
+ /*
+ * Removed for now, to permit compatibility with latter versions. The
+ * server will reject our version and disconnect if it doesn't
+ * support it.
+ */
if (remote_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)
fatal("Protocol major versions differ: %d vs. %d",
PROTOCOL_MAJOR, remote_major);
@@ -1086,10 +1109,7 @@
protocol_flags = packet_get_int();
packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags);
- /* Get supported cipher types. */
supported_ciphers = packet_get_int();
-
- /* Get supported authentication types. */
supported_authentications = packet_get_int();
debug("Received server public key (%d bits) and host key (%d bits).",
@@ -1099,11 +1119,12 @@
8 + 4 + sum_len + 0 + 4 + 0 + 0 + 4 + 4 + 4,
SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
- /* Compute the session id. */
compute_session_id(session_id, check_bytes, host_key->n, public_key->n);
- /* Check if the host key is present in the user\'s list of known
- hosts or in the systemwide list. */
+ /*
+ * Check if the host key is present in the user\'s list of known
+ * hosts or in the systemwide list.
+ */
host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(options.user_hostfile, host,
host_key->e, host_key->n,
file_key->e, file_key->n);
@@ -1111,18 +1132,22 @@
host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(options.system_hostfile, host,
host_key->e, host_key->n,
file_key->e, file_key->n);
- /* Force accepting of the host key for localhost and 127.0.0.1.
- The problem is that if the home directory is NFS-mounted to
- multiple machines, localhost will refer to a different machine
- in each of them, and the user will get bogus HOST_CHANGED
- warnings. This essentially disables host authentication for
- localhost; however, this is probably not a real problem. */
+ /*
+ * Force accepting of the host key for localhost and 127.0.0.1. The
+ * problem is that if the home directory is NFS-mounted to multiple
+ * machines, localhost will refer to a different machine in each of
+ * them, and the user will get bogus HOST_CHANGED warnings. This
+ * essentially disables host authentication for localhost; however,
+ * this is probably not a real problem.
+ */
if (local) {
debug("Forcing accepting of host key for localhost.");
host_status = HOST_OK;
}
- /* Also perform check for the ip address, skip the check if we are
- localhost or the hostname was an ip address to begin with */
+ /*
+ * Also perform check for the ip address, skip the check if we are
+ * localhost or the hostname was an ip address to begin with
+ */
if (options.check_host_ip && !local && strcmp(host, ip)) {
RSA *ip_key = RSA_new();
ip_key->n = BN_new();
@@ -1226,13 +1251,18 @@
error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.",
options.user_hostfile);
- /* If strict host key checking is in use, the user will
- have to edit the key manually and we can only abort. */
+ /*
+ * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
+ * to edit the key manually and we can only abort.
+ */
if (options.strict_host_key_checking)
fatal("Host key for %.200s has changed and you have requested strict checking.", host);
- /* If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow the connection
- but without password authentication or agent forwarding. */
+ /*
+ * If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow
+ * the connection but without password authentication or
+ * agent forwarding.
+ */
if (options.password_authentication) {
error("Password authentication is disabled to avoid trojan horses.");
options.password_authentication = 0;
@@ -1241,11 +1271,13 @@
error("Agent forwarding is disabled to avoid trojan horses.");
options.forward_agent = 0;
}
- /* XXX Should permit the user to change to use the new id.
- This could be done by converting the host key to an
- identifying sentence, tell that the host identifies
- itself by that sentence, and ask the user if he/she
- whishes to accept the authentication. */
+ /*
+ * XXX Should permit the user to change to use the new id.
+ * This could be done by converting the host key to an
+ * identifying sentence, tell that the host identifies itself
+ * by that sentence, and ask the user if he/she whishes to
+ * accept the authentication.
+ */
break;
}
@@ -1255,9 +1287,11 @@
/* Generate a session key. */
arc4random_stir();
- /* Generate an encryption key for the session. The key is a 256
- bit random number, interpreted as a 32-byte key, with the least
- significant 8 bits being the first byte of the key. */
+ /*
+ * Generate an encryption key for the session. The key is a 256 bit
+ * random number, interpreted as a 32-byte key, with the least
+ * significant 8 bits being the first byte of the key.
+ */
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
if (i % 4 == 0)
rand = arc4random();
@@ -1265,9 +1299,11 @@
rand >>= 8;
}
- /* According to the protocol spec, the first byte of the session
- key is the highest byte of the integer. The session key is
- xored with the first 16 bytes of the session id. */
+ /*
+ * According to the protocol spec, the first byte of the session key
+ * is the highest byte of the integer. The session key is xored with
+ * the first 16 bytes of the session id.
+ */
key = BN_new();
BN_set_word(key, 0);
for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) {
@@ -1278,8 +1314,10 @@
BN_add_word(key, session_key[i]);
}
- /* Encrypt the integer using the public key and host key of the
- server (key with smaller modulus first). */
+ /*
+ * Encrypt the integer using the public key and host key of the
+ * server (key with smaller modulus first).
+ */
if (BN_cmp(public_key->n, host_key->n) < 0) {
/* Public key has smaller modulus. */
if (BN_num_bits(host_key->n) <
@@ -1354,8 +1392,10 @@
/* We will no longer need the session key here. Destroy any extra copies. */
memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
- /* Expect a success message from the server. Note that this
- message will be received in encrypted form. */
+ /*
+ * Expect a success message from the server. Note that this message
+ * will be received in encrypted form.
+ */
packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
debug("Received encrypted confirmation.");
@@ -1366,9 +1406,11 @@
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
- /* The server should respond with success if no authentication is
- needed (the user has no password). Otherwise the server
- responds with failure. */
+ /*
+ * The server should respond with success if no authentication is
+ * needed (the user has no password). Otherwise the server responds
+ * with failure.
+ */
type = packet_read(&payload_len);
/* check whether the connection was accepted without authentication. */
@@ -1410,8 +1452,10 @@
}
#endif /* KRB4 */
- /* Use rhosts authentication if running in privileged socket and
- we do not wish to remain anonymous. */
+ /*
+ * Use rhosts authentication if running in privileged socket and we
+ * do not wish to remain anonymous.
+ */
if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS)) &&
options.rhosts_authentication) {
debug("Trying rhosts authentication.");
@@ -1428,8 +1472,10 @@
packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to rhosts auth",
type);
}
- /* Try .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication with RSA host
- authentication. */
+ /*
+ * Try .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication with RSA host
+ * authentication.
+ */
if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA)) &&
options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && host_key_valid) {
if (try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(local_user, own_host_key))
@@ -1438,10 +1484,11 @@
/* Try RSA authentication if the server supports it. */
if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA)) &&
options.rsa_authentication) {
- /* Try RSA authentication using the authentication agent.
- The agent is tried first because no passphrase is
- needed for it, whereas identity files may require
- passphrases. */
+ /*
+ * Try RSA authentication using the authentication agent. The
+ * agent is tried first because no passphrase is needed for
+ * it, whereas identity files may require passphrases.
+ */
if (try_agent_authentication())
return;