- More reformatting merged from OpenBSD CVS
- Merged OpenBSD CVS changes:
- [channels.c]
report from mrwizard@psu.edu via djm@ibs.com.au
- [channels.c]
set SO_REUSEADDR and SO_LINGER for forwarded ports.
chip@valinux.com via damien@ibs.com.au
- [nchan.c]
it's not an error() if shutdown_write failes in nchan.
- [readconf.c]
remove dead #ifdef-0-code
- [readconf.c servconf.c]
strcasecmp instead of tolower
- [scp.c]
progress meter overflow fix from damien@ibs.com.au
- [ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c]
SSH_ASKPASS support
- [ssh.1 ssh.c]
postpone fork_after_authentication until command execution,
request/patch from jahakala@cc.jyu.fi via damien@ibs.com.au
plus: use daemon() for backgrounding
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index d65671d..c4b1d1d 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$Id: sshd.c,v 1.31 1999/11/24 23:42:08 damien Exp $");
+RCSID("$Id: sshd.c,v 1.32 1999/11/25 00:54:59 damien Exp $");
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "rsa.h"
@@ -65,12 +65,16 @@
/* Saved arguments to main(). */
char **saved_argv;
-/* This is set to the socket that the server is listening; this is used in
- the SIGHUP signal handler. */
+/*
+ * This is set to the socket that the server is listening; this is used in
+ * the SIGHUP signal handler.
+ */
int listen_sock;
-/* the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode.
- if != NULL, sshd will skip the version-number exchange */
+/*
+ * the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode. if != NULL,
+ * sshd will skip the version-number exchange
+ */
char *client_version_string = NULL;
/* Flags set in auth-rsa from authorized_keys flags. These are set in auth-rsa.c. */
@@ -88,19 +92,23 @@
/* Session id for the current session. */
unsigned char session_id[16];
-/* Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this structure.
- The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so that the
- pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some problems.
- The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle) have
- access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is not
- very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented. */
+/*
+ * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this
+ * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so
+ * that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some
+ * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle)
+ * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is
+ * not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented.
+ */
struct {
RSA *private_key; /* Private part of server key. */
RSA *host_key; /* Private part of host key. */
} sensitive_data;
-/* Flag indicating whether the current session key has been used. This flag
- is set whenever the key is used, and cleared when the key is regenerated. */
+/*
+ * Flag indicating whether the current session key has been used. This flag
+ * is set whenever the key is used, and cleared when the key is regenerated.
+ */
int key_used = 0;
/* This is set to true when SIGHUP is received. */
@@ -466,7 +474,7 @@
fprintf(stderr, "sshd version %s\n", SSH_VERSION);
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options]\n", av0);
fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -f file Configuration file (default %s/sshd_config)\n", ETCDIR);
+ fprintf(stderr, " -f file Configuration file (default %s)\n", SERVER_CONFIG_FILE);
fprintf(stderr, " -d Debugging mode\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -i Started from inetd\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -q Quiet (no logging)\n");
@@ -614,13 +622,11 @@
setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, (void *) &linger,
sizeof(linger));
- /* Initialize the socket address. */
memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_addr = options.listen_addr;
sin.sin_port = htons(options.port);
- /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
if (bind(listen_sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sin, sizeof(sin)) < 0) {
error("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno));
shutdown(listen_sock, SHUT_RDWR);
@@ -628,12 +634,13 @@
fatal("Bind to port %d failed.", options.port);
}
if (!debug_flag) {
- /* Record our pid in /etc/sshd_pid to make it
- easier to kill the correct sshd. We don\'t
- want to do this before the bind above because
- the bind will fail if there already is a
- daemon, and this will overwrite any old pid in
- the file. */
+ /*
+ * Record our pid in /etc/sshd_pid to make it easier
+ * to kill the correct sshd. We don\'t want to do
+ * this before the bind above because the bind will
+ * fail if there already is a daemon, and this will
+ * overwrite any old pid in the file.
+ */
f = fopen(SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE, "w");
if (f) {
fprintf(f, "%u\n", (unsigned int) getpid());
@@ -666,8 +673,10 @@
/* Arrange SIGCHLD to be caught. */
signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
- /* Stay listening for connections until the system crashes
- or the daemon is killed with a signal. */
+ /*
+ * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or
+ * the daemon is killed with a signal.
+ */
for (;;) {
if (received_sighup)
sighup_restart();
@@ -682,12 +691,16 @@
error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
continue;
}
- /* Got connection. Fork a child to handle it,
- unless we are in debugging mode. */
+ /*
+ * Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless
+ * we are in debugging mode.
+ */
if (debug_flag) {
- /* In debugging mode. Close the listening
- socket, and start processing the
- connection without forking. */
+ /*
+ * In debugging mode. Close the listening
+ * socket, and start processing the
+ * connection without forking.
+ */
debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode.");
close(listen_sock);
sock_in = newsock;
@@ -695,16 +708,17 @@
pid = getpid();
break;
} else {
- /* Normal production daemon. Fork, and
- have the child process the connection.
- The parent continues listening. */
+ /*
+ * Normal production daemon. Fork, and have
+ * the child process the connection. The
+ * parent continues listening.
+ */
if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
- /* Child. Close the listening
- socket, and start using the
- accepted socket. Reinitialize
- logging (since our pid has
- changed). We break out of the
- loop to handle the connection. */
+ /*
+ * Child. Close the listening socket, and start using the
+ * accepted socket. Reinitialize logging (since our pid has
+ * changed). We break out of the loop to handle the connection.
+ */
close(listen_sock);
sock_in = newsock;
sock_out = newsock;
@@ -731,9 +745,11 @@
/* This is the child processing a new connection. */
- /* Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the
- key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone.
- We will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense. */
+ /*
+ * Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the
+ * key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We
+ * will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense.
+ */
alarm(0);
signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
@@ -741,17 +757,20 @@
signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
- /* Set socket options for the connection. We want the socket to
- close as fast as possible without waiting for anything. If the
- connection is not a socket, these will do nothing. */
- /* setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&on,
- sizeof(on)); */
+ /*
+ * Set socket options for the connection. We want the socket to
+ * close as fast as possible without waiting for anything. If the
+ * connection is not a socket, these will do nothing.
+ */
+ /* setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&on, sizeof(on)); */
linger.l_onoff = 1;
linger.l_linger = 5;
setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, (void *) &linger, sizeof(linger));
- /* Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we
- do not have a key. */
+ /*
+ * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do
+ * not have a key.
+ */
packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out);
remote_port = get_remote_port();
@@ -777,12 +796,14 @@
verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
#endif /* LIBWRAP */
- /* We don\'t want to listen forever unless the other side
- successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which
- is cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero
- indicates no limit. Note that we don\'t set the alarm in
- debugging mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit
- just when you are about to discover the bug. */
+ /*
+ * We don\'t want to listen forever unless the other side
+ * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
+ * cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero
+ * indicates no limit. Note that we don\'t set the alarm in debugging
+ * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you
+ * are about to discover the bug.
+ */
signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler);
if (!debug_flag)
alarm(options.login_grace_time);
@@ -815,8 +836,10 @@
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
}
- /* Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
- several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them. */
+ /*
+ * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
+ * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
+ */
if (sscanf(buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", &remote_major, &remote_minor,
remote_version) != 3) {
const char *s = "Protocol mismatch.\n";
@@ -848,11 +871,13 @@
no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
}
}
- /* Check that the connection comes from a privileged port. Rhosts-
- and Rhosts-RSA-Authentication only make sense from priviledged
- programs. Of course, if the intruder has root access on his
- local machine, he can connect from any port. So do not use
- these authentication methods from machines that you do not trust. */
+ /*
+ * Check that the connection comes from a privileged port. Rhosts-
+ * and Rhosts-RSA-Authentication only make sense from priviledged
+ * programs. Of course, if the intruder has root access on his local
+ * machine, he can connect from any port. So do not use these
+ * authentication methods from machines that you do not trust.
+ */
if (remote_port >= IPPORT_RESERVED ||
remote_port < IPPORT_RESERVED / 2) {
options.rhosts_authentication = 0;
@@ -914,13 +939,15 @@
int plen, slen;
u_int32_t rand = 0;
- /* Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user
- packet in order for it to be accepted; this is used to defy ip
- spoofing attacks. Note that this only works against somebody
- doing IP spoofing from a remote machine; any machine on the
- local network can still see outgoing packets and catch the
- random cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and
- this is one of the reasons why it is inherently insecure. */
+ /*
+ * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user
+ * packet in order for it to be accepted; this is used to defy ip
+ * spoofing attacks. Note that this only works against somebody
+ * doing IP spoofing from a remote machine; any machine on the local
+ * network can still see outgoing packets and catch the random
+ * cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one
+ * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure.
+ */
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
if (i % 4 == 0)
rand = arc4random();
@@ -928,9 +955,11 @@
rand >>= 8;
}
- /* Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of
- random data that must be matched in the reply in order to
- prevent IP spoofing. */
+ /*
+ * Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of random
+ * data that must be matched in the reply in order to prevent IP
+ * spoofing.
+ */
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
packet_put_char(check_bytes[i]);
@@ -1002,14 +1031,15 @@
session_key_int = BN_new();
packet_get_bignum(session_key_int, &slen);
- /* Get protocol flags. */
protocol_flags = packet_get_int();
packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags);
packet_integrity_check(plen, 1 + 8 + slen + 4, SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
- /* Decrypt it using our private server key and private host key
- (key with larger modulus first). */
+ /*
+ * Decrypt it using our private server key and private host key (key
+ * with larger modulus first).
+ */
if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.private_key->n, sensitive_data.host_key->n) > 0) {
/* Private key has bigger modulus. */
if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.private_key->n) <
@@ -1040,14 +1070,15 @@
sensitive_data.private_key);
}
- /* Compute session id for this session. */
compute_session_id(session_id, check_bytes,
sensitive_data.host_key->n,
sensitive_data.private_key->n);
- /* Extract session key from the decrypted integer. The key is in
- the least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte
- of the key is in the highest bits. */
+ /*
+ * Extract session key from the decrypted integer. The key is in the
+ * least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the
+ * key is in the highest bits.
+ */
BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8);
len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
if (len < 0 || len > sizeof(session_key))
@@ -1125,8 +1156,7 @@
if (match_pattern(pw->pw_name, options.deny_users[i]))
return 0;
}
- /* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
- there */
+ /* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
if (!pw->pw_name)
return 0;
@@ -1151,8 +1181,10 @@
if (match_pattern(grp->gr_name, options.deny_groups[i]))
return 0;
}
- /* Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and user's
- group isn't listed there */
+ /*
+ * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and user's group
+ * isn't listed there
+ */
if (options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
if (!grp->gr_name)
return 0;
@@ -1216,8 +1248,10 @@
}
#endif
- /* If we are not running as root, the user must have the same uid
- as the server. */
+ /*
+ * If we are not running as root, the user must have the same uid as
+ * the server.
+ */
if (getuid() != 0 && pw->pw_uid != getuid())
packet_disconnect("Cannot change user when server not running as root.");
@@ -1357,10 +1391,12 @@
verbose("Rhosts authentication disabled.");
break;
}
- /* Get client user name. Note that we just have
- to trust the client; this is one reason why
- rhosts authentication is insecure. (Another is
- IP-spoofing on a local network.) */
+ /*
+ * Get client user name. Note that we just have to
+ * trust the client; this is one reason why rhosts
+ * authentication is insecure. (Another is
+ * IP-spoofing on a local network.)
+ */
client_user = packet_get_string(&ulen);
packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + ulen, type);
@@ -1379,9 +1415,11 @@
verbose("Rhosts with RSA authentication disabled.");
break;
}
- /* Get client user name. Note that we just have
- to trust the client; root on the client machine
- can claim to be any user. */
+ /*
+ * Get client user name. Note that we just have to
+ * trust the client; root on the client machine can
+ * claim to be any user.
+ */
client_user = packet_get_string(&ulen);
/* Get the client host key. */
@@ -1425,9 +1463,11 @@
verbose("Password authentication disabled.");
break;
}
- /* Read user password. It is in plain text, but
- was transmitted over the encrypted channel so
- it is not visible to an outside observer. */
+ /*
+ * Read user password. It is in plain text, but was
+ * transmitted over the encrypted channel so it is
+ * not visible to an outside observer.
+ */
password = packet_get_string(&dlen);
packet_integrity_check(plen, 4 + dlen, type);
@@ -1463,8 +1503,7 @@
skeyinfo = skey_fake_keyinfo(pw->pw_name);
}
if (skeyinfo != NULL) {
- /* we send our s/key- in
- tis-challenge messages */
+ /* we send our s/key- in tis-challenge messages */
debug("sending challenge '%s'", skeyinfo);
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE);
packet_put_string(skeyinfo, strlen(skeyinfo));
@@ -1493,8 +1532,10 @@
#endif
default:
- /* Any unknown messages will be ignored (and
- failure returned) during authentication. */
+ /*
+ * Any unknown messages will be ignored (and failure
+ * returned) during authentication.
+ */
log("Unknown message during authentication: type %d", type);
break;
}
@@ -1559,11 +1600,12 @@
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
- /* Keep reading packets, and always respond with a failure. This
- is to avoid disclosing whether such a user really exists. */
+ /*
+ * Keep reading packets, and always respond with a failure. This is
+ * to avoid disclosing whether such a user really exists.
+ */
for (attempt = 1;; attempt++) {
- /* Read a packet. This will not return if the client
- disconnects. */
+ /* Read a packet. This will not return if the client disconnects. */
int plen;
int type = packet_read(&plen);
#ifdef SKEY
@@ -1583,8 +1625,10 @@
if (attempt > AUTH_FAIL_MAX)
packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, user);
- /* Send failure. This should be indistinguishable from a
- failed authentication. */
+ /*
+ * Send failure. This should be indistinguishable from a
+ * failed authentication.
+ */
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
@@ -1630,19 +1674,25 @@
mode_t tty_mode;
int n_bytes;
- /* Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for
- authentication. */
+ /*
+ * Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for
+ * authentication.
+ */
alarm(0);
- /* Inform the channel mechanism that we are the server side and
- that the client may request to connect to any port at all.
- (The user could do it anyway, and we wouldn\'t know what is
- permitted except by the client telling us, so we can equally
- well trust the client not to request anything bogus.) */
+ /*
+ * Inform the channel mechanism that we are the server side and that
+ * the client may request to connect to any port at all. (The user
+ * could do it anyway, and we wouldn\'t know what is permitted except
+ * by the client telling us, so we can equally well trust the client
+ * not to request anything bogus.)
+ */
channel_permit_all_opens();
- /* We stay in this loop until the client requests to execute a
- shell or a command. */
+ /*
+ * We stay in this loop until the client requests to execute a shell
+ * or a command.
+ */
while (1) {
int plen, dlen;
@@ -1826,8 +1876,10 @@
return;
default:
- /* Any unknown messages in this phase are ignored,
- and a failure message is returned. */
+ /*
+ * Any unknown messages in this phase are ignored,
+ * and a failure message is returned.
+ */
log("Unknown packet type received after authentication: %d", type);
goto fail;
}
@@ -1852,8 +1904,10 @@
continue;
do_forced_command:
- /* There is a forced command specified for this login.
- Execute it. */
+ /*
+ * There is a forced command specified for this login.
+ * Execute it.
+ */
debug("Executing forced command: %.900s", forced_command);
if (have_pty)
do_exec_pty(forced_command, ptyfd, ttyfd, ttyname, pw, term, display, proto, data);
@@ -1897,14 +1951,18 @@
/* Child. Reinitialize the log since the pid has changed. */
log_init(av0, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
- /* Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
- setlogin() affects the entire process group. */
+ /*
+ * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
+ * setlogin() affects the entire process group.
+ */
if (setsid() < 0)
error("setsid failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
#ifdef USE_PIPES
- /* Redirect stdin. We close the parent side of the socket
- pair, and make the child side the standard input. */
+ /*
+ * Redirect stdin. We close the parent side of the socket
+ * pair, and make the child side the standard input.
+ */
close(pin[1]);
if (dup2(pin[0], 0) < 0)
perror("dup2 stdin");
@@ -1922,9 +1980,11 @@
perror("dup2 stderr");
close(perr[1]);
#else /* USE_PIPES */
- /* Redirect stdin, stdout, and stderr. Stdin and stdout
- will use the same socket, as some programs
- (particularly rdist) seem to depend on it. */
+ /*
+ * Redirect stdin, stdout, and stderr. Stdin and stdout will
+ * use the same socket, as some programs (particularly rdist)
+ * seem to depend on it.
+ */
close(inout[1]);
close(err[1]);
if (dup2(inout[0], 0) < 0) /* stdin */
@@ -1955,8 +2015,10 @@
close(inout[0]);
close(err[0]);
- /* Enter the interactive session. Note: server_loop must be able
- to handle the case that fdin and fdout are the same. */
+ /*
+ * Enter the interactive session. Note: server_loop must be able to
+ * handle the case that fdin and fdout are the same.
+ */
server_loop(pid, inout[1], inout[1], err[1]);
/* server_loop has closed inout[1] and err[1]. */
#endif /* USE_PIPES */
@@ -2012,8 +2074,10 @@
/* Get remote host name. */
hostname = get_canonical_hostname();
- /* Get the time when the user last logged in. Buf will be set to
- contain the hostname the last login was from. */
+ /*
+ * Get the time when the user last logged in. Buf will be set to
+ * contain the hostname the last login was from.
+ */
if (!options.use_login) {
last_login_time = get_last_login_time(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_name,
buf, sizeof(buf));
@@ -2049,9 +2113,11 @@
/* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */
close(ttyfd);
- /* Get IP address of client. This is needed because we
- want to record where the user logged in from. If the
- connection is not a socket, let the ip address be 0.0.0.0. */
+ /*
+ * Get IP address of client. This is needed because we want
+ * to record where the user logged in from. If the
+ * connection is not a socket, let the ip address be 0.0.0.0.
+ */
memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
if (packet_get_connection_in() == packet_get_connection_out()) {
fromlen = sizeof(from);
@@ -2075,12 +2141,14 @@
fprintf(stderr, pamconv_msg);
#endif
- /* If the user has logged in before, display the time of
- last login. However, don't display anything extra if a
- command has been specified (so that ssh can be used to
- execute commands on a remote machine without users
- knowing they are going to another machine). Login(1)
- will do this for us as well, so check if login(1) is used */
+ /*
+ * If the user has logged in before, display the time of last
+ * login. However, don't display anything extra if a command
+ * has been specified (so that ssh can be used to execute
+ * commands on a remote machine without users knowing they
+ * are going to another machine). Login(1) will do this for
+ * us as well, so check if login(1) is used
+ */
if (command == NULL && last_login_time != 0 && !quiet_login &&
!options.use_login) {
/* Convert the date to a string. */
@@ -2095,10 +2163,12 @@
else
printf("Last login: %s from %s\r\n", time_string, buf);
}
- /* Print /etc/motd unless a command was specified or
- printing it was disabled in server options or login(1)
- will be used. Note that some machines appear to print
- it in /etc/profile or similar. */
+ /*
+ * Print /etc/motd unless a command was specified or printing
+ * it was disabled in server options or login(1) will be
+ * used. Note that some machines appear to print it in
+ * /etc/profile or similar.
+ */
if (command == NULL && options.print_motd && !quiet_login &&
!options.use_login) {
/* Print /etc/motd if it exists. */
@@ -2118,15 +2188,19 @@
/* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */
close(ttyfd);
- /* Create another descriptor of the pty master side for use as the
- standard input. We could use the original descriptor, but this
- simplifies code in server_loop. The descriptor is bidirectional. */
+ /*
+ * Create another descriptor of the pty master side for use as the
+ * standard input. We could use the original descriptor, but this
+ * simplifies code in server_loop. The descriptor is bidirectional.
+ */
fdout = dup(ptyfd);
if (fdout < 0)
packet_disconnect("dup failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- /* Add a cleanup function to clear the utmp entry and record logout
- time in case we call fatal() (e.g., the connection gets closed). */
+ /*
+ * Add a cleanup function to clear the utmp entry and record logout
+ * time in case we call fatal() (e.g., the connection gets closed).
+ */
cleanup_context.pid = pid;
cleanup_context.ttyname = ttyname;
fatal_add_cleanup(pty_cleanup_proc, (void *) &cleanup_context);
@@ -2144,9 +2218,11 @@
/* Release the pseudo-tty. */
pty_release(ttyname);
- /* Close the server side of the socket pairs. We must do this
- after the pty cleanup, so that another process doesn't get this
- pty while we're still cleaning up. */
+ /*
+ * Close the server side of the socket pairs. We must do this after
+ * the pty cleanup, so that another process doesn't get this pty
+ * while we're still cleaning up.
+ */
close(ptyfd);
close(fdout);
}
@@ -2162,19 +2238,21 @@
unsigned int i, namelen;
char **env;
- /* Find the slot where the value should be stored. If the
- variable already exists, we reuse the slot; otherwise we append
- a new slot at the end of the array, expanding if necessary. */
+ /*
+ * Find the slot where the value should be stored. If the variable
+ * already exists, we reuse the slot; otherwise we append a new slot
+ * at the end of the array, expanding if necessary.
+ */
env = *envp;
namelen = strlen(name);
for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
if (strncmp(env[i], name, namelen) == 0 && env[i][namelen] == '=')
break;
if (env[i]) {
- /* Name already exists. Reuse the slot. */
+ /* Reuse the slot. */
xfree(env[i]);
} else {
- /* New variable. Expand the array if necessary. */
+ /* New variable. Expand if necessary. */
if (i >= (*envsizep) - 1) {
(*envsizep) += 50;
env = (*envp) = xrealloc(env, (*envsizep) * sizeof(char *));
@@ -2202,40 +2280,27 @@
char buf[4096];
char *cp, *value;
- /* Open the environment file. */
f = fopen(filename, "r");
if (!f)
return;
- /* Process each line. */
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) {
- /* Skip leading whitespace. */
- for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++);
-
- /* Ignore empty and comment lines. */
+ for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n')
continue;
-
- /* Remove newline. */
if (strchr(cp, '\n'))
*strchr(cp, '\n') = '\0';
-
- /* Find the equals sign. Its lack indicates badly
- formatted line. */
value = strchr(cp, '=');
if (value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Bad line in %.100s: %.200s\n", filename, buf);
continue;
}
- /* Replace the equals sign by nul, and advance value to
- the value string. */
+ /* Replace the equals sign by nul, and advance value to the value string. */
*value = '\0';
value++;
-
- /* Set the value in environment. */
child_set_env(env, envsize, cp, value);
}
-
fclose(f);
}
@@ -2299,8 +2364,10 @@
if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
fatal("Failed to set uids to %d.", (int) pw->pw_uid);
}
- /* Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is
- legal, and means /bin/sh. */
+ /*
+ * Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is
+ * legal, and means /bin/sh.
+ */
shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
#ifdef AFS
@@ -2315,8 +2382,7 @@
}
#endif /* AFS */
- /* Initialize the environment. In the first part we allocate
- space for all environment variables. */
+ /* Initialize the environment. */
envsize = 100;
env = xmalloc(envsize * sizeof(char *));
env[0] = NULL;
@@ -2335,7 +2401,6 @@
/* Normal systems set SHELL by default. */
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SHELL", shell);
}
- /* Let it inherit timezone if we have one. */
if (getenv("TZ"))
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ"));
@@ -2354,20 +2419,14 @@
xfree(ce);
}
- /* Set SSH_CLIENT. */
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %d",
get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(), options.port);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CLIENT", buf);
- /* Set SSH_TTY if we have a pty. */
if (ttyname)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TTY", ttyname);
-
- /* Set TERM if we have a pty. */
if (term)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", term);
-
- /* Set DISPLAY if we have one. */
if (display)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "DISPLAY", display);
@@ -2400,52 +2459,57 @@
}
#endif /* HAVE_LIBPAM */
- /* Set XAUTHORITY to always be a local file. */
if (xauthfile)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "XAUTHORITY", xauthfile);
- /* Set variable for forwarded authentication connection, if we
- have one. */
if (auth_get_socket_name() != NULL)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
auth_get_socket_name());
- /* Read $HOME/.ssh/environment. */
+ /* read $HOME/.ssh/environment. */
if (!options.use_login) {
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/.ssh/environment", pw->pw_dir);
read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf);
}
- /* If debugging, dump the environment to stderr. */
if (debug_flag) {
+ /* dump the environment */
fprintf(stderr, "Environment:\n");
for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
fprintf(stderr, " %.200s\n", env[i]);
}
- /* Close the connection descriptors; note that this is the child,
- and the server will still have the socket open, and it is
- important that we do not shutdown it. Note that the
- descriptors cannot be closed before building the environment,
- as we call get_remote_ipaddr there. */
+ /*
+ * Close the connection descriptors; note that this is the child, and
+ * the server will still have the socket open, and it is important
+ * that we do not shutdown it. Note that the descriptors cannot be
+ * closed before building the environment, as we call
+ * get_remote_ipaddr there.
+ */
if (packet_get_connection_in() == packet_get_connection_out())
close(packet_get_connection_in());
else {
close(packet_get_connection_in());
close(packet_get_connection_out());
}
- /* Close all descriptors related to channels. They will still
- remain open in the parent. */
+ /*
+ * Close all descriptors related to channels. They will still remain
+ * open in the parent.
+ */
+ /* XXX better use close-on-exec? -markus */
channel_close_all();
- /* Close any extra file descriptors. Note that there may still be
- descriptors left by system functions. They will be closed
- later. */
+ /*
+ * Close any extra file descriptors. Note that there may still be
+ * descriptors left by system functions. They will be closed later.
+ */
endpwent();
endhostent();
- /* Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don\'t have
- them hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this
- after initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves
- file descriptors open. */
+ /*
+ * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don\'t have them
+ * hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after
+ * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
+ * descriptors open.
+ */
for (i = 3; i < 64; i++)
close(i);
@@ -2454,12 +2518,16 @@
fprintf(stderr, "Could not chdir to home directory %s: %s\n",
pw->pw_dir, strerror(errno));
- /* Must take new environment into use so that .ssh/rc, /etc/sshrc
- and xauth are run in the proper environment. */
+ /*
+ * Must take new environment into use so that .ssh/rc, /etc/sshrc and
+ * xauth are run in the proper environment.
+ */
environ = env;
- /* Run $HOME/.ssh/rc, /etc/sshrc, or xauth (whichever is found
- first in this order). */
+ /*
+ * Run $HOME/.ssh/rc, /etc/sshrc, or xauth (whichever is found first
+ * in this order).
+ */
if (!options.use_login) {
if (stat(SSH_USER_RC, &st) >= 0) {
if (debug_flag)
@@ -2486,8 +2554,7 @@
}
#ifdef XAUTH_PATH
else {
- /* Add authority data to .Xauthority if
- appropriate. */
+ /* Add authority data to .Xauthority if appropriate. */
if (auth_proto != NULL && auth_data != NULL) {
if (debug_flag)
fprintf(stderr, "Running %.100s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n",
@@ -2510,15 +2577,19 @@
else
cp = shell;
}
- /* If we have no command, execute the shell. In this case, the
- shell name to be passed in argv[0] is preceded by '-' to
- indicate that this is a login shell. */
+ /*
+ * If we have no command, execute the shell. In this case, the shell
+ * name to be passed in argv[0] is preceded by '-' to indicate that
+ * this is a login shell.
+ */
if (!command) {
if (!options.use_login) {
char buf[256];
- /* Check for mail if we have a tty and it was
- enabled in server options. */
+ /*
+ * Check for mail if we have a tty and it was enabled
+ * in server options.
+ */
if (ttyname && options.check_mail) {
char *mailbox;
struct stat mailstat;
@@ -2558,8 +2629,10 @@
exit(1);
}
}
- /* Execute the command using the user's shell. This uses the -c
- option to execute the command. */
+ /*
+ * Execute the command using the user's shell. This uses the -c
+ * option to execute the command.
+ */
argv[0] = (char *) cp;
argv[1] = "-c";
argv[2] = (char *) command;