| /* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.63 2017/05/30 08:52:19 markus Exp $ */ |
| /* |
| * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES |
| * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. |
| * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, |
| * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, |
| * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY |
| * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT |
| * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF |
| * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| */ |
| |
| #include "includes.h" |
| |
| #include <sys/types.h> |
| #include <sys/stat.h> |
| #include <sys/wait.h> |
| |
| #include <errno.h> |
| #include <fcntl.h> |
| #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H |
| # include <paths.h> |
| #endif |
| #include <pwd.h> |
| #include <signal.h> |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include <stdarg.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| #include <time.h> |
| #include <unistd.h> |
| #include <limits.h> |
| |
| #include "xmalloc.h" |
| #include "ssh.h" |
| #include "ssh2.h" |
| #include "packet.h" |
| #include "buffer.h" |
| #include "log.h" |
| #include "misc.h" |
| #include "servconf.h" |
| #include "compat.h" |
| #include "key.h" |
| #include "hostfile.h" |
| #include "auth.h" |
| #include "pathnames.h" |
| #include "uidswap.h" |
| #include "auth-options.h" |
| #include "canohost.h" |
| #ifdef GSSAPI |
| #include "ssh-gss.h" |
| #endif |
| #include "monitor_wrap.h" |
| #include "authfile.h" |
| #include "match.h" |
| #include "ssherr.h" |
| #include "channels.h" /* XXX for session.h */ |
| #include "session.h" /* XXX for child_set_env(); refactor? */ |
| |
| /* import */ |
| extern ServerOptions options; |
| extern u_char *session_id2; |
| extern u_int session_id2_len; |
| |
| static int |
| userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) |
| { |
| Buffer b; |
| struct sshkey *key = NULL; |
| char *pkalg, *userstyle, *fp = NULL; |
| u_char *pkblob, *sig; |
| u_int alen, blen, slen; |
| int have_sig, pktype; |
| int authenticated = 0; |
| |
| if (!authctxt->valid) { |
| debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| have_sig = packet_get_char(); |
| if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) { |
| debug2("%s: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH", __func__); |
| /* no explicit pkalg given */ |
| pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen); |
| buffer_init(&b); |
| buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen); |
| /* so we have to extract the pkalg from the pkblob */ |
| pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen); |
| buffer_free(&b); |
| } else { |
| pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen); |
| pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen); |
| } |
| pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg); |
| if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) { |
| /* this is perfectly legal */ |
| logit("%s: unsupported public key algorithm: %s", |
| __func__, pkalg); |
| goto done; |
| } |
| key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen); |
| if (key == NULL) { |
| error("%s: cannot decode key: %s", __func__, pkalg); |
| goto done; |
| } |
| if (key->type != pktype) { |
| error("%s: type mismatch for decoded key " |
| "(received %d, expected %d)", __func__, key->type, pktype); |
| goto done; |
| } |
| if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA && |
| (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { |
| logit("Refusing RSA key because client uses unsafe " |
| "signature scheme"); |
| goto done; |
| } |
| fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); |
| if (auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key)) { |
| logit("refusing previously-used %s key", key_type(key)); |
| goto done; |
| } |
| if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), |
| options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1) { |
| logit("%s: key type %s not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes", |
| __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); |
| goto done; |
| } |
| |
| if (have_sig) { |
| debug3("%s: have signature for %s %s", |
| __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp); |
| sig = packet_get_string(&slen); |
| packet_check_eom(); |
| buffer_init(&b); |
| if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { |
| buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); |
| } else { |
| buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); |
| } |
| /* reconstruct packet */ |
| buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); |
| xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, |
| authctxt->style ? ":" : "", |
| authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); |
| buffer_put_cstring(&b, userstyle); |
| free(userstyle); |
| buffer_put_cstring(&b, |
| datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ? |
| "ssh-userauth" : |
| authctxt->service); |
| if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) { |
| buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); |
| } else { |
| buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey"); |
| buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); |
| buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg); |
| } |
| buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen); |
| #ifdef DEBUG_PK |
| buffer_dump(&b); |
| #endif |
| pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL); |
| |
| /* test for correct signature */ |
| authenticated = 0; |
| if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 1)) && |
| PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), |
| buffer_len(&b))) == 1) { |
| authenticated = 1; |
| /* Record the successful key to prevent reuse */ |
| auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key); |
| key = NULL; /* Don't free below */ |
| } |
| buffer_free(&b); |
| free(sig); |
| } else { |
| debug("%s: test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable for %s %s", |
| __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp); |
| packet_check_eom(); |
| |
| /* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */ |
| /* |
| * XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed |
| * to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this |
| * message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all |
| * if a user is not allowed to login. is this an |
| * issue? -markus |
| */ |
| if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 0))) { |
| packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK); |
| packet_put_string(pkalg, alen); |
| packet_put_string(pkblob, blen); |
| packet_send(); |
| packet_write_wait(); |
| authctxt->postponed = 1; |
| } |
| } |
| if (authenticated != 1) |
| auth_clear_options(); |
| done: |
| debug2("%s: authenticated %d pkalg %s", __func__, authenticated, pkalg); |
| if (key != NULL) |
| key_free(key); |
| free(pkalg); |
| free(pkblob); |
| free(fp); |
| return authenticated; |
| } |
| |
| void |
| pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const struct sshkey *key, |
| const char *fmt, ...) |
| { |
| char *fp, *extra; |
| va_list ap; |
| int i; |
| |
| extra = NULL; |
| if (fmt != NULL) { |
| va_start(ap, fmt); |
| i = vasprintf(&extra, fmt, ap); |
| va_end(ap); |
| if (i < 0 || extra == NULL) |
| fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__); |
| } |
| |
| if (key_is_cert(key)) { |
| fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, |
| options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); |
| auth_info(authctxt, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s", |
| key_type(key), key->cert->key_id, |
| (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial, |
| key_type(key->cert->signature_key), |
| fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, |
| extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra); |
| free(fp); |
| } else { |
| fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, |
| SSH_FP_DEFAULT); |
| auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key), |
| fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, |
| extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra); |
| free(fp); |
| } |
| free(extra); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Splits 's' into an argument vector. Handles quoted string and basic |
| * escape characters (\\, \", \'). Caller must free the argument vector |
| * and its members. |
| */ |
| static int |
| split_argv(const char *s, int *argcp, char ***argvp) |
| { |
| int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| int argc = 0, quote, i, j; |
| char *arg, **argv = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*argv)); |
| |
| *argvp = NULL; |
| *argcp = 0; |
| |
| for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) { |
| /* Skip leading whitespace */ |
| if (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t') |
| continue; |
| |
| /* Start of a token */ |
| quote = 0; |
| if (s[i] == '\\' && |
| (s[i + 1] == '\'' || s[i + 1] == '\"' || s[i + 1] == '\\')) |
| i++; |
| else if (s[i] == '\'' || s[i] == '"') |
| quote = s[i++]; |
| |
| argv = xreallocarray(argv, (argc + 2), sizeof(*argv)); |
| arg = argv[argc++] = xcalloc(1, strlen(s + i) + 1); |
| argv[argc] = NULL; |
| |
| /* Copy the token in, removing escapes */ |
| for (j = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) { |
| if (s[i] == '\\') { |
| if (s[i + 1] == '\'' || |
| s[i + 1] == '\"' || |
| s[i + 1] == '\\') { |
| i++; /* Skip '\' */ |
| arg[j++] = s[i]; |
| } else { |
| /* Unrecognised escape */ |
| arg[j++] = s[i]; |
| } |
| } else if (quote == 0 && (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t')) |
| break; /* done */ |
| else if (quote != 0 && s[i] == quote) |
| break; /* done */ |
| else |
| arg[j++] = s[i]; |
| } |
| if (s[i] == '\0') { |
| if (quote != 0) { |
| /* Ran out of string looking for close quote */ |
| r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| /* Success */ |
| *argcp = argc; |
| *argvp = argv; |
| argc = 0; |
| argv = NULL; |
| r = 0; |
| out: |
| if (argc != 0 && argv != NULL) { |
| for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) |
| free(argv[i]); |
| free(argv); |
| } |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Reassemble an argument vector into a string, quoting and escaping as |
| * necessary. Caller must free returned string. |
| */ |
| static char * |
| assemble_argv(int argc, char **argv) |
| { |
| int i, j, ws, r; |
| char c, *ret; |
| struct sshbuf *buf, *arg; |
| |
| if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (arg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) |
| fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { |
| ws = 0; |
| sshbuf_reset(arg); |
| for (j = 0; argv[i][j] != '\0'; j++) { |
| r = 0; |
| c = argv[i][j]; |
| switch (c) { |
| case ' ': |
| case '\t': |
| ws = 1; |
| r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c); |
| break; |
| case '\\': |
| case '\'': |
| case '"': |
| if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, '\\')) != 0) |
| break; |
| /* FALLTHROUGH */ |
| default: |
| r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c); |
| break; |
| } |
| if (r != 0) |
| fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8: %s", |
| __func__, ssh_err(r)); |
| } |
| if ((i != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ' ')) != 0) || |
| (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0) || |
| (r = sshbuf_putb(buf, arg)) != 0 || |
| (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0)) |
| fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); |
| } |
| if ((ret = malloc(sshbuf_len(buf) + 1)) == NULL) |
| fatal("%s: malloc failed", __func__); |
| memcpy(ret, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); |
| ret[sshbuf_len(buf)] = '\0'; |
| sshbuf_free(buf); |
| sshbuf_free(arg); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Runs command in a subprocess. Returns pid on success and a FILE* to the |
| * subprocess' stdout or 0 on failure. |
| * NB. "command" is only used for logging. |
| */ |
| static pid_t |
| subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command, |
| int ac, char **av, FILE **child) |
| { |
| FILE *f; |
| struct stat st; |
| int devnull, p[2], i; |
| pid_t pid; |
| char *cp, errmsg[512]; |
| u_int envsize; |
| char **child_env; |
| |
| *child = NULL; |
| |
| debug3("%s: %s command \"%s\" running as %s", __func__, |
| tag, command, pw->pw_name); |
| |
| /* Verify the path exists and is safe-ish to execute */ |
| if (*av[0] != '/') { |
| error("%s path is not absolute", tag); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| temporarily_use_uid(pw); |
| if (stat(av[0], &st) < 0) { |
| error("Could not stat %s \"%s\": %s", tag, |
| av[0], strerror(errno)); |
| restore_uid(); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (auth_secure_path(av[0], &st, NULL, 0, |
| errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) { |
| error("Unsafe %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], errmsg); |
| restore_uid(); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Run the command; stderr is left in place, stdout is the |
| * authorized_keys output. |
| */ |
| if (pipe(p) != 0) { |
| error("%s: pipe: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); |
| restore_uid(); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and |
| * run cleanup_exit() code. |
| */ |
| restore_uid(); |
| |
| switch ((pid = fork())) { |
| case -1: /* error */ |
| error("%s: fork: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); |
| close(p[0]); |
| close(p[1]); |
| return 0; |
| case 0: /* child */ |
| /* Prepare a minimal environment for the child. */ |
| envsize = 5; |
| child_env = xcalloc(sizeof(*child_env), envsize); |
| child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH); |
| child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name); |
| child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name); |
| child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir); |
| if ((cp = getenv("LANG")) != NULL) |
| child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LANG", cp); |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++) |
| signal(i, SIG_DFL); |
| |
| if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) { |
| error("%s: open %s: %s", tag, _PATH_DEVNULL, |
| strerror(errno)); |
| _exit(1); |
| } |
| /* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */ |
| if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || |
| dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) { |
| error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); |
| _exit(1); |
| } |
| closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); |
| |
| /* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */ |
| if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) { |
| error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, |
| strerror(errno)); |
| _exit(1); |
| } |
| if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) { |
| error("%s: setresuid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, |
| strerror(errno)); |
| _exit(1); |
| } |
| /* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */ |
| if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) { |
| error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); |
| _exit(1); |
| } |
| |
| execve(av[0], av, child_env); |
| error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno)); |
| _exit(127); |
| default: /* parent */ |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| close(p[1]); |
| if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) { |
| error("%s: fdopen: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); |
| close(p[0]); |
| /* Don't leave zombie child */ |
| kill(pid, SIGTERM); |
| while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR) |
| ; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /* Success */ |
| debug3("%s: %s pid %ld", __func__, tag, (long)pid); |
| *child = f; |
| return pid; |
| } |
| |
| /* Returns 0 if pid exited cleanly, non-zero otherwise */ |
| static int |
| exited_cleanly(pid_t pid, const char *tag, const char *cmd) |
| { |
| int status; |
| |
| while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { |
| if (errno != EINTR) { |
| error("%s: waitpid: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { |
| error("%s %s exited on signal %d", tag, cmd, WTERMSIG(status)); |
| return -1; |
| } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) { |
| error("%s %s failed, status %d", tag, cmd, WEXITSTATUS(status)); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert) |
| { |
| char *result; |
| u_int i; |
| |
| /* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */ |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) { |
| if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i], |
| principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) { |
| debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"", |
| result); |
| free(result); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| process_principals(FILE *f, char *file, struct passwd *pw, |
| const struct sshkey_cert *cert) |
| { |
| char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *cp, *ep, *line_opts; |
| u_long linenum = 0; |
| u_int i, found_principal = 0; |
| |
| while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) { |
| /* Always consume entire input */ |
| if (found_principal) |
| continue; |
| /* Skip leading whitespace. */ |
| for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) |
| ; |
| /* Skip blank and comment lines. */ |
| if ((ep = strchr(cp, '#')) != NULL) |
| *ep = '\0'; |
| if (!*cp || *cp == '\n') |
| continue; |
| /* Trim trailing whitespace. */ |
| ep = cp + strlen(cp) - 1; |
| while (ep > cp && (*ep == '\n' || *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t')) |
| *ep-- = '\0'; |
| /* |
| * If the line has internal whitespace then assume it has |
| * key options. |
| */ |
| line_opts = NULL; |
| if ((ep = strrchr(cp, ' ')) != NULL || |
| (ep = strrchr(cp, '\t')) != NULL) { |
| for (; *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'; ep++) |
| ; |
| line_opts = cp; |
| cp = ep; |
| } |
| for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) { |
| if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) == 0) { |
| debug3("%s:%lu: matched principal \"%.100s\"", |
| file == NULL ? "(command)" : file, |
| linenum, cert->principals[i]); |
| if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts, |
| file, linenum) != 1) |
| continue; |
| found_principal = 1; |
| continue; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| return found_principal; |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert) |
| { |
| FILE *f; |
| int success; |
| |
| temporarily_use_uid(pw); |
| debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file); |
| if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) { |
| restore_uid(); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| success = process_principals(f, file, pw, cert); |
| fclose(f); |
| restore_uid(); |
| return success; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Checks whether principal is allowed in output of command. |
| * returns 1 if the principal is allowed or 0 otherwise. |
| */ |
| static int |
| match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key) |
| { |
| const struct sshkey_cert *cert = key->cert; |
| FILE *f = NULL; |
| int r, ok, found_principal = 0; |
| struct passwd *pw; |
| int i, ac = 0, uid_swapped = 0; |
| pid_t pid; |
| char *tmp, *username = NULL, *command = NULL, **av = NULL; |
| char *ca_fp = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *catext = NULL, *keytext = NULL; |
| char serial_s[16]; |
| void (*osigchld)(int); |
| |
| if (options.authorized_principals_command == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL) { |
| error("No user for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand specified, " |
| "skipping"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to |
| * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly. |
| */ |
| osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); |
| |
| /* Prepare and verify the user for the command */ |
| username = percent_expand(options.authorized_principals_command_user, |
| "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); |
| pw = getpwnam(username); |
| if (pw == NULL) { |
| error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s", |
| username, strerror(errno)); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| /* Turn the command into an argument vector */ |
| if (split_argv(options.authorized_principals_command, &ac, &av) != 0) { |
| error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" contains " |
| "invalid quotes", command); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if (ac == 0) { |
| error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments", |
| command); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(cert->signature_key, |
| options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { |
| error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, |
| options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { |
| error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(cert->signature_key, &catext)) != 0) { |
| error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) { |
| error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| snprintf(serial_s, sizeof(serial_s), "%llu", |
| (unsigned long long)cert->serial); |
| for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) { |
| tmp = percent_expand(av[i], |
| "u", user_pw->pw_name, |
| "h", user_pw->pw_dir, |
| "t", sshkey_ssh_name(key), |
| "T", sshkey_ssh_name(cert->signature_key), |
| "f", key_fp, |
| "F", ca_fp, |
| "k", keytext, |
| "K", catext, |
| "i", cert->key_id, |
| "s", serial_s, |
| (char *)NULL); |
| if (tmp == NULL) |
| fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__); |
| free(av[i]); |
| av[i] = tmp; |
| } |
| /* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */ |
| command = assemble_argv(ac, av); |
| |
| if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", pw, command, |
| ac, av, &f)) == 0) |
| goto out; |
| |
| uid_swapped = 1; |
| temporarily_use_uid(pw); |
| |
| ok = process_principals(f, NULL, pw, cert); |
| |
| fclose(f); |
| f = NULL; |
| |
| if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| |
| /* Read completed successfully */ |
| found_principal = ok; |
| out: |
| if (f != NULL) |
| fclose(f); |
| signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); |
| for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) |
| free(av[i]); |
| free(av); |
| if (uid_swapped) |
| restore_uid(); |
| free(command); |
| free(username); |
| free(ca_fp); |
| free(key_fp); |
| free(catext); |
| free(keytext); |
| return found_principal; |
| } |
| /* |
| * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file, |
| * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. |
| */ |
| static int |
| check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, struct sshkey* key, struct passwd *pw) |
| { |
| char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES]; |
| int found_key = 0; |
| u_long linenum = 0; |
| struct sshkey *found; |
| |
| found_key = 0; |
| |
| found = NULL; |
| while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) { |
| char *cp, *key_options = NULL, *fp = NULL; |
| const char *reason = NULL; |
| |
| /* Always consume entrire file */ |
| if (found_key) |
| continue; |
| if (found != NULL) |
| key_free(found); |
| found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type); |
| auth_clear_options(); |
| |
| /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */ |
| for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) |
| ; |
| if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') |
| continue; |
| |
| if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) { |
| /* no key? check if there are options for this key */ |
| int quoted = 0; |
| debug2("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp); |
| key_options = cp; |
| for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) { |
| if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"') |
| cp++; /* Skip both */ |
| else if (*cp == '"') |
| quoted = !quoted; |
| } |
| /* Skip remaining whitespace. */ |
| for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) |
| ; |
| if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) { |
| debug2("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp); |
| /* still no key? advance to next line*/ |
| continue; |
| } |
| } |
| if (key_is_cert(key)) { |
| if (!key_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key)) |
| continue; |
| if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, |
| linenum) != 1) |
| continue; |
| if (!key_is_cert_authority) |
| continue; |
| if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found, |
| options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) |
| continue; |
| debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s", |
| file, linenum, key_type(found), fp); |
| /* |
| * If the user has specified a list of principals as |
| * a key option, then prefer that list to matching |
| * their username in the certificate principals list. |
| */ |
| if (authorized_principals != NULL && |
| !match_principals_option(authorized_principals, |
| key->cert)) { |
| reason = "Certificate does not contain an " |
| "authorized principal"; |
| fail_reason: |
| free(fp); |
| error("%s", reason); |
| auth_debug_add("%s", reason); |
| continue; |
| } |
| if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0, |
| authorized_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL, |
| &reason) != 0) |
| goto fail_reason; |
| if (auth_cert_options(key, pw, &reason) != 0) |
| goto fail_reason; |
| verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) " |
| "signed by %s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id, |
| (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial, |
| key_type(found), fp, file); |
| free(fp); |
| found_key = 1; |
| break; |
| } else if (key_equal(found, key)) { |
| if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, |
| linenum) != 1) |
| continue; |
| if (key_is_cert_authority) |
| continue; |
| if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found, |
| options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) |
| continue; |
| debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s", |
| file, linenum, key_type(found), fp); |
| free(fp); |
| found_key = 1; |
| continue; |
| } |
| } |
| if (found != NULL) |
| key_free(found); |
| if (!found_key) |
| debug2("key not found"); |
| return found_key; |
| } |
| |
| /* Authenticate a certificate key against TrustedUserCAKeys */ |
| static int |
| user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key) |
| { |
| char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL; |
| const char *reason; |
| int ret = 0, found_principal = 0, use_authorized_principals; |
| |
| if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, |
| options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (sshkey_in_file(key->cert->signature_key, |
| options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1, 0) != 0) { |
| debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__, |
| key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, |
| options.trusted_user_ca_keys); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| /* |
| * If AuthorizedPrincipals is in use, then compare the certificate |
| * principals against the names in that file rather than matching |
| * against the username. |
| */ |
| if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) { |
| if (match_principals_file(principals_file, pw, key->cert)) |
| found_principal = 1; |
| } |
| /* Try querying command if specified */ |
| if (!found_principal && match_principals_command(pw, key)) |
| found_principal = 1; |
| /* If principals file or command is specified, then require a match */ |
| use_authorized_principals = principals_file != NULL || |
| options.authorized_principals_command != NULL; |
| if (!found_principal && use_authorized_principals) { |
| reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal"; |
| fail_reason: |
| error("%s", reason); |
| auth_debug_add("%s", reason); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1, |
| use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0) |
| goto fail_reason; |
| if (auth_cert_options(key, pw, &reason) != 0) |
| goto fail_reason; |
| |
| verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) signed by " |
| "%s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id, |
| (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial, |
| key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, |
| options.trusted_user_ca_keys); |
| ret = 1; |
| |
| out: |
| free(principals_file); |
| free(ca_fp); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Checks whether key is allowed in file. |
| * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. |
| */ |
| static int |
| user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, char *file) |
| { |
| FILE *f; |
| int found_key = 0; |
| |
| /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */ |
| temporarily_use_uid(pw); |
| |
| debug("trying public key file %s", file); |
| if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) { |
| found_key = check_authkeys_file(f, file, key, pw); |
| fclose(f); |
| } |
| |
| restore_uid(); |
| return found_key; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Checks whether key is allowed in output of command. |
| * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. |
| */ |
| static int |
| user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey *key) |
| { |
| FILE *f = NULL; |
| int r, ok, found_key = 0; |
| struct passwd *pw; |
| int i, uid_swapped = 0, ac = 0; |
| pid_t pid; |
| char *username = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *keytext = NULL; |
| char *tmp, *command = NULL, **av = NULL; |
| void (*osigchld)(int); |
| |
| if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) { |
| error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to |
| * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly. |
| */ |
| osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); |
| |
| /* Prepare and verify the user for the command */ |
| username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user, |
| "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); |
| pw = getpwnam(username); |
| if (pw == NULL) { |
| error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s", |
| username, strerror(errno)); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| /* Prepare AuthorizedKeysCommand */ |
| if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, |
| SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { |
| error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) { |
| error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| /* Turn the command into an argument vector */ |
| if (split_argv(options.authorized_keys_command, &ac, &av) != 0) { |
| error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" contains invalid quotes", |
| command); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if (ac == 0) { |
| error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments", |
| command); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) { |
| tmp = percent_expand(av[i], |
| "u", user_pw->pw_name, |
| "h", user_pw->pw_dir, |
| "t", sshkey_ssh_name(key), |
| "f", key_fp, |
| "k", keytext, |
| (char *)NULL); |
| if (tmp == NULL) |
| fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__); |
| free(av[i]); |
| av[i] = tmp; |
| } |
| /* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */ |
| command = assemble_argv(ac, av); |
| |
| /* |
| * If AuthorizedKeysCommand was run without arguments |
| * then fall back to the old behaviour of passing the |
| * target username as a single argument. |
| */ |
| if (ac == 1) { |
| av = xreallocarray(av, ac + 2, sizeof(*av)); |
| av[1] = xstrdup(user_pw->pw_name); |
| av[2] = NULL; |
| /* Fix up command too, since it is used in log messages */ |
| free(command); |
| xasprintf(&command, "%s %s", av[0], av[1]); |
| } |
| |
| if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", pw, command, |
| ac, av, &f)) == 0) |
| goto out; |
| |
| uid_swapped = 1; |
| temporarily_use_uid(pw); |
| |
| ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw); |
| |
| fclose(f); |
| f = NULL; |
| |
| if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| |
| /* Read completed successfully */ |
| found_key = ok; |
| out: |
| if (f != NULL) |
| fclose(f); |
| signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); |
| for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) |
| free(av[i]); |
| free(av); |
| if (uid_swapped) |
| restore_uid(); |
| free(command); |
| free(username); |
| free(key_fp); |
| free(keytext); |
| return found_key; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user. |
| */ |
| int |
| user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, int auth_attempt) |
| { |
| u_int success, i; |
| char *file; |
| |
| if (auth_key_is_revoked(key)) |
| return 0; |
| if (key_is_cert(key) && auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| success = user_cert_trusted_ca(pw, key); |
| if (success) |
| return success; |
| |
| success = user_key_command_allowed2(pw, key); |
| if (success > 0) |
| return success; |
| |
| for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) { |
| |
| if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0) |
| continue; |
| file = expand_authorized_keys( |
| options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw); |
| |
| success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file); |
| free(file); |
| } |
| |
| return success; |
| } |
| |
| /* Records a public key in the list of previously-successful keys */ |
| void |
| auth2_record_userkey(Authctxt *authctxt, struct sshkey *key) |
| { |
| struct sshkey **tmp; |
| |
| if (authctxt->nprev_userkeys >= INT_MAX || |
| (tmp = reallocarray(authctxt->prev_userkeys, |
| authctxt->nprev_userkeys + 1, sizeof(*tmp))) == NULL) |
| fatal("%s: reallocarray failed", __func__); |
| authctxt->prev_userkeys = tmp; |
| authctxt->prev_userkeys[authctxt->nprev_userkeys] = key; |
| authctxt->nprev_userkeys++; |
| } |
| |
| /* Checks whether a key has already been used successfully for authentication */ |
| int |
| auth2_userkey_already_used(Authctxt *authctxt, struct sshkey *key) |
| { |
| u_int i; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < authctxt->nprev_userkeys; i++) { |
| if (sshkey_equal_public(key, authctxt->prev_userkeys[i])) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| Authmethod method_pubkey = { |
| "publickey", |
| userauth_pubkey, |
| &options.pubkey_authentication |
| }; |