- Merged very large OpenBSD source code reformat
- OpenBSD CVS updates
- [channels.c cipher.c compat.c log-client.c scp.c serverloop.c]
[ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c]
syslog changes:
* Unified Logmessage for all auth-types, for success and for failed
* Standard connections get only ONE line in the LOG when level==LOG:
Auth-attempts are logged only, if authentication is:
a) successfull or
b) with passwd or
c) we had more than AUTH_FAIL_LOG failues
* many log() became verbose()
* old behaviour with level=VERBOSE
- [readconf.c readconf.h ssh.1 ssh.h sshconnect.c sshd.c]
tranfer s/key challenge/response data in SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE
messages. allows use of s/key in windows (ttssh, securecrt) and
ssh-1.2.27 clients without 'ssh -v', ok: niels@
- [sshd.8]
-V, for fallback to openssh in SSH2 compatibility mode
- [sshd.c]
fix sigchld race; cjc5@po.cwru.edu
diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c
index 08f7987..3179ddc 100644
--- a/canohost.c
+++ b/canohost.c
@@ -1,233 +1,228 @@
/*
-
-canohost.c
-
-Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
-
-Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- All rights reserved
-
-Created: Sun Jul 2 17:52:22 1995 ylo
-
-Functions for returning the canonical host name of the remote site.
-
-*/
+ *
+ * canohost.c
+ *
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * Created: Sun Jul 2 17:52:22 1995 ylo
+ *
+ * Functions for returning the canonical host name of the remote site.
+ *
+ */
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$Id: canohost.c,v 1.2 1999/11/15 04:25:10 damien Exp $");
+RCSID("$Id: canohost.c,v 1.3 1999/11/24 13:26:22 damien Exp $");
#include "packet.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
-/* Return the canonical name of the host at the other end of the socket.
+/* Return the canonical name of the host at the other end of the socket.
The caller should free the returned string with xfree. */
-char *get_remote_hostname(int socket)
+char *
+get_remote_hostname(int socket)
{
- struct sockaddr_in from;
- int fromlen, i;
- struct hostent *hp;
- char name[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
+ struct sockaddr_in from;
+ int fromlen, i;
+ struct hostent *hp;
+ char name[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
- /* Get IP address of client. */
- fromlen = sizeof(from);
- memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
- if (getpeername(socket, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0)
- {
- debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- fatal_cleanup();
- }
-
- /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
- hp = gethostbyaddr((char *)&from.sin_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr),
- from.sin_family);
- if (hp)
- {
- /* Got host name, find canonic host name. */
- if (strchr(hp->h_name, '.') != 0)
- strlcpy(name, hp->h_name, sizeof(name));
- else if (hp->h_aliases != 0
- && hp->h_aliases[0] != 0
- && strchr(hp->h_aliases[0], '.') != 0)
- strlcpy(name, hp->h_aliases[0], sizeof(name));
- else
- strlcpy(name, hp->h_name, sizeof(name));
-
- /* Convert it to all lowercase (which is expected by the rest of this
- software). */
- for (i = 0; name[i]; i++)
- if (isupper(name[i]))
- name[i] = tolower(name[i]);
-
- /* Map it back to an IP address and check that the given address actually
- is an address of this host. This is necessary because anyone with
- access to a name server can define arbitrary names for an IP address.
- Mapping from name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still
- be fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of the
- domain). */
- hp = gethostbyname(name);
- if (!hp)
- {
- log("reverse mapping checking gethostbyname for %.700s failed - POSSIBLE BREAKIN ATTEMPT!", name);
- strlcpy(name, inet_ntoa(from.sin_addr), sizeof name);
- goto check_ip_options;
+ /* Get IP address of client. */
+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ if (getpeername(socket, (struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ fatal_cleanup();
}
- /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
- for (i = 0; hp->h_addr_list[i]; i++)
- if (memcmp(hp->h_addr_list[i], &from.sin_addr, sizeof(from.sin_addr))
- == 0)
- break;
- /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
- if (!hp->h_addr_list[i])
- {
- /* Address not found for the host name. */
- log("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not map back to the address - POSSIBLE BREAKIN ATTEMPT!",
- inet_ntoa(from.sin_addr), name);
- strlcpy(name, inet_ntoa(from.sin_addr), sizeof name);
- goto check_ip_options;
+ /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
+ hp = gethostbyaddr((char *) &from.sin_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr),
+ from.sin_family);
+ if (hp) {
+ /* Got host name, find canonic host name. */
+ if (strchr(hp->h_name, '.') != 0)
+ strlcpy(name, hp->h_name, sizeof(name));
+ else if (hp->h_aliases != 0
+ && hp->h_aliases[0] != 0
+ && strchr(hp->h_aliases[0], '.') != 0)
+ strlcpy(name, hp->h_aliases[0], sizeof(name));
+ else
+ strlcpy(name, hp->h_name, sizeof(name));
+
+ /* Convert it to all lowercase (which is expected by the
+ rest of this software). */
+ for (i = 0; name[i]; i++)
+ if (isupper(name[i]))
+ name[i] = tolower(name[i]);
+
+ /* Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
+ address actually is an address of this host. This is
+ necessary because anyone with access to a name server
+ can define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping
+ from name to IP address can be trusted better (but can
+ still be fooled if the intruder has access to the name
+ server of the domain). */
+ hp = gethostbyname(name);
+ if (!hp) {
+ log("reverse mapping checking gethostbyname for %.700s failed - POSSIBLE BREAKIN ATTEMPT!", name);
+ strlcpy(name, inet_ntoa(from.sin_addr), sizeof name);
+ goto check_ip_options;
+ }
+ /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
+ for (i = 0; hp->h_addr_list[i]; i++)
+ if (memcmp(hp->h_addr_list[i], &from.sin_addr, sizeof(from.sin_addr))
+ == 0)
+ break;
+ /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not
+ there. */
+ if (!hp->h_addr_list[i]) {
+ /* Address not found for the host name. */
+ log("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not map back to the address - POSSIBLE BREAKIN ATTEMPT!",
+ inet_ntoa(from.sin_addr), name);
+ strlcpy(name, inet_ntoa(from.sin_addr), sizeof name);
+ goto check_ip_options;
+ }
+ /* Address was found for the host name. We accept the host name. */
+ } else {
+ /* Host name not found. Use ascii representation of the address. */
+ strlcpy(name, inet_ntoa(from.sin_addr), sizeof name);
+ log("Could not reverse map address %.100s.", name);
}
- /* Address was found for the host name. We accept the host name. */
- }
- else
- {
- /* Host name not found. Use ascii representation of the address. */
- strlcpy(name, inet_ntoa(from.sin_addr), sizeof name);
- log("Could not reverse map address %.100s.", name);
- }
- check_ip_options:
-
- /* If IP options are supported, make sure there are none (log and disconnect
- them if any are found). Basically we are worried about source routing;
- it can be used to pretend you are somebody (ip-address) you are not.
- That itself may be "almost acceptable" under certain circumstances,
- but rhosts autentication is useless if source routing is accepted.
- Notice also that if we just dropped source routing here, the other
- side could use IP spoofing to do rest of the interaction and could still
- bypass security. So we exit here if we detect any IP options. */
- {
- unsigned char options[200], *ucp;
- char text[1024], *cp;
- int option_size, ipproto;
- struct protoent *ip;
-
- if ((ip = getprotobyname("ip")) != NULL)
- ipproto = ip->p_proto;
- else
- ipproto = IPPROTO_IP;
- option_size = sizeof(options);
- if (getsockopt(0, ipproto, IP_OPTIONS, (char *)options,
- &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0)
- {
- cp = text;
- /* Note: "text" buffer must be at least 3x as big as options. */
- for (ucp = options; option_size > 0; ucp++, option_size--, cp += 3)
- sprintf(cp, " %2.2x", *ucp);
- log("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s",
- inet_ntoa(from.sin_addr), text);
- packet_disconnect("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s",
- inet_ntoa(from.sin_addr), text);
- }
- }
+check_ip_options:
- return xstrdup(name);
+ /* If IP options are supported, make sure there are none (log and
+ disconnect them if any are found). Basically we are worried
+ about source routing; it can be used to pretend you are
+ somebody (ip-address) you are not. That itself may be "almost
+ acceptable" under certain circumstances, but rhosts
+ autentication is useless if source routing is accepted. Notice
+ also that if we just dropped source routing here, the other
+ side could use IP spoofing to do rest of the interaction and
+ could still bypass security. So we exit here if we detect any
+ IP options. */
+ {
+ unsigned char options[200], *ucp;
+ char text[1024], *cp;
+ int option_size, ipproto;
+ struct protoent *ip;
+
+ if ((ip = getprotobyname("ip")) != NULL)
+ ipproto = ip->p_proto;
+ else
+ ipproto = IPPROTO_IP;
+ option_size = sizeof(options);
+ if (getsockopt(0, ipproto, IP_OPTIONS, (char *) options,
+ &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
+ cp = text;
+ /* Note: "text" buffer must be at least 3x as big as options. */
+ for (ucp = options; option_size > 0; ucp++, option_size--, cp += 3)
+ sprintf(cp, " %2.2x", *ucp);
+ log("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s",
+ inet_ntoa(from.sin_addr), text);
+ packet_disconnect("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s",
+ inet_ntoa(from.sin_addr), text);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return xstrdup(name);
}
static char *canonical_host_name = NULL;
static char *canonical_host_ip = NULL;
/* Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
- connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
+ connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
several times. */
-const char *get_canonical_hostname()
+const char *
+get_canonical_hostname()
{
- /* Check if we have previously retrieved this same name. */
- if (canonical_host_name != NULL)
- return canonical_host_name;
+ /* Check if we have previously retrieved this same name. */
+ if (canonical_host_name != NULL)
+ return canonical_host_name;
- /* Get the real hostname if socket; otherwise return UNKNOWN. */
- if (packet_get_connection_in() == packet_get_connection_out())
- canonical_host_name = get_remote_hostname(packet_get_connection_in());
- else
- canonical_host_name = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
+ /* Get the real hostname if socket; otherwise return UNKNOWN. */
+ if (packet_get_connection_in() == packet_get_connection_out())
+ canonical_host_name = get_remote_hostname(packet_get_connection_in());
+ else
+ canonical_host_name = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
- return canonical_host_name;
+ return canonical_host_name;
}
/* Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string. The returned
string need not be freed. */
-const char *get_remote_ipaddr()
+const char *
+get_remote_ipaddr()
{
- struct sockaddr_in from;
- int fromlen, socket;
+ struct sockaddr_in from;
+ int fromlen, socket;
- /* Check if we have previously retrieved this same name. */
- if (canonical_host_ip != NULL)
- return canonical_host_ip;
+ /* Check if we have previously retrieved this same name. */
+ if (canonical_host_ip != NULL)
+ return canonical_host_ip;
- /* If not a socket, return UNKNOWN. */
- if (packet_get_connection_in() != packet_get_connection_out())
- {
- canonical_host_ip = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
- return canonical_host_ip;
- }
+ /* If not a socket, return UNKNOWN. */
+ if (packet_get_connection_in() != packet_get_connection_out()) {
+ canonical_host_ip = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
+ return canonical_host_ip;
+ }
+ /* Get client socket. */
+ socket = packet_get_connection_in();
- /* Get client socket. */
- socket = packet_get_connection_in();
+ /* Get IP address of client. */
+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ if (getpeername(socket, (struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ fatal_cleanup();
+ }
+ /* Get the IP address in ascii. */
+ canonical_host_ip = xstrdup(inet_ntoa(from.sin_addr));
- /* Get IP address of client. */
- fromlen = sizeof(from);
- memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
- if (getpeername(socket, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0)
- {
- debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- fatal_cleanup();
- }
-
- /* Get the IP address in ascii. */
- canonical_host_ip = xstrdup(inet_ntoa(from.sin_addr));
-
- /* Return ip address string. */
- return canonical_host_ip;
+ /* Return ip address string. */
+ return canonical_host_ip;
}
/* Returns the port of the peer of the socket. */
-int get_peer_port(int sock)
+int
+get_peer_port(int sock)
{
- struct sockaddr_in from;
- int fromlen;
+ struct sockaddr_in from;
+ int fromlen;
- /* Get IP address of client. */
- fromlen = sizeof(from);
- memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
- if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0)
- {
- debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- fatal_cleanup();
- }
-
- /* Return port number. */
- return ntohs(from.sin_port);
+ /* Get IP address of client. */
+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ fatal_cleanup();
+ }
+ /* Return port number. */
+ return ntohs(from.sin_port);
}
/* Returns the port number of the remote host. */
-int get_remote_port()
+int
+get_remote_port()
{
- int socket;
+ int socket;
- /* If the connection is not a socket, return 65535. This is intentionally
- chosen to be an unprivileged port number. */
- if (packet_get_connection_in() != packet_get_connection_out())
- return 65535;
+ /* If the connection is not a socket, return 65535. This is
+ intentionally chosen to be an unprivileged port number. */
+ if (packet_get_connection_in() != packet_get_connection_out())
+ return 65535;
- /* Get client socket. */
- socket = packet_get_connection_in();
+ /* Get client socket. */
+ socket = packet_get_connection_in();
- /* Get and return the peer port number. */
- return get_peer_port(socket);
+ /* Get and return the peer port number. */
+ return get_peer_port(socket);
}