| /* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.72 2017/12/18 02:25:15 djm Exp $ */ |
| /* |
| * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES |
| * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. |
| * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, |
| * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, |
| * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY |
| * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT |
| * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF |
| * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| */ |
| |
| #include "includes.h" |
| |
| #include <sys/types.h> |
| #include <sys/stat.h> |
| |
| #include <errno.h> |
| #include <fcntl.h> |
| #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H |
| # include <paths.h> |
| #endif |
| #include <pwd.h> |
| #include <signal.h> |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include <stdarg.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| #include <time.h> |
| #include <unistd.h> |
| #include <limits.h> |
| |
| #include "xmalloc.h" |
| #include "ssh.h" |
| #include "ssh2.h" |
| #include "packet.h" |
| #include "buffer.h" |
| #include "log.h" |
| #include "misc.h" |
| #include "servconf.h" |
| #include "compat.h" |
| #include "sshkey.h" |
| #include "hostfile.h" |
| #include "auth.h" |
| #include "pathnames.h" |
| #include "uidswap.h" |
| #include "auth-options.h" |
| #include "canohost.h" |
| #ifdef GSSAPI |
| #include "ssh-gss.h" |
| #endif |
| #include "monitor_wrap.h" |
| #include "authfile.h" |
| #include "match.h" |
| #include "ssherr.h" |
| #include "channels.h" /* XXX for session.h */ |
| #include "session.h" /* XXX for child_set_env(); refactor? */ |
| |
| /* import */ |
| extern ServerOptions options; |
| extern u_char *session_id2; |
| extern u_int session_id2_len; |
| |
| static int |
| userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh) |
| { |
| Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; |
| struct sshbuf *b; |
| struct sshkey *key = NULL; |
| char *pkalg, *userstyle = NULL, *fp = NULL; |
| u_char *pkblob, *sig, have_sig; |
| size_t blen, slen; |
| int r, pktype; |
| int authenticated = 0; |
| |
| if (!authctxt->valid) { |
| debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &have_sig)) != 0) |
| fatal("%s: sshpkt_get_u8 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); |
| if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) { |
| debug2("%s: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH", __func__); |
| if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) |
| fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); |
| /* no explicit pkalg given */ |
| /* so we have to extract the pkalg from the pkblob */ |
| /* XXX use sshbuf_from() */ |
| if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_put(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0) |
| fatal("%s: failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); |
| sshbuf_free(b); |
| } else { |
| if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0) |
| fatal("%s: sshpkt_get_cstring failed: %s", |
| __func__, ssh_err(r)); |
| } |
| pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg); |
| if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) { |
| /* this is perfectly legal */ |
| logit("%s: unsupported public key algorithm: %s", |
| __func__, pkalg); |
| goto done; |
| } |
| if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) { |
| error("%s: could not parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); |
| goto done; |
| } |
| if (key == NULL) { |
| error("%s: cannot decode key: %s", __func__, pkalg); |
| goto done; |
| } |
| if (key->type != pktype) { |
| error("%s: type mismatch for decoded key " |
| "(received %d, expected %d)", __func__, key->type, pktype); |
| goto done; |
| } |
| if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA && |
| (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { |
| logit("Refusing RSA key because client uses unsafe " |
| "signature scheme"); |
| goto done; |
| } |
| fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); |
| if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key)) { |
| logit("refusing previously-used %s key", sshkey_type(key)); |
| goto done; |
| } |
| if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), |
| options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1) { |
| logit("%s: key type %s not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes", |
| __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); |
| goto done; |
| } |
| |
| if (have_sig) { |
| debug3("%s: have signature for %s %s", |
| __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp); |
| if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &sig, &slen)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) |
| fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); |
| if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) |
| fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); |
| if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { |
| if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, session_id2, |
| session_id2_len)) != 0) |
| fatal("%s: sshbuf_put session id: %s", |
| __func__, ssh_err(r)); |
| } else { |
| if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, |
| session_id2_len)) != 0) |
| fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_string session id: %s", |
| __func__, ssh_err(r)); |
| } |
| /* reconstruct packet */ |
| xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, |
| authctxt->style ? ":" : "", |
| authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); |
| if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, userstyle)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ? |
| "ssh-userauth" : authctxt->service)) != 0) |
| fatal("%s: build packet failed: %s", |
| __func__, ssh_err(r)); |
| if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) { |
| if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_sig)) != 0) |
| fatal("%s: build packet failed: %s", |
| __func__, ssh_err(r)); |
| } else { |
| if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "publickey")) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_sig)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg) != 0)) |
| fatal("%s: build packet failed: %s", |
| __func__, ssh_err(r)); |
| } |
| if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0) |
| fatal("%s: build packet failed: %s", |
| __func__, ssh_err(r)); |
| #ifdef DEBUG_PK |
| sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); |
| #endif |
| |
| /* test for correct signature */ |
| authenticated = 0; |
| if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 1)) && |
| PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), |
| sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat)) == 0) { |
| authenticated = 1; |
| } |
| sshbuf_free(b); |
| free(sig); |
| auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key); |
| } else { |
| debug("%s: test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable for %s %s", |
| __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp); |
| if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) |
| fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); |
| |
| /* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */ |
| /* |
| * XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed |
| * to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this |
| * message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all |
| * if a user is not allowed to login. is this an |
| * issue? -markus |
| */ |
| if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 0))) { |
| if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK)) |
| != 0 || |
| (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, pkalg)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, pkblob, blen)) != 0 || |
| (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) |
| fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); |
| ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh); |
| authctxt->postponed = 1; |
| } |
| } |
| if (authenticated != 1) |
| auth_clear_options(); |
| done: |
| debug2("%s: authenticated %d pkalg %s", __func__, authenticated, pkalg); |
| sshkey_free(key); |
| free(userstyle); |
| free(pkalg); |
| free(pkblob); |
| free(fp); |
| return authenticated; |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert) |
| { |
| char *result; |
| u_int i; |
| |
| /* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */ |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) { |
| if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i], |
| principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) { |
| debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"", |
| result); |
| free(result); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| process_principals(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw, |
| const struct sshkey_cert *cert) |
| { |
| char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *cp, *ep, *line_opts; |
| u_long linenum = 0; |
| u_int i, found_principal = 0; |
| |
| while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) { |
| /* Always consume entire input */ |
| if (found_principal) |
| continue; |
| /* Skip leading whitespace. */ |
| for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) |
| ; |
| /* Skip blank and comment lines. */ |
| if ((ep = strchr(cp, '#')) != NULL) |
| *ep = '\0'; |
| if (!*cp || *cp == '\n') |
| continue; |
| /* Trim trailing whitespace. */ |
| ep = cp + strlen(cp) - 1; |
| while (ep > cp && (*ep == '\n' || *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t')) |
| *ep-- = '\0'; |
| /* |
| * If the line has internal whitespace then assume it has |
| * key options. |
| */ |
| line_opts = NULL; |
| if ((ep = strrchr(cp, ' ')) != NULL || |
| (ep = strrchr(cp, '\t')) != NULL) { |
| for (; *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'; ep++) |
| ; |
| line_opts = cp; |
| cp = ep; |
| } |
| for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) { |
| if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) == 0) { |
| debug3("%s:%lu: matched principal \"%.100s\"", |
| file, linenum, cert->principals[i]); |
| if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts, |
| file, linenum) != 1) |
| continue; |
| found_principal = 1; |
| continue; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| return found_principal; |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert) |
| { |
| FILE *f; |
| int success; |
| |
| temporarily_use_uid(pw); |
| debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file); |
| if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) { |
| restore_uid(); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| success = process_principals(f, file, pw, cert); |
| fclose(f); |
| restore_uid(); |
| return success; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Checks whether principal is allowed in output of command. |
| * returns 1 if the principal is allowed or 0 otherwise. |
| */ |
| static int |
| match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key) |
| { |
| const struct sshkey_cert *cert = key->cert; |
| FILE *f = NULL; |
| int r, ok, found_principal = 0; |
| struct passwd *pw; |
| int i, ac = 0, uid_swapped = 0; |
| pid_t pid; |
| char *tmp, *username = NULL, *command = NULL, **av = NULL; |
| char *ca_fp = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *catext = NULL, *keytext = NULL; |
| char serial_s[16]; |
| void (*osigchld)(int); |
| |
| if (options.authorized_principals_command == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL) { |
| error("No user for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand specified, " |
| "skipping"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to |
| * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly. |
| */ |
| osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); |
| |
| /* Prepare and verify the user for the command */ |
| username = percent_expand(options.authorized_principals_command_user, |
| "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); |
| pw = getpwnam(username); |
| if (pw == NULL) { |
| error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s", |
| username, strerror(errno)); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| /* Turn the command into an argument vector */ |
| if (argv_split(options.authorized_principals_command, &ac, &av) != 0) { |
| error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" contains " |
| "invalid quotes", command); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if (ac == 0) { |
| error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments", |
| command); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(cert->signature_key, |
| options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { |
| error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, |
| options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { |
| error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(cert->signature_key, &catext)) != 0) { |
| error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) { |
| error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| snprintf(serial_s, sizeof(serial_s), "%llu", |
| (unsigned long long)cert->serial); |
| for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) { |
| tmp = percent_expand(av[i], |
| "u", user_pw->pw_name, |
| "h", user_pw->pw_dir, |
| "t", sshkey_ssh_name(key), |
| "T", sshkey_ssh_name(cert->signature_key), |
| "f", key_fp, |
| "F", ca_fp, |
| "k", keytext, |
| "K", catext, |
| "i", cert->key_id, |
| "s", serial_s, |
| (char *)NULL); |
| if (tmp == NULL) |
| fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__); |
| free(av[i]); |
| av[i] = tmp; |
| } |
| /* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */ |
| command = argv_assemble(ac, av); |
| |
| if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", pw, command, |
| ac, av, &f, |
| SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0) |
| goto out; |
| |
| uid_swapped = 1; |
| temporarily_use_uid(pw); |
| |
| ok = process_principals(f, "(command)", pw, cert); |
| |
| fclose(f); |
| f = NULL; |
| |
| if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command, 0) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| |
| /* Read completed successfully */ |
| found_principal = ok; |
| out: |
| if (f != NULL) |
| fclose(f); |
| signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); |
| for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) |
| free(av[i]); |
| free(av); |
| if (uid_swapped) |
| restore_uid(); |
| free(command); |
| free(username); |
| free(ca_fp); |
| free(key_fp); |
| free(catext); |
| free(keytext); |
| return found_principal; |
| } |
| /* |
| * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file, |
| * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. |
| */ |
| static int |
| check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, struct sshkey *key, struct passwd *pw) |
| { |
| char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES]; |
| int found_key = 0; |
| u_long linenum = 0; |
| struct sshkey *found = NULL; |
| |
| while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) { |
| char *cp, *key_options = NULL, *fp = NULL; |
| const char *reason = NULL; |
| |
| /* Always consume entire file */ |
| if (found_key) |
| continue; |
| if (found != NULL) |
| sshkey_free(found); |
| found = sshkey_new(sshkey_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type); |
| if (found == NULL) |
| goto done; |
| auth_clear_options(); |
| |
| /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */ |
| for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) |
| ; |
| if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') |
| continue; |
| |
| if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) { |
| /* no key? check if there are options for this key */ |
| int quoted = 0; |
| debug2("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp); |
| key_options = cp; |
| for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) { |
| if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"') |
| cp++; /* Skip both */ |
| else if (*cp == '"') |
| quoted = !quoted; |
| } |
| /* Skip remaining whitespace. */ |
| for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) |
| ; |
| if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) { |
| debug2("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp); |
| /* still no key? advance to next line*/ |
| continue; |
| } |
| } |
| if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { |
| if (!sshkey_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key)) |
| continue; |
| if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, |
| linenum) != 1) |
| continue; |
| if (!key_is_cert_authority) |
| continue; |
| if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found, |
| options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) |
| continue; |
| debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s", |
| file, linenum, sshkey_type(found), fp); |
| /* |
| * If the user has specified a list of principals as |
| * a key option, then prefer that list to matching |
| * their username in the certificate principals list. |
| */ |
| if (authorized_principals != NULL && |
| !match_principals_option(authorized_principals, |
| key->cert)) { |
| reason = "Certificate does not contain an " |
| "authorized principal"; |
| fail_reason: |
| free(fp); |
| error("%s", reason); |
| auth_debug_add("%s", reason); |
| continue; |
| } |
| if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0, |
| authorized_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL, |
| &reason) != 0) |
| goto fail_reason; |
| if (auth_cert_options(key, pw, &reason) != 0) |
| goto fail_reason; |
| verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) " |
| "signed by %s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id, |
| (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial, |
| sshkey_type(found), fp, file); |
| free(fp); |
| found_key = 1; |
| break; |
| } else if (sshkey_equal(found, key)) { |
| if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, |
| linenum) != 1) |
| continue; |
| if (key_is_cert_authority) |
| continue; |
| if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found, |
| options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) |
| continue; |
| debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s", |
| file, linenum, sshkey_type(found), fp); |
| free(fp); |
| found_key = 1; |
| continue; |
| } |
| } |
| done: |
| if (found != NULL) |
| sshkey_free(found); |
| if (!found_key) |
| debug2("key not found"); |
| return found_key; |
| } |
| |
| /* Authenticate a certificate key against TrustedUserCAKeys */ |
| static int |
| user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key) |
| { |
| char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL; |
| const char *reason; |
| int r, ret = 0, found_principal = 0, use_authorized_principals; |
| |
| if (!sshkey_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, |
| options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if ((r = sshkey_in_file(key->cert->signature_key, |
| options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1, 0)) != 0) { |
| debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s: %s", __func__, |
| sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, |
| options.trusted_user_ca_keys, ssh_err(r)); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| /* |
| * If AuthorizedPrincipals is in use, then compare the certificate |
| * principals against the names in that file rather than matching |
| * against the username. |
| */ |
| if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) { |
| if (match_principals_file(principals_file, pw, key->cert)) |
| found_principal = 1; |
| } |
| /* Try querying command if specified */ |
| if (!found_principal && match_principals_command(pw, key)) |
| found_principal = 1; |
| /* If principals file or command is specified, then require a match */ |
| use_authorized_principals = principals_file != NULL || |
| options.authorized_principals_command != NULL; |
| if (!found_principal && use_authorized_principals) { |
| reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal"; |
| fail_reason: |
| error("%s", reason); |
| auth_debug_add("%s", reason); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1, |
| use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0) |
| goto fail_reason; |
| if (auth_cert_options(key, pw, &reason) != 0) |
| goto fail_reason; |
| |
| verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) signed by " |
| "%s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id, |
| (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial, |
| sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, |
| options.trusted_user_ca_keys); |
| ret = 1; |
| |
| out: |
| free(principals_file); |
| free(ca_fp); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Checks whether key is allowed in file. |
| * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. |
| */ |
| static int |
| user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, char *file) |
| { |
| FILE *f; |
| int found_key = 0; |
| |
| /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */ |
| temporarily_use_uid(pw); |
| |
| debug("trying public key file %s", file); |
| if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) { |
| found_key = check_authkeys_file(f, file, key, pw); |
| fclose(f); |
| } |
| |
| restore_uid(); |
| return found_key; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Checks whether key is allowed in output of command. |
| * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. |
| */ |
| static int |
| user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey *key) |
| { |
| FILE *f = NULL; |
| int r, ok, found_key = 0; |
| struct passwd *pw; |
| int i, uid_swapped = 0, ac = 0; |
| pid_t pid; |
| char *username = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *keytext = NULL; |
| char *tmp, *command = NULL, **av = NULL; |
| void (*osigchld)(int); |
| |
| if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) { |
| error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to |
| * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly. |
| */ |
| osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); |
| |
| /* Prepare and verify the user for the command */ |
| username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user, |
| "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); |
| pw = getpwnam(username); |
| if (pw == NULL) { |
| error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s", |
| username, strerror(errno)); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| /* Prepare AuthorizedKeysCommand */ |
| if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, |
| SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { |
| error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) { |
| error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| /* Turn the command into an argument vector */ |
| if (argv_split(options.authorized_keys_command, &ac, &av) != 0) { |
| error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" contains invalid quotes", |
| command); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if (ac == 0) { |
| error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments", |
| command); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) { |
| tmp = percent_expand(av[i], |
| "u", user_pw->pw_name, |
| "h", user_pw->pw_dir, |
| "t", sshkey_ssh_name(key), |
| "f", key_fp, |
| "k", keytext, |
| (char *)NULL); |
| if (tmp == NULL) |
| fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__); |
| free(av[i]); |
| av[i] = tmp; |
| } |
| /* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */ |
| command = argv_assemble(ac, av); |
| |
| /* |
| * If AuthorizedKeysCommand was run without arguments |
| * then fall back to the old behaviour of passing the |
| * target username as a single argument. |
| */ |
| if (ac == 1) { |
| av = xreallocarray(av, ac + 2, sizeof(*av)); |
| av[1] = xstrdup(user_pw->pw_name); |
| av[2] = NULL; |
| /* Fix up command too, since it is used in log messages */ |
| free(command); |
| xasprintf(&command, "%s %s", av[0], av[1]); |
| } |
| |
| if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", pw, command, |
| ac, av, &f, |
| SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0) |
| goto out; |
| |
| uid_swapped = 1; |
| temporarily_use_uid(pw); |
| |
| ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw); |
| |
| fclose(f); |
| f = NULL; |
| |
| if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command, 0) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| |
| /* Read completed successfully */ |
| found_key = ok; |
| out: |
| if (f != NULL) |
| fclose(f); |
| signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); |
| for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) |
| free(av[i]); |
| free(av); |
| if (uid_swapped) |
| restore_uid(); |
| free(command); |
| free(username); |
| free(key_fp); |
| free(keytext); |
| return found_key; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user. |
| */ |
| int |
| user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, int auth_attempt) |
| { |
| u_int success, i; |
| char *file; |
| |
| if (auth_key_is_revoked(key)) |
| return 0; |
| if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && |
| auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| success = user_cert_trusted_ca(pw, key); |
| if (success) |
| return success; |
| |
| success = user_key_command_allowed2(pw, key); |
| if (success > 0) |
| return success; |
| |
| for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) { |
| |
| if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0) |
| continue; |
| file = expand_authorized_keys( |
| options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw); |
| |
| success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file); |
| free(file); |
| } |
| |
| return success; |
| } |
| |
| Authmethod method_pubkey = { |
| "publickey", |
| userauth_pubkey, |
| &options.pubkey_authentication |
| }; |