- Merged OpenBSD CVS changes:
- [auth-krb4.c auth-passwd.c auth-skey.c ssh.
move skey-auth from auth-passwd.c to auth-s
- [auth-rsa.c]
warn only about mismatch if key is _used_
warn about keysize-mismatch with log() not
channels.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh.c ssh.
ports are u_short
- [hostfile.c]
indent, shorter warning
- [nchan.c]
use error() for internal errors
- [packet.c]
set loglevel for SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT to log(
serverloop.c
indent
- [ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh.h]
document , reasonable default
- [ssh.1]
CheckHostIP is not available for connects v
- [sshconnect.c]
typo
easier to read client code for passwd and s
turn of checkhostip for proxy connects, sin
diff --git a/auth-krb4.c b/auth-krb4.c
index 9f99533..fb0e20c 100644
--- a/auth-krb4.c
+++ b/auth-krb4.c
@@ -7,10 +7,123 @@
#include "packet.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
#ifdef KRB4
char *ticket = NULL;
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+/*
+ * try krb4 authentication,
+ * return 1 on success, 0 on failure, -1 if krb4 is not available
+ */
+
+int
+auth_krb4_password(struct passwd * pw, const char *password)
+{
+ AUTH_DAT adata;
+ KTEXT_ST tkt;
+ struct hostent *hp;
+ unsigned long faddr;
+ char localhost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
+ char phost[INST_SZ];
+ char realm[REALM_SZ];
+ int r;
+
+ /*
+ * Try Kerberos password authentication only for non-root
+ * users and only if Kerberos is installed.
+ */
+ if (pw->pw_uid != 0 && krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1) == KSUCCESS) {
+
+ /* Set up our ticket file. */
+ if (!krb4_init(pw->pw_uid)) {
+ log("Couldn't initialize Kerberos ticket file for %s!",
+ pw->pw_name);
+ goto kerberos_auth_failure;
+ }
+ /* Try to get TGT using our password. */
+ r = krb_get_pw_in_tkt((char *) pw->pw_name, "",
+ realm, "krbtgt", realm,
+ DEFAULT_TKT_LIFE, (char *) password);
+ if (r != INTK_OK) {
+ packet_send_debug("Kerberos V4 password "
+ "authentication for %s failed: %s",
+ pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
+ goto kerberos_auth_failure;
+ }
+ /* Successful authentication. */
+ chown(tkt_string(), pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid);
+
+ /*
+ * Now that we have a TGT, try to get a local
+ * "rcmd" ticket to ensure that we are not talking
+ * to a bogus Kerberos server.
+ */
+ (void) gethostname(localhost, sizeof(localhost));
+ (void) strlcpy(phost, (char *) krb_get_phost(localhost),
+ INST_SZ);
+ r = krb_mk_req(&tkt, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost, realm, 33);
+
+ if (r == KSUCCESS) {
+ if (!(hp = gethostbyname(localhost))) {
+ log("Couldn't get local host address!");
+ goto kerberos_auth_failure;
+ }
+ memmove((void *) &faddr, (void *) hp->h_addr,
+ sizeof(faddr));
+
+ /* Verify our "rcmd" ticket. */
+ r = krb_rd_req(&tkt, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost,
+ faddr, &adata, "");
+ if (r == RD_AP_UNDEC) {
+ /*
+ * Probably didn't have a srvtab on
+ * localhost. Allow login.
+ */
+ log("Kerberos V4 TGT for %s unverifiable, "
+ "no srvtab installed? krb_rd_req: %s",
+ pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
+ } else if (r != KSUCCESS) {
+ log("Kerberos V4 %s ticket unverifiable: %s",
+ KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, krb_err_txt[r]);
+ goto kerberos_auth_failure;
+ }
+ } else if (r == KDC_PR_UNKNOWN) {
+ /*
+ * Allow login if no rcmd service exists, but
+ * log the error.
+ */
+ log("Kerberos V4 TGT for %s unverifiable: %s; %s.%s "
+ "not registered, or srvtab is wrong?", pw->pw_name,
+ krb_err_txt[r], KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, phost);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * TGT is bad, forget it. Possibly spoofed!
+ */
+ packet_send_debug("WARNING: Kerberos V4 TGT "
+ "possibly spoofed for %s: %s",
+ pw->pw_name, krb_err_txt[r]);
+ goto kerberos_auth_failure;
+ }
+
+ /* Authentication succeeded. */
+ return 1;
+
+kerberos_auth_failure:
+ krb4_cleanup_proc(NULL);
+
+ if (!options.kerberos_or_local_passwd)
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ /* Logging in as root or no local Kerberos realm. */
+ packet_send_debug("Unable to authenticate to Kerberos.");
+ }
+ /* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */
+ return -1;
+}
+
void
krb4_cleanup_proc(void *ignore)
{