- (djm) Pick up LOGIN_PROGRAM from environment or PATH if not set by headers
- (djm) OpenBSD CVS updates:
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:07:23
[ssh.c]
accept remsh as a valid name as well; roman@buildpoint.com
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:17:13
[deattack.c crc32.c packet.c]
rename crc32() to ssh_crc32() to avoid zlib name clash. do not move to
libz crc32 function yet, because it has ugly "long"'s in it;
oneill@cs.sfu.ca
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:26:08
[scp.1 scp.c]
-S prog support; tv@debian.org
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:50:07
[scp.c]
knf
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:57:33
[log-client.c]
shorten
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 12:48:11
[channels.c channels.h clientloop.c ssh.c ssh.h]
support for ~. in ssh2
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:29:40
[crc32.h]
proper prototype
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:34:44
[authfd.c authfd.h key.c key.h ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1]
[ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c Makefile]
[fingerprint.c fingerprint.h]
add SSH2/DSA support to the agent and some other DSA related cleanups.
(note that we cannot talk to ssh.com's ssh2 agents)
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:55:52
[channels.c channels.h clientloop.c]
more ~ support for ssh2
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 16:21:19
[clientloop.c]
oops
- millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:25:53
[session.c]
We have to stash the result of get_remote_name_or_ip() before we
close our socket or getpeername() will get EBADF and the process
will exit. Only a problem for "UseLogin yes".
- millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:30:59
[session.c]
Only check /etc/nologin if "UseLogin no" since login(1) may have its
own policy on determining who is allowed to login when /etc/nologin
is present. Also use the _PATH_NOLOGIN define.
- millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:42:43
[auth1.c auth2.c session.c ssh.c]
Add calls to setusercontext() and login_get*(). We basically call
setusercontext() in most places where previously we did a setlogin().
Add default login.conf file and put root in the "daemon" login class.
- millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/21 10:23:31
[session.c]
Fix incorrect PATH setting; noted by Markus.
diff --git a/authfd.c b/authfd.c
index a34e111..d9427d3 100644
--- a/authfd.c
+++ b/authfd.c
@@ -11,10 +11,13 @@
*
* Functions for connecting the local authentication agent.
*
+ * SSH2 implementation,
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.24 2000/08/15 19:20:46 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.25 2000/08/19 21:34:42 markus Exp $");
#include "ssh.h"
#include "rsa.h"
@@ -29,6 +32,7 @@
#include "key.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "kex.h"
+#include "dsa.h"
/* helper */
int decode_reply(int type);
@@ -71,8 +75,7 @@
}
int
-ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
- Buffer *request, Buffer *reply)
+ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply)
{
int l, len;
char buf[1024];
@@ -162,7 +165,6 @@
auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));
auth->fd = sock;
- buffer_init(&auth->packet);
buffer_init(&auth->identities);
auth->howmany = 0;
@@ -175,46 +177,57 @@
*/
void
-ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *ac)
+ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *auth)
{
- buffer_free(&ac->packet);
- buffer_free(&ac->identities);
- close(ac->fd);
- xfree(ac);
+ buffer_free(&auth->identities);
+ close(auth->fd);
+ xfree(auth);
}
/*
* Returns the first authentication identity held by the agent.
- * Returns true if an identity is available, 0 otherwise.
- * The caller must initialize the integers before the call, and free the
- * comment after a successful call (before calling ssh_get_next_identity).
*/
-int
-ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
- BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n, char **comment)
+Key *
+ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version)
{
+ int type, code1 = 0, code2 = 0;
Buffer request;
- int type;
+
+ switch(version){
+ case 1:
+ code1 = SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
+ code2 = SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER;
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ code1 = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES;
+ code2 = SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+ }
/*
* Send a message to the agent requesting for a list of the
* identities it can represent.
*/
buffer_init(&request);
- buffer_put_char(&request, SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES);
+ buffer_put_char(&request, code1);
buffer_clear(&auth->identities);
if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &request, &auth->identities) == 0) {
buffer_free(&request);
- return 0;
+ return NULL;
}
buffer_free(&request);
/* Get message type, and verify that we got a proper answer. */
type = buffer_get_char(&auth->identities);
- if (type != SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)
+ if (type == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) {
+ return NULL;
+ } else if (type != code2) {
fatal("Bad authentication reply message type: %d", type);
+ }
/* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */
auth->howmany = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
@@ -223,43 +236,49 @@
auth->howmany);
/* Return the first entry (if any). */
- return ssh_get_next_identity(auth, e, n, comment);
+ return ssh_get_next_identity(auth, comment, version);
}
-/*
- * Returns the next authentication identity for the agent. Other functions
- * can be called between this and ssh_get_first_identity or two calls of this
- * function. This returns 0 if there are no more identities. The caller
- * must free comment after a successful return.
- */
-
-int
-ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
- BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n, char **comment)
+Key *
+ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version)
{
unsigned int bits;
+ unsigned char *blob;
+ unsigned int blen;
+ Key *key = NULL;
/* Return failure if no more entries. */
if (auth->howmany <= 0)
- return 0;
+ return NULL;
/*
* Get the next entry from the packet. These will abort with a fatal
* error if the packet is too short or contains corrupt data.
*/
- bits = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
- buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, e);
- buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, n);
- *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
-
- if (bits != BN_num_bits(n))
- log("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u",
- BN_num_bits(n), bits);
-
+ switch(version){
+ case 1:
+ key = key_new(KEY_RSA);
+ bits = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->e);
+ buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->n);
+ *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
+ if (bits != BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))
+ log("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u",
+ BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ blob = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, &blen);
+ *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
+ key = dsa_key_from_blob(blob, blen);
+ xfree(blob);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+ break;
+ }
/* Decrement the number of remaining entries. */
auth->howmany--;
-
- return 1;
+ return key;
}
/*
@@ -272,7 +291,7 @@
int
ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
- BIGNUM* e, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *challenge,
+ Key* key, BIGNUM *challenge,
unsigned char session_id[16],
unsigned int response_type,
unsigned char response[16])
@@ -282,15 +301,17 @@
int i;
int type;
- if (response_type == 0)
- fatal("Compatibility with ssh protocol version "
- "1.0 no longer supported.");
-
+ if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
+ return 0;
+ if (response_type == 0) {
+ log("Compatibility with ssh protocol version 1.0 no longer supported.");
+ return 0;
+ }
buffer_init(&buffer);
buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE);
- buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(n));
- buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, e);
- buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, n);
+ buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
+ buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->e);
+ buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->n);
buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, challenge);
buffer_append(&buffer, (char *) session_id, 16);
buffer_put_int(&buffer, response_type);
@@ -318,6 +339,45 @@
return success;
}
+/* ask agent to sign data, returns -1 on error, 0 on success */
+int
+ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
+ Key *key,
+ unsigned char **sigp, int *lenp,
+ unsigned char *data, int datalen)
+{
+ Buffer msg;
+ unsigned char *blob;
+ unsigned int blen;
+ int type;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ if (dsa_make_key_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST);
+ buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
+ buffer_put_string(&msg, data, datalen);
+ xfree(blob);
+
+ if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+ if (type == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) {
+ log("Agent admitted failure to sign using the key.");
+ } else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
+ fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type);
+ } else {
+ ret = 0;
+ *sigp = buffer_get_string(&msg, lenp);
+ }
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return ret;
+}
+
/* Encode key for a message to the agent. */
void
@@ -358,29 +418,29 @@
int
ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment)
{
- Buffer buffer;
+ Buffer msg;
int type;
- buffer_init(&buffer);
+ buffer_init(&msg);
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_RSA:
- ssh_encode_identity_rsa(&buffer, key->rsa, comment);
+ ssh_encode_identity_rsa(&msg, key->rsa, comment);
break;
case KEY_DSA:
- ssh_encode_identity_dsa(&buffer, key->dsa, comment);
+ ssh_encode_identity_dsa(&msg, key->dsa, comment);
break;
default:
- buffer_free(&buffer);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
return 0;
break;
}
- if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) {
- buffer_free(&buffer);
+ if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+ buffer_free(&msg);
return 0;
}
- type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
- buffer_free(&buffer);
+ type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
return decode_reply(type);
}
@@ -390,23 +450,35 @@
*/
int
-ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, RSA *key)
+ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key)
{
- Buffer buffer;
+ Buffer msg;
int type;
+ unsigned char *blob;
+ unsigned int blen;
- buffer_init(&buffer);
- buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY);
- buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(key->n));
- buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->e);
- buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->n);
+ buffer_init(&msg);
- if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) {
- buffer_free(&buffer);
+ if (key->type == KEY_RSA) {
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY);
+ buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
+ buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->e);
+ buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->n);
+ } else if (key->type == KEY_DSA) {
+ dsa_make_key_blob(key, &blob, &blen);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY);
+ buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
+ xfree(blob);
+ } else {
+ buffer_free(&msg);
return 0;
}
- type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
- buffer_free(&buffer);
+ if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
return decode_reply(type);
}
@@ -416,20 +488,23 @@
*/
int
-ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth)
+ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version)
{
- Buffer buffer;
+ Buffer msg;
int type;
+ int code = (version==1) ?
+ SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES :
+ SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES;
- buffer_init(&buffer);
- buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES);
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, code);
- if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) {
- buffer_free(&buffer);
+ if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+ buffer_free(&msg);
return 0;
}
- type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
- buffer_free(&buffer);
+ type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
return decode_reply(type);
}