| /* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.319 2019/09/13 04:31:19 djm Exp $ */ |
| /* |
| * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> |
| * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland |
| * All rights reserved |
| * Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the |
| * login (authentication) dialog. |
| * |
| * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software |
| * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this |
| * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is |
| * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be |
| * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". |
| */ |
| |
| #include "includes.h" |
| |
| #include <sys/types.h> |
| #include <sys/wait.h> |
| #include <sys/stat.h> |
| #include <sys/socket.h> |
| #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H |
| # include <sys/time.h> |
| #endif |
| |
| #include <net/if.h> |
| #include <netinet/in.h> |
| #include <arpa/inet.h> |
| |
| #include <ctype.h> |
| #include <errno.h> |
| #include <fcntl.h> |
| #include <netdb.h> |
| #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H |
| #include <paths.h> |
| #endif |
| #include <pwd.h> |
| #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H |
| #include <poll.h> |
| #endif |
| #include <signal.h> |
| #include <stdarg.h> |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include <stdlib.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| #include <unistd.h> |
| #ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H |
| # include <ifaddrs.h> |
| #endif |
| |
| #include "xmalloc.h" |
| #include "hostfile.h" |
| #include "ssh.h" |
| #include "sshbuf.h" |
| #include "packet.h" |
| #include "compat.h" |
| #include "sshkey.h" |
| #include "sshconnect.h" |
| #include "log.h" |
| #include "misc.h" |
| #include "readconf.h" |
| #include "atomicio.h" |
| #include "dns.h" |
| #include "monitor_fdpass.h" |
| #include "ssh2.h" |
| #include "version.h" |
| #include "authfile.h" |
| #include "ssherr.h" |
| #include "authfd.h" |
| #include "kex.h" |
| |
| struct sshkey *previous_host_key = NULL; |
| |
| static int matching_host_key_dns = 0; |
| |
| static pid_t proxy_command_pid = 0; |
| |
| /* import */ |
| extern int debug_flag; |
| extern Options options; |
| extern char *__progname; |
| |
| static int show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *, struct sshkey *); |
| static void warn_changed_key(struct sshkey *); |
| |
| /* Expand a proxy command */ |
| static char * |
| expand_proxy_command(const char *proxy_command, const char *user, |
| const char *host, const char *host_arg, int port) |
| { |
| char *tmp, *ret, strport[NI_MAXSERV]; |
| |
| snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); |
| xasprintf(&tmp, "exec %s", proxy_command); |
| ret = percent_expand(tmp, |
| "h", host, |
| "n", host_arg, |
| "p", strport, |
| "r", options.user, |
| (char *)NULL); |
| free(tmp); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| static void |
| stderr_null(void) |
| { |
| int devnull; |
| |
| if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_WRONLY)) == -1) { |
| error("Can't open %s for stderr redirection: %s", |
| _PATH_DEVNULL, strerror(errno)); |
| return; |
| } |
| if (devnull == STDERR_FILENO) |
| return; |
| if (dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) |
| error("Cannot redirect stderr to %s", _PATH_DEVNULL); |
| if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) |
| close(devnull); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command that passes a |
| * a connected fd back to us. |
| */ |
| static int |
| ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, |
| const char *host_arg, u_short port, const char *proxy_command) |
| { |
| char *command_string; |
| int sp[2], sock; |
| pid_t pid; |
| char *shell; |
| |
| if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL) |
| shell = _PATH_BSHELL; |
| |
| if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sp) == -1) |
| fatal("Could not create socketpair to communicate with " |
| "proxy dialer: %.100s", strerror(errno)); |
| |
| command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user, |
| host_arg, host, port); |
| debug("Executing proxy dialer command: %.500s", command_string); |
| |
| /* Fork and execute the proxy command. */ |
| if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { |
| char *argv[10]; |
| |
| close(sp[1]); |
| /* Redirect stdin and stdout. */ |
| if (sp[0] != 0) { |
| if (dup2(sp[0], 0) == -1) |
| perror("dup2 stdin"); |
| } |
| if (sp[0] != 1) { |
| if (dup2(sp[0], 1) == -1) |
| perror("dup2 stdout"); |
| } |
| if (sp[0] >= 2) |
| close(sp[0]); |
| |
| /* |
| * Stderr is left for non-ControlPersist connections is so |
| * error messages may be printed on the user's terminal. |
| */ |
| if (!debug_flag && options.control_path != NULL && |
| options.control_persist) |
| stderr_null(); |
| |
| argv[0] = shell; |
| argv[1] = "-c"; |
| argv[2] = command_string; |
| argv[3] = NULL; |
| |
| /* |
| * Execute the proxy command. |
| * Note that we gave up any extra privileges above. |
| */ |
| execv(argv[0], argv); |
| perror(argv[0]); |
| exit(1); |
| } |
| /* Parent. */ |
| if (pid == -1) |
| fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); |
| close(sp[0]); |
| free(command_string); |
| |
| if ((sock = mm_receive_fd(sp[1])) == -1) |
| fatal("proxy dialer did not pass back a connection"); |
| close(sp[1]); |
| |
| while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1) |
| if (errno != EINTR) |
| fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno)); |
| |
| /* Set the connection file descriptors. */ |
| if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock) == NULL) |
| return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */ |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command. |
| */ |
| static int |
| ssh_proxy_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, const char *host_arg, |
| u_short port, const char *proxy_command) |
| { |
| char *command_string; |
| int pin[2], pout[2]; |
| pid_t pid; |
| char *shell; |
| |
| if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0') |
| shell = _PATH_BSHELL; |
| |
| /* Create pipes for communicating with the proxy. */ |
| if (pipe(pin) == -1 || pipe(pout) == -1) |
| fatal("Could not create pipes to communicate with the proxy: %.100s", |
| strerror(errno)); |
| |
| command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user, |
| host_arg, host, port); |
| debug("Executing proxy command: %.500s", command_string); |
| |
| /* Fork and execute the proxy command. */ |
| if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { |
| char *argv[10]; |
| |
| /* Redirect stdin and stdout. */ |
| close(pin[1]); |
| if (pin[0] != 0) { |
| if (dup2(pin[0], 0) == -1) |
| perror("dup2 stdin"); |
| close(pin[0]); |
| } |
| close(pout[0]); |
| if (dup2(pout[1], 1) == -1) |
| perror("dup2 stdout"); |
| /* Cannot be 1 because pin allocated two descriptors. */ |
| close(pout[1]); |
| |
| /* |
| * Stderr is left for non-ControlPersist connections is so |
| * error messages may be printed on the user's terminal. |
| */ |
| if (!debug_flag && options.control_path != NULL && |
| options.control_persist) |
| stderr_null(); |
| |
| argv[0] = shell; |
| argv[1] = "-c"; |
| argv[2] = command_string; |
| argv[3] = NULL; |
| |
| /* Execute the proxy command. Note that we gave up any |
| extra privileges above. */ |
| signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL); |
| execv(argv[0], argv); |
| perror(argv[0]); |
| exit(1); |
| } |
| /* Parent. */ |
| if (pid == -1) |
| fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); |
| else |
| proxy_command_pid = pid; /* save pid to clean up later */ |
| |
| /* Close child side of the descriptors. */ |
| close(pin[0]); |
| close(pout[1]); |
| |
| /* Free the command name. */ |
| free(command_string); |
| |
| /* Set the connection file descriptors. */ |
| if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, pout[0], pin[1]) == NULL) |
| return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */ |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| void |
| ssh_kill_proxy_command(void) |
| { |
| /* |
| * Send SIGHUP to proxy command if used. We don't wait() in |
| * case it hangs and instead rely on init to reap the child |
| */ |
| if (proxy_command_pid > 1) |
| kill(proxy_command_pid, SIGHUP); |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H |
| /* |
| * Search a interface address list (returned from getifaddrs(3)) for an |
| * address that matches the desired address family on the specified interface. |
| * Returns 0 and fills in *resultp and *rlenp on success. Returns -1 on failure. |
| */ |
| static int |
| check_ifaddrs(const char *ifname, int af, const struct ifaddrs *ifaddrs, |
| struct sockaddr_storage *resultp, socklen_t *rlenp) |
| { |
| struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6; |
| struct sockaddr_in *sa; |
| struct in6_addr *v6addr; |
| const struct ifaddrs *ifa; |
| int allow_local; |
| |
| /* |
| * Prefer addresses that are not loopback or linklocal, but use them |
| * if nothing else matches. |
| */ |
| for (allow_local = 0; allow_local < 2; allow_local++) { |
| for (ifa = ifaddrs; ifa != NULL; ifa = ifa->ifa_next) { |
| if (ifa->ifa_addr == NULL || ifa->ifa_name == NULL || |
| (ifa->ifa_flags & IFF_UP) == 0 || |
| ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family != af || |
| strcmp(ifa->ifa_name, options.bind_interface) != 0) |
| continue; |
| switch (ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family) { |
| case AF_INET: |
| sa = (struct sockaddr_in *)ifa->ifa_addr; |
| if (!allow_local && sa->sin_addr.s_addr == |
| htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK)) |
| continue; |
| if (*rlenp < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) { |
| error("%s: v4 addr doesn't fit", |
| __func__); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| *rlenp = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); |
| memcpy(resultp, sa, *rlenp); |
| return 0; |
| case AF_INET6: |
| sa6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)ifa->ifa_addr; |
| v6addr = &sa6->sin6_addr; |
| if (!allow_local && |
| (IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(v6addr) || |
| IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(v6addr))) |
| continue; |
| if (*rlenp < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)) { |
| error("%s: v6 addr doesn't fit", |
| __func__); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| *rlenp = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); |
| memcpy(resultp, sa6, *rlenp); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| return -1; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * Creates a socket for use as the ssh connection. |
| */ |
| static int |
| ssh_create_socket(struct addrinfo *ai) |
| { |
| int sock, r; |
| struct sockaddr_storage bindaddr; |
| socklen_t bindaddrlen = 0; |
| struct addrinfo hints, *res = NULL; |
| #ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H |
| struct ifaddrs *ifaddrs = NULL; |
| #endif |
| char ntop[NI_MAXHOST]; |
| |
| sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); |
| if (sock == -1) { |
| error("socket: %s", strerror(errno)); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); |
| |
| /* Bind the socket to an alternative local IP address */ |
| if (options.bind_address == NULL && options.bind_interface == NULL) |
| return sock; |
| |
| if (options.bind_address != NULL) { |
| memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); |
| hints.ai_family = ai->ai_family; |
| hints.ai_socktype = ai->ai_socktype; |
| hints.ai_protocol = ai->ai_protocol; |
| hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; |
| if ((r = getaddrinfo(options.bind_address, NULL, |
| &hints, &res)) != 0) { |
| error("getaddrinfo: %s: %s", options.bind_address, |
| ssh_gai_strerror(r)); |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| if (res == NULL) { |
| error("getaddrinfo: no addrs"); |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| memcpy(&bindaddr, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen); |
| bindaddrlen = res->ai_addrlen; |
| } else if (options.bind_interface != NULL) { |
| #ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H |
| if ((r = getifaddrs(&ifaddrs)) != 0) { |
| error("getifaddrs: %s: %s", options.bind_interface, |
| strerror(errno)); |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| bindaddrlen = sizeof(bindaddr); |
| if (check_ifaddrs(options.bind_interface, ai->ai_family, |
| ifaddrs, &bindaddr, &bindaddrlen) != 0) { |
| logit("getifaddrs: %s: no suitable addresses", |
| options.bind_interface); |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| #else |
| error("BindInterface not supported on this platform."); |
| #endif |
| } |
| if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&bindaddr, bindaddrlen, |
| ntop, sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != 0) { |
| error("%s: getnameinfo failed: %s", __func__, |
| ssh_gai_strerror(r)); |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&bindaddr, bindaddrlen) != 0) { |
| error("bind %s: %s", ntop, strerror(errno)); |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| debug("%s: bound to %s", __func__, ntop); |
| /* success */ |
| goto out; |
| fail: |
| close(sock); |
| sock = -1; |
| out: |
| if (res != NULL) |
| freeaddrinfo(res); |
| #ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H |
| if (ifaddrs != NULL) |
| freeifaddrs(ifaddrs); |
| #endif |
| return sock; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Opens a TCP/IP connection to the remote server on the given host. |
| * The address of the remote host will be returned in hostaddr. |
| * If port is 0, the default port will be used. |
| * Connection_attempts specifies the maximum number of tries (one per |
| * second). If proxy_command is non-NULL, it specifies the command (with %h |
| * and %p substituted for host and port, respectively) to use to contact |
| * the daemon. |
| */ |
| static int |
| ssh_connect_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, struct addrinfo *aitop, |
| struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int family, |
| int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive) |
| { |
| int on = 1, saved_timeout_ms = *timeout_ms; |
| int oerrno, sock = -1, attempt; |
| char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; |
| struct addrinfo *ai; |
| |
| debug2("%s", __func__); |
| memset(ntop, 0, sizeof(ntop)); |
| memset(strport, 0, sizeof(strport)); |
| |
| for (attempt = 0; attempt < connection_attempts; attempt++) { |
| if (attempt > 0) { |
| /* Sleep a moment before retrying. */ |
| sleep(1); |
| debug("Trying again..."); |
| } |
| /* |
| * Loop through addresses for this host, and try each one in |
| * sequence until the connection succeeds. |
| */ |
| for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { |
| if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && |
| ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) { |
| errno = EAFNOSUPPORT; |
| continue; |
| } |
| if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, |
| ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), |
| NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { |
| oerrno = errno; |
| error("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__); |
| errno = oerrno; |
| continue; |
| } |
| debug("Connecting to %.200s [%.100s] port %s.", |
| host, ntop, strport); |
| |
| /* Create a socket for connecting. */ |
| sock = ssh_create_socket(ai); |
| if (sock < 0) { |
| /* Any error is already output */ |
| errno = 0; |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| *timeout_ms = saved_timeout_ms; |
| if (timeout_connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, |
| timeout_ms) >= 0) { |
| /* Successful connection. */ |
| memcpy(hostaddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen); |
| break; |
| } else { |
| oerrno = errno; |
| debug("connect to address %s port %s: %s", |
| ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); |
| close(sock); |
| sock = -1; |
| errno = oerrno; |
| } |
| } |
| if (sock != -1) |
| break; /* Successful connection. */ |
| } |
| |
| /* Return failure if we didn't get a successful connection. */ |
| if (sock == -1) { |
| error("ssh: connect to host %s port %s: %s", |
| host, strport, errno == 0 ? "failure" : strerror(errno)); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| debug("Connection established."); |
| |
| /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */ |
| if (want_keepalive && |
| setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&on, |
| sizeof(on)) == -1) |
| error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno)); |
| |
| /* Set the connection. */ |
| if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock) == NULL) |
| return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */ |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int |
| ssh_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, const char *host_arg, |
| struct addrinfo *addrs, struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, |
| int family, int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive) |
| { |
| int in, out; |
| |
| if (options.proxy_command == NULL) { |
| return ssh_connect_direct(ssh, host, addrs, hostaddr, port, |
| family, connection_attempts, timeout_ms, want_keepalive); |
| } else if (strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0) { |
| if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) == -1 || |
| (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) == -1) { |
| if (in >= 0) |
| close(in); |
| error("%s: dup() in/out failed", __func__); |
| return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */ |
| } |
| if ((ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, in, out)) == NULL) |
| return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */ |
| return 0; |
| } else if (options.proxy_use_fdpass) { |
| return ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(ssh, host, host_arg, port, |
| options.proxy_command); |
| } |
| return ssh_proxy_connect(ssh, host, host_arg, port, |
| options.proxy_command); |
| } |
| |
| /* defaults to 'no' */ |
| static int |
| confirm(const char *prompt, const char *fingerprint) |
| { |
| const char *msg, *again = "Please type 'yes' or 'no': "; |
| const char *again_fp = "Please type 'yes', 'no' or the fingerprint: "; |
| char *p; |
| int ret = -1; |
| |
| if (options.batch_mode) |
| return 0; |
| for (msg = prompt;;msg = fingerprint ? again_fp : again) { |
| p = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ECHO); |
| if (p == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| p[strcspn(p, "\n")] = '\0'; |
| if (p[0] == '\0' || strcasecmp(p, "no") == 0) |
| ret = 0; |
| else if (strcasecmp(p, "yes") == 0 || (fingerprint != NULL && |
| strcasecmp(p, fingerprint) == 0)) |
| ret = 1; |
| free(p); |
| if (ret != -1) |
| return ret; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| check_host_cert(const char *host, const struct sshkey *key) |
| { |
| const char *reason; |
| int r; |
| |
| if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 1, 0, host, &reason) != 0) { |
| error("%s", reason); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->critical) != 0) { |
| error("Certificate for %s contains unsupported " |
| "critical options(s)", host); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if ((r = sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(key, |
| options.ca_sign_algorithms)) != 0) { |
| logit("%s: certificate signature algorithm %s: %s", __func__, |
| (key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_type == NULL) ? |
| "(null)" : key->cert->signature_type, ssh_err(r)); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| sockaddr_is_local(struct sockaddr *hostaddr) |
| { |
| switch (hostaddr->sa_family) { |
| case AF_INET: |
| return (ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)hostaddr)-> |
| sin_addr.s_addr) >> 24) == IN_LOOPBACKNET; |
| case AF_INET6: |
| return IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK( |
| &(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)hostaddr)->sin6_addr)); |
| default: |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Prepare the hostname and ip address strings that are used to lookup |
| * host keys in known_hosts files. These may have a port number appended. |
| */ |
| void |
| get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, |
| u_short port, char **hostfile_hostname, char **hostfile_ipaddr) |
| { |
| char ntop[NI_MAXHOST]; |
| socklen_t addrlen; |
| |
| switch (hostaddr == NULL ? -1 : hostaddr->sa_family) { |
| case -1: |
| addrlen = 0; |
| break; |
| case AF_INET: |
| addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); |
| break; |
| case AF_INET6: |
| addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); |
| break; |
| default: |
| addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr); |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * We don't have the remote ip-address for connections |
| * using a proxy command |
| */ |
| if (hostfile_ipaddr != NULL) { |
| if (options.proxy_command == NULL) { |
| if (getnameinfo(hostaddr, addrlen, |
| ntop, sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0) |
| fatal("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__); |
| *hostfile_ipaddr = put_host_port(ntop, port); |
| } else { |
| *hostfile_ipaddr = xstrdup("<no hostip for proxy " |
| "command>"); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Allow the user to record the key under a different name or |
| * differentiate a non-standard port. This is useful for ssh |
| * tunneling over forwarded connections or if you run multiple |
| * sshd's on different ports on the same machine. |
| */ |
| if (hostfile_hostname != NULL) { |
| if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) { |
| *hostfile_hostname = xstrdup(options.host_key_alias); |
| debug("using hostkeyalias: %s", *hostfile_hostname); |
| } else { |
| *hostfile_hostname = put_host_port(hostname, port); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * check whether the supplied host key is valid, return -1 if the key |
| * is not valid. user_hostfile[0] will not be updated if 'readonly' is true. |
| */ |
| #define RDRW 0 |
| #define RDONLY 1 |
| #define ROQUIET 2 |
| static int |
| check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, |
| struct sshkey *host_key, int readonly, |
| char **user_hostfiles, u_int num_user_hostfiles, |
| char **system_hostfiles, u_int num_system_hostfiles) |
| { |
| HostStatus host_status; |
| HostStatus ip_status; |
| struct sshkey *raw_key = NULL; |
| char *ip = NULL, *host = NULL; |
| char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp, *ra; |
| char msg[1024]; |
| const char *type; |
| const struct hostkey_entry *host_found, *ip_found; |
| int len, cancelled_forwarding = 0, confirmed; |
| int local = sockaddr_is_local(hostaddr); |
| int r, want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(host_key), host_ip_differ = 0; |
| int hostkey_trusted = 0; /* Known or explicitly accepted by user */ |
| struct hostkeys *host_hostkeys, *ip_hostkeys; |
| u_int i; |
| |
| /* |
| * Force accepting of the host key for loopback/localhost. The |
| * problem is that if the home directory is NFS-mounted to multiple |
| * machines, localhost will refer to a different machine in each of |
| * them, and the user will get bogus HOST_CHANGED warnings. This |
| * essentially disables host authentication for localhost; however, |
| * this is probably not a real problem. |
| */ |
| if (options.no_host_authentication_for_localhost == 1 && local && |
| options.host_key_alias == NULL) { |
| debug("Forcing accepting of host key for " |
| "loopback/localhost."); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Prepare the hostname and address strings used for hostkey lookup. |
| * In some cases, these will have a port number appended. |
| */ |
| get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(hostname, hostaddr, port, &host, &ip); |
| |
| /* |
| * Turn off check_host_ip if the connection is to localhost, via proxy |
| * command or if we don't have a hostname to compare with |
| */ |
| if (options.check_host_ip && (local || |
| strcmp(hostname, ip) == 0 || options.proxy_command != NULL)) |
| options.check_host_ip = 0; |
| |
| host_hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); |
| for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++) |
| load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, user_hostfiles[i]); |
| for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++) |
| load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, system_hostfiles[i]); |
| |
| ip_hostkeys = NULL; |
| if (!want_cert && options.check_host_ip) { |
| ip_hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); |
| for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++) |
| load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, user_hostfiles[i]); |
| for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++) |
| load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, system_hostfiles[i]); |
| } |
| |
| retry: |
| /* Reload these as they may have changed on cert->key downgrade */ |
| want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(host_key); |
| type = sshkey_type(host_key); |
| |
| /* |
| * Check if the host key is present in the user's list of known |
| * hosts or in the systemwide list. |
| */ |
| host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host_key, |
| &host_found); |
| |
| /* |
| * Also perform check for the ip address, skip the check if we are |
| * localhost, looking for a certificate, or the hostname was an ip |
| * address to begin with. |
| */ |
| if (!want_cert && ip_hostkeys != NULL) { |
| ip_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, host_key, |
| &ip_found); |
| if (host_status == HOST_CHANGED && |
| (ip_status != HOST_CHANGED || |
| (ip_found != NULL && |
| !sshkey_equal(ip_found->key, host_found->key)))) |
| host_ip_differ = 1; |
| } else |
| ip_status = host_status; |
| |
| switch (host_status) { |
| case HOST_OK: |
| /* The host is known and the key matches. */ |
| debug("Host '%.200s' is known and matches the %s host %s.", |
| host, type, want_cert ? "certificate" : "key"); |
| debug("Found %s in %s:%lu", want_cert ? "CA key" : "key", |
| host_found->file, host_found->line); |
| if (want_cert && |
| !check_host_cert(options.host_key_alias == NULL ? |
| hostname : options.host_key_alias, host_key)) |
| goto fail; |
| if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) { |
| if (readonly || want_cert) |
| logit("%s host key for IP address " |
| "'%.128s' not in list of known hosts.", |
| type, ip); |
| else if (!add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], ip, |
| host_key, options.hash_known_hosts)) |
| logit("Failed to add the %s host key for IP " |
| "address '%.128s' to the list of known " |
| "hosts (%.500s).", type, ip, |
| user_hostfiles[0]); |
| else |
| logit("Warning: Permanently added the %s host " |
| "key for IP address '%.128s' to the list " |
| "of known hosts.", type, ip); |
| } else if (options.visual_host_key) { |
| fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, |
| options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); |
| ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, |
| options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); |
| if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) |
| fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); |
| logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s", fp, ra); |
| free(ra); |
| free(fp); |
| } |
| hostkey_trusted = 1; |
| break; |
| case HOST_NEW: |
| if (options.host_key_alias == NULL && port != 0 && |
| port != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) { |
| debug("checking without port identifier"); |
| if (check_host_key(hostname, hostaddr, 0, host_key, |
| ROQUIET, user_hostfiles, num_user_hostfiles, |
| system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles) == 0) { |
| debug("found matching key w/out port"); |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| if (readonly || want_cert) |
| goto fail; |
| /* The host is new. */ |
| if (options.strict_host_key_checking == |
| SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES) { |
| /* |
| * User has requested strict host key checking. We |
| * will not add the host key automatically. The only |
| * alternative left is to abort. |
| */ |
| error("No %s host key is known for %.200s and you " |
| "have requested strict checking.", type, host); |
| goto fail; |
| } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == |
| SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK) { |
| char msg1[1024], msg2[1024]; |
| |
| if (show_other_keys(host_hostkeys, host_key)) |
| snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), |
| "\nbut keys of different type are already" |
| " known for this host."); |
| else |
| snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), "."); |
| /* The default */ |
| fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, |
| options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); |
| ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, |
| options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); |
| if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) |
| fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); |
| msg2[0] = '\0'; |
| if (options.verify_host_key_dns) { |
| if (matching_host_key_dns) |
| snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2), |
| "Matching host key fingerprint" |
| " found in DNS.\n"); |
| else |
| snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2), |
| "No matching host key fingerprint" |
| " found in DNS.\n"); |
| } |
| snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), |
| "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be " |
| "established%s\n" |
| "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s" |
| "Are you sure you want to continue connecting " |
| "(yes/no/[fingerprint])? ", |
| host, ip, msg1, type, fp, |
| options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "", |
| options.visual_host_key ? ra : "", |
| msg2); |
| free(ra); |
| confirmed = confirm(msg, fp); |
| free(fp); |
| if (!confirmed) |
| goto fail; |
| hostkey_trusted = 1; /* user explicitly confirmed */ |
| } |
| /* |
| * If in "new" or "off" strict mode, add the key automatically |
| * to the local known_hosts file. |
| */ |
| if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) { |
| snprintf(hostline, sizeof(hostline), "%s,%s", host, ip); |
| hostp = hostline; |
| if (options.hash_known_hosts) { |
| /* Add hash of host and IP separately */ |
| r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], |
| host, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts) && |
| add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], ip, |
| host_key, options.hash_known_hosts); |
| } else { |
| /* Add unhashed "host,ip" */ |
| r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], |
| hostline, host_key, |
| options.hash_known_hosts); |
| } |
| } else { |
| r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], host, |
| host_key, options.hash_known_hosts); |
| hostp = host; |
| } |
| |
| if (!r) |
| logit("Failed to add the host to the list of known " |
| "hosts (%.500s).", user_hostfiles[0]); |
| else |
| logit("Warning: Permanently added '%.200s' (%s) to the " |
| "list of known hosts.", hostp, type); |
| break; |
| case HOST_REVOKED: |
| error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); |
| error("@ WARNING: REVOKED HOST KEY DETECTED! @"); |
| error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); |
| error("The %s host key for %s is marked as revoked.", type, host); |
| error("This could mean that a stolen key is being used to"); |
| error("impersonate this host."); |
| |
| /* |
| * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have |
| * to edit the key manually and we can only abort. |
| */ |
| if (options.strict_host_key_checking != |
| SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) { |
| error("%s host key for %.200s was revoked and you have " |
| "requested strict checking.", type, host); |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| goto continue_unsafe; |
| |
| case HOST_CHANGED: |
| if (want_cert) { |
| /* |
| * This is only a debug() since it is valid to have |
| * CAs with wildcard DNS matches that don't match |
| * all hosts that one might visit. |
| */ |
| debug("Host certificate authority does not " |
| "match %s in %s:%lu", CA_MARKER, |
| host_found->file, host_found->line); |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| if (readonly == ROQUIET) |
| goto fail; |
| if (options.check_host_ip && host_ip_differ) { |
| char *key_msg; |
| if (ip_status == HOST_NEW) |
| key_msg = "is unknown"; |
| else if (ip_status == HOST_OK) |
| key_msg = "is unchanged"; |
| else |
| key_msg = "has a different value"; |
| error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); |
| error("@ WARNING: POSSIBLE DNS SPOOFING DETECTED! @"); |
| error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); |
| error("The %s host key for %s has changed,", type, host); |
| error("and the key for the corresponding IP address %s", ip); |
| error("%s. This could either mean that", key_msg); |
| error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host"); |
| error("and its host key have changed at the same time."); |
| if (ip_status != HOST_NEW) |
| error("Offending key for IP in %s:%lu", |
| ip_found->file, ip_found->line); |
| } |
| /* The host key has changed. */ |
| warn_changed_key(host_key); |
| error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.", |
| user_hostfiles[0]); |
| error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", |
| sshkey_type(host_found->key), |
| host_found->file, host_found->line); |
| |
| /* |
| * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have |
| * to edit the key manually and we can only abort. |
| */ |
| if (options.strict_host_key_checking != |
| SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) { |
| error("%s host key for %.200s has changed and you have " |
| "requested strict checking.", type, host); |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| continue_unsafe: |
| /* |
| * If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow |
| * the connection but without MITM-able authentication or |
| * forwarding. |
| */ |
| if (options.password_authentication) { |
| error("Password authentication is disabled to avoid " |
| "man-in-the-middle attacks."); |
| options.password_authentication = 0; |
| cancelled_forwarding = 1; |
| } |
| if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication) { |
| error("Keyboard-interactive authentication is disabled" |
| " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks."); |
| options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0; |
| options.challenge_response_authentication = 0; |
| cancelled_forwarding = 1; |
| } |
| if (options.challenge_response_authentication) { |
| error("Challenge/response authentication is disabled" |
| " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks."); |
| options.challenge_response_authentication = 0; |
| cancelled_forwarding = 1; |
| } |
| if (options.forward_agent) { |
| error("Agent forwarding is disabled to avoid " |
| "man-in-the-middle attacks."); |
| options.forward_agent = 0; |
| cancelled_forwarding = 1; |
| } |
| if (options.forward_x11) { |
| error("X11 forwarding is disabled to avoid " |
| "man-in-the-middle attacks."); |
| options.forward_x11 = 0; |
| cancelled_forwarding = 1; |
| } |
| if (options.num_local_forwards > 0 || |
| options.num_remote_forwards > 0) { |
| error("Port forwarding is disabled to avoid " |
| "man-in-the-middle attacks."); |
| options.num_local_forwards = |
| options.num_remote_forwards = 0; |
| cancelled_forwarding = 1; |
| } |
| if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) { |
| error("Tunnel forwarding is disabled to avoid " |
| "man-in-the-middle attacks."); |
| options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; |
| cancelled_forwarding = 1; |
| } |
| if (options.exit_on_forward_failure && cancelled_forwarding) |
| fatal("Error: forwarding disabled due to host key " |
| "check failure"); |
| |
| /* |
| * XXX Should permit the user to change to use the new id. |
| * This could be done by converting the host key to an |
| * identifying sentence, tell that the host identifies itself |
| * by that sentence, and ask the user if he/she wishes to |
| * accept the authentication. |
| */ |
| break; |
| case HOST_FOUND: |
| fatal("internal error"); |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| if (options.check_host_ip && host_status != HOST_CHANGED && |
| ip_status == HOST_CHANGED) { |
| snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), |
| "Warning: the %s host key for '%.200s' " |
| "differs from the key for the IP address '%.128s'" |
| "\nOffending key for IP in %s:%lu", |
| type, host, ip, ip_found->file, ip_found->line); |
| if (host_status == HOST_OK) { |
| len = strlen(msg); |
| snprintf(msg + len, sizeof(msg) - len, |
| "\nMatching host key in %s:%lu", |
| host_found->file, host_found->line); |
| } |
| if (options.strict_host_key_checking == |
| SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK) { |
| strlcat(msg, "\nAre you sure you want " |
| "to continue connecting (yes/no)? ", sizeof(msg)); |
| if (!confirm(msg, NULL)) |
| goto fail; |
| } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking != |
| SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) { |
| logit("%s", msg); |
| error("Exiting, you have requested strict checking."); |
| goto fail; |
| } else { |
| logit("%s", msg); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!hostkey_trusted && options.update_hostkeys) { |
| debug("%s: hostkey not known or explicitly trusted: " |
| "disabling UpdateHostkeys", __func__); |
| options.update_hostkeys = 0; |
| } |
| |
| free(ip); |
| free(host); |
| if (host_hostkeys != NULL) |
| free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys); |
| if (ip_hostkeys != NULL) |
| free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys); |
| return 0; |
| |
| fail: |
| if (want_cert && host_status != HOST_REVOKED) { |
| /* |
| * No matching certificate. Downgrade cert to raw key and |
| * search normally. |
| */ |
| debug("No matching CA found. Retry with plain key"); |
| if ((r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &raw_key)) != 0) |
| fatal("%s: sshkey_from_private: %s", |
| __func__, ssh_err(r)); |
| if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(raw_key)) != 0) |
| fatal("Couldn't drop certificate: %s", ssh_err(r)); |
| host_key = raw_key; |
| goto retry; |
| } |
| sshkey_free(raw_key); |
| free(ip); |
| free(host); |
| if (host_hostkeys != NULL) |
| free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys); |
| if (ip_hostkeys != NULL) |
| free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify */ |
| int |
| verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, struct sshkey *host_key) |
| { |
| u_int i; |
| int r = -1, flags = 0; |
| char valid[64], *fp = NULL, *cafp = NULL; |
| struct sshkey *plain = NULL; |
| |
| if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, |
| options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { |
| error("%s: fingerprint host key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); |
| r = -1; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| if (sshkey_is_cert(host_key)) { |
| if ((cafp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key->cert->signature_key, |
| options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { |
| error("%s: fingerprint CA key: %s", |
| __func__, ssh_err(r)); |
| r = -1; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| sshkey_format_cert_validity(host_key->cert, |
| valid, sizeof(valid)); |
| debug("Server host certificate: %s %s, serial %llu " |
| "ID \"%s\" CA %s %s valid %s", |
| sshkey_ssh_name(host_key), fp, |
| (unsigned long long)host_key->cert->serial, |
| host_key->cert->key_id, |
| sshkey_ssh_name(host_key->cert->signature_key), cafp, |
| valid); |
| for (i = 0; i < host_key->cert->nprincipals; i++) { |
| debug2("Server host certificate hostname: %s", |
| host_key->cert->principals[i]); |
| } |
| } else { |
| debug("Server host key: %s %s", sshkey_ssh_name(host_key), fp); |
| } |
| |
| if (sshkey_equal(previous_host_key, host_key)) { |
| debug2("%s: server host key %s %s matches cached key", |
| __func__, sshkey_type(host_key), fp); |
| r = 0; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| /* Check in RevokedHostKeys file if specified */ |
| if (options.revoked_host_keys != NULL) { |
| r = sshkey_check_revoked(host_key, options.revoked_host_keys); |
| switch (r) { |
| case 0: |
| break; /* not revoked */ |
| case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED: |
| error("Host key %s %s revoked by file %s", |
| sshkey_type(host_key), fp, |
| options.revoked_host_keys); |
| r = -1; |
| goto out; |
| default: |
| error("Error checking host key %s %s in " |
| "revoked keys file %s: %s", sshkey_type(host_key), |
| fp, options.revoked_host_keys, ssh_err(r)); |
| r = -1; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (options.verify_host_key_dns) { |
| /* |
| * XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS, so downgrade |
| * them and try the plain key. |
| */ |
| if ((r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &plain)) != 0) |
| goto out; |
| if (sshkey_is_cert(plain)) |
| sshkey_drop_cert(plain); |
| if (verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, plain, &flags) == 0) { |
| if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) { |
| if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 && |
| flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH && |
| flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE) { |
| r = 0; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) { |
| matching_host_key_dns = 1; |
| } else { |
| warn_changed_key(plain); |
| error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS " |
| "with the new host key to get rid " |
| "of this message."); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| r = check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key, RDRW, |
| options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles, |
| options.system_hostfiles, options.num_system_hostfiles); |
| |
| out: |
| sshkey_free(plain); |
| free(fp); |
| free(cafp); |
| if (r == 0 && host_key != NULL) { |
| sshkey_free(previous_host_key); |
| r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &previous_host_key); |
| } |
| |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Starts a dialog with the server, and authenticates the current user on the |
| * server. This does not need any extra privileges. The basic connection |
| * to the server must already have been established before this is called. |
| * If login fails, this function prints an error and never returns. |
| * This function does not require super-user privileges. |
| */ |
| void |
| ssh_login(struct ssh *ssh, Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost, |
| struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, struct passwd *pw, int timeout_ms) |
| { |
| char *host; |
| char *server_user, *local_user; |
| |
| local_user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); |
| server_user = options.user ? options.user : local_user; |
| |
| /* Convert the user-supplied hostname into all lowercase. */ |
| host = xstrdup(orighost); |
| lowercase(host); |
| |
| /* Exchange protocol version identification strings with the server. */ |
| if (kex_exchange_identification(ssh, timeout_ms, NULL) != 0) |
| cleanup_exit(255); /* error already logged */ |
| |
| /* Put the connection into non-blocking mode. */ |
| ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(ssh); |
| |
| /* key exchange */ |
| /* authenticate user */ |
| debug("Authenticating to %s:%d as '%s'", host, port, server_user); |
| ssh_kex2(ssh, host, hostaddr, port); |
| ssh_userauth2(ssh, local_user, server_user, host, sensitive); |
| free(local_user); |
| free(host); |
| } |
| |
| /* print all known host keys for a given host, but skip keys of given type */ |
| static int |
| show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *key) |
| { |
| int type[] = { |
| KEY_RSA, |
| KEY_DSA, |
| KEY_ECDSA, |
| KEY_ED25519, |
| KEY_XMSS, |
| -1 |
| }; |
| int i, ret = 0; |
| char *fp, *ra; |
| const struct hostkey_entry *found; |
| |
| for (i = 0; type[i] != -1; i++) { |
| if (type[i] == key->type) |
| continue; |
| if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found)) |
| continue; |
| fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key, |
| options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); |
| ra = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key, |
| options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); |
| if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) |
| fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); |
| logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n" |
| "in %s:%lu\n" |
| "%s key fingerprint %s.", |
| sshkey_type(found->key), |
| found->host, found->file, found->line, |
| sshkey_type(found->key), fp); |
| if (options.visual_host_key) |
| logit("%s", ra); |
| free(ra); |
| free(fp); |
| ret = 1; |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| static void |
| warn_changed_key(struct sshkey *host_key) |
| { |
| char *fp; |
| |
| fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash, |
| SSH_FP_DEFAULT); |
| if (fp == NULL) |
| fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); |
| |
| error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); |
| error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @"); |
| error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); |
| error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!"); |
| error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!"); |
| error("It is also possible that a host key has just been changed."); |
| error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.", |
| sshkey_type(host_key), fp); |
| error("Please contact your system administrator."); |
| |
| free(fp); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Execute a local command |
| */ |
| int |
| ssh_local_cmd(const char *args) |
| { |
| char *shell; |
| pid_t pid; |
| int status; |
| void (*osighand)(int); |
| |
| if (!options.permit_local_command || |
| args == NULL || !*args) |
| return (1); |
| |
| if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0') |
| shell = _PATH_BSHELL; |
| |
| osighand = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); |
| pid = fork(); |
| if (pid == 0) { |
| signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL); |
| debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args); |
| execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL); |
| error("Couldn't execute %s -c \"%s\": %s", |
| shell, args, strerror(errno)); |
| _exit(1); |
| } else if (pid == -1) |
| fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); |
| while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) |
| if (errno != EINTR) |
| fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno)); |
| signal(SIGCHLD, osighand); |
| |
| if (!WIFEXITED(status)) |
| return (1); |
| |
| return (WEXITSTATUS(status)); |
| } |
| |
| void |
| maybe_add_key_to_agent(char *authfile, struct sshkey *private, |
| char *comment, char *passphrase) |
| { |
| int auth_sock = -1, r; |
| |
| if (options.add_keys_to_agent == 0) |
| return; |
| |
| if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) { |
| debug3("no authentication agent, not adding key"); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if (options.add_keys_to_agent == 2 && |
| !ask_permission("Add key %s (%s) to agent?", authfile, comment)) { |
| debug3("user denied adding this key"); |
| close(auth_sock); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(auth_sock, private, comment, 0, |
| (options.add_keys_to_agent == 3), 0)) == 0) |
| debug("identity added to agent: %s", authfile); |
| else |
| debug("could not add identity to agent: %s (%d)", authfile, r); |
| close(auth_sock); |
| } |