- miod@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/09/18 13:02:21
[authfd.c bufaux.c dh.c mac.c ssh-keygen.c]
A few signedness fixes for harmless situations; markus@ ok
diff --git a/authfd.c b/authfd.c
index c78db6d..5fdf1ca 100644
--- a/authfd.c
+++ b/authfd.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.61 2003/06/28 16:23:06 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.62 2003/09/18 13:02:21 miod Exp $");
#include <openssl/evp.h>
@@ -114,7 +114,8 @@
static int
ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply)
{
- int l, len;
+ int l;
+ u_int len;
char buf[1024];
/* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */
@@ -147,7 +148,7 @@
/* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */
len = GET_32BIT(buf);
if (len > 256 * 1024)
- fatal("Authentication response too long: %d", len);
+ fatal("Authentication response too long: %u", len);
/* Read the rest of the response in to the buffer. */
buffer_clear(reply);
@@ -292,7 +293,7 @@
/* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */
auth->howmany = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
- if (auth->howmany > 1024)
+ if ((u_int)auth->howmany > 1024)
fatal("Too many identities in authentication reply: %d",
auth->howmany);