upstream commit
Move several subprocess-related functions from various
locations to misc.c. Extend subprocess() to offer a little more control over
stdio disposition.
feedback & ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: 3573dd7109d13ef9bd3bed93a3deb170fbfce049
diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
index 1c59b5b..0b1e88d 100644
--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.68 2017/06/24 06:34:38 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.69 2017/08/18 05:36:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
@@ -242,288 +241,6 @@
return authenticated;
}
-/*
- * Splits 's' into an argument vector. Handles quoted string and basic
- * escape characters (\\, \", \'). Caller must free the argument vector
- * and its members.
- */
-static int
-split_argv(const char *s, int *argcp, char ***argvp)
-{
- int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- int argc = 0, quote, i, j;
- char *arg, **argv = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*argv));
-
- *argvp = NULL;
- *argcp = 0;
-
- for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
- /* Skip leading whitespace */
- if (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t')
- continue;
-
- /* Start of a token */
- quote = 0;
- if (s[i] == '\\' &&
- (s[i + 1] == '\'' || s[i + 1] == '\"' || s[i + 1] == '\\'))
- i++;
- else if (s[i] == '\'' || s[i] == '"')
- quote = s[i++];
-
- argv = xreallocarray(argv, (argc + 2), sizeof(*argv));
- arg = argv[argc++] = xcalloc(1, strlen(s + i) + 1);
- argv[argc] = NULL;
-
- /* Copy the token in, removing escapes */
- for (j = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
- if (s[i] == '\\') {
- if (s[i + 1] == '\'' ||
- s[i + 1] == '\"' ||
- s[i + 1] == '\\') {
- i++; /* Skip '\' */
- arg[j++] = s[i];
- } else {
- /* Unrecognised escape */
- arg[j++] = s[i];
- }
- } else if (quote == 0 && (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t'))
- break; /* done */
- else if (quote != 0 && s[i] == quote)
- break; /* done */
- else
- arg[j++] = s[i];
- }
- if (s[i] == '\0') {
- if (quote != 0) {
- /* Ran out of string looking for close quote */
- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- goto out;
- }
- break;
- }
- }
- /* Success */
- *argcp = argc;
- *argvp = argv;
- argc = 0;
- argv = NULL;
- r = 0;
- out:
- if (argc != 0 && argv != NULL) {
- for (i = 0; i < argc; i++)
- free(argv[i]);
- free(argv);
- }
- return r;
-}
-
-/*
- * Reassemble an argument vector into a string, quoting and escaping as
- * necessary. Caller must free returned string.
- */
-static char *
-assemble_argv(int argc, char **argv)
-{
- int i, j, ws, r;
- char c, *ret;
- struct sshbuf *buf, *arg;
-
- if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (arg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
-
- for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
- ws = 0;
- sshbuf_reset(arg);
- for (j = 0; argv[i][j] != '\0'; j++) {
- r = 0;
- c = argv[i][j];
- switch (c) {
- case ' ':
- case '\t':
- ws = 1;
- r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c);
- break;
- case '\\':
- case '\'':
- case '"':
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, '\\')) != 0)
- break;
- /* FALLTHROUGH */
- default:
- r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c);
- break;
- }
- if (r != 0)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
- }
- if ((i != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ' ')) != 0) ||
- (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0) ||
- (r = sshbuf_putb(buf, arg)) != 0 ||
- (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0))
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- }
- if ((ret = malloc(sshbuf_len(buf) + 1)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: malloc failed", __func__);
- memcpy(ret, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
- ret[sshbuf_len(buf)] = '\0';
- sshbuf_free(buf);
- sshbuf_free(arg);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Runs command in a subprocess. Returns pid on success and a FILE* to the
- * subprocess' stdout or 0 on failure.
- * NB. "command" is only used for logging.
- */
-static pid_t
-subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command,
- int ac, char **av, FILE **child)
-{
- FILE *f;
- struct stat st;
- int devnull, p[2], i;
- pid_t pid;
- char *cp, errmsg[512];
- u_int envsize;
- char **child_env;
-
- *child = NULL;
-
- debug3("%s: %s command \"%s\" running as %s", __func__,
- tag, command, pw->pw_name);
-
- /* Verify the path exists and is safe-ish to execute */
- if (*av[0] != '/') {
- error("%s path is not absolute", tag);
- return 0;
- }
- temporarily_use_uid(pw);
- if (stat(av[0], &st) < 0) {
- error("Could not stat %s \"%s\": %s", tag,
- av[0], strerror(errno));
- restore_uid();
- return 0;
- }
- if (auth_secure_path(av[0], &st, NULL, 0,
- errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
- error("Unsafe %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], errmsg);
- restore_uid();
- return 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * Run the command; stderr is left in place, stdout is the
- * authorized_keys output.
- */
- if (pipe(p) != 0) {
- error("%s: pipe: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
- restore_uid();
- return 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
- * run cleanup_exit() code.
- */
- restore_uid();
-
- switch ((pid = fork())) {
- case -1: /* error */
- error("%s: fork: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
- close(p[0]);
- close(p[1]);
- return 0;
- case 0: /* child */
- /* Prepare a minimal environment for the child. */
- envsize = 5;
- child_env = xcalloc(sizeof(*child_env), envsize);
- child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
- child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
- child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
- child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
- if ((cp = getenv("LANG")) != NULL)
- child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LANG", cp);
-
- for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
- signal(i, SIG_DFL);
-
- if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
- error("%s: open %s: %s", tag, _PATH_DEVNULL,
- strerror(errno));
- _exit(1);
- }
- /* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */
- if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
- dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
- error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
- _exit(1);
- }
- closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
-
- /* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
- if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
- error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
- strerror(errno));
- _exit(1);
- }
- if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
- error("%s: setresuid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
- strerror(errno));
- _exit(1);
- }
- /* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
- if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
- error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
- _exit(1);
- }
-
- execve(av[0], av, child_env);
- error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno));
- _exit(127);
- default: /* parent */
- break;
- }
-
- close(p[1]);
- if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
- error("%s: fdopen: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
- close(p[0]);
- /* Don't leave zombie child */
- kill(pid, SIGTERM);
- while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
- ;
- return 0;
- }
- /* Success */
- debug3("%s: %s pid %ld", __func__, tag, (long)pid);
- *child = f;
- return pid;
-}
-
-/* Returns 0 if pid exited cleanly, non-zero otherwise */
-static int
-exited_cleanly(pid_t pid, const char *tag, const char *cmd)
-{
- int status;
-
- while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
- if (errno != EINTR) {
- error("%s: waitpid: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
- }
- if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
- error("%s %s exited on signal %d", tag, cmd, WTERMSIG(status));
- return -1;
- } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
- error("%s %s failed, status %d", tag, cmd, WEXITSTATUS(status));
- return -1;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
static int
match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
{
@@ -656,7 +373,7 @@
}
/* Turn the command into an argument vector */
- if (split_argv(options.authorized_principals_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
+ if (argv_split(options.authorized_principals_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" contains "
"invalid quotes", command);
goto out;
@@ -705,10 +422,11 @@
av[i] = tmp;
}
/* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
- command = assemble_argv(ac, av);
+ command = argv_assemble(ac, av);
if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", pw, command,
- ac, av, &f)) == 0)
+ ac, av, &f,
+ SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
goto out;
uid_swapped = 1;
@@ -996,7 +714,7 @@
}
/* Turn the command into an argument vector */
- if (split_argv(options.authorized_keys_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
+ if (argv_split(options.authorized_keys_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" contains invalid quotes",
command);
goto out;
@@ -1020,7 +738,7 @@
av[i] = tmp;
}
/* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
- command = assemble_argv(ac, av);
+ command = argv_assemble(ac, av);
/*
* If AuthorizedKeysCommand was run without arguments
@@ -1037,7 +755,8 @@
}
if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", pw, command,
- ac, av, &f)) == 0)
+ ac, av, &f,
+ SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
goto out;
uid_swapped = 1;