Simplify the implementation of m_trampoline and the stuff that refers
to it. Now there are no more offsets and no copying of code into the
stack. We just redirect directly to entry points in m_syscalls.S.
This will mess up pointercheck, since the redirect targets are now in
Valgrind's address space, not the client's. But pointercheck is hosed
anyway, and I'd rather back off to something simple whilst ppc32 is
stabilised. When the address space management stuff is overhauled
then pointercheck may or may not get reinstated, and if it does then
the trampoline stuff will need revisiting.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.valgrind.org/valgrind/trunk@3977 a5019735-40e9-0310-863c-91ae7b9d1cf9
diff --git a/coregrind/m_stacktrace.c b/coregrind/m_stacktrace.c
index 9b086c7..0c07c7d 100644
--- a/coregrind/m_stacktrace.c
+++ b/coregrind/m_stacktrace.c
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@
Addr sp = VG_(get_SP)(tid);
Addr stack_highest_word = VG_(threads)[tid].client_stack_highest_word;
-#if defined(VGP_x86_linux)
+# if defined(VGP_x86_linux)
/* Nasty little hack to deal with sysinfo syscalls - if libc is
using the sysinfo page for syscalls (the TLS version does), then
ip will always appear to be in that page when doing a syscall,
@@ -184,13 +184,14 @@
off the stack so that ip is placed within the library function
calling the syscall. This makes stack backtraces much more
useful. */
- if (ip >= VG_(client_trampoline_code)+VG_(tramp_syscall_offset) &&
- ip < VG_(client_trampoline_code)+VG_(trampoline_code_length) &&
- VG_(is_addressable)(sp, sizeof(Addr), VKI_PROT_READ)) {
+ if (ip >= (Addr)&VG_(trampoline_stuff_start)
+ && ip < (Addr)&VG_(trampoline_stuff_end)
+ && VG_(is_addressable)(sp, sizeof(Addr), VKI_PROT_READ)) {
ip = *(Addr *)sp;
sp += sizeof(Addr);
}
-#endif
+# endif
+
if (0)
VG_(printf)("tid %d: stack_highest=%p ip=%p sp=%p fp=%p\n",
tid, stack_highest_word, ip, sp, fp);