Lock down IInputMethodManager#shellCommand() based on caller UID

This is part of our on-going effort to review caller verifications in
InputMethodManagerService (IMMS).

In Android P, IMMS started relying on IBinder#shellCommand() to
implement 'adb shell ime' command [1].  When handling incoming
request, following caller verifications are used depending on the
command type.

  * IMMS#calledFromValidUserLocked()
    * This can be bypassed with INTERACT_ACROSS_USERS_FULL permission
  * WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS permission

From the viewpoint of caller verification, this is basically the same
as how commands like 'adb shell ime' were handled before
IBinder#shellCommand().

What this CL aims to do is adding one more foolproof to this protocol.

Given that all commands exposed via IInputMethodManager#shellCommand()
are intended to be used only from "shell" environment, it is most
likely safe to reject any request from non-shell users.  With this
additional restriction, even if some caller verification was
accidentally missed in those shell commands such a security hole would
not be exposed to random applications.

 [1]: I9a2dbbf1d4494addbe22c82e2c416eedc4d585f2
      926488d70d09baefee0489537b2915602deaeebf

Bug: 34886274
Fix: 121989657
Test: Following commands still work, before/after "adb shell root"
  * adb shell ime
  * adb shell ime list
  * adb shell ime set com.android.inputmethod.latin/.LatinIME
  * adb shell cmd input_method
  * adb shell cmd input_method refresh_debug_properties
  * adb shell dumpsys input_method
Test: atest CtsInputMethodTestCases CtsInputMethodServiceHostTestCases
Change-Id: If87189563ccaacd4f9c666bab4f9ad08a9343084
diff --git a/services/core/java/com/android/server/inputmethod/InputMethodManagerService.java b/services/core/java/com/android/server/inputmethod/InputMethodManagerService.java
index dd4afaf..292aae8 100644
--- a/services/core/java/com/android/server/inputmethod/InputMethodManagerService.java
+++ b/services/core/java/com/android/server/inputmethod/InputMethodManagerService.java
@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@
 import java.security.InvalidParameterException;
 import java.text.SimpleDateFormat;
 import java.util.ArrayList;
+import java.util.Arrays;
 import java.util.Collections;
 import java.util.Date;
 import java.util.List;
@@ -4587,6 +4588,25 @@
             @Nullable FileDescriptor err,
             @NonNull String[] args, @Nullable ShellCallback callback,
             @NonNull ResultReceiver resultReceiver) throws RemoteException {
+        final int callingUid = Binder.getCallingUid();
+        // Reject any incoming calls from non-shell users, including ones from the system user.
+        if (callingUid != Process.ROOT_UID && callingUid != Process.SHELL_UID) {
+            // Note that Binder#onTransact() will automatically close "in", "out", and "err" when
+            // returned from this method, hence there is no need to close those FDs.
+            // "resultReceiver" is the only thing that needs to be taken care of here.
+            if (resultReceiver != null) {
+                resultReceiver.send(ShellCommandResult.FAILURE, null);
+            }
+            final String errorMsg = "InputMethodManagerService does not support shell commands from"
+                    + " non-shell users. callingUid=" + callingUid
+                    + " args=" + Arrays.toString(args);
+            if (Process.isCoreUid(callingUid)) {
+                // Let's not crash the calling process if the caller is one of core components.
+                Slog.e(TAG, errorMsg);
+                return;
+            }
+            throw new SecurityException(errorMsg);
+        }
         new ShellCommandImpl(this).exec(
                 this, in, out, err, args, callback, resultReceiver);
     }