| /* |
| * Copyright (c) 1996, 2013, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. |
| * DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER. |
| * |
| * This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it |
| * under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 only, as |
| * published by the Free Software Foundation. Oracle designates this |
| * particular file as subject to the "Classpath" exception as provided |
| * by Oracle in the LICENSE file that accompanied this code. |
| * |
| * This code is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT |
| * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or |
| * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License |
| * version 2 for more details (a copy is included in the LICENSE file that |
| * accompanied this code). |
| * |
| * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License version |
| * 2 along with this work; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, |
| * Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. |
| * |
| * Please contact Oracle, 500 Oracle Parkway, Redwood Shores, CA 94065 USA |
| * or visit www.oracle.com if you need additional information or have any |
| * questions. |
| */ |
| |
| |
| package sun.security.ssl; |
| |
| import java.io.*; |
| import java.nio.*; |
| import java.net.SocketException; |
| import java.net.SocketTimeoutException; |
| |
| import javax.crypto.BadPaddingException; |
| |
| import javax.net.ssl.*; |
| |
| import sun.misc.HexDumpEncoder; |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * SSL 3.0 records, as pulled off a TCP stream. Input records are |
| * basically buffers tied to a particular input stream ... a layer |
| * above this must map these records into the model of a continuous |
| * stream of data. |
| * |
| * Since this returns SSL 3.0 records, it's the layer that needs to |
| * map SSL 2.0 style handshake records into SSL 3.0 ones for those |
| * "old" clients that interop with both V2 and V3 servers. Not as |
| * pretty as might be desired. |
| * |
| * NOTE: During handshaking, each message must be hashed to support |
| * verification that the handshake process wasn't compromised. |
| * |
| * @author David Brownell |
| */ |
| class InputRecord extends ByteArrayInputStream implements Record { |
| |
| private HandshakeHash handshakeHash; |
| private int lastHashed; |
| boolean formatVerified = true; // SSLv2 ruled out? |
| private boolean isClosed; |
| private boolean appDataValid; |
| |
| // The ClientHello version to accept. If set to ProtocolVersion.SSL20Hello |
| // and the first message we read is a ClientHello in V2 format, we convert |
| // it to V3. Otherwise we throw an exception when encountering a V2 hello. |
| private ProtocolVersion helloVersion; |
| |
| /* Class and subclass dynamic debugging support */ |
| static final Debug debug = Debug.getInstance("ssl"); |
| |
| /* The existing record length */ |
| private int exlen; |
| |
| /* V2 handshake message */ |
| private byte v2Buf[]; |
| |
| /* |
| * Construct the record to hold the maximum sized input record. |
| * Data will be filled in separately. |
| */ |
| InputRecord() { |
| super(new byte[maxRecordSize]); |
| setHelloVersion(ProtocolVersion.DEFAULT_HELLO); |
| pos = headerSize; |
| count = headerSize; |
| lastHashed = count; |
| exlen = 0; |
| v2Buf = null; |
| } |
| |
| void setHelloVersion(ProtocolVersion helloVersion) { |
| this.helloVersion = helloVersion; |
| } |
| |
| ProtocolVersion getHelloVersion() { |
| return helloVersion; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Enable format checks if initial handshaking hasn't completed |
| */ |
| void enableFormatChecks() { |
| formatVerified = false; |
| } |
| |
| // return whether the data in this record is valid, decrypted data |
| boolean isAppDataValid() { |
| return appDataValid; |
| } |
| |
| void setAppDataValid(boolean value) { |
| appDataValid = value; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Return the content type of the record. |
| */ |
| byte contentType() { |
| return buf[0]; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * For handshaking, we need to be able to hash every byte above the |
| * record marking layer. This is where we're guaranteed to see those |
| * bytes, so this is where we can hash them ... especially in the |
| * case of hashing the initial V2 message! |
| */ |
| void setHandshakeHash(HandshakeHash handshakeHash) { |
| this.handshakeHash = handshakeHash; |
| } |
| |
| HandshakeHash getHandshakeHash() { |
| return handshakeHash; |
| } |
| |
| void decrypt(MAC signer, CipherBox box) throws BadPaddingException { |
| |
| BadPaddingException reservedBPE = null; |
| int tagLen = signer.MAClen(); |
| int cipheredLength = count - headerSize; |
| |
| if (!box.isNullCipher()) { |
| // sanity check length of the ciphertext |
| if (!box.sanityCheck(tagLen, cipheredLength)) { |
| throw new BadPaddingException( |
| "ciphertext sanity check failed"); |
| } |
| |
| try { |
| // Note that the CipherBox.decrypt() does not change |
| // the capacity of the buffer. |
| count = headerSize + |
| box.decrypt(buf, headerSize, cipheredLength, tagLen); |
| } catch (BadPaddingException bpe) { |
| // RFC 2246 states that decryption_failed should be used |
| // for this purpose. However, that allows certain attacks, |
| // so we just send bad record MAC. We also need to make |
| // sure to always check the MAC to avoid a timing attack |
| // for the same issue. See paper by Vaudenay et al and the |
| // update in RFC 4346/5246. |
| // |
| // Failover to message authentication code checking. |
| reservedBPE = bpe; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (tagLen != 0) { |
| int macOffset = count - tagLen; |
| int contentLen = macOffset - headerSize; |
| |
| // Note that although it is not necessary, we run the same MAC |
| // computation and comparison on the payload for both stream |
| // cipher and CBC block cipher. |
| if (contentLen < 0) { |
| // negative data length, something is wrong |
| if (reservedBPE == null) { |
| reservedBPE = new BadPaddingException("bad record"); |
| } |
| |
| // set offset of the dummy MAC |
| macOffset = headerSize + cipheredLength - tagLen; |
| contentLen = macOffset - headerSize; |
| } |
| |
| count -= tagLen; // Set the count before any MAC checking |
| // exception occurs, so that the following |
| // process can read the actual decrypted |
| // content (minus the MAC) in the fragment |
| // if necessary. |
| |
| // Run MAC computation and comparison on the payload. |
| if (checkMacTags(contentType(), |
| buf, headerSize, contentLen, signer, false)) { |
| if (reservedBPE == null) { |
| reservedBPE = new BadPaddingException("bad record MAC"); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Run MAC computation and comparison on the remainder. |
| // |
| // It is only necessary for CBC block cipher. It is used to get a |
| // constant time of MAC computation and comparison on each record. |
| if (box.isCBCMode()) { |
| int remainingLen = calculateRemainingLen( |
| signer, cipheredLength, contentLen); |
| |
| // NOTE: remainingLen may be bigger (less than 1 block of the |
| // hash algorithm of the MAC) than the cipheredLength. However, |
| // We won't need to worry about it because we always use a |
| // maximum buffer for every record. We need a change here if |
| // we use small buffer size in the future. |
| if (remainingLen > buf.length) { |
| // unlikely to happen, just a placehold |
| throw new RuntimeException( |
| "Internal buffer capacity error"); |
| } |
| |
| // Won't need to worry about the result on the remainder. And |
| // then we won't need to worry about what's actual data to |
| // check MAC tag on. We start the check from the header of the |
| // buffer so that we don't need to construct a new byte buffer. |
| checkMacTags(contentType(), buf, 0, remainingLen, signer, true); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Is it a failover? |
| if (reservedBPE != null) { |
| throw reservedBPE; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Run MAC computation and comparison |
| * |
| * Please DON'T change the content of the byte buffer parameter! |
| */ |
| static boolean checkMacTags(byte contentType, byte[] buffer, |
| int offset, int contentLen, MAC signer, boolean isSimulated) { |
| |
| int tagLen = signer.MAClen(); |
| byte[] hash = signer.compute( |
| contentType, buffer, offset, contentLen, isSimulated); |
| if (hash == null || tagLen != hash.length) { |
| // Something is wrong with MAC implementation. |
| throw new RuntimeException("Internal MAC error"); |
| } |
| |
| int[] results = compareMacTags(buffer, offset + contentLen, hash); |
| return (results[0] != 0); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * A constant-time comparison of the MAC tags. |
| * |
| * Please DON'T change the content of the byte buffer parameter! |
| */ |
| private static int[] compareMacTags( |
| byte[] buffer, int offset, byte[] tag) { |
| |
| // An array of hits is used to prevent Hotspot optimization for |
| // the purpose of a constant-time check. |
| int[] results = {0, 0}; // {missed #, matched #} |
| |
| // The caller ensures there are enough bytes available in the buffer. |
| // So we won't need to check the length of the buffer. |
| for (int i = 0; i < tag.length; i++) { |
| if (buffer[offset + i] != tag[i]) { |
| results[0]++; // mismatched bytes |
| } else { |
| results[1]++; // matched bytes |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return results; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Calculate the length of a dummy buffer to run MAC computation |
| * and comparison on the remainder. |
| * |
| * The caller MUST ensure that the fullLen is not less than usedLen. |
| */ |
| static int calculateRemainingLen( |
| MAC signer, int fullLen, int usedLen) { |
| |
| int blockLen = signer.hashBlockLen(); |
| int minimalPaddingLen = signer.minimalPaddingLen(); |
| |
| // (blockLen - minimalPaddingLen) is the maximum message size of |
| // the last block of hash function operation. See FIPS 180-4, or |
| // MD5 specification. |
| fullLen += 13 - (blockLen - minimalPaddingLen); |
| usedLen += 13 - (blockLen - minimalPaddingLen); |
| |
| // Note: fullLen is always not less than usedLen, and blockLen |
| // is always bigger than minimalPaddingLen, so we don't worry |
| // about negative values. 0x01 is added to the result to ensure |
| // that the return value is positive. The extra one byte does |
| // not impact the overall MAC compression function evaluations. |
| return 0x01 + (int)(Math.ceil(fullLen/(1.0d * blockLen)) - |
| Math.ceil(usedLen/(1.0d * blockLen))) * signer.hashBlockLen(); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Well ... hello_request messages are _never_ hashed since we can't |
| * know when they'd appear in the sequence. |
| */ |
| void ignore(int bytes) { |
| if (bytes > 0) { |
| pos += bytes; |
| lastHashed = pos; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * We hash the (plaintext) we've processed, but only on demand. |
| * |
| * There is one place where we want to access the hash in the middle |
| * of a record: client cert message gets hashed, and part of the |
| * same record is the client cert verify message which uses that hash. |
| * So we track how much we've read and hashed. |
| */ |
| void doHashes() { |
| int len = pos - lastHashed; |
| |
| if (len > 0) { |
| hashInternal(buf, lastHashed, len); |
| lastHashed = pos; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Need a helper function so we can hash the V2 hello correctly |
| */ |
| private void hashInternal(byte databuf [], int offset, int len) { |
| if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("data")) { |
| try { |
| HexDumpEncoder hd = new HexDumpEncoder(); |
| |
| System.out.println("[read] MD5 and SHA1 hashes: len = " |
| + len); |
| hd.encodeBuffer(new ByteArrayInputStream(databuf, offset, len), |
| System.out); |
| } catch (IOException e) { } |
| } |
| handshakeHash.update(databuf, offset, len); |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* |
| * Handshake messages may cross record boundaries. We "queue" |
| * these in big buffers if we need to cope with this problem. |
| * This is not anticipated to be a common case; if this turns |
| * out to be wrong, this can readily be sped up. |
| */ |
| void queueHandshake(InputRecord r) throws IOException { |
| int len; |
| |
| /* |
| * Hash any data that's read but unhashed. |
| */ |
| doHashes(); |
| |
| /* |
| * Move any unread data to the front of the buffer, |
| * flagging it all as unhashed. |
| */ |
| if (pos > headerSize) { |
| len = count - pos; |
| if (len != 0) { |
| System.arraycopy(buf, pos, buf, headerSize, len); |
| } |
| pos = headerSize; |
| lastHashed = pos; |
| count = headerSize + len; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Grow "buf" if needed |
| */ |
| len = r.available() + count; |
| if (buf.length < len) { |
| byte newbuf []; |
| |
| newbuf = new byte [len]; |
| System.arraycopy(buf, 0, newbuf, 0, count); |
| buf = newbuf; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Append the new buffer to this one. |
| */ |
| System.arraycopy(r.buf, r.pos, buf, count, len - count); |
| count = len; |
| |
| /* |
| * Adjust lastHashed; important for now with clients which |
| * send SSL V2 client hellos. This will go away eventually, |
| * by buffer code cleanup. |
| */ |
| len = r.lastHashed - r.pos; |
| if (pos == headerSize) { |
| lastHashed += len; |
| } else { |
| throw new SSLProtocolException("?? confused buffer hashing ??"); |
| } |
| // we've read the record, advance the pointers |
| r.pos = r.count; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * Prevent any more data from being read into this record, |
| * and flag the record as holding no data. |
| */ |
| public void close() { |
| appDataValid = false; |
| isClosed = true; |
| mark = 0; |
| pos = 0; |
| count = 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* |
| * We may need to send this SSL v2 "No Cipher" message back, if we |
| * are faced with an SSLv2 "hello" that's not saying "I talk v3". |
| * It's the only one documented in the V2 spec as a fatal error. |
| */ |
| private static final byte[] v2NoCipher = { |
| (byte)0x80, (byte)0x03, // unpadded 3 byte record |
| (byte)0x00, // ... error message |
| (byte)0x00, (byte)0x01 // ... NO_CIPHER error |
| }; |
| |
| private int readFully(InputStream s, byte b[], int off, int len) |
| throws IOException { |
| int n = 0; |
| while (n < len) { |
| int readLen = s.read(b, off + n, len - n); |
| if (readLen < 0) { |
| return readLen; |
| } |
| |
| if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("packet")) { |
| try { |
| HexDumpEncoder hd = new HexDumpEncoder(); |
| ByteBuffer bb = ByteBuffer.wrap(b, off + n, readLen); |
| |
| System.out.println("[Raw read]: length = " + |
| bb.remaining()); |
| hd.encodeBuffer(bb, System.out); |
| } catch (IOException e) { } |
| } |
| |
| n += readLen; |
| exlen += readLen; |
| } |
| |
| return n; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Read the SSL V3 record ... first time around, check to see if it |
| * really IS a V3 record. Handle SSL V2 clients which can talk V3.0, |
| * as well as real V3 record format; otherwise report an error. |
| */ |
| void read(InputStream s, OutputStream o) throws IOException { |
| if (isClosed) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * For SSL it really _is_ an error if the other end went away |
| * so ungracefully as to not shut down cleanly. |
| */ |
| if(exlen < headerSize) { |
| int really = readFully(s, buf, exlen, headerSize - exlen); |
| if (really < 0) { |
| throw new EOFException("SSL peer shut down incorrectly"); |
| } |
| |
| pos = headerSize; |
| count = headerSize; |
| lastHashed = pos; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * The first record might use some other record marking convention, |
| * typically SSL v2 header. (PCT could also be detected here.) |
| * This case is currently common -- Navigator 3.0 usually works |
| * this way, as do IE 3.0 and other products. |
| */ |
| if (!formatVerified) { |
| formatVerified = true; |
| /* |
| * The first record must either be a handshake record or an |
| * alert message. If it's not, it is either invalid or an |
| * SSLv2 message. |
| */ |
| if (buf[0] != ct_handshake && buf[0] != ct_alert) { |
| handleUnknownRecord(s, o); |
| } else { |
| readV3Record(s, o); |
| } |
| } else { // formatVerified == true |
| readV3Record(s, o); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * Read a SSL/TLS record. Throw an IOException if the format is invalid. |
| */ |
| private void readV3Record(InputStream s, OutputStream o) |
| throws IOException { |
| ProtocolVersion recordVersion = ProtocolVersion.valueOf(buf[1], buf[2]); |
| // Check if too old (currently not possible) |
| // or if the major version does not match. |
| // The actual version negotiation is in the handshaker classes |
| if ((recordVersion.v < ProtocolVersion.MIN.v) |
| || (recordVersion.major > ProtocolVersion.MAX.major)) { |
| throw new SSLException( |
| "Unsupported record version " + recordVersion); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Get and check length, then the data. |
| */ |
| int contentLen = ((buf[3] & 0x0ff) << 8) + (buf[4] & 0xff); |
| |
| /* |
| * Check for upper bound. |
| */ |
| if (contentLen < 0 || contentLen > maxLargeRecordSize - headerSize) { |
| throw new SSLProtocolException("Bad InputRecord size" |
| + ", count = " + contentLen |
| + ", buf.length = " + buf.length); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Grow "buf" if needed. Since buf is maxRecordSize by default, |
| * this only occurs when we receive records which violate the |
| * SSL specification. This is a workaround for a Microsoft SSL bug. |
| */ |
| if (contentLen > buf.length - headerSize) { |
| byte[] newbuf = new byte[contentLen + headerSize]; |
| System.arraycopy(buf, 0, newbuf, 0, headerSize); |
| buf = newbuf; |
| } |
| |
| if (exlen < contentLen + headerSize) { |
| int really = readFully( |
| s, buf, exlen, contentLen + headerSize - exlen); |
| if (really < 0) { |
| throw new SSLException("SSL peer shut down incorrectly"); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // now we've got a complete record. |
| count = contentLen + headerSize; |
| exlen = 0; |
| |
| if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("record")) { |
| if (count < 0 || count > (maxRecordSize - headerSize)) { |
| System.out.println(Thread.currentThread().getName() |
| + ", Bad InputRecord size" + ", count = " + count); |
| } |
| System.out.println(Thread.currentThread().getName() |
| + ", READ: " + recordVersion + " " |
| + contentName(contentType()) + ", length = " + available()); |
| } |
| /* |
| * then caller decrypts, verifies, and uncompresses |
| */ |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * Deal with unknown records. Called if the first data we read on this |
| * connection does not look like an SSL/TLS record. It could a SSLv2 |
| * message, or just garbage. |
| */ |
| private void handleUnknownRecord(InputStream s, OutputStream o) |
| throws IOException { |
| /* |
| * No? Oh well; does it look like a V2 "ClientHello"? |
| * That'd be an unpadded handshake message; we don't |
| * bother checking length just now. |
| */ |
| if (((buf[0] & 0x080) != 0) && buf[2] == 1) { |
| /* |
| * if the user has disabled SSLv2Hello (using |
| * setEnabledProtocol) then throw an |
| * exception |
| */ |
| if (helloVersion != ProtocolVersion.SSL20Hello) { |
| throw new SSLHandshakeException("SSLv2Hello is disabled"); |
| } |
| |
| ProtocolVersion recordVersion = |
| ProtocolVersion.valueOf(buf[3], buf[4]); |
| |
| if (recordVersion == ProtocolVersion.SSL20Hello) { |
| /* |
| * Looks like a V2 client hello, but not one saying |
| * "let's talk SSLv3". So we send an SSLv2 error |
| * message, one that's treated as fatal by clients. |
| * (Otherwise we'll hang.) |
| */ |
| try { |
| writeBuffer(o, v2NoCipher, 0, v2NoCipher.length); |
| } catch (Exception e) { |
| /* NOTHING */ |
| } |
| throw new SSLException("Unsupported SSL v2.0 ClientHello"); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * If we can map this into a V3 ClientHello, read and |
| * hash the rest of the V2 handshake, turn it into a |
| * V3 ClientHello message, and pass it up. |
| */ |
| int len = ((buf[0] & 0x7f) << 8) + |
| (buf[1] & 0xff) - 3; |
| if (v2Buf == null) { |
| v2Buf = new byte[len]; |
| } |
| if (exlen < len + headerSize) { |
| int really = readFully( |
| s, v2Buf, exlen - headerSize, len + headerSize - exlen); |
| if (really < 0) { |
| throw new EOFException("SSL peer shut down incorrectly"); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // now we've got a complete record. |
| exlen = 0; |
| |
| hashInternal(buf, 2, 3); |
| hashInternal(v2Buf, 0, len); |
| V2toV3ClientHello(v2Buf); |
| v2Buf = null; |
| lastHashed = count; |
| |
| if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("record")) { |
| System.out.println( |
| Thread.currentThread().getName() |
| + ", READ: SSL v2, contentType = " |
| + contentName(contentType()) |
| + ", translated length = " + available()); |
| } |
| return; |
| |
| } else { |
| /* |
| * Does it look like a V2 "ServerHello"? |
| */ |
| if (((buf [0] & 0x080) != 0) && buf [2] == 4) { |
| throw new SSLException( |
| "SSL V2.0 servers are not supported."); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * If this is a V2 NoCipher message then this means |
| * the other server doesn't support V3. Otherwise, we just |
| * don't understand what it's saying. |
| */ |
| for (int i = 0; i < v2NoCipher.length; i++) { |
| if (buf[i] != v2NoCipher[i]) { |
| throw new SSLException( |
| "Unrecognized SSL message, plaintext connection?"); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| throw new SSLException("SSL V2.0 servers are not supported."); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Actually do the write here. For SSLEngine's HS data, |
| * we'll override this method and let it take the appropriate |
| * action. |
| */ |
| void writeBuffer(OutputStream s, byte [] buf, int off, int len) |
| throws IOException { |
| s.write(buf, 0, len); |
| s.flush(); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Support "old" clients which are capable of SSL V3.0 protocol ... for |
| * example, Navigator 3.0 clients. The V2 message is in the header and |
| * the bytes passed as parameter. This routine translates the V2 message |
| * into an equivalent V3 one. |
| */ |
| private void V2toV3ClientHello(byte v2Msg []) throws SSLException |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| /* |
| * Build the first part of the V3 record header from the V2 one |
| * that's now buffered up. (Lengths are fixed up later). |
| */ |
| buf [0] = ct_handshake; |
| buf [1] = buf [3]; // V3.x |
| buf[2] = buf[4]; |
| // header [3..4] for handshake message length |
| // count = 5; |
| |
| /* |
| * Store the generic V3 handshake header: 4 bytes |
| */ |
| buf [5] = 1; // HandshakeMessage.ht_client_hello |
| // buf [6..8] for length of ClientHello (int24) |
| // count += 4; |
| |
| /* |
| * ClientHello header starts with SSL version |
| */ |
| buf [9] = buf [1]; |
| buf [10] = buf [2]; |
| // count += 2; |
| count = 11; |
| |
| /* |
| * Start parsing the V2 message ... |
| */ |
| int cipherSpecLen, sessionIdLen, nonceLen; |
| |
| cipherSpecLen = ((v2Msg [0] & 0xff) << 8) + (v2Msg [1] & 0xff); |
| sessionIdLen = ((v2Msg [2] & 0xff) << 8) + (v2Msg [3] & 0xff); |
| nonceLen = ((v2Msg [4] & 0xff) << 8) + (v2Msg [5] & 0xff); |
| |
| /* |
| * Copy Random value/nonce ... if less than the 32 bytes of |
| * a V3 "Random", right justify and zero pad to the left. Else |
| * just take the last 32 bytes. |
| */ |
| int offset = 6 + cipherSpecLen + sessionIdLen; |
| |
| if (nonceLen < 32) { |
| for (i = 0; i < (32 - nonceLen); i++) |
| buf [count++] = 0; |
| System.arraycopy(v2Msg, offset, buf, count, nonceLen); |
| count += nonceLen; |
| } else { |
| System.arraycopy(v2Msg, offset + (nonceLen - 32), |
| buf, count, 32); |
| count += 32; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Copy Session ID (only one byte length!) |
| */ |
| offset -= sessionIdLen; |
| buf [count++] = (byte) sessionIdLen; |
| |
| System.arraycopy(v2Msg, offset, buf, count, sessionIdLen); |
| count += sessionIdLen; |
| |
| /* |
| * Copy and translate cipher suites ... V2 specs with first byte zero |
| * are really V3 specs (in the last 2 bytes), just copy those and drop |
| * the other ones. Preference order remains unchanged. |
| * |
| * Example: Netscape Navigator 3.0 (exportable) says: |
| * |
| * 0/3, SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 |
| * 0/6, SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 |
| * |
| * Microsoft Internet Explorer 3.0 (exportable) supports only |
| * |
| * 0/3, SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 |
| */ |
| int j; |
| |
| offset -= cipherSpecLen; |
| j = count + 2; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < cipherSpecLen; i += 3) { |
| if (v2Msg [offset + i] != 0) |
| continue; |
| buf [j++] = v2Msg [offset + i + 1]; |
| buf [j++] = v2Msg [offset + i + 2]; |
| } |
| |
| j -= count + 2; |
| buf [count++] = (byte) (j >>> 8); |
| buf [count++] = (byte) j; |
| count += j; |
| |
| /* |
| * Append compression methods (default/null only) |
| */ |
| buf [count++] = 1; |
| buf [count++] = 0; // Session.compression_null |
| |
| /* |
| * Fill in lengths of the messages we synthesized (nested: |
| * V3 handshake message within V3 record) and then return |
| */ |
| buf [3] = (byte) (count - headerSize); |
| buf [4] = (byte) ((count - headerSize) >>> 8); |
| |
| buf [headerSize + 1] = 0; |
| buf [headerSize + 2] = (byte) (((count - headerSize) - 4) >>> 8); |
| buf [headerSize + 3] = (byte) ((count - headerSize) - 4); |
| |
| pos = headerSize; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * Return a description for the given content type. This method should be |
| * in Record, but since that is an interface this is not possible. |
| * Called from InputRecord and OutputRecord. |
| */ |
| static String contentName(int contentType) { |
| switch (contentType) { |
| case ct_change_cipher_spec: |
| return "Change Cipher Spec"; |
| case ct_alert: |
| return "Alert"; |
| case ct_handshake: |
| return "Handshake"; |
| case ct_application_data: |
| return "Application Data"; |
| default: |
| return "contentType = " + contentType; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| } |