Wlan: Ignore security mismatch during WPS registartion
During WPS registration process the psession encryption type is 0.
Now if AP's beacon have RSN IE, while processing beacons security
mismatch is detected and DUT sends unicast probe request without
WPS IE.
To avoid this ignore security mismatch during WPS registartion.
Change-Id: Ic1b4de116ec6a99749ec3d8ba28b29d52190c344
CRs-Fixed: 967553
diff --git a/CORE/MAC/src/pe/lim/limApi.c b/CORE/MAC/src/pe/lim/limApi.c
index 87d921d..911441d 100644
--- a/CORE/MAC/src/pe/lim/limApi.c
+++ b/CORE/MAC/src/pe/lim/limApi.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2012-2015 The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2011-2016 The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved.
*
* Previously licensed under the ISC license by Qualcomm Atheros, Inc.
*
@@ -1787,9 +1787,10 @@
pBeacon->capabilityInfo.privacy, pBeacon->wpaPresent,
pBeacon->rsnPresent);
limLog(pMac, LOG1,
- FL("pSession:: Privacy :%d EncyptionType: %d"),
+ FL("pSession:: Privacy :%d EncyptionType: %d WPS %d OSEN %d"),
SIR_MAC_GET_PRIVACY(pSession->limCurrentBssCaps),
- pSession->encryptType);
+ pSession->encryptType, pSession->bWPSAssociation,
+ pSession->bOSENAssociation);
/* This is handled by sending probe req due to IOT issues so return TRUE
*/
@@ -1831,13 +1832,18 @@
* in beacon. Therefore no need to
* check for security type in case
* OSEN session.
+ * For WPS registration session no need to detect
+ * security mismatch as it wont match and
+ * driver may end up sending probe request without
+ * WPS IE during WPS registartion process.
*/
/*TODO: AP capability mismatch
* is not checked here because
* no logic for beacon parsing
* is avilable for HS2.0.
*/
- if (pSession->bOSENAssociation)
+ if (pSession->bOSENAssociation ||
+ pSession->bWPSAssociation)
return eSIR_TRUE;
return eSIR_FALSE;