Torne (Richard Coles) | c2e0dbd | 2013-05-09 18:35:53 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. |
| 2 | // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be |
| 3 | // found in the LICENSE file. |
| 4 | |
| 5 | #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_nss.h" |
| 6 | |
| 7 | #include <string> |
| 8 | #include <vector> |
| 9 | |
| 10 | #include <cert.h> |
| 11 | #include <nss.h> |
| 12 | #include <prerror.h> |
| 13 | #include <secerr.h> |
| 14 | #include <sechash.h> |
| 15 | #include <sslerr.h> |
| 16 | |
| 17 | #include "base/logging.h" |
| 18 | #include "crypto/nss_util.h" |
| 19 | #include "crypto/scoped_nss_types.h" |
| 20 | #include "crypto/sha2.h" |
| 21 | #include "net/base/net_errors.h" |
| 22 | #include "net/cert/asn1_util.h" |
| 23 | #include "net/cert/cert_status_flags.h" |
| 24 | #include "net/cert/cert_verifier.h" |
| 25 | #include "net/cert/cert_verify_result.h" |
| 26 | #include "net/cert/crl_set.h" |
| 27 | #include "net/cert/ev_root_ca_metadata.h" |
| 28 | #include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h" |
| 29 | #include "net/cert/x509_util_nss.h" |
| 30 | |
| 31 | #if defined(OS_IOS) |
| 32 | #include <CommonCrypto/CommonDigest.h> |
| 33 | #include "net/cert/x509_util_ios.h" |
| 34 | #endif // defined(OS_IOS) |
| 35 | |
| 36 | #define NSS_VERSION_NUM (NSS_VMAJOR * 10000 + NSS_VMINOR * 100 + NSS_VPATCH) |
| 37 | #if NSS_VERSION_NUM < 31305 |
| 38 | // Added in NSS 3.13.5. |
| 39 | #define SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED -8016 |
| 40 | #endif |
| 41 | |
| 42 | #if NSS_VERSION_NUM < 31402 |
| 43 | // Added in NSS 3.14.2. |
| 44 | #define cert_pi_useOnlyTrustAnchors static_cast<CERTValParamInType>(14) |
| 45 | #endif |
| 46 | |
| 47 | namespace net { |
| 48 | |
| 49 | namespace { |
| 50 | |
| 51 | typedef scoped_ptr_malloc< |
| 52 | CERTCertificatePolicies, |
| 53 | crypto::NSSDestroyer<CERTCertificatePolicies, |
| 54 | CERT_DestroyCertificatePoliciesExtension> > |
| 55 | ScopedCERTCertificatePolicies; |
| 56 | |
| 57 | typedef scoped_ptr_malloc< |
| 58 | CERTCertList, |
| 59 | crypto::NSSDestroyer<CERTCertList, CERT_DestroyCertList> > |
| 60 | ScopedCERTCertList; |
| 61 | |
| 62 | // ScopedCERTValOutParam manages destruction of values in the CERTValOutParam |
| 63 | // array that cvout points to. cvout must be initialized as passed to |
| 64 | // CERT_PKIXVerifyCert, so that the array must be terminated with |
| 65 | // cert_po_end type. |
| 66 | // When it goes out of scope, it destroys values of cert_po_trustAnchor |
| 67 | // and cert_po_certList types, but doesn't release the array itself. |
| 68 | class ScopedCERTValOutParam { |
| 69 | public: |
Ben Murdoch | 558790d | 2013-07-30 15:19:42 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 70 | explicit ScopedCERTValOutParam(CERTValOutParam* cvout) : cvout_(cvout) {} |
Torne (Richard Coles) | c2e0dbd | 2013-05-09 18:35:53 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 71 | |
| 72 | ~ScopedCERTValOutParam() { |
Ben Murdoch | 558790d | 2013-07-30 15:19:42 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 73 | Clear(); |
| 74 | } |
| 75 | |
| 76 | // Free the internal resources, but do not release the array itself. |
| 77 | void Clear() { |
Torne (Richard Coles) | c2e0dbd | 2013-05-09 18:35:53 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 78 | if (cvout_ == NULL) |
| 79 | return; |
| 80 | for (CERTValOutParam *p = cvout_; p->type != cert_po_end; p++) { |
| 81 | switch (p->type) { |
| 82 | case cert_po_trustAnchor: |
| 83 | if (p->value.pointer.cert) { |
| 84 | CERT_DestroyCertificate(p->value.pointer.cert); |
| 85 | p->value.pointer.cert = NULL; |
| 86 | } |
| 87 | break; |
| 88 | case cert_po_certList: |
| 89 | if (p->value.pointer.chain) { |
| 90 | CERT_DestroyCertList(p->value.pointer.chain); |
| 91 | p->value.pointer.chain = NULL; |
| 92 | } |
| 93 | break; |
| 94 | default: |
| 95 | break; |
| 96 | } |
| 97 | } |
| 98 | } |
| 99 | |
| 100 | private: |
| 101 | CERTValOutParam* cvout_; |
| 102 | |
| 103 | DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(ScopedCERTValOutParam); |
| 104 | }; |
| 105 | |
| 106 | // Map PORT_GetError() return values to our network error codes. |
| 107 | int MapSecurityError(int err) { |
| 108 | switch (err) { |
| 109 | case PR_DIRECTORY_LOOKUP_ERROR: // DNS lookup error. |
| 110 | return ERR_NAME_NOT_RESOLVED; |
| 111 | case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS: |
| 112 | return ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; |
| 113 | case SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN: |
| 114 | return ERR_CERT_COMMON_NAME_INVALID; |
| 115 | case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_TIME: |
| 116 | case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE: |
| 117 | case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE: |
| 118 | return ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID; |
| 119 | case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER: |
| 120 | case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER: |
| 121 | case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID: |
| 122 | return ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID; |
| 123 | // TODO(port): map ERR_CERT_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM. |
| 124 | case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_BAD_HTTP_RESPONSE: |
| 125 | case SEC_ERROR_OCSP_SERVER_ERROR: |
| 126 | return ERR_CERT_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION; |
| 127 | case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE: |
| 128 | case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT: // Treat as revoked. |
| 129 | return ERR_CERT_REVOKED; |
| 130 | case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DER: |
| 131 | case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE: |
| 132 | case SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_VALID: |
| 133 | // TODO(port): add an ERR_CERT_WRONG_USAGE error code. |
| 134 | case SEC_ERROR_CERT_USAGES_INVALID: |
| 135 | case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE: // Key usage. |
| 136 | case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_CERT_TYPE: // Extended key usage and whether |
| 137 | // the certificate is a CA. |
| 138 | case SEC_ERROR_POLICY_VALIDATION_FAILED: |
| 139 | case SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_IN_NAME_SPACE: |
| 140 | case SEC_ERROR_PATH_LEN_CONSTRAINT_INVALID: |
| 141 | case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION: |
| 142 | case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID: |
| 143 | return ERR_CERT_INVALID; |
| 144 | case SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED: |
| 145 | return ERR_CERT_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; |
| 146 | default: |
| 147 | LOG(WARNING) << "Unknown error " << err << " mapped to net::ERR_FAILED"; |
| 148 | return ERR_FAILED; |
| 149 | } |
| 150 | } |
| 151 | |
| 152 | // Map PORT_GetError() return values to our cert status flags. |
| 153 | CertStatus MapCertErrorToCertStatus(int err) { |
| 154 | int net_error = MapSecurityError(err); |
| 155 | return MapNetErrorToCertStatus(net_error); |
| 156 | } |
| 157 | |
| 158 | // Saves some information about the certificate chain cert_list in |
| 159 | // *verify_result. The caller MUST initialize *verify_result before calling |
| 160 | // this function. |
| 161 | // Note that cert_list[0] is the end entity certificate. |
| 162 | void GetCertChainInfo(CERTCertList* cert_list, |
| 163 | CERTCertificate* root_cert, |
| 164 | CertVerifyResult* verify_result) { |
Torne (Richard Coles) | c2e0dbd | 2013-05-09 18:35:53 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 165 | DCHECK(cert_list); |
| 166 | |
| 167 | CERTCertificate* verified_cert = NULL; |
| 168 | std::vector<CERTCertificate*> verified_chain; |
| 169 | int i = 0; |
| 170 | for (CERTCertListNode* node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(cert_list); |
| 171 | !CERT_LIST_END(node, cert_list); |
| 172 | node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node), ++i) { |
| 173 | if (i == 0) { |
| 174 | verified_cert = node->cert; |
| 175 | } else { |
| 176 | // Because of an NSS bug, CERT_PKIXVerifyCert may chain a self-signed |
| 177 | // certificate of a root CA to another certificate of the same root CA |
| 178 | // key. Detect that error and ignore the root CA certificate. |
| 179 | // See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=721288. |
| 180 | if (node->cert->isRoot) { |
| 181 | // NOTE: isRoot doesn't mean the certificate is a trust anchor. It |
| 182 | // means the certificate is self-signed. Here we assume isRoot only |
| 183 | // implies the certificate is self-issued. |
| 184 | CERTCertListNode* next_node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node); |
| 185 | CERTCertificate* next_cert; |
| 186 | if (!CERT_LIST_END(next_node, cert_list)) { |
| 187 | next_cert = next_node->cert; |
| 188 | } else { |
| 189 | next_cert = root_cert; |
| 190 | } |
| 191 | // Test that |node->cert| is actually a self-signed certificate |
| 192 | // whose key is equal to |next_cert|, and not a self-issued |
| 193 | // certificate signed by another key of the same CA. |
| 194 | if (next_cert && SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(&node->cert->derPublicKey, |
| 195 | &next_cert->derPublicKey)) { |
| 196 | continue; |
| 197 | } |
| 198 | } |
| 199 | verified_chain.push_back(node->cert); |
| 200 | } |
| 201 | |
| 202 | SECAlgorithmID& signature = node->cert->signature; |
| 203 | SECOidTag oid_tag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&signature.algorithm); |
| 204 | switch (oid_tag) { |
| 205 | case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: |
| 206 | verify_result->has_md5 = true; |
Torne (Richard Coles) | c2e0dbd | 2013-05-09 18:35:53 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 207 | break; |
| 208 | case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD2_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: |
| 209 | verify_result->has_md2 = true; |
Torne (Richard Coles) | c2e0dbd | 2013-05-09 18:35:53 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 210 | break; |
| 211 | case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD4_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: |
| 212 | verify_result->has_md4 = true; |
| 213 | break; |
| 214 | default: |
| 215 | break; |
| 216 | } |
| 217 | } |
| 218 | |
| 219 | if (root_cert) |
| 220 | verified_chain.push_back(root_cert); |
| 221 | #if defined(OS_IOS) |
| 222 | verify_result->verified_cert = |
| 223 | x509_util_ios::CreateCertFromNSSHandles(verified_cert, verified_chain); |
| 224 | #else |
| 225 | verify_result->verified_cert = |
| 226 | X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(verified_cert, verified_chain); |
| 227 | #endif // defined(OS_IOS) |
| 228 | } |
| 229 | |
| 230 | // IsKnownRoot returns true if the given certificate is one that we believe |
| 231 | // is a standard (as opposed to user-installed) root. |
| 232 | bool IsKnownRoot(CERTCertificate* root) { |
| 233 | if (!root || !root->slot) |
| 234 | return false; |
| 235 | |
| 236 | // This magic name is taken from |
| 237 | // http://bonsai.mozilla.org/cvsblame.cgi?file=mozilla/security/nss/lib/ckfw/builtins/constants.c&rev=1.13&mark=86,89#79 |
| 238 | return 0 == strcmp(PK11_GetSlotName(root->slot), |
| 239 | "NSS Builtin Objects"); |
| 240 | } |
| 241 | |
| 242 | // Returns true if the given certificate is one of the additional trust anchors. |
| 243 | bool IsAdditionalTrustAnchor(CERTCertList* additional_trust_anchors, |
| 244 | CERTCertificate* root) { |
| 245 | if (!additional_trust_anchors || !root) |
| 246 | return false; |
| 247 | for (CERTCertListNode* node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(additional_trust_anchors); |
| 248 | !CERT_LIST_END(node, additional_trust_anchors); |
| 249 | node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) { |
| 250 | if (CERT_CompareCerts(node->cert, root)) |
| 251 | return true; |
| 252 | } |
| 253 | return false; |
| 254 | } |
| 255 | |
| 256 | enum CRLSetResult { |
Torne (Richard Coles) | c2e0dbd | 2013-05-09 18:35:53 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 257 | kCRLSetOk, |
Torne (Richard Coles) | a36e592 | 2013-08-05 13:57:33 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 258 | kCRLSetRevoked, |
| 259 | kCRLSetUnknown, |
Torne (Richard Coles) | c2e0dbd | 2013-05-09 18:35:53 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 260 | }; |
| 261 | |
| 262 | // CheckRevocationWithCRLSet attempts to check each element of |cert_list| |
| 263 | // against |crl_set|. It returns: |
| 264 | // kCRLSetRevoked: if any element of the chain is known to have been revoked. |
Torne (Richard Coles) | a36e592 | 2013-08-05 13:57:33 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 265 | // kCRLSetUnknown: if there is no fresh information about some element in |
| 266 | // the chain. |
| 267 | // kCRLSetOk: if every element in the chain is covered by a fresh CRLSet and |
| 268 | // is unrevoked. |
Torne (Richard Coles) | c2e0dbd | 2013-05-09 18:35:53 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 269 | CRLSetResult CheckRevocationWithCRLSet(CERTCertList* cert_list, |
| 270 | CERTCertificate* root, |
| 271 | CRLSet* crl_set) { |
| 272 | std::vector<CERTCertificate*> certs; |
| 273 | |
| 274 | if (cert_list) { |
| 275 | for (CERTCertListNode* node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(cert_list); |
| 276 | !CERT_LIST_END(node, cert_list); |
| 277 | node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) { |
| 278 | certs.push_back(node->cert); |
| 279 | } |
| 280 | } |
| 281 | if (root) |
| 282 | certs.push_back(root); |
| 283 | |
Torne (Richard Coles) | a36e592 | 2013-08-05 13:57:33 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 284 | bool covered = true; |
| 285 | |
Torne (Richard Coles) | c2e0dbd | 2013-05-09 18:35:53 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 286 | // We iterate from the root certificate down to the leaf, keeping track of |
| 287 | // the issuer's SPKI at each step. |
| 288 | std::string issuer_spki_hash; |
| 289 | for (std::vector<CERTCertificate*>::reverse_iterator i = certs.rbegin(); |
| 290 | i != certs.rend(); ++i) { |
| 291 | CERTCertificate* cert = *i; |
| 292 | |
| 293 | base::StringPiece der(reinterpret_cast<char*>(cert->derCert.data), |
| 294 | cert->derCert.len); |
| 295 | |
| 296 | base::StringPiece spki; |
| 297 | if (!asn1::ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(der, &spki)) { |
| 298 | NOTREACHED(); |
Torne (Richard Coles) | a36e592 | 2013-08-05 13:57:33 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 299 | covered = false; |
| 300 | continue; |
Torne (Richard Coles) | c2e0dbd | 2013-05-09 18:35:53 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 301 | } |
| 302 | const std::string spki_hash = crypto::SHA256HashString(spki); |
| 303 | |
| 304 | base::StringPiece serial_number = base::StringPiece( |
| 305 | reinterpret_cast<char*>(cert->serialNumber.data), |
| 306 | cert->serialNumber.len); |
| 307 | |
| 308 | CRLSet::Result result = crl_set->CheckSPKI(spki_hash); |
| 309 | |
| 310 | if (result != CRLSet::REVOKED && !issuer_spki_hash.empty()) |
| 311 | result = crl_set->CheckSerial(serial_number, issuer_spki_hash); |
| 312 | |
| 313 | issuer_spki_hash = spki_hash; |
| 314 | |
| 315 | switch (result) { |
| 316 | case CRLSet::REVOKED: |
| 317 | return kCRLSetRevoked; |
| 318 | case CRLSet::UNKNOWN: |
Torne (Richard Coles) | a36e592 | 2013-08-05 13:57:33 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 319 | covered = false; |
| 320 | continue; |
Torne (Richard Coles) | c2e0dbd | 2013-05-09 18:35:53 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 321 | case CRLSet::GOOD: |
| 322 | continue; |
| 323 | default: |
| 324 | NOTREACHED(); |
Torne (Richard Coles) | a36e592 | 2013-08-05 13:57:33 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 325 | covered = false; |
| 326 | continue; |
Torne (Richard Coles) | c2e0dbd | 2013-05-09 18:35:53 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 327 | } |
| 328 | } |
| 329 | |
Torne (Richard Coles) | a36e592 | 2013-08-05 13:57:33 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 330 | if (!covered || crl_set->IsExpired()) |
| 331 | return kCRLSetUnknown; |
Torne (Richard Coles) | c2e0dbd | 2013-05-09 18:35:53 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 332 | return kCRLSetOk; |
| 333 | } |
| 334 | |
| 335 | // Forward declarations. |
| 336 | SECStatus RetryPKIXVerifyCertWithWorkarounds( |
| 337 | CERTCertificate* cert_handle, int num_policy_oids, |
| 338 | bool cert_io_enabled, std::vector<CERTValInParam>* cvin, |
| 339 | CERTValOutParam* cvout); |
| 340 | SECOidTag GetFirstCertPolicy(CERTCertificate* cert_handle); |
| 341 | |
| 342 | // Call CERT_PKIXVerifyCert for the cert_handle. |
| 343 | // Verification results are stored in an array of CERTValOutParam. |
Ben Murdoch | 558790d | 2013-07-30 15:19:42 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 344 | // If |hard_fail| is true, and no policy_oids are supplied (eg: EV is NOT being |
| 345 | // checked), then the failure to obtain valid CRL/OCSP information for all |
| 346 | // certificates that contain CRL/OCSP URLs will cause the certificate to be |
| 347 | // treated as if it was revoked. Since failures may be caused by transient |
| 348 | // network failures or by malicious attackers, in general, hard_fail should be |
| 349 | // false. |
Torne (Richard Coles) | c2e0dbd | 2013-05-09 18:35:53 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 350 | // If policy_oids is not NULL and num_policy_oids is positive, policies |
| 351 | // are also checked. |
| 352 | // additional_trust_anchors is an optional list of certificates that can be |
| 353 | // trusted as anchors when building a certificate chain. |
| 354 | // Caller must initialize cvout before calling this function. |
| 355 | SECStatus PKIXVerifyCert(CERTCertificate* cert_handle, |
| 356 | bool check_revocation, |
Ben Murdoch | 558790d | 2013-07-30 15:19:42 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 357 | bool hard_fail, |
Torne (Richard Coles) | c2e0dbd | 2013-05-09 18:35:53 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 358 | bool cert_io_enabled, |
| 359 | const SECOidTag* policy_oids, |
| 360 | int num_policy_oids, |
| 361 | CERTCertList* additional_trust_anchors, |
| 362 | CERTValOutParam* cvout) { |
| 363 | bool use_crl = check_revocation; |
| 364 | bool use_ocsp = check_revocation; |
| 365 | |
Torne (Richard Coles) | c2e0dbd | 2013-05-09 18:35:53 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 366 | PRUint64 revocation_method_flags = |
| 367 | CERT_REV_M_DO_NOT_TEST_USING_THIS_METHOD | |
| 368 | CERT_REV_M_ALLOW_NETWORK_FETCHING | |
| 369 | CERT_REV_M_IGNORE_IMPLICIT_DEFAULT_SOURCE | |
| 370 | CERT_REV_M_IGNORE_MISSING_FRESH_INFO | |
| 371 | CERT_REV_M_STOP_TESTING_ON_FRESH_INFO; |
| 372 | PRUint64 revocation_method_independent_flags = |
| 373 | CERT_REV_MI_TEST_ALL_LOCAL_INFORMATION_FIRST; |
| 374 | if (check_revocation && policy_oids && num_policy_oids > 0) { |
| 375 | // EV verification requires revocation checking. Consider the certificate |
| 376 | // revoked if we don't have revocation info. |
| 377 | // TODO(wtc): Add a bool parameter to expressly specify we're doing EV |
| 378 | // verification or we want strict revocation flags. |
| 379 | revocation_method_flags |= CERT_REV_M_REQUIRE_INFO_ON_MISSING_SOURCE; |
| 380 | revocation_method_independent_flags |= |
| 381 | CERT_REV_MI_REQUIRE_SOME_FRESH_INFO_AVAILABLE; |
Ben Murdoch | 558790d | 2013-07-30 15:19:42 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 382 | } else if (check_revocation && hard_fail) { |
| 383 | revocation_method_flags |= CERT_REV_M_FAIL_ON_MISSING_FRESH_INFO; |
| 384 | revocation_method_independent_flags |= |
| 385 | CERT_REV_MI_REQUIRE_SOME_FRESH_INFO_AVAILABLE; |
Torne (Richard Coles) | c2e0dbd | 2013-05-09 18:35:53 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 386 | } else { |
| 387 | revocation_method_flags |= CERT_REV_M_SKIP_TEST_ON_MISSING_SOURCE; |
| 388 | revocation_method_independent_flags |= |
| 389 | CERT_REV_MI_NO_OVERALL_INFO_REQUIREMENT; |
| 390 | } |
| 391 | PRUint64 method_flags[2]; |
| 392 | method_flags[cert_revocation_method_crl] = revocation_method_flags; |
| 393 | method_flags[cert_revocation_method_ocsp] = revocation_method_flags; |
| 394 | |
| 395 | if (use_crl) { |
| 396 | method_flags[cert_revocation_method_crl] |= |
| 397 | CERT_REV_M_TEST_USING_THIS_METHOD; |
| 398 | } |
| 399 | if (use_ocsp) { |
| 400 | method_flags[cert_revocation_method_ocsp] |= |
| 401 | CERT_REV_M_TEST_USING_THIS_METHOD; |
| 402 | } |
| 403 | |
| 404 | CERTRevocationMethodIndex preferred_revocation_methods[1]; |
| 405 | if (use_ocsp) { |
| 406 | preferred_revocation_methods[0] = cert_revocation_method_ocsp; |
| 407 | } else { |
| 408 | preferred_revocation_methods[0] = cert_revocation_method_crl; |
| 409 | } |
| 410 | |
| 411 | CERTRevocationFlags revocation_flags; |
| 412 | revocation_flags.leafTests.number_of_defined_methods = |
| 413 | arraysize(method_flags); |
| 414 | revocation_flags.leafTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method = method_flags; |
| 415 | revocation_flags.leafTests.number_of_preferred_methods = |
| 416 | arraysize(preferred_revocation_methods); |
| 417 | revocation_flags.leafTests.preferred_methods = preferred_revocation_methods; |
| 418 | revocation_flags.leafTests.cert_rev_method_independent_flags = |
| 419 | revocation_method_independent_flags; |
| 420 | |
| 421 | revocation_flags.chainTests.number_of_defined_methods = |
| 422 | arraysize(method_flags); |
| 423 | revocation_flags.chainTests.cert_rev_flags_per_method = method_flags; |
| 424 | revocation_flags.chainTests.number_of_preferred_methods = |
| 425 | arraysize(preferred_revocation_methods); |
| 426 | revocation_flags.chainTests.preferred_methods = preferred_revocation_methods; |
| 427 | revocation_flags.chainTests.cert_rev_method_independent_flags = |
| 428 | revocation_method_independent_flags; |
| 429 | |
| 430 | |
| 431 | std::vector<CERTValInParam> cvin; |
| 432 | cvin.reserve(7); |
| 433 | CERTValInParam in_param; |
| 434 | in_param.type = cert_pi_revocationFlags; |
| 435 | in_param.value.pointer.revocation = &revocation_flags; |
| 436 | cvin.push_back(in_param); |
| 437 | if (policy_oids && num_policy_oids > 0) { |
| 438 | in_param.type = cert_pi_policyOID; |
| 439 | in_param.value.arraySize = num_policy_oids; |
| 440 | in_param.value.array.oids = policy_oids; |
| 441 | cvin.push_back(in_param); |
| 442 | } |
| 443 | if (additional_trust_anchors) { |
| 444 | in_param.type = cert_pi_trustAnchors; |
| 445 | in_param.value.pointer.chain = additional_trust_anchors; |
| 446 | cvin.push_back(in_param); |
| 447 | in_param.type = cert_pi_useOnlyTrustAnchors; |
| 448 | in_param.value.scalar.b = PR_FALSE; |
| 449 | cvin.push_back(in_param); |
| 450 | } |
| 451 | in_param.type = cert_pi_end; |
| 452 | cvin.push_back(in_param); |
| 453 | |
| 454 | SECStatus rv = CERT_PKIXVerifyCert(cert_handle, certificateUsageSSLServer, |
| 455 | &cvin[0], cvout, NULL); |
| 456 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 457 | rv = RetryPKIXVerifyCertWithWorkarounds(cert_handle, num_policy_oids, |
| 458 | cert_io_enabled, &cvin, cvout); |
| 459 | } |
| 460 | return rv; |
| 461 | } |
| 462 | |
| 463 | // PKIXVerifyCert calls this function to work around some bugs in |
| 464 | // CERT_PKIXVerifyCert. All the arguments of this function are either the |
| 465 | // arguments or local variables of PKIXVerifyCert. |
| 466 | SECStatus RetryPKIXVerifyCertWithWorkarounds( |
| 467 | CERTCertificate* cert_handle, int num_policy_oids, |
| 468 | bool cert_io_enabled, std::vector<CERTValInParam>* cvin, |
| 469 | CERTValOutParam* cvout) { |
| 470 | // We call this function when the first CERT_PKIXVerifyCert call in |
| 471 | // PKIXVerifyCert failed, so we initialize |rv| to SECFailure. |
| 472 | SECStatus rv = SECFailure; |
| 473 | int nss_error = PORT_GetError(); |
| 474 | CERTValInParam in_param; |
| 475 | |
| 476 | // If we get SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER, we may be missing an intermediate |
| 477 | // CA certificate, so we retry with cert_pi_useAIACertFetch. |
| 478 | // cert_pi_useAIACertFetch has several bugs in its error handling and |
| 479 | // error reporting (NSS bug 528743), so we don't use it by default. |
| 480 | // Note: When building a certificate chain, CERT_PKIXVerifyCert may |
| 481 | // incorrectly pick a CA certificate with the same subject name as the |
| 482 | // missing intermediate CA certificate, and fail with the |
| 483 | // SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE error (NSS bug 524013), so we also retry with |
| 484 | // cert_pi_useAIACertFetch on SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE. |
| 485 | if (cert_io_enabled && |
| 486 | (nss_error == SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER || |
| 487 | nss_error == SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE)) { |
| 488 | DCHECK_EQ(cvin->back().type, cert_pi_end); |
| 489 | cvin->pop_back(); |
| 490 | in_param.type = cert_pi_useAIACertFetch; |
| 491 | in_param.value.scalar.b = PR_TRUE; |
| 492 | cvin->push_back(in_param); |
| 493 | in_param.type = cert_pi_end; |
| 494 | cvin->push_back(in_param); |
| 495 | rv = CERT_PKIXVerifyCert(cert_handle, certificateUsageSSLServer, |
| 496 | &(*cvin)[0], cvout, NULL); |
| 497 | if (rv == SECSuccess) |
| 498 | return rv; |
| 499 | int new_nss_error = PORT_GetError(); |
| 500 | if (new_nss_error == SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS || |
| 501 | new_nss_error == SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_AIA_LOCATION_TYPE || |
| 502 | new_nss_error == SEC_ERROR_BAD_INFO_ACCESS_LOCATION || |
| 503 | new_nss_error == SEC_ERROR_BAD_HTTP_RESPONSE || |
| 504 | new_nss_error == SEC_ERROR_BAD_LDAP_RESPONSE || |
| 505 | !IS_SEC_ERROR(new_nss_error)) { |
| 506 | // Use the original error code because of cert_pi_useAIACertFetch's |
| 507 | // bad error reporting. |
| 508 | PORT_SetError(nss_error); |
| 509 | return rv; |
| 510 | } |
| 511 | nss_error = new_nss_error; |
| 512 | } |
| 513 | |
| 514 | // If an intermediate CA certificate has requireExplicitPolicy in its |
| 515 | // policyConstraints extension, CERT_PKIXVerifyCert fails with |
| 516 | // SEC_ERROR_POLICY_VALIDATION_FAILED because we didn't specify any |
| 517 | // certificate policy (NSS bug 552775). So we retry with the certificate |
| 518 | // policy found in the server certificate. |
| 519 | if (nss_error == SEC_ERROR_POLICY_VALIDATION_FAILED && |
| 520 | num_policy_oids == 0) { |
| 521 | SECOidTag policy = GetFirstCertPolicy(cert_handle); |
| 522 | if (policy != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) { |
| 523 | DCHECK_EQ(cvin->back().type, cert_pi_end); |
| 524 | cvin->pop_back(); |
| 525 | in_param.type = cert_pi_policyOID; |
| 526 | in_param.value.arraySize = 1; |
| 527 | in_param.value.array.oids = &policy; |
| 528 | cvin->push_back(in_param); |
| 529 | in_param.type = cert_pi_end; |
| 530 | cvin->push_back(in_param); |
| 531 | rv = CERT_PKIXVerifyCert(cert_handle, certificateUsageSSLServer, |
| 532 | &(*cvin)[0], cvout, NULL); |
| 533 | if (rv != SECSuccess) { |
| 534 | // Use the original error code. |
| 535 | PORT_SetError(nss_error); |
| 536 | } |
| 537 | } |
| 538 | } |
| 539 | |
| 540 | return rv; |
| 541 | } |
| 542 | |
| 543 | // Decodes the certificatePolicies extension of the certificate. Returns |
| 544 | // NULL if the certificate doesn't have the extension or the extension can't |
| 545 | // be decoded. The returned value must be freed with a |
| 546 | // CERT_DestroyCertificatePoliciesExtension call. |
| 547 | CERTCertificatePolicies* DecodeCertPolicies( |
| 548 | CERTCertificate* cert_handle) { |
| 549 | SECItem policy_ext; |
| 550 | SECStatus rv = CERT_FindCertExtension(cert_handle, |
| 551 | SEC_OID_X509_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES, |
| 552 | &policy_ext); |
| 553 | if (rv != SECSuccess) |
| 554 | return NULL; |
| 555 | CERTCertificatePolicies* policies = |
| 556 | CERT_DecodeCertificatePoliciesExtension(&policy_ext); |
| 557 | SECITEM_FreeItem(&policy_ext, PR_FALSE); |
| 558 | return policies; |
| 559 | } |
| 560 | |
| 561 | // Returns the OID tag for the first certificate policy in the certificate's |
| 562 | // certificatePolicies extension. Returns SEC_OID_UNKNOWN if the certificate |
| 563 | // has no certificate policy. |
| 564 | SECOidTag GetFirstCertPolicy(CERTCertificate* cert_handle) { |
| 565 | ScopedCERTCertificatePolicies policies(DecodeCertPolicies(cert_handle)); |
| 566 | if (!policies.get()) |
| 567 | return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN; |
| 568 | |
| 569 | CERTPolicyInfo* policy_info = policies->policyInfos[0]; |
| 570 | if (!policy_info) |
| 571 | return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN; |
| 572 | if (policy_info->oid != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) |
| 573 | return policy_info->oid; |
| 574 | |
| 575 | // The certificate policy is unknown to NSS. We need to create a dynamic |
| 576 | // OID tag for the policy. |
| 577 | SECOidData od; |
| 578 | od.oid.len = policy_info->policyID.len; |
| 579 | od.oid.data = policy_info->policyID.data; |
| 580 | od.offset = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN; |
| 581 | // NSS doesn't allow us to pass an empty description, so I use a hardcoded, |
| 582 | // default description here. The description doesn't need to be unique for |
| 583 | // each OID. |
| 584 | od.desc = "a certificate policy"; |
| 585 | od.mechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM; |
| 586 | od.supportedExtension = INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION; |
| 587 | return SECOID_AddEntry(&od); |
| 588 | } |
| 589 | |
| 590 | HashValue CertPublicKeyHashSHA1(CERTCertificate* cert) { |
| 591 | HashValue hash(HASH_VALUE_SHA1); |
| 592 | #if defined(OS_IOS) |
| 593 | CC_SHA1(cert->derPublicKey.data, cert->derPublicKey.len, hash.data()); |
| 594 | #else |
| 595 | SECStatus rv = HASH_HashBuf(HASH_AlgSHA1, hash.data(), |
| 596 | cert->derPublicKey.data, cert->derPublicKey.len); |
| 597 | DCHECK_EQ(SECSuccess, rv); |
| 598 | #endif |
| 599 | return hash; |
| 600 | } |
| 601 | |
| 602 | HashValue CertPublicKeyHashSHA256(CERTCertificate* cert) { |
| 603 | HashValue hash(HASH_VALUE_SHA256); |
| 604 | #if defined(OS_IOS) |
| 605 | CC_SHA256(cert->derPublicKey.data, cert->derPublicKey.len, hash.data()); |
| 606 | #else |
| 607 | SECStatus rv = HASH_HashBuf(HASH_AlgSHA256, hash.data(), |
| 608 | cert->derPublicKey.data, cert->derPublicKey.len); |
| 609 | DCHECK_EQ(rv, SECSuccess); |
| 610 | #endif |
| 611 | return hash; |
| 612 | } |
| 613 | |
| 614 | void AppendPublicKeyHashes(CERTCertList* cert_list, |
| 615 | CERTCertificate* root_cert, |
| 616 | HashValueVector* hashes) { |
| 617 | for (CERTCertListNode* node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(cert_list); |
| 618 | !CERT_LIST_END(node, cert_list); |
| 619 | node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) { |
| 620 | hashes->push_back(CertPublicKeyHashSHA1(node->cert)); |
| 621 | hashes->push_back(CertPublicKeyHashSHA256(node->cert)); |
| 622 | } |
| 623 | if (root_cert) { |
| 624 | hashes->push_back(CertPublicKeyHashSHA1(root_cert)); |
| 625 | hashes->push_back(CertPublicKeyHashSHA256(root_cert)); |
| 626 | } |
| 627 | } |
| 628 | |
| 629 | // Returns true if |cert_handle| contains a policy OID that is an EV policy |
| 630 | // OID according to |metadata|, storing the resulting policy OID in |
| 631 | // |*ev_policy_oid|. A true return is not sufficient to establish that a |
| 632 | // certificate is EV, but a false return is sufficient to establish the |
| 633 | // certificate cannot be EV. |
| 634 | bool IsEVCandidate(EVRootCAMetadata* metadata, |
| 635 | CERTCertificate* cert_handle, |
| 636 | SECOidTag* ev_policy_oid) { |
| 637 | DCHECK(cert_handle); |
| 638 | ScopedCERTCertificatePolicies policies(DecodeCertPolicies(cert_handle)); |
| 639 | if (!policies.get()) |
| 640 | return false; |
| 641 | |
| 642 | CERTPolicyInfo** policy_infos = policies->policyInfos; |
| 643 | while (*policy_infos != NULL) { |
| 644 | CERTPolicyInfo* policy_info = *policy_infos++; |
| 645 | // If the Policy OID is unknown, that implicitly means it has not been |
| 646 | // registered as an EV policy. |
| 647 | if (policy_info->oid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) |
| 648 | continue; |
| 649 | if (metadata->IsEVPolicyOID(policy_info->oid)) { |
| 650 | *ev_policy_oid = policy_info->oid; |
| 651 | return true; |
| 652 | } |
| 653 | } |
| 654 | |
| 655 | return false; |
| 656 | } |
| 657 | |
| 658 | // Studied Mozilla's code (esp. security/manager/ssl/src/nsIdentityChecking.cpp |
| 659 | // and nsNSSCertHelper.cpp) to learn how to verify EV certificate. |
| 660 | // TODO(wtc): A possible optimization is that we get the trust anchor from |
| 661 | // the first PKIXVerifyCert call. We look up the EV policy for the trust |
| 662 | // anchor. If the trust anchor has no EV policy, we know the cert isn't EV. |
| 663 | // Otherwise, we pass just that EV policy (as opposed to all the EV policies) |
| 664 | // to the second PKIXVerifyCert call. |
| 665 | bool VerifyEV(CERTCertificate* cert_handle, |
| 666 | int flags, |
| 667 | CRLSet* crl_set, |
Torne (Richard Coles) | a36e592 | 2013-08-05 13:57:33 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 668 | bool rev_checking_enabled, |
Torne (Richard Coles) | c2e0dbd | 2013-05-09 18:35:53 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 669 | EVRootCAMetadata* metadata, |
| 670 | SECOidTag ev_policy_oid, |
| 671 | CERTCertList* additional_trust_anchors) { |
| 672 | CERTValOutParam cvout[3]; |
| 673 | int cvout_index = 0; |
| 674 | cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_certList; |
| 675 | cvout[cvout_index].value.pointer.chain = NULL; |
| 676 | int cvout_cert_list_index = cvout_index; |
| 677 | cvout_index++; |
| 678 | cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_trustAnchor; |
| 679 | cvout[cvout_index].value.pointer.cert = NULL; |
| 680 | int cvout_trust_anchor_index = cvout_index; |
| 681 | cvout_index++; |
| 682 | cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_end; |
| 683 | ScopedCERTValOutParam scoped_cvout(cvout); |
| 684 | |
Torne (Richard Coles) | c2e0dbd | 2013-05-09 18:35:53 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 685 | SECStatus status = PKIXVerifyCert( |
| 686 | cert_handle, |
| 687 | rev_checking_enabled, |
Ben Murdoch | 558790d | 2013-07-30 15:19:42 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 688 | true, /* hard fail is implied in EV. */ |
Torne (Richard Coles) | c2e0dbd | 2013-05-09 18:35:53 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 689 | flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_CERT_IO_ENABLED, |
| 690 | &ev_policy_oid, |
| 691 | 1, |
| 692 | additional_trust_anchors, |
| 693 | cvout); |
| 694 | if (status != SECSuccess) |
| 695 | return false; |
| 696 | |
| 697 | CERTCertificate* root_ca = |
| 698 | cvout[cvout_trust_anchor_index].value.pointer.cert; |
| 699 | if (root_ca == NULL) |
| 700 | return false; |
| 701 | |
| 702 | // This second PKIXVerifyCert call could have found a different certification |
| 703 | // path and one or more of the certificates on this new path, that weren't on |
| 704 | // the old path, might have been revoked. |
| 705 | if (crl_set) { |
| 706 | CRLSetResult crl_set_result = CheckRevocationWithCRLSet( |
| 707 | cvout[cvout_cert_list_index].value.pointer.chain, |
| 708 | cvout[cvout_trust_anchor_index].value.pointer.cert, |
| 709 | crl_set); |
| 710 | if (crl_set_result == kCRLSetRevoked) |
| 711 | return false; |
| 712 | } |
| 713 | |
| 714 | #if defined(OS_IOS) |
| 715 | SHA1HashValue fingerprint = x509_util_ios::CalculateFingerprintNSS(root_ca); |
| 716 | #else |
| 717 | SHA1HashValue fingerprint = |
| 718 | X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint(root_ca); |
| 719 | #endif |
| 720 | return metadata->HasEVPolicyOID(fingerprint, ev_policy_oid); |
| 721 | } |
| 722 | |
| 723 | CERTCertList* CertificateListToCERTCertList(const CertificateList& list) { |
| 724 | CERTCertList* result = CERT_NewCertList(); |
| 725 | for (size_t i = 0; i < list.size(); ++i) { |
| 726 | #if defined(OS_IOS) |
| 727 | // X509Certificate::os_cert_handle() on iOS is a SecCertificateRef; convert |
| 728 | // it to an NSS CERTCertificate. |
| 729 | CERTCertificate* cert = x509_util_ios::CreateNSSCertHandleFromOSHandle( |
| 730 | list[i]->os_cert_handle()); |
| 731 | #else |
| 732 | CERTCertificate* cert = list[i]->os_cert_handle(); |
| 733 | #endif |
| 734 | CERT_AddCertToListTail(result, CERT_DupCertificate(cert)); |
| 735 | } |
| 736 | return result; |
| 737 | } |
| 738 | |
| 739 | } // namespace |
| 740 | |
| 741 | CertVerifyProcNSS::CertVerifyProcNSS() {} |
| 742 | |
| 743 | CertVerifyProcNSS::~CertVerifyProcNSS() {} |
| 744 | |
| 745 | bool CertVerifyProcNSS::SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors() const { |
| 746 | // This requires APIs introduced in 3.14.2. |
| 747 | return NSS_VersionCheck("3.14.2"); |
| 748 | } |
| 749 | |
| 750 | int CertVerifyProcNSS::VerifyInternal( |
| 751 | X509Certificate* cert, |
| 752 | const std::string& hostname, |
| 753 | int flags, |
| 754 | CRLSet* crl_set, |
| 755 | const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors, |
| 756 | CertVerifyResult* verify_result) { |
| 757 | #if defined(OS_IOS) |
| 758 | // For iOS, the entire chain must be loaded into NSS's in-memory certificate |
| 759 | // store. |
| 760 | x509_util_ios::NSSCertChain scoped_chain(cert); |
| 761 | CERTCertificate* cert_handle = scoped_chain.cert_handle(); |
| 762 | #else |
| 763 | CERTCertificate* cert_handle = cert->os_cert_handle(); |
| 764 | #endif // defined(OS_IOS) |
| 765 | |
| 766 | // Make sure that the hostname matches with the common name of the cert. |
| 767 | SECStatus status = CERT_VerifyCertName(cert_handle, hostname.c_str()); |
| 768 | if (status != SECSuccess) |
| 769 | verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID; |
| 770 | |
| 771 | // Make sure that the cert is valid now. |
| 772 | SECCertTimeValidity validity = CERT_CheckCertValidTimes( |
| 773 | cert_handle, PR_Now(), PR_TRUE); |
| 774 | if (validity != secCertTimeValid) |
| 775 | verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID; |
| 776 | |
| 777 | CERTValOutParam cvout[3]; |
| 778 | int cvout_index = 0; |
| 779 | cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_certList; |
| 780 | cvout[cvout_index].value.pointer.chain = NULL; |
| 781 | int cvout_cert_list_index = cvout_index; |
| 782 | cvout_index++; |
| 783 | cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_trustAnchor; |
| 784 | cvout[cvout_index].value.pointer.cert = NULL; |
| 785 | int cvout_trust_anchor_index = cvout_index; |
| 786 | cvout_index++; |
| 787 | cvout[cvout_index].type = cert_po_end; |
| 788 | ScopedCERTValOutParam scoped_cvout(cvout); |
| 789 | |
| 790 | EVRootCAMetadata* metadata = EVRootCAMetadata::GetInstance(); |
| 791 | SECOidTag ev_policy_oid = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN; |
| 792 | bool is_ev_candidate = |
| 793 | (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_EV_CERT) && |
| 794 | IsEVCandidate(metadata, cert_handle, &ev_policy_oid); |
| 795 | bool cert_io_enabled = flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_CERT_IO_ENABLED; |
| 796 | bool check_revocation = |
| 797 | cert_io_enabled && |
Torne (Richard Coles) | a36e592 | 2013-08-05 13:57:33 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 798 | (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED); |
Torne (Richard Coles) | c2e0dbd | 2013-05-09 18:35:53 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 799 | if (check_revocation) |
| 800 | verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED; |
| 801 | |
| 802 | ScopedCERTCertList trust_anchors; |
| 803 | if (SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors() && !additional_trust_anchors.empty()) { |
| 804 | trust_anchors.reset( |
| 805 | CertificateListToCERTCertList(additional_trust_anchors)); |
| 806 | } |
| 807 | |
Ben Murdoch | 558790d | 2013-07-30 15:19:42 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 808 | status = PKIXVerifyCert(cert_handle, check_revocation, false, |
| 809 | cert_io_enabled, NULL, 0, trust_anchors.get(), |
| 810 | cvout); |
| 811 | |
| 812 | if (status == SECSuccess && |
| 813 | (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_REQUIRED_LOCAL_ANCHORS) && |
| 814 | !IsKnownRoot(cvout[cvout_trust_anchor_index].value.pointer.cert)) { |
| 815 | // TODO(rsleevi): Optimize this by supplying the constructed chain to |
| 816 | // libpkix via cvin. Omitting for now, due to lack of coverage in upstream |
| 817 | // NSS tests for that feature. |
| 818 | scoped_cvout.Clear(); |
| 819 | verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED; |
| 820 | status = PKIXVerifyCert(cert_handle, true, true, |
| 821 | cert_io_enabled, NULL, 0, trust_anchors.get(), |
| 822 | cvout); |
| 823 | } |
Torne (Richard Coles) | c2e0dbd | 2013-05-09 18:35:53 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 824 | |
| 825 | if (status == SECSuccess) { |
| 826 | AppendPublicKeyHashes(cvout[cvout_cert_list_index].value.pointer.chain, |
| 827 | cvout[cvout_trust_anchor_index].value.pointer.cert, |
| 828 | &verify_result->public_key_hashes); |
| 829 | |
| 830 | verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root = |
| 831 | IsKnownRoot(cvout[cvout_trust_anchor_index].value.pointer.cert); |
| 832 | verify_result->is_issued_by_additional_trust_anchor = |
| 833 | IsAdditionalTrustAnchor( |
| 834 | trust_anchors.get(), |
| 835 | cvout[cvout_trust_anchor_index].value.pointer.cert); |
| 836 | |
| 837 | GetCertChainInfo(cvout[cvout_cert_list_index].value.pointer.chain, |
| 838 | cvout[cvout_trust_anchor_index].value.pointer.cert, |
| 839 | verify_result); |
| 840 | } |
| 841 | |
Torne (Richard Coles) | a36e592 | 2013-08-05 13:57:33 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 842 | CRLSetResult crl_set_result = kCRLSetUnknown; |
Torne (Richard Coles) | c2e0dbd | 2013-05-09 18:35:53 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 843 | if (crl_set) { |
Torne (Richard Coles) | a36e592 | 2013-08-05 13:57:33 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 844 | crl_set_result = CheckRevocationWithCRLSet( |
Torne (Richard Coles) | c2e0dbd | 2013-05-09 18:35:53 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 845 | cvout[cvout_cert_list_index].value.pointer.chain, |
| 846 | cvout[cvout_trust_anchor_index].value.pointer.cert, |
| 847 | crl_set); |
| 848 | if (crl_set_result == kCRLSetRevoked) { |
| 849 | PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE); |
| 850 | status = SECFailure; |
| 851 | } |
| 852 | } |
| 853 | |
| 854 | if (status != SECSuccess) { |
| 855 | int err = PORT_GetError(); |
| 856 | LOG(ERROR) << "CERT_PKIXVerifyCert for " << hostname |
| 857 | << " failed err=" << err; |
| 858 | // CERT_PKIXVerifyCert rerports the wrong error code for |
| 859 | // expired certificates (NSS bug 491174) |
| 860 | if (err == SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_VALID && |
| 861 | (verify_result->cert_status & CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID)) |
| 862 | err = SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE; |
| 863 | CertStatus cert_status = MapCertErrorToCertStatus(err); |
| 864 | if (cert_status) { |
| 865 | verify_result->cert_status |= cert_status; |
| 866 | return MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status); |
| 867 | } |
| 868 | // |err| is not a certificate error. |
| 869 | return MapSecurityError(err); |
| 870 | } |
| 871 | |
| 872 | if (IsCertStatusError(verify_result->cert_status)) |
| 873 | return MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status); |
| 874 | |
Torne (Richard Coles) | a36e592 | 2013-08-05 13:57:33 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 875 | if ((flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_EV_CERT) && is_ev_candidate) { |
| 876 | check_revocation |= |
| 877 | crl_set_result != kCRLSetOk && |
| 878 | cert_io_enabled && |
| 879 | (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED_EV_ONLY); |
| 880 | if (check_revocation) |
| 881 | verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED; |
| 882 | |
| 883 | if (VerifyEV(cert_handle, flags, crl_set, check_revocation, metadata, |
| 884 | ev_policy_oid, trust_anchors.get())) { |
| 885 | verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_IS_EV; |
| 886 | } |
Torne (Richard Coles) | c2e0dbd | 2013-05-09 18:35:53 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 887 | } |
| 888 | |
| 889 | return OK; |
| 890 | } |
| 891 | |
| 892 | } // namespace net |