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Todd Poynorb2b87d92013-06-03 14:09:54 -07001# healthd seclabel is specified in init.rc since
2# it lives in the rootfs and has no unique file type.
3type healthd, domain;
Todd Poynorb2b87d92013-06-03 14:09:54 -07004type healthd_exec, exec_type, file_type;
5
6init_daemon_domain(healthd)
Stephen Smalley2a604ad2013-11-04 09:53:46 -05007allow healthd rootfs:file { read entrypoint };
Todd Poynorb2b87d92013-06-03 14:09:54 -07008write_klog(healthd)
Stephen Smalley190c7042014-01-22 13:23:02 -05009# /dev/__null__ created by init prior to policy load,
10# open fd inherited by healthd.
11allow healthd tmpfs:chr_file { read write };
Todd Poynorb2b87d92013-06-03 14:09:54 -070012
Stephen Smalley2a604ad2013-11-04 09:53:46 -050013allow healthd self:capability { net_admin mknod };
14allow healthd self:capability2 block_suspend;
15allow healthd self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms;
16binder_use(healthd)
Nick Kralevich09e6abd2013-12-13 22:19:45 -080017binder_service(healthd)
Stephen Smalley2a604ad2013-11-04 09:53:46 -050018binder_call(healthd, system_server)
Todd Poynorb2b87d92013-06-03 14:09:54 -070019
Stephen Smalley2a604ad2013-11-04 09:53:46 -050020# Workaround for 0x10 / block_suspend capability2 denials.
21# Requires a kernel patch to fix properly.
22permissive healthd;