Shawn Willden | 0cb6942 | 2015-05-26 08:31:37 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | /* |
| 2 | * Copyright 2015 The Android Open Source Project |
| 3 | * |
| 4 | * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); |
| 5 | * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. |
| 6 | * You may obtain a copy of the License at |
| 7 | * |
| 8 | * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 |
| 9 | * |
| 10 | * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software |
| 11 | * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, |
| 12 | * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. |
| 13 | * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and |
| 14 | * limitations under the License. |
| 15 | */ |
| 16 | |
| 17 | #include "auth_encrypted_key_blob.h" |
| 18 | |
| 19 | #include <keymaster/android_keymaster_utils.h> |
| 20 | #include <keymaster/authorization_set.h> |
| 21 | #include <keymaster/logger.h> |
| 22 | |
| 23 | #include "ocb_utils.h" |
| 24 | |
| 25 | namespace keymaster { |
| 26 | |
| 27 | const uint32_t CURRENT_BLOB_VERSION = 0; |
| 28 | |
| 29 | keymaster_error_t SerializeAuthEncryptedBlob(const KeymasterKeyBlob& encrypted_key_material, |
| 30 | const AuthorizationSet& hw_enforced, |
| 31 | const AuthorizationSet& sw_enforced, |
| 32 | |
| 33 | const Buffer& nonce, const Buffer& tag, |
| 34 | KeymasterKeyBlob* key_blob) { |
| 35 | size_t size = 1 /* version byte */ + nonce.SerializedSize() + |
| 36 | encrypted_key_material.SerializedSize() + tag.SerializedSize() + |
| 37 | hw_enforced.SerializedSize() + sw_enforced.SerializedSize(); |
| 38 | |
| 39 | if (!key_blob->Reset(size)) |
| 40 | return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED; |
| 41 | |
| 42 | uint8_t* buf = key_blob->writable_data(); |
| 43 | const uint8_t* end = key_blob->key_material + key_blob->key_material_size; |
| 44 | |
| 45 | *buf++ = CURRENT_BLOB_VERSION; |
| 46 | buf = nonce.Serialize(buf, end); |
| 47 | buf = encrypted_key_material.Serialize(buf, end); |
| 48 | buf = tag.Serialize(buf, end); |
| 49 | buf = hw_enforced.Serialize(buf, end); |
| 50 | buf = sw_enforced.Serialize(buf, end); |
| 51 | if (buf != key_blob->key_material + key_blob->key_material_size) |
| 52 | return KM_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR; |
| 53 | |
| 54 | return KM_ERROR_OK; |
| 55 | } |
| 56 | |
Shawn Willden | c7fe06d | 2015-06-11 15:50:04 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 57 | static keymaster_error_t DeserializeUnversionedBlob(const KeymasterKeyBlob& key_blob, |
| 58 | KeymasterKeyBlob* encrypted_key_material, |
| 59 | AuthorizationSet* hw_enforced, |
| 60 | AuthorizationSet* sw_enforced, Buffer* nonce, |
| 61 | Buffer* tag) { |
| 62 | const uint8_t* tmp = key_blob.key_material; |
| 63 | const uint8_t** buf_ptr = &tmp; |
| 64 | const uint8_t* end = tmp + key_blob.key_material_size; |
| 65 | |
| 66 | if (!nonce->reserve(OCB_NONCE_LENGTH) || !tag->reserve(OCB_TAG_LENGTH)) |
| 67 | return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED; |
| 68 | |
| 69 | if (!copy_from_buf(buf_ptr, end, nonce->peek_write(), OCB_NONCE_LENGTH) || |
| 70 | !encrypted_key_material->Deserialize(buf_ptr, end) || |
| 71 | !copy_from_buf(buf_ptr, end, tag->peek_write(), OCB_TAG_LENGTH) || |
| 72 | !hw_enforced->Deserialize(buf_ptr, end) || // |
| 73 | !sw_enforced->Deserialize(buf_ptr, end)) { |
Shawn Willden | 2612fb5 | 2015-07-27 16:58:30 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 74 | LOG_D("Failed to deserialize unversioned blob (may be a HW-backed key)", 0); |
Shawn Willden | c7fe06d | 2015-06-11 15:50:04 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 75 | return KM_ERROR_INVALID_KEY_BLOB; |
| 76 | } |
Shawn Willden | 0f906ec | 2015-06-20 09:16:30 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 77 | if (!nonce->advance_write(OCB_NONCE_LENGTH) || !tag->advance_write(OCB_TAG_LENGTH)) |
| 78 | return KM_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR; |
Shawn Willden | c7fe06d | 2015-06-11 15:50:04 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 79 | return KM_ERROR_OK; |
| 80 | } |
| 81 | |
Shawn Willden | 0cb6942 | 2015-05-26 08:31:37 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 82 | keymaster_error_t DeserializeAuthEncryptedBlob(const KeymasterKeyBlob& key_blob, |
| 83 | KeymasterKeyBlob* encrypted_key_material, |
| 84 | AuthorizationSet* hw_enforced, |
| 85 | AuthorizationSet* sw_enforced, Buffer* nonce, |
| 86 | Buffer* tag) { |
Shawn Willden | 0f906ec | 2015-06-20 09:16:30 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 87 | if (!key_blob.key_material || key_blob.key_material_size == 0) |
| 88 | return KM_ERROR_INVALID_KEY_BLOB; |
| 89 | |
Shawn Willden | 0cb6942 | 2015-05-26 08:31:37 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 90 | const uint8_t* tmp = key_blob.key_material; |
| 91 | const uint8_t** buf_ptr = &tmp; |
| 92 | const uint8_t* end = tmp + key_blob.key_material_size; |
| 93 | |
Shawn Willden | 0f906ec | 2015-06-20 09:16:30 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 94 | if (end <= *buf_ptr) |
| 95 | return KM_ERROR_INVALID_KEY_BLOB; |
| 96 | |
Shawn Willden | 0cb6942 | 2015-05-26 08:31:37 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 97 | uint8_t version = *(*buf_ptr)++; |
| 98 | if (version != CURRENT_BLOB_VERSION || // |
| 99 | !nonce->Deserialize(buf_ptr, end) || nonce->available_read() != OCB_NONCE_LENGTH || |
| 100 | !encrypted_key_material->Deserialize(buf_ptr, end) || // |
| 101 | !tag->Deserialize(buf_ptr, end) || tag->available_read() != OCB_TAG_LENGTH || |
| 102 | !hw_enforced->Deserialize(buf_ptr, end) || // |
Shawn Willden | c7fe06d | 2015-06-11 15:50:04 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 103 | !sw_enforced->Deserialize(buf_ptr, end)) { |
| 104 | // This blob failed to parse. Either it's corrupted or it's a blob generated by an earlier |
| 105 | // version of keymaster using a previous blob format which did not include the version byte |
| 106 | // or the nonce or tag length fields. So we try to parse it as that previous version. |
| 107 | // |
| 108 | // Note that it's not really a problem if we erronously parse a corrupted blob, because |
| 109 | // decryption will fail the authentication check. |
| 110 | // |
| 111 | // A bigger potential problem is: What if a valid unversioned blob appears to parse |
| 112 | // correctly as a versioned blob? It would then be rejected during decryption, causing a |
| 113 | // valid key to become unusable. If this is a disk encryption key, upgrading to a keymaster |
| 114 | // version with the new format would destroy the user's data. |
| 115 | // |
| 116 | // What is the probability that an unversioned key could be successfully parsed as a version |
| 117 | // 0 key? The first 12 bytes of an unversioned key are the nonce, which, in the only |
| 118 | // keymaster version released with unversioned keys, is chosen randomly. In order for an |
| 119 | // unversioned key to parse as a version 0 key, the following must be true about the first |
| 120 | // five of those random bytes: |
| 121 | // |
| 122 | // 1. The first byte must be zero. This will happen with probability 1/2^8. |
| 123 | // |
| 124 | // 2. The second through fifth bytes must contain an unsigned integer value equal to |
| 125 | // NONCE_LENGTH. This will happen with probability 1/2^32. |
| 126 | // |
| 127 | // Based on those two checks alone, the probability of interpreting an unversioned blob as a |
| 128 | // version 0 blob is 1/2^40. That's small enough to be negligible, but there are additional |
| 129 | // checks which lower it further. |
Shawn Willden | 2612fb5 | 2015-07-27 16:58:30 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 130 | LOG_D("Failed to deserialize versioned key blob. Assuming unversioned.", 0); |
Shawn Willden | c7fe06d | 2015-06-11 15:50:04 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 131 | return DeserializeUnversionedBlob(key_blob, encrypted_key_material, hw_enforced, |
| 132 | sw_enforced, nonce, tag); |
| 133 | } |
Shawn Willden | 0cb6942 | 2015-05-26 08:31:37 -0600 | [diff] [blame] | 134 | return KM_ERROR_OK; |
| 135 | } |
| 136 | |
| 137 | } // namespace keymaster |