| /* |
| * Copyright (C) 2009 The Android Open Source Project |
| * |
| * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); |
| * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. |
| * You may obtain a copy of the License at |
| * |
| * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 |
| * |
| * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software |
| * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, |
| * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. |
| * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and |
| * limitations under the License. |
| */ |
| |
| //#define LOG_NDEBUG 0 |
| #define LOG_TAG "keystore" |
| |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include <stdint.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| #include <strings.h> |
| #include <unistd.h> |
| #include <signal.h> |
| #include <errno.h> |
| #include <dirent.h> |
| #include <errno.h> |
| #include <fcntl.h> |
| #include <limits.h> |
| #include <assert.h> |
| #include <sys/types.h> |
| #include <sys/socket.h> |
| #include <sys/stat.h> |
| #include <sys/time.h> |
| #include <arpa/inet.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/aes.h> |
| #include <openssl/bio.h> |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #include <openssl/md5.h> |
| #include <openssl/pem.h> |
| |
| #include <hardware/keymaster0.h> |
| |
| #include <keymaster/soft_keymaster_device.h> |
| #include <keymaster/soft_keymaster_logger.h> |
| #include <keymaster/softkeymaster.h> |
| |
| #include <UniquePtr.h> |
| #include <utils/String8.h> |
| #include <utils/Vector.h> |
| |
| #include <keystore/IKeystoreService.h> |
| #include <binder/IPCThreadState.h> |
| #include <binder/IServiceManager.h> |
| |
| #include <cutils/log.h> |
| #include <cutils/sockets.h> |
| #include <private/android_filesystem_config.h> |
| |
| #include <keystore/keystore.h> |
| |
| #include <selinux/android.h> |
| |
| #include <sstream> |
| |
| #include "auth_token_table.h" |
| #include "defaults.h" |
| #include "keystore_keymaster_enforcement.h" |
| #include "operation.h" |
| |
| /* KeyStore is a secured storage for key-value pairs. In this implementation, |
| * each file stores one key-value pair. Keys are encoded in file names, and |
| * values are encrypted with checksums. The encryption key is protected by a |
| * user-defined password. To keep things simple, buffers are always larger than |
| * the maximum space we needed, so boundary checks on buffers are omitted. */ |
| |
| #define KEY_SIZE ((NAME_MAX - 15) / 2) |
| #define VALUE_SIZE 32768 |
| #define PASSWORD_SIZE VALUE_SIZE |
| |
| |
| struct BIGNUM_Delete { |
| void operator()(BIGNUM* p) const { |
| BN_free(p); |
| } |
| }; |
| typedef UniquePtr<BIGNUM, BIGNUM_Delete> Unique_BIGNUM; |
| |
| struct BIO_Delete { |
| void operator()(BIO* p) const { |
| BIO_free(p); |
| } |
| }; |
| typedef UniquePtr<BIO, BIO_Delete> Unique_BIO; |
| |
| struct EVP_PKEY_Delete { |
| void operator()(EVP_PKEY* p) const { |
| EVP_PKEY_free(p); |
| } |
| }; |
| typedef UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_Delete> Unique_EVP_PKEY; |
| |
| struct PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_Delete { |
| void operator()(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO* p) const { |
| PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p); |
| } |
| }; |
| typedef UniquePtr<PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_Delete> Unique_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO; |
| |
| static int keymaster_device_initialize(keymaster1_device_t** dev) { |
| int rc; |
| |
| const hw_module_t* mod; |
| keymaster::SoftKeymasterDevice* softkeymaster = NULL; |
| rc = hw_get_module_by_class(KEYSTORE_HARDWARE_MODULE_ID, NULL, &mod); |
| if (rc) { |
| ALOGE("could not find any keystore module"); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| rc = mod->methods->open(mod, KEYSTORE_KEYMASTER, reinterpret_cast<struct hw_device_t**>(dev)); |
| if (rc) { |
| ALOGE("could not open keymaster device in %s (%s)", |
| KEYSTORE_HARDWARE_MODULE_ID, strerror(-rc)); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| // Wrap older hardware modules with a softkeymaster adapter. |
| if ((*dev)->common.module->module_api_version >= KEYMASTER_MODULE_API_VERSION_1_0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| softkeymaster = |
| new keymaster::SoftKeymasterDevice(reinterpret_cast<keymaster0_device_t*>(*dev)); |
| *dev = softkeymaster->keymaster_device(); |
| return 0; |
| |
| out: |
| *dev = NULL; |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| // softkeymaster_logger appears not to be used in keystore, but it installs itself as the |
| // logger used by SoftKeymasterDevice. |
| static keymaster::SoftKeymasterLogger softkeymaster_logger; |
| |
| static int fallback_keymaster_device_initialize(keymaster1_device_t** dev) { |
| keymaster::SoftKeymasterDevice* softkeymaster = |
| new keymaster::SoftKeymasterDevice(); |
| *dev = softkeymaster->keymaster_device(); |
| // softkeymaster will be freed by *dev->close_device; don't delete here. |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static void keymaster_device_release(keymaster1_device_t* dev) { |
| dev->common.close(&dev->common); |
| } |
| |
| /*************** |
| * PERMISSIONS * |
| ***************/ |
| |
| /* Here are the permissions, actions, users, and the main function. */ |
| typedef enum { |
| P_GET_STATE = 1 << 0, |
| P_GET = 1 << 1, |
| P_INSERT = 1 << 2, |
| P_DELETE = 1 << 3, |
| P_EXIST = 1 << 4, |
| P_LIST = 1 << 5, |
| P_RESET = 1 << 6, |
| P_PASSWORD = 1 << 7, |
| P_LOCK = 1 << 8, |
| P_UNLOCK = 1 << 9, |
| P_IS_EMPTY = 1 << 10, |
| P_SIGN = 1 << 11, |
| P_VERIFY = 1 << 12, |
| P_GRANT = 1 << 13, |
| P_DUPLICATE = 1 << 14, |
| P_CLEAR_UID = 1 << 15, |
| P_ADD_AUTH = 1 << 16, |
| P_USER_CHANGED = 1 << 17, |
| } perm_t; |
| |
| static struct user_euid { |
| uid_t uid; |
| uid_t euid; |
| } user_euids[] = { |
| {AID_VPN, AID_SYSTEM}, |
| {AID_WIFI, AID_SYSTEM}, |
| {AID_ROOT, AID_SYSTEM}, |
| }; |
| |
| /* perm_labels associcated with keystore_key SELinux class verbs. */ |
| const char *perm_labels[] = { |
| "get_state", |
| "get", |
| "insert", |
| "delete", |
| "exist", |
| "list", |
| "reset", |
| "password", |
| "lock", |
| "unlock", |
| "is_empty", |
| "sign", |
| "verify", |
| "grant", |
| "duplicate", |
| "clear_uid", |
| "add_auth", |
| "user_changed", |
| }; |
| |
| static struct user_perm { |
| uid_t uid; |
| perm_t perms; |
| } user_perms[] = { |
| {AID_SYSTEM, static_cast<perm_t>((uint32_t)(~0)) }, |
| {AID_VPN, static_cast<perm_t>(P_GET | P_SIGN | P_VERIFY) }, |
| {AID_WIFI, static_cast<perm_t>(P_GET | P_SIGN | P_VERIFY) }, |
| {AID_ROOT, static_cast<perm_t>(P_GET) }, |
| }; |
| |
| static const perm_t DEFAULT_PERMS = static_cast<perm_t>(P_GET_STATE | P_GET | P_INSERT | P_DELETE |
| | P_EXIST | P_LIST | P_SIGN | P_VERIFY); |
| |
| static char *tctx; |
| static int ks_is_selinux_enabled; |
| |
| static const char *get_perm_label(perm_t perm) { |
| unsigned int index = ffs(perm); |
| if (index > 0 && index <= (sizeof(perm_labels) / sizeof(perm_labels[0]))) { |
| return perm_labels[index - 1]; |
| } else { |
| ALOGE("Keystore: Failed to retrieve permission label.\n"); |
| abort(); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * Returns the app ID (in the Android multi-user sense) for the current |
| * UNIX UID. |
| */ |
| static uid_t get_app_id(uid_t uid) { |
| return uid % AID_USER; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * Returns the user ID (in the Android multi-user sense) for the current |
| * UNIX UID. |
| */ |
| static uid_t get_user_id(uid_t uid) { |
| return uid / AID_USER; |
| } |
| |
| static bool keystore_selinux_check_access(uid_t /*uid*/, perm_t perm, pid_t spid) { |
| if (!ks_is_selinux_enabled) { |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| char *sctx = NULL; |
| const char *selinux_class = "keystore_key"; |
| const char *str_perm = get_perm_label(perm); |
| |
| if (!str_perm) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| if (getpidcon(spid, &sctx) != 0) { |
| ALOGE("SELinux: Failed to get source pid context.\n"); |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| bool allowed = selinux_check_access(sctx, tctx, selinux_class, str_perm, |
| NULL) == 0; |
| freecon(sctx); |
| return allowed; |
| } |
| |
| static bool has_permission(uid_t uid, perm_t perm, pid_t spid) { |
| // All system users are equivalent for multi-user support. |
| if (get_app_id(uid) == AID_SYSTEM) { |
| uid = AID_SYSTEM; |
| } |
| |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(user_perms)/sizeof(user_perms[0]); i++) { |
| struct user_perm user = user_perms[i]; |
| if (user.uid == uid) { |
| return (user.perms & perm) && |
| keystore_selinux_check_access(uid, perm, spid); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return (DEFAULT_PERMS & perm) && |
| keystore_selinux_check_access(uid, perm, spid); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * Returns the UID that the callingUid should act as. This is here for |
| * legacy support of the WiFi and VPN systems and should be removed |
| * when WiFi can operate in its own namespace. |
| */ |
| static uid_t get_keystore_euid(uid_t uid) { |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(user_euids)/sizeof(user_euids[0]); i++) { |
| struct user_euid user = user_euids[i]; |
| if (user.uid == uid) { |
| return user.euid; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return uid; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * Returns true if the callingUid is allowed to interact in the targetUid's |
| * namespace. |
| */ |
| static bool is_granted_to(uid_t callingUid, uid_t targetUid) { |
| if (callingUid == targetUid) { |
| return true; |
| } |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(user_euids)/sizeof(user_euids[0]); i++) { |
| struct user_euid user = user_euids[i]; |
| if (user.euid == callingUid && user.uid == targetUid) { |
| return true; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| /* Here is the encoding of keys. This is necessary in order to allow arbitrary |
| * characters in keys. Characters in [0-~] are not encoded. Others are encoded |
| * into two bytes. The first byte is one of [+-.] which represents the first |
| * two bits of the character. The second byte encodes the rest of the bits into |
| * [0-o]. Therefore in the worst case the length of a key gets doubled. Note |
| * that Base64 cannot be used here due to the need of prefix match on keys. */ |
| |
| static size_t encode_key_length(const android::String8& keyName) { |
| const uint8_t* in = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(keyName.string()); |
| size_t length = keyName.length(); |
| for (int i = length; i > 0; --i, ++in) { |
| if (*in < '0' || *in > '~') { |
| ++length; |
| } |
| } |
| return length; |
| } |
| |
| static int encode_key(char* out, const android::String8& keyName) { |
| const uint8_t* in = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(keyName.string()); |
| size_t length = keyName.length(); |
| for (int i = length; i > 0; --i, ++in, ++out) { |
| if (*in < '0' || *in > '~') { |
| *out = '+' + (*in >> 6); |
| *++out = '0' + (*in & 0x3F); |
| ++length; |
| } else { |
| *out = *in; |
| } |
| } |
| *out = '\0'; |
| return length; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Converts from the "escaped" format on disk to actual name. |
| * This will be smaller than the input string. |
| * |
| * Characters that should combine with the next at the end will be truncated. |
| */ |
| static size_t decode_key_length(const char* in, size_t length) { |
| size_t outLength = 0; |
| |
| for (const char* end = in + length; in < end; in++) { |
| /* This combines with the next character. */ |
| if (*in < '0' || *in > '~') { |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| outLength++; |
| } |
| return outLength; |
| } |
| |
| static void decode_key(char* out, const char* in, size_t length) { |
| for (const char* end = in + length; in < end; in++) { |
| if (*in < '0' || *in > '~') { |
| /* Truncate combining characters at the end. */ |
| if (in + 1 >= end) { |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| *out = (*in++ - '+') << 6; |
| *out++ |= (*in - '0') & 0x3F; |
| } else { |
| *out++ = *in; |
| } |
| } |
| *out = '\0'; |
| } |
| |
| static size_t readFully(int fd, uint8_t* data, size_t size) { |
| size_t remaining = size; |
| while (remaining > 0) { |
| ssize_t n = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(read(fd, data, remaining)); |
| if (n <= 0) { |
| return size - remaining; |
| } |
| data += n; |
| remaining -= n; |
| } |
| return size; |
| } |
| |
| static size_t writeFully(int fd, uint8_t* data, size_t size) { |
| size_t remaining = size; |
| while (remaining > 0) { |
| ssize_t n = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(write(fd, data, remaining)); |
| if (n < 0) { |
| ALOGW("write failed: %s", strerror(errno)); |
| return size - remaining; |
| } |
| data += n; |
| remaining -= n; |
| } |
| return size; |
| } |
| |
| class Entropy { |
| public: |
| Entropy() : mRandom(-1) {} |
| ~Entropy() { |
| if (mRandom >= 0) { |
| close(mRandom); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| bool open() { |
| const char* randomDevice = "/dev/urandom"; |
| mRandom = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(::open(randomDevice, O_RDONLY)); |
| if (mRandom < 0) { |
| ALOGE("open: %s: %s", randomDevice, strerror(errno)); |
| return false; |
| } |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| bool generate_random_data(uint8_t* data, size_t size) const { |
| return (readFully(mRandom, data, size) == size); |
| } |
| |
| private: |
| int mRandom; |
| }; |
| |
| /* Here is the file format. There are two parts in blob.value, the secret and |
| * the description. The secret is stored in ciphertext, and its original size |
| * can be found in blob.length. The description is stored after the secret in |
| * plaintext, and its size is specified in blob.info. The total size of the two |
| * parts must be no more than VALUE_SIZE bytes. The first field is the version, |
| * the second is the blob's type, and the third byte is flags. Fields other |
| * than blob.info, blob.length, and blob.value are modified by encryptBlob() |
| * and decryptBlob(). Thus they should not be accessed from outside. */ |
| |
| /* ** Note to future implementors of encryption: ** |
| * Currently this is the construction: |
| * metadata || Enc(MD5(data) || data) |
| * |
| * This should be the construction used for encrypting if re-implementing: |
| * |
| * Derive independent keys for encryption and MAC: |
| * Kenc = AES_encrypt(masterKey, "Encrypt") |
| * Kmac = AES_encrypt(masterKey, "MAC") |
| * |
| * Store this: |
| * metadata || AES_CTR_encrypt(Kenc, rand_IV, data) || |
| * HMAC(Kmac, metadata || Enc(data)) |
| */ |
| struct __attribute__((packed)) blob { |
| uint8_t version; |
| uint8_t type; |
| uint8_t flags; |
| uint8_t info; |
| uint8_t vector[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
| uint8_t encrypted[0]; // Marks offset to encrypted data. |
| uint8_t digest[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
| uint8_t digested[0]; // Marks offset to digested data. |
| int32_t length; // in network byte order when encrypted |
| uint8_t value[VALUE_SIZE + AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
| }; |
| |
| typedef enum { |
| TYPE_ANY = 0, // meta type that matches anything |
| TYPE_GENERIC = 1, |
| TYPE_MASTER_KEY = 2, |
| TYPE_KEY_PAIR = 3, |
| TYPE_KEYMASTER_10 = 4, |
| } BlobType; |
| |
| static const uint8_t CURRENT_BLOB_VERSION = 2; |
| |
| class Blob { |
| public: |
| Blob(const uint8_t* value, int32_t valueLength, const uint8_t* info, uint8_t infoLength, |
| BlobType type) { |
| memset(&mBlob, 0, sizeof(mBlob)); |
| mBlob.length = valueLength; |
| memcpy(mBlob.value, value, valueLength); |
| |
| mBlob.info = infoLength; |
| memcpy(mBlob.value + valueLength, info, infoLength); |
| |
| mBlob.version = CURRENT_BLOB_VERSION; |
| mBlob.type = uint8_t(type); |
| |
| if (type == TYPE_MASTER_KEY) { |
| mBlob.flags = KEYSTORE_FLAG_ENCRYPTED; |
| } else { |
| mBlob.flags = KEYSTORE_FLAG_NONE; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| Blob(blob b) { |
| mBlob = b; |
| } |
| |
| Blob() { |
| memset(&mBlob, 0, sizeof(mBlob)); |
| } |
| |
| const uint8_t* getValue() const { |
| return mBlob.value; |
| } |
| |
| int32_t getLength() const { |
| return mBlob.length; |
| } |
| |
| const uint8_t* getInfo() const { |
| return mBlob.value + mBlob.length; |
| } |
| |
| uint8_t getInfoLength() const { |
| return mBlob.info; |
| } |
| |
| uint8_t getVersion() const { |
| return mBlob.version; |
| } |
| |
| bool isEncrypted() const { |
| if (mBlob.version < 2) { |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| return mBlob.flags & KEYSTORE_FLAG_ENCRYPTED; |
| } |
| |
| void setEncrypted(bool encrypted) { |
| if (encrypted) { |
| mBlob.flags |= KEYSTORE_FLAG_ENCRYPTED; |
| } else { |
| mBlob.flags &= ~KEYSTORE_FLAG_ENCRYPTED; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| bool isFallback() const { |
| return mBlob.flags & KEYSTORE_FLAG_FALLBACK; |
| } |
| |
| void setFallback(bool fallback) { |
| if (fallback) { |
| mBlob.flags |= KEYSTORE_FLAG_FALLBACK; |
| } else { |
| mBlob.flags &= ~KEYSTORE_FLAG_FALLBACK; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void setVersion(uint8_t version) { |
| mBlob.version = version; |
| } |
| |
| BlobType getType() const { |
| return BlobType(mBlob.type); |
| } |
| |
| void setType(BlobType type) { |
| mBlob.type = uint8_t(type); |
| } |
| |
| ResponseCode writeBlob(const char* filename, AES_KEY *aes_key, State state, Entropy* entropy) { |
| ALOGV("writing blob %s", filename); |
| if (isEncrypted()) { |
| if (state != STATE_NO_ERROR) { |
| ALOGD("couldn't insert encrypted blob while not unlocked"); |
| return LOCKED; |
| } |
| |
| if (!entropy->generate_random_data(mBlob.vector, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) { |
| ALOGW("Could not read random data for: %s", filename); |
| return SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // data includes the value and the value's length |
| size_t dataLength = mBlob.length + sizeof(mBlob.length); |
| // pad data to the AES_BLOCK_SIZE |
| size_t digestedLength = ((dataLength + AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1) |
| / AES_BLOCK_SIZE * AES_BLOCK_SIZE); |
| // encrypted data includes the digest value |
| size_t encryptedLength = digestedLength + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH; |
| // move info after space for padding |
| memmove(&mBlob.encrypted[encryptedLength], &mBlob.value[mBlob.length], mBlob.info); |
| // zero padding area |
| memset(mBlob.value + mBlob.length, 0, digestedLength - dataLength); |
| |
| mBlob.length = htonl(mBlob.length); |
| |
| if (isEncrypted()) { |
| MD5(mBlob.digested, digestedLength, mBlob.digest); |
| |
| uint8_t vector[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
| memcpy(vector, mBlob.vector, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); |
| AES_cbc_encrypt(mBlob.encrypted, mBlob.encrypted, encryptedLength, |
| aes_key, vector, AES_ENCRYPT); |
| } |
| |
| size_t headerLength = (mBlob.encrypted - (uint8_t*) &mBlob); |
| size_t fileLength = encryptedLength + headerLength + mBlob.info; |
| |
| const char* tmpFileName = ".tmp"; |
| int out = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(tmpFileName, |
| O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC | O_CREAT, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR)); |
| if (out < 0) { |
| ALOGW("could not open file: %s: %s", tmpFileName, strerror(errno)); |
| return SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| size_t writtenBytes = writeFully(out, (uint8_t*) &mBlob, fileLength); |
| if (close(out) != 0) { |
| return SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| if (writtenBytes != fileLength) { |
| ALOGW("blob not fully written %zu != %zu", writtenBytes, fileLength); |
| unlink(tmpFileName); |
| return SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| if (rename(tmpFileName, filename) == -1) { |
| ALOGW("could not rename blob to %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno)); |
| return SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| return NO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| ResponseCode readBlob(const char* filename, AES_KEY *aes_key, State state) { |
| ALOGV("reading blob %s", filename); |
| int in = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(filename, O_RDONLY)); |
| if (in < 0) { |
| return (errno == ENOENT) ? KEY_NOT_FOUND : SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| // fileLength may be less than sizeof(mBlob) since the in |
| // memory version has extra padding to tolerate rounding up to |
| // the AES_BLOCK_SIZE |
| size_t fileLength = readFully(in, (uint8_t*) &mBlob, sizeof(mBlob)); |
| if (close(in) != 0) { |
| return SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| if (fileLength == 0) { |
| return VALUE_CORRUPTED; |
| } |
| |
| if (isEncrypted() && (state != STATE_NO_ERROR)) { |
| return LOCKED; |
| } |
| |
| size_t headerLength = (mBlob.encrypted - (uint8_t*) &mBlob); |
| if (fileLength < headerLength) { |
| return VALUE_CORRUPTED; |
| } |
| |
| ssize_t encryptedLength = fileLength - (headerLength + mBlob.info); |
| if (encryptedLength < 0) { |
| return VALUE_CORRUPTED; |
| } |
| |
| ssize_t digestedLength; |
| if (isEncrypted()) { |
| if (encryptedLength % AES_BLOCK_SIZE != 0) { |
| return VALUE_CORRUPTED; |
| } |
| |
| AES_cbc_encrypt(mBlob.encrypted, mBlob.encrypted, encryptedLength, aes_key, |
| mBlob.vector, AES_DECRYPT); |
| digestedLength = encryptedLength - MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH; |
| uint8_t computedDigest[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
| MD5(mBlob.digested, digestedLength, computedDigest); |
| if (memcmp(mBlob.digest, computedDigest, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0) { |
| return VALUE_CORRUPTED; |
| } |
| } else { |
| digestedLength = encryptedLength; |
| } |
| |
| ssize_t maxValueLength = digestedLength - sizeof(mBlob.length); |
| mBlob.length = ntohl(mBlob.length); |
| if (mBlob.length < 0 || mBlob.length > maxValueLength) { |
| return VALUE_CORRUPTED; |
| } |
| if (mBlob.info != 0) { |
| // move info from after padding to after data |
| memmove(&mBlob.value[mBlob.length], &mBlob.value[maxValueLength], mBlob.info); |
| } |
| return ::NO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| private: |
| struct blob mBlob; |
| }; |
| |
| class UserState { |
| public: |
| UserState(uid_t userId) : mUserId(userId), mRetry(MAX_RETRY) { |
| asprintf(&mUserDir, "user_%u", mUserId); |
| asprintf(&mMasterKeyFile, "%s/.masterkey", mUserDir); |
| } |
| |
| ~UserState() { |
| free(mUserDir); |
| free(mMasterKeyFile); |
| } |
| |
| bool initialize() { |
| if ((mkdir(mUserDir, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IXUSR) < 0) && (errno != EEXIST)) { |
| ALOGE("Could not create directory '%s'", mUserDir); |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| if (access(mMasterKeyFile, R_OK) == 0) { |
| setState(STATE_LOCKED); |
| } else { |
| setState(STATE_UNINITIALIZED); |
| } |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| uid_t getUserId() const { |
| return mUserId; |
| } |
| |
| const char* getUserDirName() const { |
| return mUserDir; |
| } |
| |
| const char* getMasterKeyFileName() const { |
| return mMasterKeyFile; |
| } |
| |
| void setState(State state) { |
| mState = state; |
| if (mState == STATE_NO_ERROR || mState == STATE_UNINITIALIZED) { |
| mRetry = MAX_RETRY; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| State getState() const { |
| return mState; |
| } |
| |
| int8_t getRetry() const { |
| return mRetry; |
| } |
| |
| void zeroizeMasterKeysInMemory() { |
| memset(mMasterKey, 0, sizeof(mMasterKey)); |
| memset(mSalt, 0, sizeof(mSalt)); |
| memset(&mMasterKeyEncryption, 0, sizeof(mMasterKeyEncryption)); |
| memset(&mMasterKeyDecryption, 0, sizeof(mMasterKeyDecryption)); |
| } |
| |
| bool deleteMasterKey() { |
| setState(STATE_UNINITIALIZED); |
| zeroizeMasterKeysInMemory(); |
| return unlink(mMasterKeyFile) == 0 || errno == ENOENT; |
| } |
| |
| ResponseCode initialize(const android::String8& pw, Entropy* entropy) { |
| if (!generateMasterKey(entropy)) { |
| return SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| ResponseCode response = writeMasterKey(pw, entropy); |
| if (response != NO_ERROR) { |
| return response; |
| } |
| setupMasterKeys(); |
| return ::NO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| ResponseCode copyMasterKey(UserState* src) { |
| if (mState != STATE_UNINITIALIZED) { |
| return ::SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| if (src->getState() != STATE_NO_ERROR) { |
| return ::SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| memcpy(mMasterKey, src->mMasterKey, MASTER_KEY_SIZE_BYTES); |
| setupMasterKeys(); |
| return ::NO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| ResponseCode writeMasterKey(const android::String8& pw, Entropy* entropy) { |
| uint8_t passwordKey[MASTER_KEY_SIZE_BYTES]; |
| generateKeyFromPassword(passwordKey, MASTER_KEY_SIZE_BYTES, pw, mSalt); |
| AES_KEY passwordAesKey; |
| AES_set_encrypt_key(passwordKey, MASTER_KEY_SIZE_BITS, &passwordAesKey); |
| Blob masterKeyBlob(mMasterKey, sizeof(mMasterKey), mSalt, sizeof(mSalt), TYPE_MASTER_KEY); |
| return masterKeyBlob.writeBlob(mMasterKeyFile, &passwordAesKey, STATE_NO_ERROR, entropy); |
| } |
| |
| ResponseCode readMasterKey(const android::String8& pw, Entropy* entropy) { |
| int in = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(mMasterKeyFile, O_RDONLY)); |
| if (in < 0) { |
| return SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| // we read the raw blob to just to get the salt to generate |
| // the AES key, then we create the Blob to use with decryptBlob |
| blob rawBlob; |
| size_t length = readFully(in, (uint8_t*) &rawBlob, sizeof(rawBlob)); |
| if (close(in) != 0) { |
| return SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| // find salt at EOF if present, otherwise we have an old file |
| uint8_t* salt; |
| if (length > SALT_SIZE && rawBlob.info == SALT_SIZE) { |
| salt = (uint8_t*) &rawBlob + length - SALT_SIZE; |
| } else { |
| salt = NULL; |
| } |
| uint8_t passwordKey[MASTER_KEY_SIZE_BYTES]; |
| generateKeyFromPassword(passwordKey, MASTER_KEY_SIZE_BYTES, pw, salt); |
| AES_KEY passwordAesKey; |
| AES_set_decrypt_key(passwordKey, MASTER_KEY_SIZE_BITS, &passwordAesKey); |
| Blob masterKeyBlob(rawBlob); |
| ResponseCode response = masterKeyBlob.readBlob(mMasterKeyFile, &passwordAesKey, |
| STATE_NO_ERROR); |
| if (response == SYSTEM_ERROR) { |
| return response; |
| } |
| if (response == NO_ERROR && masterKeyBlob.getLength() == MASTER_KEY_SIZE_BYTES) { |
| // if salt was missing, generate one and write a new master key file with the salt. |
| if (salt == NULL) { |
| if (!generateSalt(entropy)) { |
| return SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| response = writeMasterKey(pw, entropy); |
| } |
| if (response == NO_ERROR) { |
| memcpy(mMasterKey, masterKeyBlob.getValue(), MASTER_KEY_SIZE_BYTES); |
| setupMasterKeys(); |
| } |
| return response; |
| } |
| if (mRetry <= 0) { |
| reset(); |
| return UNINITIALIZED; |
| } |
| --mRetry; |
| switch (mRetry) { |
| case 0: return WRONG_PASSWORD_0; |
| case 1: return WRONG_PASSWORD_1; |
| case 2: return WRONG_PASSWORD_2; |
| case 3: return WRONG_PASSWORD_3; |
| default: return WRONG_PASSWORD_3; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| AES_KEY* getEncryptionKey() { |
| return &mMasterKeyEncryption; |
| } |
| |
| AES_KEY* getDecryptionKey() { |
| return &mMasterKeyDecryption; |
| } |
| |
| bool reset() { |
| DIR* dir = opendir(getUserDirName()); |
| if (!dir) { |
| // If the directory doesn't exist then nothing to do. |
| if (errno == ENOENT) { |
| return true; |
| } |
| ALOGW("couldn't open user directory: %s", strerror(errno)); |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| struct dirent* file; |
| while ((file = readdir(dir)) != NULL) { |
| // skip . and .. |
| if (!strcmp(".", file->d_name) || !strcmp("..", file->d_name)) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| unlinkat(dirfd(dir), file->d_name, 0); |
| } |
| closedir(dir); |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| private: |
| static const int MASTER_KEY_SIZE_BYTES = 16; |
| static const int MASTER_KEY_SIZE_BITS = MASTER_KEY_SIZE_BYTES * 8; |
| |
| static const int MAX_RETRY = 4; |
| static const size_t SALT_SIZE = 16; |
| |
| void generateKeyFromPassword(uint8_t* key, ssize_t keySize, const android::String8& pw, |
| uint8_t* salt) { |
| size_t saltSize; |
| if (salt != NULL) { |
| saltSize = SALT_SIZE; |
| } else { |
| // pre-gingerbread used this hardwired salt, readMasterKey will rewrite these when found |
| salt = (uint8_t*) "keystore"; |
| // sizeof = 9, not strlen = 8 |
| saltSize = sizeof("keystore"); |
| } |
| |
| PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(pw.string()), pw.length(), salt, |
| saltSize, 8192, keySize, key); |
| } |
| |
| bool generateSalt(Entropy* entropy) { |
| return entropy->generate_random_data(mSalt, sizeof(mSalt)); |
| } |
| |
| bool generateMasterKey(Entropy* entropy) { |
| if (!entropy->generate_random_data(mMasterKey, sizeof(mMasterKey))) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| if (!generateSalt(entropy)) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| void setupMasterKeys() { |
| AES_set_encrypt_key(mMasterKey, MASTER_KEY_SIZE_BITS, &mMasterKeyEncryption); |
| AES_set_decrypt_key(mMasterKey, MASTER_KEY_SIZE_BITS, &mMasterKeyDecryption); |
| setState(STATE_NO_ERROR); |
| } |
| |
| uid_t mUserId; |
| |
| char* mUserDir; |
| char* mMasterKeyFile; |
| |
| State mState; |
| int8_t mRetry; |
| |
| uint8_t mMasterKey[MASTER_KEY_SIZE_BYTES]; |
| uint8_t mSalt[SALT_SIZE]; |
| |
| AES_KEY mMasterKeyEncryption; |
| AES_KEY mMasterKeyDecryption; |
| }; |
| |
| typedef struct { |
| uint32_t uid; |
| const uint8_t* filename; |
| } grant_t; |
| |
| class KeyStore { |
| public: |
| KeyStore(Entropy* entropy, keymaster1_device_t* device, keymaster1_device_t* fallback) |
| : mEntropy(entropy) |
| , mDevice(device) |
| , mFallbackDevice(fallback) |
| { |
| memset(&mMetaData, '\0', sizeof(mMetaData)); |
| } |
| |
| ~KeyStore() { |
| for (android::Vector<grant_t*>::iterator it(mGrants.begin()); |
| it != mGrants.end(); it++) { |
| delete *it; |
| } |
| mGrants.clear(); |
| |
| for (android::Vector<UserState*>::iterator it(mMasterKeys.begin()); |
| it != mMasterKeys.end(); it++) { |
| delete *it; |
| } |
| mMasterKeys.clear(); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * Depending on the hardware keymaster version is this may return a |
| * keymaster0_device_t* cast to a keymaster1_device_t*. All methods from |
| * keymaster0 are safe to call, calls to keymaster1_device_t methods should |
| * be guarded by a check on the device's version. |
| */ |
| keymaster1_device_t *getDevice() const { |
| return mDevice; |
| } |
| |
| keymaster1_device_t *getFallbackDevice() const { |
| return mFallbackDevice; |
| } |
| |
| keymaster1_device_t *getDeviceForBlob(const Blob& blob) const { |
| return blob.isFallback() ? mFallbackDevice: mDevice; |
| } |
| |
| ResponseCode initialize() { |
| readMetaData(); |
| if (upgradeKeystore()) { |
| writeMetaData(); |
| } |
| |
| return ::NO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| State getState(uid_t userId) { |
| return getUserState(userId)->getState(); |
| } |
| |
| ResponseCode initializeUser(const android::String8& pw, uid_t userId) { |
| UserState* userState = getUserState(userId); |
| return userState->initialize(pw, mEntropy); |
| } |
| |
| ResponseCode copyMasterKey(uid_t srcUser, uid_t dstUser) { |
| UserState *userState = getUserState(dstUser); |
| UserState *initState = getUserState(srcUser); |
| return userState->copyMasterKey(initState); |
| } |
| |
| ResponseCode writeMasterKey(const android::String8& pw, uid_t userId) { |
| UserState* userState = getUserState(userId); |
| return userState->writeMasterKey(pw, mEntropy); |
| } |
| |
| ResponseCode readMasterKey(const android::String8& pw, uid_t userId) { |
| UserState* userState = getUserState(userId); |
| return userState->readMasterKey(pw, mEntropy); |
| } |
| |
| android::String8 getKeyName(const android::String8& keyName) { |
| char encoded[encode_key_length(keyName) + 1]; // add 1 for null char |
| encode_key(encoded, keyName); |
| return android::String8(encoded); |
| } |
| |
| android::String8 getKeyNameForUid(const android::String8& keyName, uid_t uid) { |
| char encoded[encode_key_length(keyName) + 1]; // add 1 for null char |
| encode_key(encoded, keyName); |
| return android::String8::format("%u_%s", uid, encoded); |
| } |
| |
| android::String8 getKeyNameForUidWithDir(const android::String8& keyName, uid_t uid) { |
| char encoded[encode_key_length(keyName) + 1]; // add 1 for null char |
| encode_key(encoded, keyName); |
| return android::String8::format("%s/%u_%s", getUserStateByUid(uid)->getUserDirName(), uid, |
| encoded); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Delete entries owned by userId. If keepUnencryptedEntries is true |
| * then only encrypted entries will be removed, otherwise all entries will |
| * be removed. |
| */ |
| void resetUser(uid_t userId, bool keepUnenryptedEntries) { |
| android::String8 prefix(""); |
| android::Vector<android::String16> aliases; |
| UserState* userState = getUserState(userId); |
| if (list(prefix, &aliases, userId) != ::NO_ERROR) { |
| return; |
| } |
| for (uint32_t i = 0; i < aliases.size(); i++) { |
| android::String8 filename(aliases[i]); |
| filename = android::String8::format("%s/%s", userState->getUserDirName(), |
| getKeyName(filename).string()); |
| bool shouldDelete = true; |
| if (keepUnenryptedEntries) { |
| Blob blob; |
| ResponseCode rc = get(filename, &blob, ::TYPE_ANY, userId); |
| |
| /* get can fail if the blob is encrypted and the state is |
| * not unlocked, only skip deleting blobs that were loaded and |
| * who are not encrypted. If there are blobs we fail to read for |
| * other reasons err on the safe side and delete them since we |
| * can't tell if they're encrypted. |
| */ |
| shouldDelete = !(rc == ::NO_ERROR && !blob.isEncrypted()); |
| } |
| if (shouldDelete) { |
| del(filename, ::TYPE_ANY, userId); |
| } |
| } |
| if (!userState->deleteMasterKey()) { |
| ALOGE("Failed to delete user %d's master key", userId); |
| } |
| if (!keepUnenryptedEntries) { |
| if(!userState->reset()) { |
| ALOGE("Failed to remove user %d's directory", userId); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| bool isEmpty(uid_t userId) const { |
| const UserState* userState = getUserState(userId); |
| if (userState == NULL) { |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| DIR* dir = opendir(userState->getUserDirName()); |
| if (!dir) { |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| bool result = true; |
| struct dirent* file; |
| while ((file = readdir(dir)) != NULL) { |
| // We only care about files. |
| if (file->d_type != DT_REG) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| // Skip anything that starts with a "." |
| if (file->d_name[0] == '.') { |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| result = false; |
| break; |
| } |
| closedir(dir); |
| return result; |
| } |
| |
| void lock(uid_t userId) { |
| UserState* userState = getUserState(userId); |
| userState->zeroizeMasterKeysInMemory(); |
| userState->setState(STATE_LOCKED); |
| } |
| |
| ResponseCode get(const char* filename, Blob* keyBlob, const BlobType type, uid_t userId) { |
| UserState* userState = getUserState(userId); |
| ResponseCode rc = keyBlob->readBlob(filename, userState->getDecryptionKey(), |
| userState->getState()); |
| if (rc != NO_ERROR) { |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| const uint8_t version = keyBlob->getVersion(); |
| if (version < CURRENT_BLOB_VERSION) { |
| /* If we upgrade the key, we need to write it to disk again. Then |
| * it must be read it again since the blob is encrypted each time |
| * it's written. |
| */ |
| if (upgradeBlob(filename, keyBlob, version, type, userId)) { |
| if ((rc = this->put(filename, keyBlob, userId)) != NO_ERROR |
| || (rc = keyBlob->readBlob(filename, userState->getDecryptionKey(), |
| userState->getState())) != NO_ERROR) { |
| return rc; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This will upgrade software-backed keys to hardware-backed keys when |
| * the HAL for the device supports the newer key types. |
| */ |
| if (rc == NO_ERROR && type == TYPE_KEY_PAIR |
| && mDevice->common.module->module_api_version >= KEYMASTER_MODULE_API_VERSION_0_2 |
| && keyBlob->isFallback()) { |
| ResponseCode imported = importKey(keyBlob->getValue(), keyBlob->getLength(), filename, |
| userId, keyBlob->isEncrypted() ? KEYSTORE_FLAG_ENCRYPTED : KEYSTORE_FLAG_NONE); |
| |
| // The HAL allowed the import, reget the key to have the "fresh" |
| // version. |
| if (imported == NO_ERROR) { |
| rc = get(filename, keyBlob, TYPE_KEY_PAIR, userId); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Keymaster 0.3 keys are valid keymaster 1.0 keys, so silently upgrade. |
| if (keyBlob->getType() == TYPE_KEY_PAIR) { |
| keyBlob->setType(TYPE_KEYMASTER_10); |
| rc = this->put(filename, keyBlob, userId); |
| } |
| |
| if (type != TYPE_ANY && keyBlob->getType() != type) { |
| ALOGW("key found but type doesn't match: %d vs %d", keyBlob->getType(), type); |
| return KEY_NOT_FOUND; |
| } |
| |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| ResponseCode put(const char* filename, Blob* keyBlob, uid_t userId) { |
| UserState* userState = getUserState(userId); |
| return keyBlob->writeBlob(filename, userState->getEncryptionKey(), userState->getState(), |
| mEntropy); |
| } |
| |
| ResponseCode del(const char *filename, const BlobType type, uid_t userId) { |
| Blob keyBlob; |
| ResponseCode rc = get(filename, &keyBlob, type, userId); |
| if (rc == ::VALUE_CORRUPTED) { |
| // The file is corrupt, the best we can do is rm it. |
| return (unlink(filename) && errno != ENOENT) ? ::SYSTEM_ERROR : ::NO_ERROR; |
| } |
| if (rc != ::NO_ERROR) { |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| if (keyBlob.getType() == ::TYPE_KEY_PAIR) { |
| // A device doesn't have to implement delete_keypair. |
| if (mDevice->delete_keypair != NULL && !keyBlob.isFallback()) { |
| if (mDevice->delete_keypair(mDevice, keyBlob.getValue(), keyBlob.getLength())) { |
| rc = ::SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| if (keyBlob.getType() == ::TYPE_KEYMASTER_10) { |
| keymaster1_device_t* dev = getDeviceForBlob(keyBlob); |
| if (dev->delete_key) { |
| keymaster_key_blob_t blob; |
| blob.key_material = keyBlob.getValue(); |
| blob.key_material_size = keyBlob.getLength(); |
| dev->delete_key(dev, &blob); |
| } |
| } |
| if (rc != ::NO_ERROR) { |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| return (unlink(filename) && errno != ENOENT) ? ::SYSTEM_ERROR : ::NO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| ResponseCode list(const android::String8& prefix, android::Vector<android::String16> *matches, |
| uid_t userId) { |
| |
| UserState* userState = getUserState(userId); |
| size_t n = prefix.length(); |
| |
| DIR* dir = opendir(userState->getUserDirName()); |
| if (!dir) { |
| ALOGW("can't open directory for user: %s", strerror(errno)); |
| return ::SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| struct dirent* file; |
| while ((file = readdir(dir)) != NULL) { |
| // We only care about files. |
| if (file->d_type != DT_REG) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| // Skip anything that starts with a "." |
| if (file->d_name[0] == '.') { |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| if (!strncmp(prefix.string(), file->d_name, n)) { |
| const char* p = &file->d_name[n]; |
| size_t plen = strlen(p); |
| |
| size_t extra = decode_key_length(p, plen); |
| char *match = (char*) malloc(extra + 1); |
| if (match != NULL) { |
| decode_key(match, p, plen); |
| matches->push(android::String16(match, extra)); |
| free(match); |
| } else { |
| ALOGW("could not allocate match of size %zd", extra); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| closedir(dir); |
| return ::NO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| void addGrant(const char* filename, uid_t granteeUid) { |
| const grant_t* existing = getGrant(filename, granteeUid); |
| if (existing == NULL) { |
| grant_t* grant = new grant_t; |
| grant->uid = granteeUid; |
| grant->filename = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(strdup(filename)); |
| mGrants.add(grant); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| bool removeGrant(const char* filename, uid_t granteeUid) { |
| for (android::Vector<grant_t*>::iterator it(mGrants.begin()); |
| it != mGrants.end(); it++) { |
| grant_t* grant = *it; |
| if (grant->uid == granteeUid |
| && !strcmp(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(grant->filename), filename)) { |
| mGrants.erase(it); |
| return true; |
| } |
| } |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| bool hasGrant(const char* filename, const uid_t uid) const { |
| return getGrant(filename, uid) != NULL; |
| } |
| |
| ResponseCode importKey(const uint8_t* key, size_t keyLen, const char* filename, uid_t userId, |
| int32_t flags) { |
| uint8_t* data; |
| size_t dataLength; |
| int rc; |
| |
| if (mDevice->import_keypair == NULL) { |
| ALOGE("Keymaster doesn't support import!"); |
| return SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| bool isFallback = false; |
| rc = mDevice->import_keypair(mDevice, key, keyLen, &data, &dataLength); |
| if (rc) { |
| /* |
| * Maybe the device doesn't support this type of key. Try to use the |
| * software fallback keymaster implementation. This is a little bit |
| * lazier than checking the PKCS#8 key type, but the software |
| * implementation will do that anyway. |
| */ |
| rc = mFallbackDevice->import_keypair(mFallbackDevice, key, keyLen, &data, &dataLength); |
| isFallback = true; |
| |
| if (rc) { |
| ALOGE("Error while importing keypair: %d", rc); |
| return SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| Blob keyBlob(data, dataLength, NULL, 0, TYPE_KEY_PAIR); |
| free(data); |
| |
| keyBlob.setEncrypted(flags & KEYSTORE_FLAG_ENCRYPTED); |
| keyBlob.setFallback(isFallback); |
| |
| return put(filename, &keyBlob, userId); |
| } |
| |
| bool isHardwareBacked(const android::String16& keyType) const { |
| if (mDevice == NULL) { |
| ALOGW("can't get keymaster device"); |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| if (sRSAKeyType == keyType) { |
| return (mDevice->flags & KEYMASTER_SOFTWARE_ONLY) == 0; |
| } else { |
| return (mDevice->flags & KEYMASTER_SOFTWARE_ONLY) == 0 |
| && (mDevice->common.module->module_api_version |
| >= KEYMASTER_MODULE_API_VERSION_0_2); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| ResponseCode getKeyForName(Blob* keyBlob, const android::String8& keyName, const uid_t uid, |
| const BlobType type) { |
| android::String8 filepath8(getKeyNameForUidWithDir(keyName, uid)); |
| uid_t userId = get_user_id(uid); |
| |
| ResponseCode responseCode = get(filepath8.string(), keyBlob, type, userId); |
| if (responseCode == NO_ERROR) { |
| return responseCode; |
| } |
| |
| // If this is one of the legacy UID->UID mappings, use it. |
| uid_t euid = get_keystore_euid(uid); |
| if (euid != uid) { |
| filepath8 = getKeyNameForUidWithDir(keyName, euid); |
| responseCode = get(filepath8.string(), keyBlob, type, userId); |
| if (responseCode == NO_ERROR) { |
| return responseCode; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // They might be using a granted key. |
| android::String8 filename8 = getKeyName(keyName); |
| char* end; |
| strtoul(filename8.string(), &end, 10); |
| if (end[0] != '_' || end[1] == 0) { |
| return KEY_NOT_FOUND; |
| } |
| filepath8 = android::String8::format("%s/%s", getUserState(userId)->getUserDirName(), |
| filename8.string()); |
| if (!hasGrant(filepath8.string(), uid)) { |
| return responseCode; |
| } |
| |
| // It is a granted key. Try to load it. |
| return get(filepath8.string(), keyBlob, type, userId); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * Returns any existing UserState or creates it if it doesn't exist. |
| */ |
| UserState* getUserState(uid_t userId) { |
| for (android::Vector<UserState*>::iterator it(mMasterKeys.begin()); |
| it != mMasterKeys.end(); it++) { |
| UserState* state = *it; |
| if (state->getUserId() == userId) { |
| return state; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| UserState* userState = new UserState(userId); |
| if (!userState->initialize()) { |
| /* There's not much we can do if initialization fails. Trying to |
| * unlock the keystore for that user will fail as well, so any |
| * subsequent request for this user will just return SYSTEM_ERROR. |
| */ |
| ALOGE("User initialization failed for %u; subsuquent operations will fail", userId); |
| } |
| mMasterKeys.add(userState); |
| return userState; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * Returns any existing UserState or creates it if it doesn't exist. |
| */ |
| UserState* getUserStateByUid(uid_t uid) { |
| uid_t userId = get_user_id(uid); |
| return getUserState(userId); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * Returns NULL if the UserState doesn't already exist. |
| */ |
| const UserState* getUserState(uid_t userId) const { |
| for (android::Vector<UserState*>::const_iterator it(mMasterKeys.begin()); |
| it != mMasterKeys.end(); it++) { |
| UserState* state = *it; |
| if (state->getUserId() == userId) { |
| return state; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * Returns NULL if the UserState doesn't already exist. |
| */ |
| const UserState* getUserStateByUid(uid_t uid) const { |
| uid_t userId = get_user_id(uid); |
| return getUserState(userId); |
| } |
| |
| private: |
| static const char* sOldMasterKey; |
| static const char* sMetaDataFile; |
| static const android::String16 sRSAKeyType; |
| Entropy* mEntropy; |
| |
| keymaster1_device_t* mDevice; |
| keymaster1_device_t* mFallbackDevice; |
| |
| android::Vector<UserState*> mMasterKeys; |
| |
| android::Vector<grant_t*> mGrants; |
| |
| typedef struct { |
| uint32_t version; |
| } keystore_metadata_t; |
| |
| keystore_metadata_t mMetaData; |
| |
| const grant_t* getGrant(const char* filename, uid_t uid) const { |
| for (android::Vector<grant_t*>::const_iterator it(mGrants.begin()); |
| it != mGrants.end(); it++) { |
| grant_t* grant = *it; |
| if (grant->uid == uid |
| && !strcmp(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(grant->filename), filename)) { |
| return grant; |
| } |
| } |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * Upgrade code. This will upgrade the key from the current version |
| * to whatever is newest. |
| */ |
| bool upgradeBlob(const char* filename, Blob* blob, const uint8_t oldVersion, |
| const BlobType type, uid_t uid) { |
| bool updated = false; |
| uint8_t version = oldVersion; |
| |
| /* From V0 -> V1: All old types were unknown */ |
| if (version == 0) { |
| ALOGV("upgrading to version 1 and setting type %d", type); |
| |
| blob->setType(type); |
| if (type == TYPE_KEY_PAIR) { |
| importBlobAsKey(blob, filename, uid); |
| } |
| version = 1; |
| updated = true; |
| } |
| |
| /* From V1 -> V2: All old keys were encrypted */ |
| if (version == 1) { |
| ALOGV("upgrading to version 2"); |
| |
| blob->setEncrypted(true); |
| version = 2; |
| updated = true; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * If we've updated, set the key blob to the right version |
| * and write it. |
| */ |
| if (updated) { |
| ALOGV("updated and writing file %s", filename); |
| blob->setVersion(version); |
| } |
| |
| return updated; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * Takes a blob that is an PEM-encoded RSA key as a byte array and |
| * converts it to a DER-encoded PKCS#8 for import into a keymaster. |
| * Then it overwrites the original blob with the new blob |
| * format that is returned from the keymaster. |
| */ |
| ResponseCode importBlobAsKey(Blob* blob, const char* filename, uid_t uid) { |
| // We won't even write to the blob directly with this BIO, so const_cast is okay. |
| Unique_BIO b(BIO_new_mem_buf(const_cast<uint8_t*>(blob->getValue()), blob->getLength())); |
| if (b.get() == NULL) { |
| ALOGE("Problem instantiating BIO"); |
| return SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| Unique_EVP_PKEY pkey(PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(b.get(), NULL, NULL, NULL)); |
| if (pkey.get() == NULL) { |
| ALOGE("Couldn't read old PEM file"); |
| return SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| Unique_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO pkcs8(EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(pkey.get())); |
| int len = i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(pkcs8.get(), NULL); |
| if (len < 0) { |
| ALOGE("Couldn't measure PKCS#8 length"); |
| return SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| UniquePtr<unsigned char[]> pkcs8key(new unsigned char[len]); |
| uint8_t* tmp = pkcs8key.get(); |
| if (i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(pkcs8.get(), &tmp) != len) { |
| ALOGE("Couldn't convert to PKCS#8"); |
| return SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| ResponseCode rc = importKey(pkcs8key.get(), len, filename, get_user_id(uid), |
| blob->isEncrypted() ? KEYSTORE_FLAG_ENCRYPTED : KEYSTORE_FLAG_NONE); |
| if (rc != NO_ERROR) { |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| return get(filename, blob, TYPE_KEY_PAIR, uid); |
| } |
| |
| void readMetaData() { |
| int in = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(sMetaDataFile, O_RDONLY)); |
| if (in < 0) { |
| return; |
| } |
| size_t fileLength = readFully(in, (uint8_t*) &mMetaData, sizeof(mMetaData)); |
| if (fileLength != sizeof(mMetaData)) { |
| ALOGI("Metadata file is %zd bytes (%zd experted); upgrade?", fileLength, |
| sizeof(mMetaData)); |
| } |
| close(in); |
| } |
| |
| void writeMetaData() { |
| const char* tmpFileName = ".metadata.tmp"; |
| int out = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(tmpFileName, |
| O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC | O_CREAT, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR)); |
| if (out < 0) { |
| ALOGE("couldn't write metadata file: %s", strerror(errno)); |
| return; |
| } |
| size_t fileLength = writeFully(out, (uint8_t*) &mMetaData, sizeof(mMetaData)); |
| if (fileLength != sizeof(mMetaData)) { |
| ALOGI("Could only write %zd bytes to metadata file (%zd expected)", fileLength, |
| sizeof(mMetaData)); |
| } |
| close(out); |
| rename(tmpFileName, sMetaDataFile); |
| } |
| |
| bool upgradeKeystore() { |
| bool upgraded = false; |
| |
| if (mMetaData.version == 0) { |
| UserState* userState = getUserStateByUid(0); |
| |
| // Initialize first so the directory is made. |
| userState->initialize(); |
| |
| // Migrate the old .masterkey file to user 0. |
| if (access(sOldMasterKey, R_OK) == 0) { |
| if (rename(sOldMasterKey, userState->getMasterKeyFileName()) < 0) { |
| ALOGE("couldn't migrate old masterkey: %s", strerror(errno)); |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Initialize again in case we had a key. |
| userState->initialize(); |
| |
| // Try to migrate existing keys. |
| DIR* dir = opendir("."); |
| if (!dir) { |
| // Give up now; maybe we can upgrade later. |
| ALOGE("couldn't open keystore's directory; something is wrong"); |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| struct dirent* file; |
| while ((file = readdir(dir)) != NULL) { |
| // We only care about files. |
| if (file->d_type != DT_REG) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| // Skip anything that starts with a "." |
| if (file->d_name[0] == '.') { |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| // Find the current file's user. |
| char* end; |
| unsigned long thisUid = strtoul(file->d_name, &end, 10); |
| if (end[0] != '_' || end[1] == 0) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| UserState* otherUser = getUserStateByUid(thisUid); |
| if (otherUser->getUserId() != 0) { |
| unlinkat(dirfd(dir), file->d_name, 0); |
| } |
| |
| // Rename the file into user directory. |
| DIR* otherdir = opendir(otherUser->getUserDirName()); |
| if (otherdir == NULL) { |
| ALOGW("couldn't open user directory for rename"); |
| continue; |
| } |
| if (renameat(dirfd(dir), file->d_name, dirfd(otherdir), file->d_name) < 0) { |
| ALOGW("couldn't rename blob: %s: %s", file->d_name, strerror(errno)); |
| } |
| closedir(otherdir); |
| } |
| closedir(dir); |
| |
| mMetaData.version = 1; |
| upgraded = true; |
| } |
| |
| return upgraded; |
| } |
| }; |
| |
| const char* KeyStore::sOldMasterKey = ".masterkey"; |
| const char* KeyStore::sMetaDataFile = ".metadata"; |
| |
| const android::String16 KeyStore::sRSAKeyType("RSA"); |
| |
| namespace android { |
| class KeyStoreProxy : public BnKeystoreService, public IBinder::DeathRecipient { |
| public: |
| KeyStoreProxy(KeyStore* keyStore) |
| : mKeyStore(keyStore), |
| mOperationMap(this) |
| { |
| } |
| |
| void binderDied(const wp<IBinder>& who) { |
| auto operations = mOperationMap.getOperationsForToken(who.unsafe_get()); |
| for (auto token: operations) { |
| abort(token); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| int32_t getState(int32_t userId) { |
| if (!checkBinderPermission(P_GET_STATE)) { |
| return ::PERMISSION_DENIED; |
| } |
| |
| return mKeyStore->getState(userId); |
| } |
| |
| int32_t get(const String16& name, uint8_t** item, size_t* itemLength) { |
| if (!checkBinderPermission(P_GET)) { |
| return ::PERMISSION_DENIED; |
| } |
| |
| uid_t callingUid = IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingUid(); |
| String8 name8(name); |
| Blob keyBlob; |
| |
| ResponseCode responseCode = mKeyStore->getKeyForName(&keyBlob, name8, callingUid, |
| TYPE_GENERIC); |
| if (responseCode != ::NO_ERROR) { |
| *item = NULL; |
| *itemLength = 0; |
| return responseCode; |
| } |
| |
| *item = (uint8_t*) malloc(keyBlob.getLength()); |
| memcpy(*item, keyBlob.getValue(), keyBlob.getLength()); |
| *itemLength = keyBlob.getLength(); |
| |
| return ::NO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| int32_t insert(const String16& name, const uint8_t* item, size_t itemLength, int targetUid, |
| int32_t flags) { |
| targetUid = getEffectiveUid(targetUid); |
| int32_t result = checkBinderPermissionAndKeystoreState(P_INSERT, targetUid, |
| flags & KEYSTORE_FLAG_ENCRYPTED); |
| if (result != ::NO_ERROR) { |
| return result; |
| } |
| |
| String8 name8(name); |
| String8 filename(mKeyStore->getKeyNameForUidWithDir(name8, targetUid)); |
| |
| Blob keyBlob(item, itemLength, NULL, 0, ::TYPE_GENERIC); |
| keyBlob.setEncrypted(flags & KEYSTORE_FLAG_ENCRYPTED); |
| |
| return mKeyStore->put(filename.string(), &keyBlob, get_user_id(targetUid)); |
| } |
| |
| int32_t del(const String16& name, int targetUid) { |
| targetUid = getEffectiveUid(targetUid); |
| if (!checkBinderPermission(P_DELETE, targetUid)) { |
| return ::PERMISSION_DENIED; |
| } |
| String8 name8(name); |
| String8 filename(mKeyStore->getKeyNameForUidWithDir(name8, targetUid)); |
| return mKeyStore->del(filename.string(), ::TYPE_ANY, get_user_id(targetUid)); |
| } |
| |
| int32_t exist(const String16& name, int targetUid) { |
| targetUid = getEffectiveUid(targetUid); |
| if (!checkBinderPermission(P_EXIST, targetUid)) { |
| return ::PERMISSION_DENIED; |
| } |
| |
| String8 name8(name); |
| String8 filename(mKeyStore->getKeyNameForUidWithDir(name8, targetUid)); |
| |
| if (access(filename.string(), R_OK) == -1) { |
| return (errno != ENOENT) ? ::SYSTEM_ERROR : ::KEY_NOT_FOUND; |
| } |
| return ::NO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| int32_t list(const String16& prefix, int targetUid, Vector<String16>* matches) { |
| targetUid = getEffectiveUid(targetUid); |
| if (!checkBinderPermission(P_LIST, targetUid)) { |
| return ::PERMISSION_DENIED; |
| } |
| const String8 prefix8(prefix); |
| String8 filename(mKeyStore->getKeyNameForUid(prefix8, targetUid)); |
| |
| if (mKeyStore->list(filename, matches, get_user_id(targetUid)) != ::NO_ERROR) { |
| return ::SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| return ::NO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| int32_t reset() { |
| if (!checkBinderPermission(P_RESET)) { |
| return ::PERMISSION_DENIED; |
| } |
| |
| uid_t callingUid = IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingUid(); |
| mKeyStore->resetUser(get_user_id(callingUid), false); |
| return ::NO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| int32_t onUserPasswordChanged(int32_t userId, const String16& password) { |
| if (!checkBinderPermission(P_PASSWORD)) { |
| return ::PERMISSION_DENIED; |
| } |
| |
| const String8 password8(password); |
| // Flush the auth token table to prevent stale tokens from sticking |
| // around. |
| mAuthTokenTable.Clear(); |
| |
| if (password.size() == 0) { |
| ALOGI("Secure lockscreen for user %d removed, deleting encrypted entries", userId); |
| mKeyStore->resetUser(userId, true); |
| return ::NO_ERROR; |
| } else { |
| switch (mKeyStore->getState(userId)) { |
| case ::STATE_UNINITIALIZED: { |
| // generate master key, encrypt with password, write to file, |
| // initialize mMasterKey*. |
| return mKeyStore->initializeUser(password8, userId); |
| } |
| case ::STATE_NO_ERROR: { |
| // rewrite master key with new password. |
| return mKeyStore->writeMasterKey(password8, userId); |
| } |
| case ::STATE_LOCKED: { |
| ALOGE("Changing user %d's password while locked, clearing old encryption", |
| userId); |
| mKeyStore->resetUser(userId, true); |
| return mKeyStore->initializeUser(password8, userId); |
| } |
| } |
| return ::SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| int32_t onUserAdded(int32_t userId, int32_t parentId) { |
| if (!checkBinderPermission(P_USER_CHANGED)) { |
| return ::PERMISSION_DENIED; |
| } |
| |
| // Sanity check that the new user has an empty keystore. |
| if (!mKeyStore->isEmpty(userId)) { |
| ALOGW("New user %d's keystore not empty. Clearing old entries.", userId); |
| } |
| // Unconditionally clear the keystore, just to be safe. |
| mKeyStore->resetUser(userId, false); |
| |
| // If the user has a parent user then use the parent's |
| // masterkey/password, otherwise there's nothing to do. |
| if (parentId != -1) { |
| return mKeyStore->copyMasterKey(parentId, userId); |
| } else { |
| return ::NO_ERROR; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| int32_t onUserRemoved(int32_t userId) { |
| if (!checkBinderPermission(P_USER_CHANGED)) { |
| return ::PERMISSION_DENIED; |
| } |
| |
| mKeyStore->resetUser(userId, false); |
| return ::NO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| int32_t lock(int32_t userId) { |
| if (!checkBinderPermission(P_LOCK)) { |
| return ::PERMISSION_DENIED; |
| } |
| |
| State state = mKeyStore->getState(userId); |
| if (state != ::STATE_NO_ERROR) { |
| ALOGD("calling lock in state: %d", state); |
| return state; |
| } |
| |
| mKeyStore->lock(userId); |
| return ::NO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| int32_t unlock(int32_t userId, const String16& pw) { |
| if (!checkBinderPermission(P_UNLOCK)) { |
| return ::PERMISSION_DENIED; |
| } |
| |
| State state = mKeyStore->getState(userId); |
| if (state != ::STATE_LOCKED) { |
| ALOGI("calling unlock when not locked, ignoring."); |
| return state; |
| } |
| |
| const String8 password8(pw); |
| // read master key, decrypt with password, initialize mMasterKey*. |
| return mKeyStore->readMasterKey(password8, userId); |
| } |
| |
| bool isEmpty(int32_t userId) { |
| if (!checkBinderPermission(P_IS_EMPTY)) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| return mKeyStore->isEmpty(userId); |
| } |
| |
| int32_t generate(const String16& name, int32_t targetUid, int32_t keyType, int32_t keySize, |
| int32_t flags, Vector<sp<KeystoreArg> >* args) { |
| targetUid = getEffectiveUid(targetUid); |
| int32_t result = checkBinderPermissionAndKeystoreState(P_INSERT, targetUid, |
| flags & KEYSTORE_FLAG_ENCRYPTED); |
| if (result != ::NO_ERROR) { |
| return result; |
| } |
| |
| KeymasterArguments params; |
| addLegacyKeyAuthorizations(params.params, keyType); |
| |
| switch (keyType) { |
| case EVP_PKEY_EC: { |
| params.params.push_back(keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_ALGORITHM, KM_ALGORITHM_EC)); |
| if (keySize == -1) { |
| keySize = EC_DEFAULT_KEY_SIZE; |
| } else if (keySize < EC_MIN_KEY_SIZE || keySize > EC_MAX_KEY_SIZE) { |
| ALOGI("invalid key size %d", keySize); |
| return ::SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| params.params.push_back(keymaster_param_int(KM_TAG_KEY_SIZE, keySize)); |
| break; |
| } |
| case EVP_PKEY_RSA: { |
| params.params.push_back(keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_ALGORITHM, KM_ALGORITHM_RSA)); |
| if (keySize == -1) { |
| keySize = RSA_DEFAULT_KEY_SIZE; |
| } else if (keySize < RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE || keySize > RSA_MAX_KEY_SIZE) { |
| ALOGI("invalid key size %d", keySize); |
| return ::SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| params.params.push_back(keymaster_param_int(KM_TAG_KEY_SIZE, keySize)); |
| unsigned long exponent = RSA_DEFAULT_EXPONENT; |
| if (args->size() > 1) { |
| ALOGI("invalid number of arguments: %zu", args->size()); |
| return ::SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } else if (args->size() == 1) { |
| sp<KeystoreArg> expArg = args->itemAt(0); |
| if (expArg != NULL) { |
| Unique_BIGNUM pubExpBn( |
| BN_bin2bn(reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(expArg->data()), |
| expArg->size(), NULL)); |
| if (pubExpBn.get() == NULL) { |
| ALOGI("Could not convert public exponent to BN"); |
| return ::SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| exponent = BN_get_word(pubExpBn.get()); |
| if (exponent == 0xFFFFFFFFL) { |
| ALOGW("cannot represent public exponent as a long value"); |
| return ::SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| } else { |
| ALOGW("public exponent not read"); |
| return ::SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| } |
| params.params.push_back(keymaster_param_long(KM_TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, |
| exponent)); |
| break; |
| } |
| default: { |
| ALOGW("Unsupported key type %d", keyType); |
| return ::SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| int32_t rc = generateKey(name, params, NULL, 0, targetUid, flags, |
| /*outCharacteristics*/ NULL); |
| if (rc != ::NO_ERROR) { |
| ALOGW("generate failed: %d", rc); |
| } |
| return translateResultToLegacyResult(rc); |
| } |
| |
| int32_t import(const String16& name, const uint8_t* data, size_t length, int targetUid, |
| int32_t flags) { |
| const uint8_t* ptr = data; |
| |
| Unique_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO pkcs8(d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &ptr, length)); |
| if (!pkcs8.get()) { |
| return ::SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| Unique_EVP_PKEY pkey(EVP_PKCS82PKEY(pkcs8.get())); |
| if (!pkey.get()) { |
| return ::SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| int type = EVP_PKEY_type(pkey->type); |
| KeymasterArguments params; |
| addLegacyKeyAuthorizations(params.params, type); |
| switch (type) { |
| case EVP_PKEY_RSA: |
| params.params.push_back(keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_ALGORITHM, KM_ALGORITHM_RSA)); |
| break; |
| case EVP_PKEY_EC: |
| params.params.push_back(keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_ALGORITHM, |
| KM_ALGORITHM_EC)); |
| break; |
| default: |
| ALOGW("Unsupported key type %d", type); |
| return ::SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| int32_t rc = importKey(name, params, KM_KEY_FORMAT_PKCS8, data, length, targetUid, flags, |
| /*outCharacteristics*/ NULL); |
| if (rc != ::NO_ERROR) { |
| ALOGW("importKey failed: %d", rc); |
| } |
| return translateResultToLegacyResult(rc); |
| } |
| |
| int32_t sign(const String16& name, const uint8_t* data, size_t length, uint8_t** out, |
| size_t* outLength) { |
| if (!checkBinderPermission(P_SIGN)) { |
| return ::PERMISSION_DENIED; |
| } |
| return doLegacySignVerify(name, data, length, out, outLength, NULL, 0, KM_PURPOSE_SIGN); |
| } |
| |
| int32_t verify(const String16& name, const uint8_t* data, size_t dataLength, |
| const uint8_t* signature, size_t signatureLength) { |
| if (!checkBinderPermission(P_VERIFY)) { |
| return ::PERMISSION_DENIED; |
| } |
| return doLegacySignVerify(name, data, dataLength, NULL, NULL, signature, signatureLength, |
| KM_PURPOSE_VERIFY); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * TODO: The abstraction between things stored in hardware and regular blobs |
| * of data stored on the filesystem should be moved down to keystore itself. |
| * Unfortunately the Java code that calls this has naming conventions that it |
| * knows about. Ideally keystore shouldn't be used to store random blobs of |
| * data. |
| * |
| * Until that happens, it's necessary to have a separate "get_pubkey" and |
| * "del_key" since the Java code doesn't really communicate what it's |
| * intentions are. |
| */ |
| int32_t get_pubkey(const String16& name, uint8_t** pubkey, size_t* pubkeyLength) { |
| ExportResult result; |
| exportKey(name, KM_KEY_FORMAT_X509, NULL, NULL, &result); |
| if (result.resultCode != ::NO_ERROR) { |
| ALOGW("export failed: %d", result.resultCode); |
| return translateResultToLegacyResult(result.resultCode); |
| } |
| |
| *pubkey = result.exportData.release(); |
| *pubkeyLength = result.dataLength; |
| return ::NO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| int32_t grant(const String16& name, int32_t granteeUid) { |
| uid_t callingUid = IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingUid(); |
| int32_t result = checkBinderPermissionAndKeystoreState(P_GRANT); |
| if (result != ::NO_ERROR) { |
| return result; |
| } |
| |
| String8 name8(name); |
| String8 filename(mKeyStore->getKeyNameForUidWithDir(name8, callingUid)); |
| |
| if (access(filename.string(), R_OK) == -1) { |
| return (errno != ENOENT) ? ::SYSTEM_ERROR : ::KEY_NOT_FOUND; |
| } |
| |
| mKeyStore->addGrant(filename.string(), granteeUid); |
| return ::NO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| int32_t ungrant(const String16& name, int32_t granteeUid) { |
| uid_t callingUid = IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingUid(); |
| int32_t result = checkBinderPermissionAndKeystoreState(P_GRANT); |
| if (result != ::NO_ERROR) { |
| return result; |
| } |
| |
| String8 name8(name); |
| String8 filename(mKeyStore->getKeyNameForUidWithDir(name8, callingUid)); |
| |
| if (access(filename.string(), R_OK) == -1) { |
| return (errno != ENOENT) ? ::SYSTEM_ERROR : ::KEY_NOT_FOUND; |
| } |
| |
| return mKeyStore->removeGrant(filename.string(), granteeUid) ? ::NO_ERROR : ::KEY_NOT_FOUND; |
| } |
| |
| int64_t getmtime(const String16& name) { |
| uid_t callingUid = IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingUid(); |
| if (!checkBinderPermission(P_GET)) { |
| ALOGW("permission denied for %d: getmtime", callingUid); |
| return -1L; |
| } |
| |
| String8 name8(name); |
| String8 filename(mKeyStore->getKeyNameForUidWithDir(name8, callingUid)); |
| |
| if (access(filename.string(), R_OK) == -1) { |
| ALOGW("could not access %s for getmtime", filename.string()); |
| return -1L; |
| } |
| |
| int fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(filename.string(), O_NOFOLLOW, O_RDONLY)); |
| if (fd < 0) { |
| ALOGW("could not open %s for getmtime", filename.string()); |
| return -1L; |
| } |
| |
| struct stat s; |
| int ret = fstat(fd, &s); |
| close(fd); |
| if (ret == -1) { |
| ALOGW("could not stat %s for getmtime", filename.string()); |
| return -1L; |
| } |
| |
| return static_cast<int64_t>(s.st_mtime); |
| } |
| |
| int32_t duplicate(const String16& srcKey, int32_t srcUid, const String16& destKey, |
| int32_t destUid) { |
| uid_t callingUid = IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingUid(); |
| pid_t spid = IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingPid(); |
| if (!has_permission(callingUid, P_DUPLICATE, spid)) { |
| ALOGW("permission denied for %d: duplicate", callingUid); |
| return -1L; |
| } |
| |
| State state = mKeyStore->getState(get_user_id(callingUid)); |
| if (!isKeystoreUnlocked(state)) { |
| ALOGD("calling duplicate in state: %d", state); |
| return state; |
| } |
| |
| if (srcUid == -1 || static_cast<uid_t>(srcUid) == callingUid) { |
| srcUid = callingUid; |
| } else if (!is_granted_to(callingUid, srcUid)) { |
| ALOGD("migrate not granted from source: %d -> %d", callingUid, srcUid); |
| return ::PERMISSION_DENIED; |
| } |
| |
| if (destUid == -1) { |
| destUid = callingUid; |
| } |
| |
| if (srcUid != destUid) { |
| if (static_cast<uid_t>(srcUid) != callingUid) { |
| ALOGD("can only duplicate from caller to other or to same uid: " |
| "calling=%d, srcUid=%d, destUid=%d", callingUid, srcUid, destUid); |
| return ::PERMISSION_DENIED; |
| } |
| |
| if (!is_granted_to(callingUid, destUid)) { |
| ALOGD("duplicate not granted to dest: %d -> %d", callingUid, destUid); |
| return ::PERMISSION_DENIED; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| String8 source8(srcKey); |
| String8 sourceFile(mKeyStore->getKeyNameForUidWithDir(source8, srcUid)); |
| |
| String8 target8(destKey); |
| String8 targetFile(mKeyStore->getKeyNameForUidWithDir(target8, destUid)); |
| |
| if (access(targetFile.string(), W_OK) != -1 || errno != ENOENT) { |
| ALOGD("destination already exists: %s", targetFile.string()); |
| return ::SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| Blob keyBlob; |
| ResponseCode responseCode = mKeyStore->get(sourceFile.string(), &keyBlob, TYPE_ANY, |
| get_user_id(srcUid)); |
| if (responseCode != ::NO_ERROR) { |
| return responseCode; |
| } |
| |
| return mKeyStore->put(targetFile.string(), &keyBlob, get_user_id(destUid)); |
| } |
| |
| int32_t is_hardware_backed(const String16& keyType) { |
| return mKeyStore->isHardwareBacked(keyType) ? 1 : 0; |
| } |
| |
| int32_t clear_uid(int64_t targetUid64) { |
| uid_t targetUid = getEffectiveUid(targetUid64); |
| if (!checkBinderPermissionSelfOrSystem(P_CLEAR_UID, targetUid)) { |
| return ::PERMISSION_DENIED; |
| } |
| |
| String8 prefix = String8::format("%u_", targetUid); |
| Vector<String16> aliases; |
| if (mKeyStore->list(prefix, &aliases, get_user_id(targetUid)) != ::NO_ERROR) { |
| return ::SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| for (uint32_t i = 0; i < aliases.size(); i++) { |
| String8 name8(aliases[i]); |
| String8 filename(mKeyStore->getKeyNameForUidWithDir(name8, targetUid)); |
| mKeyStore->del(filename.string(), ::TYPE_ANY, get_user_id(targetUid)); |
| } |
| return ::NO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| int32_t addRngEntropy(const uint8_t* data, size_t dataLength) { |
| const keymaster1_device_t* device = mKeyStore->getDevice(); |
| const keymaster1_device_t* fallback = mKeyStore->getFallbackDevice(); |
| int32_t devResult = KM_ERROR_UNIMPLEMENTED; |
| int32_t fallbackResult = KM_ERROR_UNIMPLEMENTED; |
| if (device->common.module->module_api_version >= KEYMASTER_MODULE_API_VERSION_1_0 && |
| device->add_rng_entropy != NULL) { |
| devResult = device->add_rng_entropy(device, data, dataLength); |
| } |
| if (fallback->add_rng_entropy) { |
| fallbackResult = fallback->add_rng_entropy(fallback, data, dataLength); |
| } |
| if (devResult) { |
| return devResult; |
| } |
| if (fallbackResult) { |
| return fallbackResult; |
| } |
| return ::NO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| int32_t generateKey(const String16& name, const KeymasterArguments& params, |
| const uint8_t* entropy, size_t entropyLength, int uid, int flags, |
| KeyCharacteristics* outCharacteristics) { |
| uid = getEffectiveUid(uid); |
| int rc = checkBinderPermissionAndKeystoreState(P_INSERT, uid, |
| flags & KEYSTORE_FLAG_ENCRYPTED); |
| if (rc != ::NO_ERROR) { |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| rc = KM_ERROR_UNIMPLEMENTED; |
| bool isFallback = false; |
| keymaster_key_blob_t blob; |
| keymaster_key_characteristics_t *out = NULL; |
| |
| const keymaster1_device_t* device = mKeyStore->getDevice(); |
| const keymaster1_device_t* fallback = mKeyStore->getFallbackDevice(); |
| std::vector<keymaster_key_param_t> opParams(params.params); |
| const keymaster_key_param_set_t inParams = {opParams.data(), opParams.size()}; |
| if (device == NULL) { |
| return ::SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| // TODO: Seed from Linux RNG before this. |
| if (device->common.module->module_api_version >= KEYMASTER_MODULE_API_VERSION_1_0 && |
| device->generate_key != NULL) { |
| if (!entropy) { |
| rc = KM_ERROR_OK; |
| } else if (device->add_rng_entropy) { |
| rc = device->add_rng_entropy(device, entropy, entropyLength); |
| } else { |
| rc = KM_ERROR_UNIMPLEMENTED; |
| } |
| if (rc == KM_ERROR_OK) { |
| rc = device->generate_key(device, &inParams, &blob, &out); |
| } |
| } |
| // If the HW device didn't support generate_key or generate_key failed |
| // fall back to the software implementation. |
| if (rc && fallback->generate_key != NULL) { |
| isFallback = true; |
| if (!entropy) { |
| rc = KM_ERROR_OK; |
| } else if (fallback->add_rng_entropy) { |
| rc = fallback->add_rng_entropy(fallback, entropy, entropyLength); |
| } else { |
| rc = KM_ERROR_UNIMPLEMENTED; |
| } |
| if (rc == KM_ERROR_OK) { |
| rc = fallback->generate_key(fallback, &inParams, &blob, &out); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (out) { |
| if (outCharacteristics) { |
| outCharacteristics->characteristics = *out; |
| } else { |
| keymaster_free_characteristics(out); |
| } |
| free(out); |
| } |
| |
| if (rc) { |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| String8 name8(name); |
| String8 filename(mKeyStore->getKeyNameForUidWithDir(name8, uid)); |
| |
| Blob keyBlob(blob.key_material, blob.key_material_size, NULL, 0, ::TYPE_KEYMASTER_10); |
| keyBlob.setFallback(isFallback); |
| keyBlob.setEncrypted(flags & KEYSTORE_FLAG_ENCRYPTED); |
| |
| free(const_cast<uint8_t*>(blob.key_material)); |
| |
| return mKeyStore->put(filename.string(), &keyBlob, get_user_id(uid)); |
| } |
| |
| int32_t getKeyCharacteristics(const String16& name, |
| const keymaster_blob_t* clientId, |
| const keymaster_blob_t* appData, |
| KeyCharacteristics* outCharacteristics) { |
| if (!outCharacteristics) { |
| return KM_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_NULL_POINTER; |
| } |
| |
| uid_t callingUid = IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingUid(); |
| |
| Blob keyBlob; |
| String8 name8(name); |
| int rc; |
| |
| ResponseCode responseCode = mKeyStore->getKeyForName(&keyBlob, name8, callingUid, |
| TYPE_KEYMASTER_10); |
| if (responseCode != ::NO_ERROR) { |
| return responseCode; |
| } |
| keymaster_key_blob_t key; |
| key.key_material_size = keyBlob.getLength(); |
| key.key_material = keyBlob.getValue(); |
| keymaster1_device_t* dev = mKeyStore->getDeviceForBlob(keyBlob); |
| keymaster_key_characteristics_t *out = NULL; |
| if (!dev->get_key_characteristics) { |
| ALOGW("device does not implement get_key_characteristics"); |
| return KM_ERROR_UNIMPLEMENTED; |
| } |
| rc = dev->get_key_characteristics(dev, &key, clientId, appData, &out); |
| if (out) { |
| outCharacteristics->characteristics = *out; |
| free(out); |
| } |
| return rc ? rc : ::NO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| int32_t importKey(const String16& name, const KeymasterArguments& params, |
| keymaster_key_format_t format, const uint8_t *keyData, |
| size_t keyLength, int uid, int flags, |
| KeyCharacteristics* outCharacteristics) { |
| uid = getEffectiveUid(uid); |
| int rc = checkBinderPermissionAndKeystoreState(P_INSERT, uid, |
| flags & KEYSTORE_FLAG_ENCRYPTED); |
| if (rc != ::NO_ERROR) { |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| rc = KM_ERROR_UNIMPLEMENTED; |
| bool isFallback = false; |
| keymaster_key_blob_t blob; |
| keymaster_key_characteristics_t *out = NULL; |
| |
| const keymaster1_device_t* device = mKeyStore->getDevice(); |
| const keymaster1_device_t* fallback = mKeyStore->getFallbackDevice(); |
| std::vector<keymaster_key_param_t> opParams(params.params); |
| const keymaster_key_param_set_t inParams = {opParams.data(), opParams.size()}; |
| const keymaster_blob_t input = {keyData, keyLength}; |
| if (device == NULL) { |
| return ::SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| if (device->common.module->module_api_version >= KEYMASTER_MODULE_API_VERSION_1_0 && |
| device->import_key != NULL) { |
| rc = device->import_key(device, &inParams, format,&input, &blob, &out); |
| } |
| if (rc && fallback->import_key != NULL) { |
| isFallback = true; |
| rc = fallback->import_key(fallback, &inParams, format, &input, &blob, &out); |
| } |
| if (out) { |
| if (outCharacteristics) { |
| outCharacteristics->characteristics = *out; |
| } else { |
| keymaster_free_characteristics(out); |
| } |
| free(out); |
| } |
| if (rc) { |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| String8 name8(name); |
| String8 filename(mKeyStore->getKeyNameForUidWithDir(name8, uid)); |
| |
| Blob keyBlob(blob.key_material, blob.key_material_size, NULL, 0, ::TYPE_KEYMASTER_10); |
| keyBlob.setFallback(isFallback); |
| keyBlob.setEncrypted(flags & KEYSTORE_FLAG_ENCRYPTED); |
| |
| free((void*) blob.key_material); |
| |
| return mKeyStore->put(filename.string(), &keyBlob, get_user_id(uid)); |
| } |
| |
| void exportKey(const String16& name, keymaster_key_format_t format, |
| const keymaster_blob_t* clientId, |
| const keymaster_blob_t* appData, ExportResult* result) { |
| |
| uid_t callingUid = IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingUid(); |
| |
| Blob keyBlob; |
| String8 name8(name); |
| int rc; |
| |
| ResponseCode responseCode = mKeyStore->getKeyForName(&keyBlob, name8, callingUid, |
| TYPE_KEYMASTER_10); |
| if (responseCode != ::NO_ERROR) { |
| result->resultCode = responseCode; |
| return; |
| } |
| keymaster_key_blob_t key; |
| key.key_material_size = keyBlob.getLength(); |
| key.key_material = keyBlob.getValue(); |
| keymaster1_device_t* dev = mKeyStore->getDeviceForBlob(keyBlob); |
| if (!dev->export_key) { |
| result->resultCode = KM_ERROR_UNIMPLEMENTED; |
| return; |
| } |
| keymaster_blob_t output = {NULL, 0}; |
| rc = dev->export_key(dev, format, &key, clientId, appData, &output); |
| result->exportData.reset(const_cast<uint8_t*>(output.data)); |
| result->dataLength = output.data_length; |
| result->resultCode = rc ? rc : ::NO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| |
| void begin(const sp<IBinder>& appToken, const String16& name, keymaster_purpose_t purpose, |
| bool pruneable, const KeymasterArguments& params, const uint8_t* entropy, |
| size_t entropyLength, OperationResult* result) { |
| uid_t callingUid = IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingUid(); |
| if (!pruneable && get_app_id(callingUid) != AID_SYSTEM) { |
| ALOGE("Non-system uid %d trying to start non-pruneable operation", callingUid); |
| result->resultCode = ::PERMISSION_DENIED; |
| return; |
| } |
| if (!checkAllowedOperationParams(params.params)) { |
| result->resultCode = KM_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; |
| return; |
| } |
| Blob keyBlob; |
| String8 name8(name); |
| ResponseCode responseCode = mKeyStore->getKeyForName(&keyBlob, name8, callingUid, |
| TYPE_KEYMASTER_10); |
| if (responseCode != ::NO_ERROR) { |
| result->resultCode = responseCode; |
| return; |
| } |
| keymaster_key_blob_t key; |
| key.key_material_size = keyBlob.getLength(); |
| key.key_material = keyBlob.getValue(); |
| keymaster_operation_handle_t handle; |
| keymaster1_device_t* dev = mKeyStore->getDeviceForBlob(keyBlob); |
| keymaster_error_t err = KM_ERROR_UNIMPLEMENTED; |
| std::vector<keymaster_key_param_t> opParams(params.params); |
| Unique_keymaster_key_characteristics characteristics; |
| characteristics.reset(new keymaster_key_characteristics_t); |
| err = getOperationCharacteristics(key, dev, opParams, characteristics.get()); |
| if (err) { |
| result->resultCode = err; |
| return; |
| } |
| const hw_auth_token_t* authToken = NULL; |
| int32_t authResult = getAuthToken(characteristics.get(), 0, purpose, &authToken, |
| /*failOnTokenMissing*/ false); |
| // If per-operation auth is needed we need to begin the operation and |
| // the client will need to authorize that operation before calling |
| // update. Any other auth issues stop here. |
| if (authResult != ::NO_ERROR && authResult != ::OP_AUTH_NEEDED) { |
| result->resultCode = authResult; |
| return; |
| } |
| addAuthToParams(&opParams, authToken); |
| // Add entropy to the device first. |
| if (entropy) { |
| if (dev->add_rng_entropy) { |
| err = dev->add_rng_entropy(dev, entropy, entropyLength); |
| } else { |
| err = KM_ERROR_UNIMPLEMENTED; |
| } |
| if (err) { |
| result->resultCode = err; |
| return; |
| } |
| } |
| keymaster_key_param_set_t inParams = {opParams.data(), opParams.size()}; |
| |
| // Create a keyid for this key. |
| keymaster::km_id_t keyid; |
| if (!enforcement_policy.CreateKeyId(key, &keyid)) { |
| ALOGE("Failed to create a key ID for authorization checking."); |
| result->resultCode = KM_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR; |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| // Check that all key authorization policy requirements are met. |
| keymaster::AuthorizationSet key_auths(characteristics->hw_enforced); |
| key_auths.push_back(characteristics->sw_enforced); |
| keymaster::AuthorizationSet operation_params(inParams); |
| err = enforcement_policy.AuthorizeOperation(purpose, keyid, key_auths, operation_params, |
| 0 /* op_handle */, |
| true /* is_begin_operation */); |
| if (err) { |
| result->resultCode = err; |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| keymaster_key_param_set_t outParams = {NULL, 0}; |
| err = dev->begin(dev, purpose, &key, &inParams, &outParams, &handle); |
| |
| // If there are too many operations abort the oldest operation that was |
| // started as pruneable and try again. |
| while (err == KM_ERROR_TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS && mOperationMap.hasPruneableOperation()) { |
| sp<IBinder> oldest = mOperationMap.getOldestPruneableOperation(); |
| ALOGD("Ran out of operation handles, trying to prune %p", oldest.get()); |
| |
| // We mostly ignore errors from abort() below because all we care about is whether at |
| // least one pruneable operation has been removed. |
| size_t op_count_before = mOperationMap.getPruneableOperationCount(); |
| int abort_error = abort(oldest); |
| size_t op_count_after = mOperationMap.getPruneableOperationCount(); |
| if (op_count_after >= op_count_before) { |
| // Failed to create space for a new operation. Bail to avoid an infinite loop. |
| ALOGE("Failed to remove pruneable operation %p, error: %d", |
| oldest.get(), abort_error); |
| break; |
| } |
| err = dev->begin(dev, purpose, &key, &inParams, &outParams, &handle); |
| } |
| if (err) { |
| result->resultCode = err; |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| sp<IBinder> operationToken = mOperationMap.addOperation(handle, keyid, purpose, dev, |
| appToken, characteristics.release(), |
| pruneable); |
| if (authToken) { |
| mOperationMap.setOperationAuthToken(operationToken, authToken); |
| } |
| // Return the authentication lookup result. If this is a per operation |
| // auth'd key then the resultCode will be ::OP_AUTH_NEEDED and the |
| // application should get an auth token using the handle before the |
| // first call to update, which will fail if keystore hasn't received the |
| // auth token. |
| result->resultCode = authResult; |
| result->token = operationToken; |
| result->handle = handle; |
| if (outParams.params) { |
| result->outParams.params.assign(outParams.params, outParams.params + outParams.length); |
| free(outParams.params); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void update(const sp<IBinder>& token, const KeymasterArguments& params, const uint8_t* data, |
| size_t dataLength, OperationResult* result) { |
| if (!checkAllowedOperationParams(params.params)) { |
| result->resultCode = KM_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; |
| return; |
| } |
| const keymaster1_device_t* dev; |
| keymaster_operation_handle_t handle; |
| keymaster_purpose_t purpose; |
| keymaster::km_id_t keyid; |
| const keymaster_key_characteristics_t* characteristics; |
| if (!mOperationMap.getOperation(token, &handle, &keyid, &purpose, &dev, &characteristics)) { |
| result->resultCode = KM_ERROR_INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE; |
| return; |
| } |
| std::vector<keymaster_key_param_t> opParams(params.params); |
| int32_t authResult = addOperationAuthTokenIfNeeded(token, &opParams); |
| if (authResult != ::NO_ERROR) { |
| result->resultCode = authResult; |
| return; |
| } |
| keymaster_key_param_set_t inParams = {opParams.data(), opParams.size()}; |
| keymaster_blob_t input = {data, dataLength}; |
| size_t consumed = 0; |
| keymaster_blob_t output = {NULL, 0}; |
| keymaster_key_param_set_t outParams = {NULL, 0}; |
| |
| // Check that all key authorization policy requirements are met. |
| keymaster::AuthorizationSet key_auths(characteristics->hw_enforced); |
| key_auths.push_back(characteristics->sw_enforced); |
| keymaster::AuthorizationSet operation_params(inParams); |
| result->resultCode = |
| enforcement_policy.AuthorizeOperation(purpose, keyid, key_auths, |
| operation_params, handle, |
| false /* is_begin_operation */); |
| if (result->resultCode) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| keymaster_error_t err = dev->update(dev, handle, &inParams, &input, &consumed, &outParams, |
| &output); |
| result->data.reset(const_cast<uint8_t*>(output.data)); |
| result->dataLength = output.data_length; |
| result->inputConsumed = consumed; |
| result->resultCode = err ? (int32_t) err : ::NO_ERROR; |
| if (outParams.params) { |
| result->outParams.params.assign(outParams.params, outParams.params + outParams.length); |
| free(outParams.params); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void finish(const sp<IBinder>& token, const KeymasterArguments& params, |
| const uint8_t* signature, size_t signatureLength, |
| const uint8_t* entropy, size_t entropyLength, OperationResult* result) { |
| if (!checkAllowedOperationParams(params.params)) { |
| result->resultCode = KM_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; |
| return; |
| } |
| const keymaster1_device_t* dev; |
| keymaster_operation_handle_t handle; |
| keymaster_purpose_t purpose; |
| keymaster::km_id_t keyid; |
| const keymaster_key_characteristics_t* characteristics; |
| if (!mOperationMap.getOperation(token, &handle, &keyid, &purpose, &dev, &characteristics)) { |
| result->resultCode = KM_ERROR_INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE; |
| return; |
| } |
| std::vector<keymaster_key_param_t> opParams(params.params); |
| int32_t authResult = addOperationAuthTokenIfNeeded(token, &opParams); |
| if (authResult != ::NO_ERROR) { |
| result->resultCode = authResult; |
| return; |
| } |
| keymaster_error_t err; |
| if (entropy) { |
| if (dev->add_rng_entropy) { |
| err = dev->add_rng_entropy(dev, entropy, entropyLength); |
| } else { |
| err = KM_ERROR_UNIMPLEMENTED; |
| } |
| if (err) { |
| result->resultCode = err; |
| return; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| keymaster_key_param_set_t inParams = {opParams.data(), opParams.size()}; |
| keymaster_blob_t input = {signature, signatureLength}; |
| keymaster_blob_t output = {NULL, 0}; |
| keymaster_key_param_set_t outParams = {NULL, 0}; |
| |
| // Check that all key authorization policy requirements are met. |
| keymaster::AuthorizationSet key_auths(characteristics->hw_enforced); |
| key_auths.push_back(characteristics->sw_enforced); |
| keymaster::AuthorizationSet operation_params(inParams); |
| err = enforcement_policy.AuthorizeOperation(purpose, keyid, key_auths, operation_params, |
| handle, false /* is_begin_operation */); |
| if (err) { |
| result->resultCode = err; |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| err = dev->finish(dev, handle, &inParams, &input, &outParams, &output); |
| // Remove the operation regardless of the result |
| mOperationMap.removeOperation(token); |
| mAuthTokenTable.MarkCompleted(handle); |
| |
| result->data.reset(const_cast<uint8_t*>(output.data)); |
| result->dataLength = output.data_length; |
| result->resultCode = err ? (int32_t) err : ::NO_ERROR; |
| if (outParams.params) { |
| result->outParams.params.assign(outParams.params, outParams.params + outParams.length); |
| free(outParams.params); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| int32_t abort(const sp<IBinder>& token) { |
| const keymaster1_device_t* dev; |
| keymaster_operation_handle_t handle; |
| keymaster_purpose_t purpose; |
| keymaster::km_id_t keyid; |
| if (!mOperationMap.getOperation(token, &handle, &keyid, &purpose, &dev, NULL)) { |
| return KM_ERROR_INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE; |
| } |
| mOperationMap.removeOperation(token); |
| int32_t rc; |
| if (!dev->abort) { |
| rc = KM_ERROR_UNIMPLEMENTED; |
| } else { |
| rc = dev->abort(dev, handle); |
| } |
| mAuthTokenTable.MarkCompleted(handle); |
| if (rc) { |
| return rc; |
| } |
| return ::NO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| bool isOperationAuthorized(const sp<IBinder>& token) { |
| const keymaster1_device_t* dev; |
| keymaster_operation_handle_t handle; |
| const keymaster_key_characteristics_t* characteristics; |
| keymaster_purpose_t purpose; |
| keymaster::km_id_t keyid; |
| if (!mOperationMap.getOperation(token, &handle, &keyid, &purpose, &dev, &characteristics)) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| const hw_auth_token_t* authToken = NULL; |
| mOperationMap.getOperationAuthToken(token, &authToken); |
| std::vector<keymaster_key_param_t> ignored; |
| int32_t authResult = addOperationAuthTokenIfNeeded(token, &ignored); |
| return authResult == ::NO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| int32_t addAuthToken(const uint8_t* token, size_t length) { |
| if (!checkBinderPermission(P_ADD_AUTH)) { |
| ALOGW("addAuthToken: permission denied for %d", |
| IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingUid()); |
| return ::PERMISSION_DENIED; |
| } |
| if (length != sizeof(hw_auth_token_t)) { |
| return KM_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; |
| } |
| hw_auth_token_t* authToken = new hw_auth_token_t; |
| memcpy(reinterpret_cast<void*>(authToken), token, sizeof(hw_auth_token_t)); |
| // The table takes ownership of authToken. |
| mAuthTokenTable.AddAuthenticationToken(authToken); |
| return ::NO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| private: |
| static const int32_t UID_SELF = -1; |
| |
| /** |
| * Get the effective target uid for a binder operation that takes an |
| * optional uid as the target. |
| */ |
| inline uid_t getEffectiveUid(int32_t targetUid) { |
| if (targetUid == UID_SELF) { |
| return IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingUid(); |
| } |
| return static_cast<uid_t>(targetUid); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * Check if the caller of the current binder method has the required |
| * permission and if acting on other uids the grants to do so. |
| */ |
| inline bool checkBinderPermission(perm_t permission, int32_t targetUid = UID_SELF) { |
| uid_t callingUid = IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingUid(); |
| pid_t spid = IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingPid(); |
| if (!has_permission(callingUid, permission, spid)) { |
| ALOGW("permission %s denied for %d", get_perm_label(permission), callingUid); |
| return false; |
| } |
| if (!is_granted_to(callingUid, getEffectiveUid(targetUid))) { |
| ALOGW("uid %d not granted to act for %d", callingUid, targetUid); |
| return false; |
| } |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * Check if the caller of the current binder method has the required |
| * permission and the target uid is the caller or the caller is system. |
| */ |
| inline bool checkBinderPermissionSelfOrSystem(perm_t permission, int32_t targetUid) { |
| uid_t callingUid = IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingUid(); |
| pid_t spid = IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingPid(); |
| if (!has_permission(callingUid, permission, spid)) { |
| ALOGW("permission %s denied for %d", get_perm_label(permission), callingUid); |
| return false; |
| } |
| return getEffectiveUid(targetUid) == callingUid || callingUid == AID_SYSTEM; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * Check if the caller of the current binder method has the required |
| * permission or the target of the operation is the caller's uid. This is |
| * for operation where the permission is only for cross-uid activity and all |
| * uids are allowed to act on their own (ie: clearing all entries for a |
| * given uid). |
| */ |
| inline bool checkBinderPermissionOrSelfTarget(perm_t permission, int32_t targetUid) { |
| uid_t callingUid = IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingUid(); |
| if (getEffectiveUid(targetUid) == callingUid) { |
| return true; |
| } else { |
| return checkBinderPermission(permission, targetUid); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * Helper method to check that the caller has the required permission as |
| * well as the keystore is in the unlocked state if checkUnlocked is true. |
| * |
| * Returns NO_ERROR on success, PERMISSION_DENIED on a permission error and |
| * otherwise the state of keystore when not unlocked and checkUnlocked is |
| * true. |
| */ |
| inline int32_t checkBinderPermissionAndKeystoreState(perm_t permission, int32_t targetUid = -1, |
| bool checkUnlocked = true) { |
| if (!checkBinderPermission(permission, targetUid)) { |
| return ::PERMISSION_DENIED; |
| } |
| State state = mKeyStore->getState(get_user_id(getEffectiveUid(targetUid))); |
| if (checkUnlocked && !isKeystoreUnlocked(state)) { |
| return state; |
| } |
| |
| return ::NO_ERROR; |
| |
| } |
| |
| inline bool isKeystoreUnlocked(State state) { |
| switch (state) { |
| case ::STATE_NO_ERROR: |
| return true; |
| case ::STATE_UNINITIALIZED: |
| case ::STATE_LOCKED: |
| return false; |
| } |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| bool isKeyTypeSupported(const keymaster1_device_t* device, keymaster_keypair_t keyType) { |
| const int32_t device_api = device->common.module->module_api_version; |
| if (device_api == KEYMASTER_MODULE_API_VERSION_0_2) { |
| switch (keyType) { |
| case TYPE_RSA: |
| case TYPE_DSA: |
| case TYPE_EC: |
| return true; |
| default: |
| return false; |
| } |
| } else if (device_api >= KEYMASTER_MODULE_API_VERSION_0_3) { |
| switch (keyType) { |
| case TYPE_RSA: |
| return true; |
| case TYPE_DSA: |
| return device->flags & KEYMASTER_SUPPORTS_DSA; |
| case TYPE_EC: |
| return device->flags & KEYMASTER_SUPPORTS_EC; |
| default: |
| return false; |
| } |
| } else { |
| return keyType == TYPE_RSA; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * Check that all keymaster_key_param_t's provided by the application are |
| * allowed. Any parameter that keystore adds itself should be disallowed here. |
| */ |
| bool checkAllowedOperationParams(const std::vector<keymaster_key_param_t>& params) { |
| for (auto param: params) { |
| switch (param.tag) { |
| case KM_TAG_AUTH_TOKEN: |
| return false; |
| default: |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| keymaster_error_t getOperationCharacteristics(const keymaster_key_blob_t& key, |
| const keymaster1_device_t* dev, |
| const std::vector<keymaster_key_param_t>& params, |
| keymaster_key_characteristics_t* out) { |
| UniquePtr<keymaster_blob_t> appId; |
| UniquePtr<keymaster_blob_t> appData; |
| for (auto param : params) { |
| if (param.tag == KM_TAG_APPLICATION_ID) { |
| appId.reset(new keymaster_blob_t); |
| appId->data = param.blob.data; |
| appId->data_length = param.blob.data_length; |
| } else if (param.tag == KM_TAG_APPLICATION_DATA) { |
| appData.reset(new keymaster_blob_t); |
| appData->data = param.blob.data; |
| appData->data_length = param.blob.data_length; |
| } |
| } |
| keymaster_key_characteristics_t* result = NULL; |
| if (!dev->get_key_characteristics) { |
| return KM_ERROR_UNIMPLEMENTED; |
| } |
| keymaster_error_t error = dev->get_key_characteristics(dev, &key, appId.get(), |
| appData.get(), &result); |
| if (result) { |
| *out = *result; |
| free(result); |
| } |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * Get the auth token for this operation from the auth token table. |
| * |
| * Returns ::NO_ERROR if the auth token was set or none was required. |
| * ::OP_AUTH_NEEDED if it is a per op authorization, no |
| * authorization token exists for that operation and |
| * failOnTokenMissing is false. |
| * KM_ERROR_KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED if there is no valid auth |
| * token for the operation |
| */ |
| int32_t getAuthToken(const keymaster_key_characteristics_t* characteristics, |
| keymaster_operation_handle_t handle, |
| keymaster_purpose_t purpose, |
| const hw_auth_token_t** authToken, |
| bool failOnTokenMissing = true) { |
| |
| std::vector<keymaster_key_param_t> allCharacteristics; |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < characteristics->sw_enforced.length; i++) { |
| allCharacteristics.push_back(characteristics->sw_enforced.params[i]); |
| } |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < characteristics->hw_enforced.length; i++) { |
| allCharacteristics.push_back(characteristics->hw_enforced.params[i]); |
| } |
| keymaster::AuthTokenTable::Error err = mAuthTokenTable.FindAuthorization( |
| allCharacteristics.data(), allCharacteristics.size(), purpose, handle, authToken); |
| switch (err) { |
| case keymaster::AuthTokenTable::OK: |
| case keymaster::AuthTokenTable::AUTH_NOT_REQUIRED: |
| return ::NO_ERROR; |
| case keymaster::AuthTokenTable::AUTH_TOKEN_NOT_FOUND: |
| case keymaster::AuthTokenTable::AUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRED: |
| case keymaster::AuthTokenTable::AUTH_TOKEN_WRONG_SID: |
| return KM_ERROR_KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED; |
| case keymaster::AuthTokenTable::OP_HANDLE_REQUIRED: |
| return failOnTokenMissing ? (int32_t) KM_ERROR_KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED : |
| (int32_t) ::OP_AUTH_NEEDED; |
| default: |
| ALOGE("Unexpected FindAuthorization return value %d", err); |
| return KM_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| inline void addAuthToParams(std::vector<keymaster_key_param_t>* params, |
| const hw_auth_token_t* token) { |
| if (token) { |
| params->push_back(keymaster_param_blob(KM_TAG_AUTH_TOKEN, |
| reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(token), |
| sizeof(hw_auth_token_t))); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * Add the auth token for the operation to the param list if the operation |
| * requires authorization. Uses the cached result in the OperationMap if available |
| * otherwise gets the token from the AuthTokenTable and caches the result. |
| * |
| * Returns ::NO_ERROR if the auth token was added or not needed. |
| * KM_ERROR_KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED if the operation is not |
| * authenticated. |
| * KM_ERROR_INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE if token is not a valid |
| * operation token. |
| */ |
| int32_t addOperationAuthTokenIfNeeded(sp<IBinder> token, |
| std::vector<keymaster_key_param_t>* params) { |
| const hw_auth_token_t* authToken = NULL; |
| mOperationMap.getOperationAuthToken(token, &authToken); |
| if (!authToken) { |
| const keymaster1_device_t* dev; |
| keymaster_operation_handle_t handle; |
| const keymaster_key_characteristics_t* characteristics = NULL; |
| keymaster_purpose_t purpose; |
| keymaster::km_id_t keyid; |
| if (!mOperationMap.getOperation(token, &handle, &keyid, &purpose, &dev, |
| &characteristics)) { |
| return KM_ERROR_INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE; |
| } |
| int32_t result = getAuthToken(characteristics, handle, purpose, &authToken); |
| if (result != ::NO_ERROR) { |
| return result; |
| } |
| if (authToken) { |
| mOperationMap.setOperationAuthToken(token, authToken); |
| } |
| } |
| addAuthToParams(params, authToken); |
| return ::NO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * Translate a result value to a legacy return value. All keystore errors are |
| * preserved and keymaster errors become SYSTEM_ERRORs |
| */ |
| inline int32_t translateResultToLegacyResult(int32_t result) { |
| if (result > 0) { |
| return result; |
| } |
| return ::SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| void addLegacyKeyAuthorizations(std::vector<keymaster_key_param_t>& params, int keyType) { |
| params.push_back(keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_PURPOSE, KM_PURPOSE_SIGN)); |
| params.push_back(keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_PURPOSE, KM_PURPOSE_VERIFY)); |
| params.push_back(keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_PURPOSE, KM_PURPOSE_ENCRYPT)); |
| params.push_back(keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_PURPOSE, KM_PURPOSE_DECRYPT)); |
| params.push_back(keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_PADDING, KM_PAD_NONE)); |
| if (keyType == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { |
| params.push_back(keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_PADDING, KM_PAD_RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)); |
| params.push_back(keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_PADDING, KM_PAD_RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT)); |
| params.push_back(keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_PADDING, KM_PAD_RSA_PSS)); |
| params.push_back(keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_PADDING, KM_PAD_RSA_OAEP)); |
| } |
| params.push_back(keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_NONE)); |
| params.push_back(keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_MD5)); |
| params.push_back(keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_SHA1)); |
| params.push_back(keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_SHA_2_224)); |
| params.push_back(keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_SHA_2_256)); |
| params.push_back(keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_SHA_2_384)); |
| params.push_back(keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_SHA_2_512)); |
| params.push_back(keymaster_param_bool(KM_TAG_ALL_USERS)); |
| params.push_back(keymaster_param_bool(KM_TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)); |
| params.push_back(keymaster_param_date(KM_TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME, LLONG_MAX)); |
| params.push_back(keymaster_param_date(KM_TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, LLONG_MAX)); |
| params.push_back(keymaster_param_date(KM_TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME, 0)); |
| uint64_t now = keymaster::java_time(time(NULL)); |
| params.push_back(keymaster_param_date(KM_TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, now)); |
| } |
| |
| keymaster_key_param_t* getKeyAlgorithm(keymaster_key_characteristics_t* characteristics) { |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < characteristics->hw_enforced.length; i++) { |
| if (characteristics->hw_enforced.params[i].tag == KM_TAG_ALGORITHM) { |
| return &characteristics->hw_enforced.params[i]; |
| } |
| } |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < characteristics->sw_enforced.length; i++) { |
| if (characteristics->sw_enforced.params[i].tag == KM_TAG_ALGORITHM) { |
| return &characteristics->sw_enforced.params[i]; |
| } |
| } |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| void addLegacyBeginParams(const String16& name, std::vector<keymaster_key_param_t>& params) { |
| // All legacy keys are DIGEST_NONE/PAD_NONE. |
| params.push_back(keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_NONE)); |
| params.push_back(keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_PADDING, KM_PAD_NONE)); |
| |
| // Look up the algorithm of the key. |
| KeyCharacteristics characteristics; |
| int32_t rc = getKeyCharacteristics(name, NULL, NULL, &characteristics); |
| if (rc != ::NO_ERROR) { |
| ALOGE("Failed to get key characteristics"); |
| return; |
| } |
| keymaster_key_param_t* algorithm = getKeyAlgorithm(&characteristics.characteristics); |
| if (!algorithm) { |
| ALOGE("getKeyCharacteristics did not include KM_TAG_ALGORITHM"); |
| return; |
| } |
| params.push_back(*algorithm); |
| } |
| |
| int32_t doLegacySignVerify(const String16& name, const uint8_t* data, size_t length, |
| uint8_t** out, size_t* outLength, const uint8_t* signature, |
| size_t signatureLength, keymaster_purpose_t purpose) { |
| |
| std::basic_stringstream<uint8_t> outBuffer; |
| OperationResult result; |
| KeymasterArguments inArgs; |
| addLegacyBeginParams(name, inArgs.params); |
| sp<IBinder> appToken(new BBinder); |
| sp<IBinder> token; |
| |
| begin(appToken, name, purpose, true, inArgs, NULL, 0, &result); |
| if (result.resultCode != ResponseCode::NO_ERROR) { |
| if (result.resultCode == ::KEY_NOT_FOUND) { |
| ALOGW("Key not found"); |
| } else { |
| ALOGW("Error in begin: %d", result.resultCode); |
| } |
| return translateResultToLegacyResult(result.resultCode); |
| } |
| inArgs.params.clear(); |
| token = result.token; |
| size_t consumed = 0; |
| size_t lastConsumed = 0; |
| do { |
| update(token, inArgs, data + consumed, length - consumed, &result); |
| if (result.resultCode != ResponseCode::NO_ERROR) { |
| ALOGW("Error in update: %d", result.resultCode); |
| return translateResultToLegacyResult(result.resultCode); |
| } |
| if (out) { |
| outBuffer.write(result.data.get(), result.dataLength); |
| } |
| lastConsumed = result.inputConsumed; |
| consumed += lastConsumed; |
| } while (consumed < length && lastConsumed > 0); |
| |
| if (consumed != length) { |
| ALOGW("Not all data consumed. Consumed %zu of %zu", consumed, length); |
| return ::SYSTEM_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| finish(token, inArgs, signature, signatureLength, NULL, 0, &result); |
| if (result.resultCode != ResponseCode::NO_ERROR) { |
| ALOGW("Error in finish: %d", result.resultCode); |
| return translateResultToLegacyResult(result.resultCode); |
| } |
| if (out) { |
| outBuffer.write(result.data.get(), result.dataLength); |
| } |
| |
| if (out) { |
| auto buf = outBuffer.str(); |
| *out = new uint8_t[buf.size()]; |
| memcpy(*out, buf.c_str(), buf.size()); |
| *outLength = buf.size(); |
| } |
| |
| return ::NO_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| ::KeyStore* mKeyStore; |
| OperationMap mOperationMap; |
| keymaster::AuthTokenTable mAuthTokenTable; |
| KeystoreKeymasterEnforcement enforcement_policy; |
| }; |
| |
| }; // namespace android |
| |
| int main(int argc, char* argv[]) { |
| if (argc < 2) { |
| ALOGE("A directory must be specified!"); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| if (chdir(argv[1]) == -1) { |
| ALOGE("chdir: %s: %s", argv[1], strerror(errno)); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| Entropy entropy; |
| if (!entropy.open()) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| keymaster1_device_t* dev; |
| if (keymaster_device_initialize(&dev)) { |
| ALOGE("keystore keymaster could not be initialized; exiting"); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| keymaster1_device_t* fallback; |
| if (fallback_keymaster_device_initialize(&fallback)) { |
| ALOGE("software keymaster could not be initialized; exiting"); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| ks_is_selinux_enabled = is_selinux_enabled(); |
| if (ks_is_selinux_enabled) { |
| union selinux_callback cb; |
| cb.func_log = selinux_log_callback; |
| selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, cb); |
| if (getcon(&tctx) != 0) { |
| ALOGE("SELinux: Could not acquire target context. Aborting keystore.\n"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } else { |
| ALOGI("SELinux: Keystore SELinux is disabled.\n"); |
| } |
| |
| KeyStore keyStore(&entropy, dev, fallback); |
| keyStore.initialize(); |
| android::sp<android::IServiceManager> sm = android::defaultServiceManager(); |
| android::sp<android::KeyStoreProxy> proxy = new android::KeyStoreProxy(&keyStore); |
| android::status_t ret = sm->addService(android::String16("android.security.keystore"), proxy); |
| if (ret != android::OK) { |
| ALOGE("Couldn't register binder service!"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * We're the only thread in existence, so we're just going to process |
| * Binder transaction as a single-threaded program. |
| */ |
| android::IPCThreadState::self()->joinThreadPool(); |
| |
| keymaster_device_release(dev); |
| return 1; |
| } |