| /* ssl/t1_enc.c */ |
| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| * |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| * the code are not to be removed. |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| * distribution. |
| * |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
| * |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| * |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| * acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * ==================================================================== |
| * |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by |
| * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source |
| * license. |
| * |
| * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of |
| * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites |
| * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. |
| * |
| * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in |
| * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received |
| * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. |
| * |
| * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not |
| * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third |
| * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights |
| * to make use of the Contribution. |
| * |
| * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN |
| * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA |
| * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY |
| * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR |
| * OTHERWISE. |
| */ |
| |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include "ssl_locl.h" |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
| #include <openssl/comp.h> |
| #endif |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #include <openssl/hmac.h> |
| #include <openssl/md5.h> |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
| #include <openssl/des.h> |
| #endif |
| |
| /* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */ |
| static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec, |
| int sec_len, |
| const void *seed1, int seed1_len, |
| const void *seed2, int seed2_len, |
| const void *seed3, int seed3_len, |
| const void *seed4, int seed4_len, |
| const void *seed5, int seed5_len, |
| unsigned char *out, int olen) |
| { |
| int chunk,n; |
| unsigned int j; |
| HMAC_CTX ctx; |
| HMAC_CTX ctx_tmp; |
| unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| unsigned int A1_len; |
| int ret = 0; |
| |
| chunk=EVP_MD_size(md); |
| OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0); |
| |
| HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx); |
| HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp); |
| if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,sec,sec_len,md, NULL)) |
| goto err; |
| if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,sec,sec_len,md, NULL)) |
| goto err; |
| if (seed1 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len)) |
| goto err; |
| if (seed2 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len)) |
| goto err; |
| if (seed3 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len)) |
| goto err; |
| if (seed4 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len)) |
| goto err; |
| if (seed5 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len)) |
| goto err; |
| if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| n=0; |
| for (;;) |
| { |
| if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,NULL,0,NULL,NULL)) /* re-init */ |
| goto err; |
| if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,NULL,0,NULL,NULL)) /* re-init */ |
| goto err; |
| if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx,A1,A1_len)) |
| goto err; |
| if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len)) |
| goto err; |
| if (seed1 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len)) |
| goto err; |
| if (seed2 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len)) |
| goto err; |
| if (seed3 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len)) |
| goto err; |
| if (seed4 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len)) |
| goto err; |
| if (seed5 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| if (olen > chunk) |
| { |
| if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,out,&j)) |
| goto err; |
| out+=j; |
| olen-=j; |
| if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len)) /* calc the next A1 value */ |
| goto err; |
| } |
| else /* last one */ |
| { |
| if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len)) |
| goto err; |
| memcpy(out,A1,olen); |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| ret = 1; |
| err: |
| HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
| HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp); |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(A1,sizeof(A1)); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */ |
| static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask, |
| const void *seed1, int seed1_len, |
| const void *seed2, int seed2_len, |
| const void *seed3, int seed3_len, |
| const void *seed4, int seed4_len, |
| const void *seed5, int seed5_len, |
| const unsigned char *sec, int slen, |
| unsigned char *out1, |
| unsigned char *out2, int olen) |
| { |
| int len,i,idx,count; |
| const unsigned char *S1; |
| long m; |
| const EVP_MD *md; |
| int ret = 0; |
| |
| /* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */ |
| count=0; |
| for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) { |
| if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) count++; |
| } |
| len=slen/count; |
| S1=sec; |
| memset(out1,0,olen); |
| for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) { |
| if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) { |
| if (!md) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, |
| SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (!tls1_P_hash(md ,S1,len+(slen&1), |
| seed1,seed1_len,seed2,seed2_len,seed3,seed3_len,seed4,seed4_len,seed5,seed5_len, |
| out2,olen)) |
| goto err; |
| S1+=len; |
| for (i=0; i<olen; i++) |
| { |
| out1[i]^=out2[i]; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| ret = 1; |
| err: |
| return ret; |
| } |
| static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, |
| unsigned char *tmp, int num) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| ret = tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2, |
| TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, |
| s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, |
| s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, |
| NULL,0,NULL,0, |
| s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length, |
| km,tmp,num); |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
| printf("tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t", |
| s->session->master_key_length); |
| { |
| int i; |
| for (i=0; i < s->session->master_key_length; i++) |
| { |
| printf("%02X", s->session->master_key[i]); |
| } |
| printf("\n"); } |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) |
| { |
| static const unsigned char empty[]=""; |
| unsigned char *p,*key_block,*mac_secret; |
| unsigned char *exp_label; |
| unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; |
| unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; |
| unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2]; |
| unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2]; |
| unsigned char *ms,*key,*iv,*er1,*er2; |
| int client_write; |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd; |
| const EVP_CIPHER *c; |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
| const SSL_COMP *comp; |
| #endif |
| const EVP_MD *m; |
| int mac_type; |
| int *mac_secret_size; |
| EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx; |
| EVP_PKEY *mac_key; |
| int is_export,n,i,j,k,exp_label_len,cl; |
| int reuse_dd = 0; |
| |
| is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); |
| c=s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc; |
| m=s->s3->tmp.new_hash; |
| mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type; |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
| comp=s->s3->tmp.new_compression; |
| #endif |
| key_block=s->s3->tmp.key_block; |
| |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
| printf("tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which); |
| printf("\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n", |
| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey, |
| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, |
| comp); |
| printf("\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c); |
| printf("\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n", |
| c->nid,c->block_size,c->key_len,c->iv_len); |
| printf("\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ", s->s3->tmp.key_block_length); |
| { |
| int i; |
| for (i=0; i<s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++) |
| printf("%02x", key_block[i]); printf("\n"); |
| } |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
| |
| if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) |
| { |
| if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) |
| s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; |
| else |
| s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; |
| |
| if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) |
| reuse_dd = 1; |
| else if ((s->enc_read_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| else |
| /* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */ |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx); |
| dd= s->enc_read_ctx; |
| mac_ctx=ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash,NULL); |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
| if (s->expand != NULL) |
| { |
| COMP_CTX_free(s->expand); |
| s->expand=NULL; |
| } |
| if (comp != NULL) |
| { |
| s->expand=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method); |
| if (s->expand == NULL) |
| { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR); |
| goto err2; |
| } |
| if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL) |
| s->s3->rrec.comp=(unsigned char *) |
| OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH); |
| if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| #endif |
| /* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */ |
| if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]),0,8); |
| mac_secret= &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]); |
| mac_secret_size=&(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) |
| s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; |
| else |
| s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; |
| if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) |
| reuse_dd = 1; |
| else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| else |
| /* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */ |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx); |
| dd= s->enc_write_ctx; |
| mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,NULL); |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
| if (s->compress != NULL) |
| { |
| COMP_CTX_free(s->compress); |
| s->compress=NULL; |
| } |
| if (comp != NULL) |
| { |
| s->compress=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method); |
| if (s->compress == NULL) |
| { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR); |
| goto err2; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| /* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */ |
| if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]),0,8); |
| mac_secret= &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]); |
| mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size); |
| } |
| |
| if (reuse_dd) |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd); |
| |
| p=s->s3->tmp.key_block; |
| i=*mac_secret_size=s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size; |
| |
| cl=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); |
| j=is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ? |
| cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl; |
| /* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */ |
| k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c); |
| er1= &(s->s3->client_random[0]); |
| er2= &(s->s3->server_random[0]); |
| if ( (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) || |
| (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) |
| { |
| ms= &(p[ 0]); n=i+i; |
| key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+j; |
| iv= &(p[ n]); n+=k+k; |
| exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST; |
| exp_label_len=TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE; |
| client_write=1; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| n=i; |
| ms= &(p[ n]); n+=i+j; |
| key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+k; |
| iv= &(p[ n]); n+=k; |
| exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST; |
| exp_label_len=TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE; |
| client_write=0; |
| } |
| |
| if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) |
| { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err2; |
| } |
| |
| memcpy(mac_secret,ms,i); |
| mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, |
| mac_secret,*mac_secret_size); |
| EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx,NULL,m,NULL,mac_key); |
| EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); |
| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG |
| printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which); |
| { int z; for (z=0; z<i; z++) printf("%02X%c",ms[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } |
| #endif |
| if (is_export) |
| { |
| /* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the |
| * same value since only the correct one will be used :-). |
| */ |
| if (!tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2, |
| exp_label,exp_label_len, |
| s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, |
| s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, |
| NULL,0,NULL,0, |
| key,j,tmp1,tmp2,EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) |
| goto err2; |
| key=tmp1; |
| |
| if (k > 0) |
| { |
| if (!tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2, |
| TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST,TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE, |
| s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, |
| s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, |
| NULL,0,NULL,0, |
| empty,0,iv1,iv2,k*2)) |
| goto err2; |
| if (client_write) |
| iv=iv1; |
| else |
| iv= &(iv1[k]); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| s->session->key_arg_length=0; |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
| { |
| int i; |
| printf("EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n"); |
| printf("\tkey= "); for (i=0; i<c->key_len; i++) printf("%02x", key[i]); |
| printf("\n"); |
| printf("\t iv= "); for (i=0; i<c->iv_len; i++) printf("%02x", iv[i]); |
| printf("\n"); |
| } |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
| |
| EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)); |
| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG |
| printf("which = %04X\nkey=",which); |
| { int z; for (z=0; z<EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) printf("%02X%c",key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } |
| printf("\niv="); |
| { int z; for (z=0; z<k; z++) printf("%02X%c",iv[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } |
| printf("\n"); |
| #endif |
| |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1,sizeof(tmp1)); |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2,sizeof(tmp1)); |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1,sizeof(iv1)); |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2,sizeof(iv2)); |
| return(1); |
| err: |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| err2: |
| return(0); |
| } |
| |
| int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p1,*p2=NULL; |
| const EVP_CIPHER *c; |
| const EVP_MD *hash; |
| int num; |
| SSL_COMP *comp; |
| int mac_type= NID_undef,mac_secret_size=0; |
| int ret=0; |
| |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
| printf ("tls1_setup_key_block()\n"); |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
| |
| if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0) |
| return(1); |
| |
| if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&mac_type,&mac_secret_size,&comp)) |
| { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); |
| return(0); |
| } |
| |
| s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc=c; |
| s->s3->tmp.new_hash=hash; |
| s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type; |
| s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; |
| num=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)+mac_secret_size+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c); |
| num*=2; |
| |
| ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); |
| |
| if ((p1=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) |
| { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=num; |
| s->s3->tmp.key_block=p1; |
| |
| if ((p2=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) |
| { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG |
| printf("client random\n"); |
| { int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->client_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } |
| printf("server random\n"); |
| { int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->server_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } |
| printf("pre-master\n"); |
| { int z; for (z=0; z<s->session->master_key_length; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->session->master_key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } |
| #endif |
| if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s,p1,p2,num)) |
| goto err; |
| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG |
| printf("\nkey block\n"); |
| { int z; for (z=0; z<num; z++) printf("%02X%c",p1[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } |
| #endif |
| |
| if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)) |
| { |
| /* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with |
| * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) |
| */ |
| s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1; |
| |
| if (s->session->cipher != NULL) |
| { |
| if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) |
| s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0; |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 |
| if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) |
| s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0; |
| #endif |
| } |
| } |
| |
| ret = 1; |
| err: |
| if (p2) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(p2,num); |
| OPENSSL_free(p2); |
| } |
| return(ret); |
| } |
| |
| int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) |
| { |
| SSL3_RECORD *rec; |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; |
| unsigned long l; |
| int bs,i,ii,j,k,n=0; |
| const EVP_CIPHER *enc; |
| |
| if (send) |
| { |
| if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) |
| { |
| n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); |
| OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); |
| } |
| ds=s->enc_write_ctx; |
| rec= &(s->s3->wrec); |
| if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) |
| enc=NULL; |
| else |
| enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) |
| { |
| n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); |
| OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); |
| } |
| ds=s->enc_read_ctx; |
| rec= &(s->s3->rrec); |
| if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) |
| enc=NULL; |
| else |
| enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
| printf("tls1_enc(%d)\n", send); |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
| |
| if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || |
| (enc == NULL)) |
| { |
| memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length); |
| rec->input=rec->data; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| l=rec->length; |
| bs=EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher); |
| |
| if ((bs != 1) && send) |
| { |
| i=bs-((int)l%bs); |
| |
| /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */ |
| |
| /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */ |
| j=i-1; |
| if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) |
| { |
| if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) |
| j++; |
| } |
| for (k=(int)l; k<(int)(l+i); k++) |
| rec->input[k]=j; |
| l+=i; |
| rec->length+=i; |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
| { |
| unsigned long ui; |
| printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n", |
| ds,rec->data,rec->input,l); |
| printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n", |
| ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len, |
| DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ, |
| ds->cipher->iv_len); |
| printf("\t\tIV: "); |
| for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]); |
| printf("\n"); |
| printf("\trec->input="); |
| for (ui=0; ui<l; ui++) printf(" %02x", rec->input[ui]); |
| printf("\n"); |
| } |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
| |
| if (!send) |
| { |
| if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0) |
| { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l); |
| |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
| { |
| unsigned long i; |
| printf("\trec->data="); |
| for (i=0; i<l; i++) |
| printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]); printf("\n"); |
| } |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
| |
| if ((bs != 1) && !send) |
| { |
| ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */ |
| i++; |
| /* NB: if compression is in operation the first packet |
| * may not be of even length so the padding bug check |
| * cannot be performed. This bug workaround has been |
| * around since SSLeay so hopefully it is either fixed |
| * now or no buggy implementation supports compression |
| * [steve] |
| */ |
| if ( (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) |
| && !s->expand) |
| { |
| /* First packet is even in size, so check */ |
| if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence, |
| "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && !(ii & 1)) |
| s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG; |
| if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) |
| i--; |
| } |
| /* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size. |
| * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */ |
| if (i > (int)rec->length) |
| { |
| /* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done |
| * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is |
| * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure |
| * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ |
| return -1; |
| } |
| for (j=(int)(l-i); j<(int)l; j++) |
| { |
| if (rec->data[j] != ii) |
| { |
| /* Incorrect padding */ |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| rec->length-=i; |
| } |
| } |
| return(1); |
| } |
| int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out) |
| { |
| unsigned int ret; |
| EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d=NULL; |
| int i; |
| |
| if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) |
| if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| for (i=0;i<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;i++) |
| { |
| if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]&&EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])==md_nid) |
| { |
| d=s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| if (!d) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC,SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); |
| EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,d); |
| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,out,&ret); |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
| return((int)ret); |
| } |
| |
| int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, |
| const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out) |
| { |
| unsigned int i; |
| EVP_MD_CTX ctx; |
| unsigned char buf[2*EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| unsigned char *q,buf2[12]; |
| int idx; |
| long mask; |
| int err=0; |
| const EVP_MD *md; |
| |
| q=buf; |
| |
| if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) |
| if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); |
| |
| for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&mask,&md);idx++) |
| { |
| if (mask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2) |
| { |
| int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md); |
| if (hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf))) |
| { |
| /* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! */ |
| err = 1; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx]); |
| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i); |
| if (i != (unsigned int)hashsize) /* can't really happen */ |
| err = 1; |
| q+=i; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2, |
| str,slen, buf,(int)(q-buf), NULL,0, NULL,0, NULL,0, |
| s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length, |
| out,buf2,sizeof buf2)) |
| err = 1; |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
| |
| if (err) |
| return 0; |
| else |
| return sizeof buf2; |
| } |
| |
| int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) |
| { |
| SSL3_RECORD *rec; |
| unsigned char *mac_sec,*seq; |
| EVP_MD_CTX *hash; |
| size_t md_size; |
| int i; |
| EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx; |
| unsigned char buf[5]; |
| int stream_mac = (send?(ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM):(ssl->mac_flags&SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM)); |
| int t; |
| |
| if (send) |
| { |
| rec= &(ssl->s3->wrec); |
| mac_sec= &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]); |
| seq= &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]); |
| hash=ssl->write_hash; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| rec= &(ssl->s3->rrec); |
| mac_sec= &(ssl->s3->read_mac_secret[0]); |
| seq= &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]); |
| hash=ssl->read_hash; |
| } |
| |
| t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); |
| OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0); |
| md_size=t; |
| |
| buf[0]=rec->type; |
| buf[1]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8); |
| buf[2]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version); |
| buf[3]=rec->length>>8; |
| buf[4]=rec->length&0xff; |
| |
| /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */ |
| if (stream_mac) |
| { |
| mac_ctx = hash; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac,hash); |
| mac_ctx = &hmac; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION || ssl->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
| { |
| unsigned char dtlsseq[8],*p=dtlsseq; |
| |
| s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p); |
| memcpy (p,&seq[2],6); |
| |
| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,dtlsseq,8); |
| } |
| else |
| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,seq,8); |
| |
| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,buf,5); |
| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length); |
| t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size); |
| OPENSSL_assert(t > 0); |
| |
| if (!stream_mac) EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); |
| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG |
| printf("sec="); |
| {unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",mac_sec[z]); printf("\n"); } |
| printf("seq="); |
| {int z; for (z=0; z<8; z++) printf("%02X ",seq[z]); printf("\n"); } |
| printf("buf="); |
| {int z; for (z=0; z<5; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); } |
| printf("rec="); |
| {unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); } |
| #endif |
| |
| if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
| { |
| for (i=7; i>=0; i--) |
| { |
| ++seq[i]; |
| if (seq[i] != 0) break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG |
| {unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",md[z]); printf("\n"); } |
| #endif |
| return(md_size); |
| } |
| |
| int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, |
| int len) |
| { |
| unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; |
| const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL; |
| int col = 0, sol = 0; |
| |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
| printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s,out, p,len); |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
| |
| #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
| if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && |
| s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len > 0 && |
| s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) |
| { |
| co = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input; |
| col = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; |
| so = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input; |
| sol = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; /* must be same as col (see draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt, section 3.1) */ |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2, |
| TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE, |
| s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, |
| co, col, |
| s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, |
| so, sol, |
| p,len, |
| s->session->master_key,buff,sizeof buff); |
| |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
| printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n"); |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
| return(SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE); |
| } |
| |
| int tls1_alert_code(int code) |
| { |
| switch (code) |
| { |
| case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: return(SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY); |
| case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: return(SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: return(SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC); |
| case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
| case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: return(TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW); |
| case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:return(SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE); |
| case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: return(-1); |
| case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: return(SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE); |
| case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:return(SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE); |
| case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED); |
| case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED); |
| case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN); |
| case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: return(SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); |
| case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA); |
| case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: return(TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED); |
| case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR); |
| case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: return(TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION); |
| case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: return(TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); |
| case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:return(TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY); |
| case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: return(TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED); |
| case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: return(TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); |
| case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: return(TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); |
| case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: return(TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE); |
| case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: return(TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME); |
| case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE); |
| case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE); |
| case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); |
| #if 0 /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */ |
| case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: return |
| (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE); |
| #endif |
| default: return(-1); |
| } |
| } |
| |