Kinson Chik | a8fa74c | 2011-07-29 11:33:41 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */ |
| 2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| 3 | * All rights reserved. |
| 4 | * |
| 5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| 6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| 7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| 8 | * |
| 9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| 10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| 11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| 12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| 13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| 14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| 15 | * |
| 16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| 17 | * the code are not to be removed. |
| 18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| 19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| 20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| 21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| 22 | * |
| 23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| 25 | * are met: |
| 26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| 27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| 28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| 29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| 30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| 31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| 32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| 33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| 34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| 35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| 36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| 37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| 38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| 39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| 40 | * |
| 41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| 42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| 43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| 44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| 45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| 46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| 47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| 48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| 49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| 50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| 51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| 52 | * |
| 53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| 54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| 55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| 56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| 57 | */ |
| 58 | /* ==================================================================== |
| 59 | * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| 60 | * |
| 61 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 62 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| 63 | * are met: |
| 64 | * |
| 65 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| 66 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| 67 | * |
| 68 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| 69 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| 70 | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| 71 | * distribution. |
| 72 | * |
| 73 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| 74 | * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| 75 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| 76 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| 77 | * |
| 78 | * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| 79 | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| 80 | * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| 81 | * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
| 82 | * |
| 83 | * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| 84 | * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| 85 | * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| 86 | * |
| 87 | * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| 88 | * acknowledgment: |
| 89 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| 90 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| 91 | * |
| 92 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| 93 | * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| 94 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| 95 | * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| 96 | * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| 97 | * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| 98 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| 99 | * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| 100 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| 101 | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| 102 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| 103 | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| 104 | * ==================================================================== |
| 105 | * |
| 106 | * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| 107 | * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| 108 | * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| 109 | * |
| 110 | */ |
| 111 | /* ==================================================================== |
| 112 | * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. |
| 113 | * |
| 114 | * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by |
| 115 | * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
| 116 | * |
| 117 | * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source |
| 118 | * license provided above. |
| 119 | * |
| 120 | * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by |
| 121 | * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. |
| 122 | * |
| 123 | */ |
| 124 | /* ==================================================================== |
| 125 | * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. |
| 126 | * |
| 127 | * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by |
| 128 | * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source |
| 129 | * license. |
| 130 | * |
| 131 | * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of |
| 132 | * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites |
| 133 | * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. |
| 134 | * |
| 135 | * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in |
| 136 | * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received |
| 137 | * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. |
| 138 | * |
| 139 | * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not |
| 140 | * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third |
| 141 | * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights |
| 142 | * to make use of the Contribution. |
| 143 | * |
| 144 | * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN |
| 145 | * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA |
| 146 | * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY |
| 147 | * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR |
| 148 | * OTHERWISE. |
| 149 | */ |
| 150 | |
| 151 | #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG |
| 152 | #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG |
| 153 | |
| 154 | #include <stdio.h> |
| 155 | #include "ssl_locl.h" |
| 156 | #include "kssl_lcl.h" |
| 157 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
| 158 | #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| 159 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
| 160 | #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| 161 | #include <openssl/hmac.h> |
| 162 | #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| 163 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| 164 | #include <openssl/dh.h> |
| 165 | #endif |
| 166 | #include <openssl/bn.h> |
| 167 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 |
| 168 | #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> |
| 169 | #endif |
| 170 | #include <openssl/md5.h> |
| 171 | |
| 172 | static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); |
| 173 | |
| 174 | static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) |
| 175 | { |
| 176 | if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) |
| 177 | return(SSLv3_server_method()); |
| 178 | else |
| 179 | return(NULL); |
| 180 | } |
| 181 | |
| 182 | IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, |
| 183 | ssl3_accept, |
| 184 | ssl_undefined_function, |
| 185 | ssl3_get_server_method) |
| 186 | |
| 187 | int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) |
| 188 | { |
| 189 | BUF_MEM *buf; |
| 190 | unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); |
| 191 | void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; |
| 192 | int ret= -1; |
| 193 | int new_state,state,skip=0; |
| 194 | |
| 195 | RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); |
| 196 | ERR_clear_error(); |
| 197 | clear_sys_error(); |
| 198 | |
| 199 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) |
| 200 | cb=s->info_callback; |
| 201 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) |
| 202 | cb=s->ctx->info_callback; |
| 203 | |
| 204 | /* init things to blank */ |
| 205 | s->in_handshake++; |
| 206 | if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); |
| 207 | |
| 208 | if (s->cert == NULL) |
| 209 | { |
| 210 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); |
| 211 | return(-1); |
| 212 | } |
| 213 | |
| 214 | for (;;) |
| 215 | { |
| 216 | state=s->state; |
| 217 | |
| 218 | switch (s->state) |
| 219 | { |
| 220 | case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: |
| 221 | s->new_session=1; |
| 222 | /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ |
| 223 | |
| 224 | case SSL_ST_BEFORE: |
| 225 | case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: |
| 226 | case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: |
| 227 | case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: |
| 228 | |
| 229 | s->server=1; |
| 230 | if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); |
| 231 | |
| 232 | if ((s->version>>8) != 3) |
| 233 | { |
| 234 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 235 | return -1; |
| 236 | } |
| 237 | s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; |
| 238 | |
| 239 | if (s->init_buf == NULL) |
| 240 | { |
| 241 | if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) |
| 242 | { |
| 243 | ret= -1; |
| 244 | goto end; |
| 245 | } |
| 246 | if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) |
| 247 | { |
| 248 | ret= -1; |
| 249 | goto end; |
| 250 | } |
| 251 | s->init_buf=buf; |
| 252 | } |
| 253 | |
| 254 | if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) |
| 255 | { |
| 256 | ret= -1; |
| 257 | goto end; |
| 258 | } |
| 259 | |
| 260 | s->init_num=0; |
| 261 | |
| 262 | if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) |
| 263 | { |
| 264 | /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that |
| 265 | * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) |
| 266 | */ |
| 267 | if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; } |
| 268 | |
| 269 | ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); |
| 270 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; |
| 271 | s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; |
| 272 | } |
| 273 | else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && |
| 274 | !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) |
| 275 | { |
| 276 | /* Server attempting to renegotiate with |
| 277 | * client that doesn't support secure |
| 278 | * renegotiation. |
| 279 | */ |
| 280 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); |
| 281 | ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| 282 | ret = -1; |
| 283 | goto end; |
| 284 | } |
| 285 | else |
| 286 | { |
| 287 | /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, |
| 288 | * we will just send a HelloRequest */ |
| 289 | s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; |
| 290 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; |
| 291 | } |
| 292 | break; |
| 293 | |
| 294 | case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: |
| 295 | case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: |
| 296 | |
| 297 | s->shutdown=0; |
| 298 | ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s); |
| 299 | if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| 300 | s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; |
| 301 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; |
| 302 | s->init_num=0; |
| 303 | |
| 304 | ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); |
| 305 | break; |
| 306 | |
| 307 | case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: |
| 308 | s->state=SSL_ST_OK; |
| 309 | break; |
| 310 | |
| 311 | case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: |
| 312 | case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: |
| 313 | case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: |
| 314 | |
| 315 | s->shutdown=0; |
| 316 | ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s); |
| 317 | if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| 318 | |
| 319 | s->new_session = 2; |
| 320 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; |
| 321 | s->init_num=0; |
| 322 | break; |
| 323 | |
| 324 | case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: |
| 325 | case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: |
| 326 | ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s); |
| 327 | if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| 328 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| 329 | if (s->hit) |
| 330 | { |
| 331 | if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) |
| 332 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; |
| 333 | else |
| 334 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; |
| 335 | } |
| 336 | #else |
| 337 | if (s->hit) |
| 338 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; |
| 339 | #endif |
| 340 | else |
| 341 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; |
| 342 | s->init_num=0; |
| 343 | break; |
| 344 | |
| 345 | case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: |
| 346 | case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: |
| 347 | /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ |
| 348 | /* normal PSK or KRB5 */ |
| 349 | if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) |
| 350 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) |
| 351 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) |
| 352 | { |
| 353 | ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); |
| 354 | if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| 355 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| 356 | if (s->tlsext_status_expected) |
| 357 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; |
| 358 | else |
| 359 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| 360 | } |
| 361 | else |
| 362 | { |
| 363 | skip = 1; |
| 364 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| 365 | } |
| 366 | #else |
| 367 | } |
| 368 | else |
| 369 | skip=1; |
| 370 | |
| 371 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| 372 | #endif |
| 373 | s->init_num=0; |
| 374 | break; |
| 375 | |
| 376 | case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: |
| 377 | case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: |
| 378 | alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
| 379 | |
| 380 | /* clear this, it may get reset by |
| 381 | * send_server_key_exchange */ |
| 382 | if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA) |
| 383 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 |
| 384 | && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) |
| 385 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ |
| 386 | ) |
| 387 | /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key |
| 388 | * even when forbidden by protocol specs |
| 389 | * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to |
| 390 | * be able to handle this) */ |
| 391 | s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; |
| 392 | else |
| 393 | s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0; |
| 394 | |
| 395 | |
| 396 | /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or |
| 397 | * RSA but we have a sign only certificate |
| 398 | * |
| 399 | * PSK: may send PSK identity hints |
| 400 | * |
| 401 | * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange |
| 402 | * message only if the cipher suite is either |
| 403 | * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the |
| 404 | * server certificate contains the server's |
| 405 | * public key for key exchange. |
| 406 | */ |
| 407 | if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp |
| 408 | /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity |
| 409 | * hint if provided */ |
| 410 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
| 411 | || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) |
| 412 | #endif |
| 413 | || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH)) |
| 414 | || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) |
| 415 | || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) |
| 416 | && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL |
| 417 | || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) |
| 418 | && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) |
| 419 | ) |
| 420 | ) |
| 421 | ) |
| 422 | ) |
| 423 | { |
| 424 | ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); |
| 425 | if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| 426 | } |
| 427 | else |
| 428 | skip=1; |
| 429 | |
| 430 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; |
| 431 | s->init_num=0; |
| 432 | break; |
| 433 | |
| 434 | case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: |
| 435 | case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: |
| 436 | if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ |
| 437 | !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || |
| 438 | /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, |
| 439 | * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */ |
| 440 | ((s->session->peer != NULL) && |
| 441 | (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || |
| 442 | /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites |
| 443 | * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts |
| 444 | * and in RFC 2246): */ |
| 445 | ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && |
| 446 | /* ... except when the application insists on verification |
| 447 | * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */ |
| 448 | !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || |
| 449 | /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */ |
| 450 | (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) |
| 451 | /* With normal PSK Certificates and |
| 452 | * Certificate Requests are omitted */ |
| 453 | || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) |
| 454 | { |
| 455 | /* no cert request */ |
| 456 | skip=1; |
| 457 | s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0; |
| 458 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; |
| 459 | } |
| 460 | else |
| 461 | { |
| 462 | s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1; |
| 463 | ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); |
| 464 | if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| 465 | #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG |
| 466 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; |
| 467 | #else |
| 468 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; |
| 469 | s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; |
| 470 | #endif |
| 471 | s->init_num=0; |
| 472 | } |
| 473 | break; |
| 474 | |
| 475 | case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: |
| 476 | case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: |
| 477 | ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s); |
| 478 | if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| 479 | s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; |
| 480 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; |
| 481 | s->init_num=0; |
| 482 | break; |
| 483 | |
| 484 | case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: |
| 485 | |
| 486 | /* This code originally checked to see if |
| 487 | * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO |
| 488 | * and then flushed. This caused problems |
| 489 | * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed |
| 490 | * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue |
| 491 | * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING |
| 492 | * still exist. So instead we just flush |
| 493 | * unconditionally. |
| 494 | */ |
| 495 | |
| 496 | s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; |
| 497 | if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) |
| 498 | { |
| 499 | ret= -1; |
| 500 | goto end; |
| 501 | } |
| 502 | s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| 503 | |
| 504 | s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; |
| 505 | break; |
| 506 | |
| 507 | case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: |
| 508 | case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: |
| 509 | /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */ |
| 510 | ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); |
| 511 | if (ret <= 0) |
| 512 | goto end; |
| 513 | if (ret == 2) |
| 514 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; |
| 515 | else { |
| 516 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) |
| 517 | { |
| 518 | ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); |
| 519 | if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| 520 | } |
| 521 | s->init_num=0; |
| 522 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| 523 | } |
| 524 | break; |
| 525 | |
| 526 | case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: |
| 527 | case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: |
| 528 | ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); |
| 529 | if (ret <= 0) |
| 530 | goto end; |
| 531 | if (ret == 2) |
| 532 | { |
| 533 | /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when |
| 534 | * the client sends its ECDH pub key in |
| 535 | * a certificate, the CertificateVerify |
| 536 | * message is not sent. |
| 537 | * Also for GOST ciphersuites when |
| 538 | * the client uses its key from the certificate |
| 539 | * for key exchange. |
| 540 | */ |
| 541 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; |
| 542 | s->init_num = 0; |
| 543 | } |
| 544 | else |
| 545 | { |
| 546 | int offset=0; |
| 547 | int dgst_num; |
| 548 | |
| 549 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; |
| 550 | s->init_num=0; |
| 551 | |
| 552 | /* We need to get hashes here so if there is |
| 553 | * a client cert, it can be verified |
| 554 | * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify |
| 555 | * should be generalized. But it is next step |
| 556 | */ |
| 557 | if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) |
| 558 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) |
| 559 | return -1; |
| 560 | for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++) |
| 561 | if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) |
| 562 | { |
| 563 | int dgst_size; |
| 564 | |
| 565 | s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset])); |
| 566 | dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); |
| 567 | if (dgst_size < 0) |
| 568 | { |
| 569 | ret = -1; |
| 570 | goto end; |
| 571 | } |
| 572 | offset+=dgst_size; |
| 573 | } |
| 574 | } |
| 575 | break; |
| 576 | |
| 577 | case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: |
| 578 | case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: |
| 579 | |
| 580 | /* we should decide if we expected this one */ |
| 581 | ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); |
| 582 | if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| 583 | |
| 584 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; |
| 585 | s->init_num=0; |
| 586 | break; |
| 587 | |
| 588 | case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: |
| 589 | case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: |
| 590 | ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, |
| 591 | SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); |
| 592 | if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| 593 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| 594 | if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) |
| 595 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; |
| 596 | else if (s->hit) |
| 597 | s->state=SSL_ST_OK; |
| 598 | #else |
| 599 | if (s->hit) |
| 600 | s->state=SSL_ST_OK; |
| 601 | #endif |
| 602 | else |
| 603 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; |
| 604 | s->init_num=0; |
| 605 | break; |
| 606 | |
| 607 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| 608 | case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: |
| 609 | case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: |
| 610 | ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); |
| 611 | if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| 612 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; |
| 613 | s->init_num=0; |
| 614 | break; |
| 615 | |
| 616 | case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: |
| 617 | case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: |
| 618 | ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s); |
| 619 | if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| 620 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| 621 | s->init_num=0; |
| 622 | break; |
| 623 | |
| 624 | #endif |
| 625 | |
| 626 | case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: |
| 627 | case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: |
| 628 | |
| 629 | s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; |
| 630 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) |
| 631 | { ret= -1; goto end; } |
| 632 | |
| 633 | ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, |
| 634 | SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); |
| 635 | |
| 636 | if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| 637 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; |
| 638 | s->init_num=0; |
| 639 | |
| 640 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, |
| 641 | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) |
| 642 | { |
| 643 | ret= -1; |
| 644 | goto end; |
| 645 | } |
| 646 | |
| 647 | break; |
| 648 | |
| 649 | case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: |
| 650 | case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: |
| 651 | ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, |
| 652 | SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, |
| 653 | s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, |
| 654 | s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); |
| 655 | if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| 656 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; |
| 657 | if (s->hit) |
| 658 | s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; |
| 659 | else |
| 660 | s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; |
| 661 | s->init_num=0; |
| 662 | break; |
| 663 | |
| 664 | case SSL_ST_OK: |
| 665 | /* clean a few things up */ |
| 666 | ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); |
| 667 | |
| 668 | BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); |
| 669 | s->init_buf=NULL; |
| 670 | |
| 671 | /* remove buffering on output */ |
| 672 | ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); |
| 673 | |
| 674 | s->init_num=0; |
| 675 | |
| 676 | if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ |
| 677 | { |
| 678 | /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless |
| 679 | * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */ |
| 680 | |
| 681 | s->new_session=0; |
| 682 | |
| 683 | ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); |
| 684 | |
| 685 | s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; |
| 686 | /* s->server=1; */ |
| 687 | s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept; |
| 688 | |
| 689 | if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1); |
| 690 | } |
| 691 | |
| 692 | ret = 1; |
| 693 | goto end; |
| 694 | /* break; */ |
| 695 | |
| 696 | default: |
| 697 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); |
| 698 | ret= -1; |
| 699 | goto end; |
| 700 | /* break; */ |
| 701 | } |
| 702 | |
| 703 | if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) |
| 704 | { |
| 705 | if (s->debug) |
| 706 | { |
| 707 | if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) |
| 708 | goto end; |
| 709 | } |
| 710 | |
| 711 | |
| 712 | if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) |
| 713 | { |
| 714 | new_state=s->state; |
| 715 | s->state=state; |
| 716 | cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1); |
| 717 | s->state=new_state; |
| 718 | } |
| 719 | } |
| 720 | skip=0; |
| 721 | } |
| 722 | end: |
| 723 | /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ |
| 724 | |
| 725 | s->in_handshake--; |
| 726 | if (cb != NULL) |
| 727 | cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret); |
| 728 | return(ret); |
| 729 | } |
| 730 | |
| 731 | int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) |
| 732 | { |
| 733 | unsigned char *p; |
| 734 | |
| 735 | if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) |
| 736 | { |
| 737 | p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; |
| 738 | *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; |
| 739 | *(p++)=0; |
| 740 | *(p++)=0; |
| 741 | *(p++)=0; |
| 742 | |
| 743 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; |
| 744 | /* number of bytes to write */ |
| 745 | s->init_num=4; |
| 746 | s->init_off=0; |
| 747 | } |
| 748 | |
| 749 | /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ |
| 750 | return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); |
| 751 | } |
| 752 | |
| 753 | int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) |
| 754 | { |
| 755 | int ok; |
| 756 | long n; |
| 757 | |
| 758 | /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message, |
| 759 | * so permit appropriate message length */ |
| 760 | n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, |
| 761 | SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, |
| 762 | SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, |
| 763 | -1, |
| 764 | s->max_cert_list, |
| 765 | &ok); |
| 766 | if (!ok) return((int)n); |
| 767 | s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; |
| 768 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) |
| 769 | { |
| 770 | /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake, |
| 771 | * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) |
| 772 | * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared |
| 773 | * when a handshake is not completed ... */ |
| 774 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| 775 | if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) |
| 776 | { |
| 777 | DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); |
| 778 | s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; |
| 779 | } |
| 780 | #endif |
| 781 | return 2; |
| 782 | } |
| 783 | return 1; |
| 784 | } |
| 785 | |
| 786 | int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) |
| 787 | { |
| 788 | int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1; |
| 789 | unsigned int cookie_len; |
| 790 | long n; |
| 791 | unsigned long id; |
| 792 | unsigned char *p,*d,*q; |
| 793 | SSL_CIPHER *c; |
| 794 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
| 795 | SSL_COMP *comp=NULL; |
| 796 | #endif |
| 797 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL; |
| 798 | |
| 799 | /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. |
| 800 | * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, |
| 801 | * This down switching should be handled by a different method. |
| 802 | * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with |
| 803 | * TLSv1. |
| 804 | */ |
| 805 | if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) |
| 806 | { |
| 807 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; |
| 808 | } |
| 809 | s->first_packet=1; |
| 810 | n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, |
| 811 | SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, |
| 812 | SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, |
| 813 | SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
| 814 | SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, |
| 815 | &ok); |
| 816 | |
| 817 | if (!ok) return((int)n); |
| 818 | s->first_packet=0; |
| 819 | d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; |
| 820 | |
| 821 | /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header |
| 822 | * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */ |
| 823 | s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1]; |
| 824 | p+=2; |
| 825 | |
| 826 | if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) || |
| 827 | (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) |
| 828 | { |
| 829 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); |
| 830 | if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) |
| 831 | { |
| 832 | /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ |
| 833 | s->version = s->client_version; |
| 834 | } |
| 835 | al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
| 836 | goto f_err; |
| 837 | } |
| 838 | |
| 839 | /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't |
| 840 | * contain one, just return since we do not want to |
| 841 | * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length... |
| 842 | */ |
| 843 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) |
| 844 | { |
| 845 | unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; |
| 846 | |
| 847 | session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| 848 | cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); |
| 849 | |
| 850 | if (cookie_length == 0) |
| 851 | return 1; |
| 852 | } |
| 853 | |
| 854 | /* load the client random */ |
| 855 | memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| 856 | p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; |
| 857 | |
| 858 | /* get the session-id */ |
| 859 | j= *(p++); |
| 860 | |
| 861 | s->hit=0; |
| 862 | /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation |
| 863 | * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option |
| 864 | * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7. |
| 865 | * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default, |
| 866 | * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications |
| 867 | * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with |
| 868 | * an earlier library version) |
| 869 | */ |
| 870 | if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) |
| 871 | { |
| 872 | if (!s->session_creation_enabled) |
| 873 | { |
| 874 | ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| 875 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED); |
| 876 | goto err; |
| 877 | } |
| 878 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) |
| 879 | goto err; |
| 880 | } |
| 881 | else |
| 882 | { |
| 883 | i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); |
| 884 | if (i == 1) |
| 885 | { /* previous session */ |
| 886 | s->hit=1; |
| 887 | } |
| 888 | else if (i == -1) |
| 889 | goto err; |
| 890 | else /* i == 0 */ |
| 891 | { |
| 892 | if (!s->session_creation_enabled) |
| 893 | { |
| 894 | ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| 895 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED); |
| 896 | goto err; |
| 897 | } |
| 898 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) |
| 899 | goto err; |
| 900 | } |
| 901 | } |
| 902 | |
| 903 | p+=j; |
| 904 | |
| 905 | if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
| 906 | { |
| 907 | /* cookie stuff */ |
| 908 | cookie_len = *(p++); |
| 909 | |
| 910 | /* |
| 911 | * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the |
| 912 | * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it |
| 913 | * does not cause an overflow. |
| 914 | */ |
| 915 | if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) |
| 916 | { |
| 917 | /* too much data */ |
| 918 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 919 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); |
| 920 | goto f_err; |
| 921 | } |
| 922 | |
| 923 | /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ |
| 924 | if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && |
| 925 | cookie_len > 0) |
| 926 | { |
| 927 | memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); |
| 928 | |
| 929 | if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) |
| 930 | { |
| 931 | if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, |
| 932 | cookie_len) == 0) |
| 933 | { |
| 934 | al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 935 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, |
| 936 | SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); |
| 937 | goto f_err; |
| 938 | } |
| 939 | /* else cookie verification succeeded */ |
| 940 | } |
| 941 | else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, |
| 942 | s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */ |
| 943 | { |
| 944 | al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 945 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, |
| 946 | SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); |
| 947 | goto f_err; |
| 948 | } |
| 949 | |
| 950 | ret = 2; |
| 951 | } |
| 952 | |
| 953 | p += cookie_len; |
| 954 | } |
| 955 | |
| 956 | n2s(p,i); |
| 957 | if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) |
| 958 | { |
| 959 | /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */ |
| 960 | al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| 961 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); |
| 962 | goto f_err; |
| 963 | } |
| 964 | if ((p+i) >= (d+n)) |
| 965 | { |
| 966 | /* not enough data */ |
| 967 | al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 968 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| 969 | goto f_err; |
| 970 | } |
| 971 | if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers)) |
| 972 | == NULL)) |
| 973 | { |
| 974 | goto err; |
| 975 | } |
| 976 | p+=i; |
| 977 | |
| 978 | /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ |
| 979 | if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) |
| 980 | { |
| 981 | j=0; |
| 982 | id=s->session->cipher->id; |
| 983 | |
| 984 | #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG |
| 985 | printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers)); |
| 986 | #endif |
| 987 | for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) |
| 988 | { |
| 989 | c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i); |
| 990 | #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG |
| 991 | printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", |
| 992 | i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); |
| 993 | #endif |
| 994 | if (c->id == id) |
| 995 | { |
| 996 | j=1; |
| 997 | break; |
| 998 | } |
| 999 | } |
| 1000 | if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) |
| 1001 | { |
| 1002 | /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may |
| 1003 | * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to |
| 1004 | * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server |
| 1005 | * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not |
| 1006 | * enabled, though. */ |
| 1007 | c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); |
| 1008 | if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) |
| 1009 | { |
| 1010 | s->session->cipher = c; |
| 1011 | j = 1; |
| 1012 | } |
| 1013 | } |
| 1014 | if (j == 0) |
| 1015 | { |
| 1016 | /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher |
| 1017 | * list if we are asked to reuse it */ |
| 1018 | al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| 1019 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); |
| 1020 | goto f_err; |
| 1021 | } |
| 1022 | } |
| 1023 | |
| 1024 | /* compression */ |
| 1025 | i= *(p++); |
| 1026 | if ((p+i) > (d+n)) |
| 1027 | { |
| 1028 | /* not enough data */ |
| 1029 | al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1030 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| 1031 | goto f_err; |
| 1032 | } |
| 1033 | q=p; |
| 1034 | for (j=0; j<i; j++) |
| 1035 | { |
| 1036 | if (p[j] == 0) break; |
| 1037 | } |
| 1038 | |
| 1039 | p+=i; |
| 1040 | if (j >= i) |
| 1041 | { |
| 1042 | /* no compress */ |
| 1043 | al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1044 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); |
| 1045 | goto f_err; |
| 1046 | } |
| 1047 | |
| 1048 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| 1049 | /* TLS extensions*/ |
| 1050 | if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) |
| 1051 | { |
| 1052 | if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al)) |
| 1053 | { |
| 1054 | /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */ |
| 1055 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); |
| 1056 | goto f_err; |
| 1057 | } |
| 1058 | } |
| 1059 | if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { |
| 1060 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); |
| 1061 | goto err; |
| 1062 | } |
| 1063 | |
| 1064 | /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this |
| 1065 | * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate |
| 1066 | * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow |
| 1067 | * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */ |
| 1068 | { |
| 1069 | unsigned long Time; |
| 1070 | unsigned char *pos; |
| 1071 | Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */ |
| 1072 | pos=s->s3->server_random; |
| 1073 | l2n(Time,pos); |
| 1074 | if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0) |
| 1075 | { |
| 1076 | al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1077 | goto f_err; |
| 1078 | } |
| 1079 | } |
| 1080 | |
| 1081 | if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) |
| 1082 | { |
| 1083 | SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL; |
| 1084 | |
| 1085 | s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key); |
| 1086 | if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length, |
| 1087 | ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) |
| 1088 | { |
| 1089 | s->hit=1; |
| 1090 | s->session->ciphers=ciphers; |
| 1091 | s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK; |
| 1092 | |
| 1093 | ciphers=NULL; |
| 1094 | |
| 1095 | /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ |
| 1096 | pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); |
| 1097 | if (pref_cipher == NULL) |
| 1098 | { |
| 1099 | al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 1100 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); |
| 1101 | goto f_err; |
| 1102 | } |
| 1103 | |
| 1104 | s->session->cipher=pref_cipher; |
| 1105 | |
| 1106 | if (s->cipher_list) |
| 1107 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); |
| 1108 | |
| 1109 | if (s->cipher_list_by_id) |
| 1110 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); |
| 1111 | |
| 1112 | s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); |
| 1113 | s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); |
| 1114 | } |
| 1115 | } |
| 1116 | #endif |
| 1117 | |
| 1118 | /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other |
| 1119 | * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression |
| 1120 | * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */ |
| 1121 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL; |
| 1122 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
| 1123 | /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ |
| 1124 | if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) |
| 1125 | { |
| 1126 | int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; |
| 1127 | /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ |
| 1128 | /* Can't disable compression */ |
| 1129 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) |
| 1130 | { |
| 1131 | al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1132 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); |
| 1133 | goto f_err; |
| 1134 | } |
| 1135 | /* Look for resumed compression method */ |
| 1136 | for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) |
| 1137 | { |
| 1138 | comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m); |
| 1139 | if (comp_id == comp->id) |
| 1140 | { |
| 1141 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; |
| 1142 | break; |
| 1143 | } |
| 1144 | } |
| 1145 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) |
| 1146 | { |
| 1147 | al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1148 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); |
| 1149 | goto f_err; |
| 1150 | } |
| 1151 | /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ |
| 1152 | for (m = 0; m < i; m++) |
| 1153 | { |
| 1154 | if (q[m] == comp_id) |
| 1155 | break; |
| 1156 | } |
| 1157 | if (m >= i) |
| 1158 | { |
| 1159 | al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| 1160 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); |
| 1161 | goto f_err; |
| 1162 | } |
| 1163 | } |
| 1164 | else if (s->hit) |
| 1165 | comp = NULL; |
| 1166 | else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) |
| 1167 | { /* See if we have a match */ |
| 1168 | int m,nn,o,v,done=0; |
| 1169 | |
| 1170 | nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); |
| 1171 | for (m=0; m<nn; m++) |
| 1172 | { |
| 1173 | comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m); |
| 1174 | v=comp->id; |
| 1175 | for (o=0; o<i; o++) |
| 1176 | { |
| 1177 | if (v == q[o]) |
| 1178 | { |
| 1179 | done=1; |
| 1180 | break; |
| 1181 | } |
| 1182 | } |
| 1183 | if (done) break; |
| 1184 | } |
| 1185 | if (done) |
| 1186 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; |
| 1187 | else |
| 1188 | comp=NULL; |
| 1189 | } |
| 1190 | #else |
| 1191 | /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session |
| 1192 | * using compression. |
| 1193 | */ |
| 1194 | if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) |
| 1195 | { |
| 1196 | al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| 1197 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); |
| 1198 | goto f_err; |
| 1199 | } |
| 1200 | #endif |
| 1201 | |
| 1202 | /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must |
| 1203 | * pick a cipher */ |
| 1204 | |
| 1205 | if (!s->hit) |
| 1206 | { |
| 1207 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
| 1208 | s->session->compress_meth=0; |
| 1209 | #else |
| 1210 | s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id; |
| 1211 | #endif |
| 1212 | if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) |
| 1213 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); |
| 1214 | s->session->ciphers=ciphers; |
| 1215 | if (ciphers == NULL) |
| 1216 | { |
| 1217 | al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| 1218 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); |
| 1219 | goto f_err; |
| 1220 | } |
| 1221 | ciphers=NULL; |
| 1222 | c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers, |
| 1223 | SSL_get_ciphers(s)); |
| 1224 | |
| 1225 | if (c == NULL) |
| 1226 | { |
| 1227 | al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 1228 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); |
| 1229 | goto f_err; |
| 1230 | } |
| 1231 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c; |
| 1232 | } |
| 1233 | else |
| 1234 | { |
| 1235 | /* Session-id reuse */ |
| 1236 | #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG |
| 1237 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; |
| 1238 | SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL; |
| 1239 | SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL; |
| 1240 | |
| 1241 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) |
| 1242 | { |
| 1243 | sk=s->session->ciphers; |
| 1244 | for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) |
| 1245 | { |
| 1246 | c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i); |
| 1247 | if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) |
| 1248 | nc=c; |
| 1249 | if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) |
| 1250 | ec=c; |
| 1251 | } |
| 1252 | if (nc != NULL) |
| 1253 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc; |
| 1254 | else if (ec != NULL) |
| 1255 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec; |
| 1256 | else |
| 1257 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; |
| 1258 | } |
| 1259 | else |
| 1260 | #endif |
| 1261 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; |
| 1262 | } |
| 1263 | |
| 1264 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) |
| 1265 | goto f_err; |
| 1266 | |
| 1267 | /* we now have the following setup. |
| 1268 | * client_random |
| 1269 | * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers |
| 1270 | * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers |
| 1271 | * compression - basically ignored right now |
| 1272 | * ssl version is set - sslv3 |
| 1273 | * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. |
| 1274 | * s->hit - session reuse flag |
| 1275 | * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. |
| 1276 | */ |
| 1277 | |
| 1278 | if (ret < 0) ret=1; |
| 1279 | if (0) |
| 1280 | { |
| 1281 | f_err: |
| 1282 | ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| 1283 | } |
| 1284 | err: |
| 1285 | if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); |
| 1286 | return(ret); |
| 1287 | } |
| 1288 | |
| 1289 | int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) |
| 1290 | { |
| 1291 | unsigned char *buf; |
| 1292 | unsigned char *p,*d; |
| 1293 | int i,sl; |
| 1294 | unsigned long l; |
| 1295 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| 1296 | unsigned long Time; |
| 1297 | #endif |
| 1298 | |
| 1299 | if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) |
| 1300 | { |
| 1301 | buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; |
| 1302 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| 1303 | p=s->s3->server_random; |
| 1304 | /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */ |
| 1305 | Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */ |
| 1306 | l2n(Time,p); |
| 1307 | if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0) |
| 1308 | return -1; |
| 1309 | #endif |
| 1310 | /* Do the message type and length last */ |
| 1311 | d=p= &(buf[4]); |
| 1312 | |
| 1313 | *(p++)=s->version>>8; |
| 1314 | *(p++)=s->version&0xff; |
| 1315 | |
| 1316 | /* Random stuff */ |
| 1317 | memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| 1318 | p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; |
| 1319 | |
| 1320 | /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the |
| 1321 | * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the |
| 1322 | * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send |
| 1323 | * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length |
| 1324 | * session-id if we want it to be single use. |
| 1325 | * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id |
| 1326 | * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff. |
| 1327 | * |
| 1328 | * We also have an additional case where stateless session |
| 1329 | * resumption is successful: we always send back the old |
| 1330 | * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can |
| 1331 | * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful |
| 1332 | * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality |
| 1333 | * is unaffected. |
| 1334 | */ |
| 1335 | if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) |
| 1336 | && !s->hit) |
| 1337 | s->session->session_id_length=0; |
| 1338 | |
| 1339 | sl=s->session->session_id_length; |
| 1340 | if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) |
| 1341 | { |
| 1342 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 1343 | return -1; |
| 1344 | } |
| 1345 | *(p++)=sl; |
| 1346 | memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl); |
| 1347 | p+=sl; |
| 1348 | |
| 1349 | /* put the cipher */ |
| 1350 | i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p); |
| 1351 | p+=i; |
| 1352 | |
| 1353 | /* put the compression method */ |
| 1354 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
| 1355 | *(p++)=0; |
| 1356 | #else |
| 1357 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) |
| 1358 | *(p++)=0; |
| 1359 | else |
| 1360 | *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; |
| 1361 | #endif |
| 1362 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| 1363 | if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) |
| 1364 | { |
| 1365 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); |
| 1366 | return -1; |
| 1367 | } |
| 1368 | if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) |
| 1369 | { |
| 1370 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 1371 | return -1; |
| 1372 | } |
| 1373 | #endif |
| 1374 | /* do the header */ |
| 1375 | l=(p-d); |
| 1376 | d=buf; |
| 1377 | *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; |
| 1378 | l2n3(l,d); |
| 1379 | |
| 1380 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; |
| 1381 | /* number of bytes to write */ |
| 1382 | s->init_num=p-buf; |
| 1383 | s->init_off=0; |
| 1384 | } |
| 1385 | |
| 1386 | /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ |
| 1387 | return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); |
| 1388 | } |
| 1389 | |
| 1390 | int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) |
| 1391 | { |
| 1392 | unsigned char *p; |
| 1393 | |
| 1394 | if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) |
| 1395 | { |
| 1396 | p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; |
| 1397 | |
| 1398 | /* do the header */ |
| 1399 | *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; |
| 1400 | *(p++)=0; |
| 1401 | *(p++)=0; |
| 1402 | *(p++)=0; |
| 1403 | |
| 1404 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; |
| 1405 | /* number of bytes to write */ |
| 1406 | s->init_num=4; |
| 1407 | s->init_off=0; |
| 1408 | } |
| 1409 | |
| 1410 | /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ |
| 1411 | return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); |
| 1412 | } |
| 1413 | |
| 1414 | int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) |
| 1415 | { |
| 1416 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
| 1417 | unsigned char *q; |
| 1418 | int j,num; |
| 1419 | RSA *rsa; |
| 1420 | unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
| 1421 | unsigned int u; |
| 1422 | #endif |
| 1423 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| 1424 | DH *dh=NULL,*dhp; |
| 1425 | #endif |
| 1426 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
| 1427 | EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp; |
| 1428 | unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; |
| 1429 | int encodedlen = 0; |
| 1430 | int curve_id = 0; |
| 1431 | BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; |
| 1432 | #endif |
| 1433 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; |
| 1434 | unsigned char *p,*d; |
| 1435 | int al,i; |
| 1436 | unsigned long type; |
| 1437 | int n; |
| 1438 | CERT *cert; |
| 1439 | BIGNUM *r[4]; |
| 1440 | int nr[4],kn; |
| 1441 | BUF_MEM *buf; |
| 1442 | EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; |
| 1443 | |
| 1444 | EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); |
| 1445 | if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) |
| 1446 | { |
| 1447 | type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
| 1448 | cert=s->cert; |
| 1449 | |
| 1450 | buf=s->init_buf; |
| 1451 | |
| 1452 | r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL; |
| 1453 | n=0; |
| 1454 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
| 1455 | if (type & SSL_kRSA) |
| 1456 | { |
| 1457 | rsa=cert->rsa_tmp; |
| 1458 | if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) |
| 1459 | { |
| 1460 | rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, |
| 1461 | SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), |
| 1462 | SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); |
| 1463 | if(rsa == NULL) |
| 1464 | { |
| 1465 | al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 1466 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); |
| 1467 | goto f_err; |
| 1468 | } |
| 1469 | RSA_up_ref(rsa); |
| 1470 | cert->rsa_tmp=rsa; |
| 1471 | } |
| 1472 | if (rsa == NULL) |
| 1473 | { |
| 1474 | al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 1475 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); |
| 1476 | goto f_err; |
| 1477 | } |
| 1478 | r[0]=rsa->n; |
| 1479 | r[1]=rsa->e; |
| 1480 | s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; |
| 1481 | } |
| 1482 | else |
| 1483 | #endif |
| 1484 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| 1485 | if (type & SSL_kEDH) |
| 1486 | { |
| 1487 | dhp=cert->dh_tmp; |
| 1488 | if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) |
| 1489 | dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, |
| 1490 | SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), |
| 1491 | SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); |
| 1492 | if (dhp == NULL) |
| 1493 | { |
| 1494 | al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 1495 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); |
| 1496 | goto f_err; |
| 1497 | } |
| 1498 | |
| 1499 | if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) |
| 1500 | { |
| 1501 | DH_free(dh); |
| 1502 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 1503 | goto err; |
| 1504 | } |
| 1505 | |
| 1506 | if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) |
| 1507 | { |
| 1508 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); |
| 1509 | goto err; |
| 1510 | } |
| 1511 | |
| 1512 | s->s3->tmp.dh=dh; |
| 1513 | if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || |
| 1514 | dhp->priv_key == NULL || |
| 1515 | (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) |
| 1516 | { |
| 1517 | if(!DH_generate_key(dh)) |
| 1518 | { |
| 1519 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 1520 | ERR_R_DH_LIB); |
| 1521 | goto err; |
| 1522 | } |
| 1523 | } |
| 1524 | else |
| 1525 | { |
| 1526 | dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); |
| 1527 | dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); |
| 1528 | if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || |
| 1529 | (dh->priv_key == NULL)) |
| 1530 | { |
| 1531 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); |
| 1532 | goto err; |
| 1533 | } |
| 1534 | } |
| 1535 | r[0]=dh->p; |
| 1536 | r[1]=dh->g; |
| 1537 | r[2]=dh->pub_key; |
| 1538 | } |
| 1539 | else |
| 1540 | #endif |
| 1541 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
| 1542 | if (type & SSL_kEECDH) |
| 1543 | { |
| 1544 | const EC_GROUP *group; |
| 1545 | |
| 1546 | ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp; |
| 1547 | if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) |
| 1548 | { |
| 1549 | ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, |
| 1550 | SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), |
| 1551 | SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); |
| 1552 | } |
| 1553 | if (ecdhp == NULL) |
| 1554 | { |
| 1555 | al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 1556 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); |
| 1557 | goto f_err; |
| 1558 | } |
| 1559 | |
| 1560 | if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) |
| 1561 | { |
| 1562 | EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); |
| 1563 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 1564 | goto err; |
| 1565 | } |
| 1566 | |
| 1567 | /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ |
| 1568 | if (ecdhp == NULL) |
| 1569 | { |
| 1570 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); |
| 1571 | goto err; |
| 1572 | } |
| 1573 | if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp)) |
| 1574 | { |
| 1575 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); |
| 1576 | goto err; |
| 1577 | } |
| 1578 | ecdh = ecdhp; |
| 1579 | |
| 1580 | s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh; |
| 1581 | if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || |
| 1582 | (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || |
| 1583 | (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) |
| 1584 | { |
| 1585 | if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) |
| 1586 | { |
| 1587 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); |
| 1588 | goto err; |
| 1589 | } |
| 1590 | } |
| 1591 | |
| 1592 | if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || |
| 1593 | (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || |
| 1594 | (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) |
| 1595 | { |
| 1596 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); |
| 1597 | goto err; |
| 1598 | } |
| 1599 | |
| 1600 | if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && |
| 1601 | (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) |
| 1602 | { |
| 1603 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); |
| 1604 | goto err; |
| 1605 | } |
| 1606 | |
| 1607 | /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH |
| 1608 | * keys over named (not generic) curves. For |
| 1609 | * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero. |
| 1610 | */ |
| 1611 | if ((curve_id = |
| 1612 | tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) |
| 1613 | == 0) |
| 1614 | { |
| 1615 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); |
| 1616 | goto err; |
| 1617 | } |
| 1618 | |
| 1619 | /* Encode the public key. |
| 1620 | * First check the size of encoding and |
| 1621 | * allocate memory accordingly. |
| 1622 | */ |
| 1623 | encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, |
| 1624 | EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), |
| 1625 | POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, |
| 1626 | NULL, 0, NULL); |
| 1627 | |
| 1628 | encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) |
| 1629 | OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); |
| 1630 | bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); |
| 1631 | if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) |
| 1632 | { |
| 1633 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 1634 | goto err; |
| 1635 | } |
| 1636 | |
| 1637 | |
| 1638 | encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, |
| 1639 | EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), |
| 1640 | POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, |
| 1641 | encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); |
| 1642 | |
| 1643 | if (encodedlen == 0) |
| 1644 | { |
| 1645 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); |
| 1646 | goto err; |
| 1647 | } |
| 1648 | |
| 1649 | BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL; |
| 1650 | |
| 1651 | /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not |
| 1652 | * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. |
| 1653 | * In this situation, we need four additional bytes |
| 1654 | * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams |
| 1655 | * structure. |
| 1656 | */ |
| 1657 | n = 4 + encodedlen; |
| 1658 | |
| 1659 | /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message |
| 1660 | * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs |
| 1661 | */ |
| 1662 | r[0]=NULL; |
| 1663 | r[1]=NULL; |
| 1664 | r[2]=NULL; |
| 1665 | r[3]=NULL; |
| 1666 | } |
| 1667 | else |
| 1668 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ |
| 1669 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
| 1670 | if (type & SSL_kPSK) |
| 1671 | { |
| 1672 | /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/ |
| 1673 | n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); |
| 1674 | } |
| 1675 | else |
| 1676 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ |
| 1677 | { |
| 1678 | al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 1679 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); |
| 1680 | goto f_err; |
| 1681 | } |
| 1682 | for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++) |
| 1683 | { |
| 1684 | nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]); |
| 1685 | n+=2+nr[i]; |
| 1686 | } |
| 1687 | |
| 1688 | if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) |
| 1689 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) |
| 1690 | { |
| 1691 | if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) |
| 1692 | == NULL) |
| 1693 | { |
| 1694 | al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 1695 | goto f_err; |
| 1696 | } |
| 1697 | kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); |
| 1698 | } |
| 1699 | else |
| 1700 | { |
| 1701 | pkey=NULL; |
| 1702 | kn=0; |
| 1703 | } |
| 1704 | |
| 1705 | if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn)) |
| 1706 | { |
| 1707 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF); |
| 1708 | goto err; |
| 1709 | } |
| 1710 | d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; |
| 1711 | p= &(d[4]); |
| 1712 | |
| 1713 | for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++) |
| 1714 | { |
| 1715 | s2n(nr[i],p); |
| 1716 | BN_bn2bin(r[i],p); |
| 1717 | p+=nr[i]; |
| 1718 | } |
| 1719 | |
| 1720 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
| 1721 | if (type & SSL_kEECDH) |
| 1722 | { |
| 1723 | /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. |
| 1724 | * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: |
| 1725 | * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] |
| 1726 | * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by |
| 1727 | * the actual encoded point itself |
| 1728 | */ |
| 1729 | *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; |
| 1730 | p += 1; |
| 1731 | *p = 0; |
| 1732 | p += 1; |
| 1733 | *p = curve_id; |
| 1734 | p += 1; |
| 1735 | *p = encodedlen; |
| 1736 | p += 1; |
| 1737 | memcpy((unsigned char*)p, |
| 1738 | (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, |
| 1739 | encodedlen); |
| 1740 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
| 1741 | p += encodedlen; |
| 1742 | } |
| 1743 | #endif |
| 1744 | |
| 1745 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
| 1746 | if (type & SSL_kPSK) |
| 1747 | { |
| 1748 | /* copy PSK identity hint */ |
| 1749 | s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); |
| 1750 | strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)); |
| 1751 | p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); |
| 1752 | } |
| 1753 | #endif |
| 1754 | |
| 1755 | /* not anonymous */ |
| 1756 | if (pkey != NULL) |
| 1757 | { |
| 1758 | /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) |
| 1759 | * and p points to the space at the end. */ |
| 1760 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
| 1761 | if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) |
| 1762 | { |
| 1763 | q=md_buf; |
| 1764 | j=0; |
| 1765 | for (num=2; num > 0; num--) |
| 1766 | { |
| 1767 | EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) |
| 1768 | ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL); |
| 1769 | EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| 1770 | EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| 1771 | EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); |
| 1772 | EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q, |
| 1773 | (unsigned int *)&i); |
| 1774 | q+=i; |
| 1775 | j+=i; |
| 1776 | } |
| 1777 | if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, |
| 1778 | &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) |
| 1779 | { |
| 1780 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA); |
| 1781 | goto err; |
| 1782 | } |
| 1783 | s2n(u,p); |
| 1784 | n+=u+2; |
| 1785 | } |
| 1786 | else |
| 1787 | #endif |
| 1788 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) |
| 1789 | if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) |
| 1790 | { |
| 1791 | /* lets do DSS */ |
| 1792 | EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL); |
| 1793 | EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| 1794 | EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| 1795 | EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); |
| 1796 | if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), |
| 1797 | (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) |
| 1798 | { |
| 1799 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA); |
| 1800 | goto err; |
| 1801 | } |
| 1802 | s2n(i,p); |
| 1803 | n+=i+2; |
| 1804 | } |
| 1805 | else |
| 1806 | #endif |
| 1807 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA) |
| 1808 | if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) |
| 1809 | { |
| 1810 | /* let's do ECDSA */ |
| 1811 | EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL); |
| 1812 | EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| 1813 | EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| 1814 | EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); |
| 1815 | if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), |
| 1816 | (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) |
| 1817 | { |
| 1818 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA); |
| 1819 | goto err; |
| 1820 | } |
| 1821 | s2n(i,p); |
| 1822 | n+=i+2; |
| 1823 | } |
| 1824 | else |
| 1825 | #endif |
| 1826 | { |
| 1827 | /* Is this error check actually needed? */ |
| 1828 | al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 1829 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); |
| 1830 | goto f_err; |
| 1831 | } |
| 1832 | } |
| 1833 | |
| 1834 | *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; |
| 1835 | l2n3(n,d); |
| 1836 | |
| 1837 | /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send |
| 1838 | * it off */ |
| 1839 | s->init_num=n+4; |
| 1840 | s->init_off=0; |
| 1841 | } |
| 1842 | |
| 1843 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; |
| 1844 | EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); |
| 1845 | return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); |
| 1846 | f_err: |
| 1847 | ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| 1848 | err: |
| 1849 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
| 1850 | if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
| 1851 | BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); |
| 1852 | #endif |
| 1853 | EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); |
| 1854 | return(-1); |
| 1855 | } |
| 1856 | |
| 1857 | int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) |
| 1858 | { |
| 1859 | unsigned char *p,*d; |
| 1860 | int i,j,nl,off,n; |
| 1861 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL; |
| 1862 | X509_NAME *name; |
| 1863 | BUF_MEM *buf; |
| 1864 | |
| 1865 | if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) |
| 1866 | { |
| 1867 | buf=s->init_buf; |
| 1868 | |
| 1869 | d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]); |
| 1870 | |
| 1871 | /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ |
| 1872 | p++; |
| 1873 | n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p); |
| 1874 | d[0]=n; |
| 1875 | p+=n; |
| 1876 | n++; |
| 1877 | |
| 1878 | off=n; |
| 1879 | p+=2; |
| 1880 | n+=2; |
| 1881 | |
| 1882 | sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); |
| 1883 | nl=0; |
| 1884 | if (sk != NULL) |
| 1885 | { |
| 1886 | for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) |
| 1887 | { |
| 1888 | name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i); |
| 1889 | j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL); |
| 1890 | if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2)) |
| 1891 | { |
| 1892 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
| 1893 | goto err; |
| 1894 | } |
| 1895 | p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]); |
| 1896 | if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) |
| 1897 | { |
| 1898 | s2n(j,p); |
| 1899 | i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); |
| 1900 | n+=2+j; |
| 1901 | nl+=2+j; |
| 1902 | } |
| 1903 | else |
| 1904 | { |
| 1905 | d=p; |
| 1906 | i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); |
| 1907 | j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2; |
| 1908 | n+=j; |
| 1909 | nl+=j; |
| 1910 | } |
| 1911 | } |
| 1912 | } |
| 1913 | /* else no CA names */ |
| 1914 | p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]); |
| 1915 | s2n(nl,p); |
| 1916 | |
| 1917 | d=(unsigned char *)buf->data; |
| 1918 | *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; |
| 1919 | l2n3(n,d); |
| 1920 | |
| 1921 | /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send |
| 1922 | * it off */ |
| 1923 | |
| 1924 | s->init_num=n+4; |
| 1925 | s->init_off=0; |
| 1926 | #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG |
| 1927 | p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; |
| 1928 | |
| 1929 | /* do the header */ |
| 1930 | *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; |
| 1931 | *(p++)=0; |
| 1932 | *(p++)=0; |
| 1933 | *(p++)=0; |
| 1934 | s->init_num += 4; |
| 1935 | #endif |
| 1936 | |
| 1937 | s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; |
| 1938 | } |
| 1939 | |
| 1940 | /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ |
| 1941 | return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); |
| 1942 | err: |
| 1943 | return(-1); |
| 1944 | } |
| 1945 | |
| 1946 | int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) |
| 1947 | { |
| 1948 | int i,al,ok; |
| 1949 | long n; |
| 1950 | unsigned long alg_k; |
| 1951 | unsigned char *p; |
| 1952 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
| 1953 | RSA *rsa=NULL; |
| 1954 | EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; |
| 1955 | #endif |
| 1956 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| 1957 | BIGNUM *pub=NULL; |
| 1958 | DH *dh_srvr; |
| 1959 | #endif |
| 1960 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 |
| 1961 | KSSL_ERR kssl_err; |
| 1962 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ |
| 1963 | |
| 1964 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
| 1965 | EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; |
| 1966 | EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; |
| 1967 | EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; |
| 1968 | BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; |
| 1969 | #endif |
| 1970 | |
| 1971 | n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, |
| 1972 | SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, |
| 1973 | SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, |
| 1974 | SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 1975 | 2048, /* ??? */ |
| 1976 | &ok); |
| 1977 | |
| 1978 | if (!ok) return((int)n); |
| 1979 | p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; |
| 1980 | |
| 1981 | alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
| 1982 | |
| 1983 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
| 1984 | if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) |
| 1985 | { |
| 1986 | /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ |
| 1987 | if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) |
| 1988 | { |
| 1989 | if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) |
| 1990 | rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp; |
| 1991 | /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should |
| 1992 | * be sent already */ |
| 1993 | if (rsa == NULL) |
| 1994 | { |
| 1995 | al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 1996 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); |
| 1997 | goto f_err; |
| 1998 | |
| 1999 | } |
| 2000 | } |
| 2001 | else |
| 2002 | { |
| 2003 | pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; |
| 2004 | if ( (pkey == NULL) || |
| 2005 | (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || |
| 2006 | (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) |
| 2007 | { |
| 2008 | al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 2009 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); |
| 2010 | goto f_err; |
| 2011 | } |
| 2012 | rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa; |
| 2013 | } |
| 2014 | |
| 2015 | /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */ |
| 2016 | if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
| 2017 | { |
| 2018 | n2s(p,i); |
| 2019 | if (n != i+2) |
| 2020 | { |
| 2021 | if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) |
| 2022 | { |
| 2023 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); |
| 2024 | goto err; |
| 2025 | } |
| 2026 | else |
| 2027 | p-=2; |
| 2028 | } |
| 2029 | else |
| 2030 | n=i; |
| 2031 | } |
| 2032 | |
| 2033 | i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); |
| 2034 | |
| 2035 | al = -1; |
| 2036 | |
| 2037 | if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) |
| 2038 | { |
| 2039 | al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 2040 | /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */ |
| 2041 | } |
| 2042 | |
| 2043 | if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) |
| 2044 | { |
| 2045 | /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the |
| 2046 | * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the |
| 2047 | * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). |
| 2048 | * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol |
| 2049 | * version instead if the server does not support the requested |
| 2050 | * protocol version. |
| 2051 | * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */ |
| 2052 | if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) && |
| 2053 | (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff)))) |
| 2054 | { |
| 2055 | al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 2056 | /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */ |
| 2057 | |
| 2058 | /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack |
| 2059 | * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version |
| 2060 | * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would |
| 2061 | * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext |
| 2062 | * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except |
| 2063 | * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks, |
| 2064 | * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */ |
| 2065 | } |
| 2066 | } |
| 2067 | |
| 2068 | if (al != -1) |
| 2069 | { |
| 2070 | /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure |
| 2071 | * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding |
| 2072 | * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */ |
| 2073 | ERR_clear_error(); |
| 2074 | i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; |
| 2075 | p[0] = s->client_version >> 8; |
| 2076 | p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; |
| 2077 | if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */ |
| 2078 | goto err; |
| 2079 | } |
| 2080 | |
| 2081 | s->session->master_key_length= |
| 2082 | s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, |
| 2083 | s->session->master_key, |
| 2084 | p,i); |
| 2085 | OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); |
| 2086 | } |
| 2087 | else |
| 2088 | #endif |
| 2089 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| 2090 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) |
| 2091 | { |
| 2092 | n2s(p,i); |
| 2093 | if (n != i+2) |
| 2094 | { |
| 2095 | if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) |
| 2096 | { |
| 2097 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); |
| 2098 | goto err; |
| 2099 | } |
| 2100 | else |
| 2101 | { |
| 2102 | p-=2; |
| 2103 | i=(int)n; |
| 2104 | } |
| 2105 | } |
| 2106 | |
| 2107 | if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */ |
| 2108 | { |
| 2109 | al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 2110 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS); |
| 2111 | goto f_err; |
| 2112 | } |
| 2113 | else |
| 2114 | { |
| 2115 | if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) |
| 2116 | { |
| 2117 | al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 2118 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); |
| 2119 | goto f_err; |
| 2120 | } |
| 2121 | else |
| 2122 | dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh; |
| 2123 | } |
| 2124 | |
| 2125 | pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL); |
| 2126 | if (pub == NULL) |
| 2127 | { |
| 2128 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB); |
| 2129 | goto err; |
| 2130 | } |
| 2131 | |
| 2132 | i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr); |
| 2133 | |
| 2134 | if (i <= 0) |
| 2135 | { |
| 2136 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); |
| 2137 | goto err; |
| 2138 | } |
| 2139 | |
| 2140 | DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); |
| 2141 | s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL; |
| 2142 | |
| 2143 | BN_clear_free(pub); |
| 2144 | pub=NULL; |
| 2145 | s->session->master_key_length= |
| 2146 | s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, |
| 2147 | s->session->master_key,p,i); |
| 2148 | OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); |
| 2149 | } |
| 2150 | else |
| 2151 | #endif |
| 2152 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 |
| 2153 | if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) |
| 2154 | { |
| 2155 | krb5_error_code krb5rc; |
| 2156 | krb5_data enc_ticket; |
| 2157 | krb5_data authenticator; |
| 2158 | krb5_data enc_pms; |
| 2159 | KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; |
| 2160 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; |
| 2161 | const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; |
| 2162 | unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; |
| 2163 | unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH |
| 2164 | + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; |
| 2165 | int padl, outl; |
| 2166 | krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; |
| 2167 | krb5_ticket_times ttimes; |
| 2168 | |
| 2169 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); |
| 2170 | |
| 2171 | if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); |
| 2172 | |
| 2173 | n2s(p,i); |
| 2174 | enc_ticket.length = i; |
| 2175 | |
| 2176 | if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) |
| 2177 | { |
| 2178 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2179 | SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| 2180 | goto err; |
| 2181 | } |
| 2182 | |
| 2183 | enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; |
| 2184 | p+=enc_ticket.length; |
| 2185 | |
| 2186 | n2s(p,i); |
| 2187 | authenticator.length = i; |
| 2188 | |
| 2189 | if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) |
| 2190 | { |
| 2191 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2192 | SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| 2193 | goto err; |
| 2194 | } |
| 2195 | |
| 2196 | authenticator.data = (char *)p; |
| 2197 | p+=authenticator.length; |
| 2198 | |
| 2199 | n2s(p,i); |
| 2200 | enc_pms.length = i; |
| 2201 | enc_pms.data = (char *)p; |
| 2202 | p+=enc_pms.length; |
| 2203 | |
| 2204 | /* Note that the length is checked again below, |
| 2205 | ** after decryption |
| 2206 | */ |
| 2207 | if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) |
| 2208 | { |
| 2209 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2210 | SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| 2211 | goto err; |
| 2212 | } |
| 2213 | |
| 2214 | if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + |
| 2215 | enc_pms.length + 6)) |
| 2216 | { |
| 2217 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2218 | SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| 2219 | goto err; |
| 2220 | } |
| 2221 | |
| 2222 | if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, |
| 2223 | &kssl_err)) != 0) |
| 2224 | { |
| 2225 | #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
| 2226 | printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", |
| 2227 | krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); |
| 2228 | if (kssl_err.text) |
| 2229 | printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); |
| 2230 | #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
| 2231 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2232 | kssl_err.reason); |
| 2233 | goto err; |
| 2234 | } |
| 2235 | |
| 2236 | /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, |
| 2237 | ** but will return authtime == 0. |
| 2238 | */ |
| 2239 | if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, |
| 2240 | &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) |
| 2241 | { |
| 2242 | #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
| 2243 | printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", |
| 2244 | krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); |
| 2245 | if (kssl_err.text) |
| 2246 | printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); |
| 2247 | #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
| 2248 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2249 | kssl_err.reason); |
| 2250 | goto err; |
| 2251 | } |
| 2252 | |
| 2253 | if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) |
| 2254 | { |
| 2255 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); |
| 2256 | goto err; |
| 2257 | } |
| 2258 | |
| 2259 | #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
| 2260 | kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); |
| 2261 | #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
| 2262 | |
| 2263 | enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); |
| 2264 | if (enc == NULL) |
| 2265 | goto err; |
| 2266 | |
| 2267 | memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ |
| 2268 | |
| 2269 | if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv)) |
| 2270 | { |
| 2271 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2272 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
| 2273 | goto err; |
| 2274 | } |
| 2275 | if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl, |
| 2276 | (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) |
| 2277 | { |
| 2278 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2279 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
| 2280 | goto err; |
| 2281 | } |
| 2282 | if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) |
| 2283 | { |
| 2284 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2285 | SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| 2286 | goto err; |
| 2287 | } |
| 2288 | if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl)) |
| 2289 | { |
| 2290 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2291 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
| 2292 | goto err; |
| 2293 | } |
| 2294 | outl += padl; |
| 2295 | if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) |
| 2296 | { |
| 2297 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2298 | SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| 2299 | goto err; |
| 2300 | } |
| 2301 | if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) |
| 2302 | { |
| 2303 | /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the |
| 2304 | * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the |
| 2305 | * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). |
| 2306 | * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of |
| 2307 | * the protocol version. |
| 2308 | * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. |
| 2309 | * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher) |
| 2310 | */ |
| 2311 | if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) |
| 2312 | { |
| 2313 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2314 | SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| 2315 | goto err; |
| 2316 | } |
| 2317 | } |
| 2318 | |
| 2319 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); |
| 2320 | |
| 2321 | s->session->master_key_length= |
| 2322 | s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, |
| 2323 | s->session->master_key, pms, outl); |
| 2324 | |
| 2325 | if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) |
| 2326 | { |
| 2327 | size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); |
| 2328 | if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) |
| 2329 | { |
| 2330 | s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; |
| 2331 | memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len); |
| 2332 | } |
| 2333 | } |
| 2334 | |
| 2335 | |
| 2336 | /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, |
| 2337 | ** but it caused problems for apache. |
| 2338 | ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); |
| 2339 | ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; |
| 2340 | */ |
| 2341 | } |
| 2342 | else |
| 2343 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ |
| 2344 | |
| 2345 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
| 2346 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) |
| 2347 | { |
| 2348 | int ret = 1; |
| 2349 | int field_size = 0; |
| 2350 | const EC_KEY *tkey; |
| 2351 | const EC_GROUP *group; |
| 2352 | const BIGNUM *priv_key; |
| 2353 | |
| 2354 | /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ |
| 2355 | if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) |
| 2356 | { |
| 2357 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2358 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 2359 | goto err; |
| 2360 | } |
| 2361 | |
| 2362 | /* Let's get server private key and group information */ |
| 2363 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) |
| 2364 | { |
| 2365 | /* use the certificate */ |
| 2366 | tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; |
| 2367 | } |
| 2368 | else |
| 2369 | { |
| 2370 | /* use the ephermeral values we saved when |
| 2371 | * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg. |
| 2372 | */ |
| 2373 | tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; |
| 2374 | } |
| 2375 | |
| 2376 | group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); |
| 2377 | priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); |
| 2378 | |
| 2379 | if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || |
| 2380 | !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) |
| 2381 | { |
| 2382 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2383 | ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
| 2384 | goto err; |
| 2385 | } |
| 2386 | |
| 2387 | /* Let's get client's public key */ |
| 2388 | if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) |
| 2389 | { |
| 2390 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2391 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 2392 | goto err; |
| 2393 | } |
| 2394 | |
| 2395 | if (n == 0L) |
| 2396 | { |
| 2397 | /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ |
| 2398 | |
| 2399 | if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) |
| 2400 | { |
| 2401 | al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 2402 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); |
| 2403 | goto f_err; |
| 2404 | } |
| 2405 | if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) |
| 2406 | == NULL) || |
| 2407 | (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) |
| 2408 | { |
| 2409 | /* XXX: For now, we do not support client |
| 2410 | * authentication using ECDH certificates |
| 2411 | * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is |
| 2412 | * never executed. When that support is |
| 2413 | * added, we ought to ensure the key |
| 2414 | * received in the certificate is |
| 2415 | * authorized for key agreement. |
| 2416 | * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that |
| 2417 | * the two ECDH shares are for the same |
| 2418 | * group. |
| 2419 | */ |
| 2420 | al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 2421 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2422 | SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); |
| 2423 | goto f_err; |
| 2424 | } |
| 2425 | |
| 2426 | if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, |
| 2427 | EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0) |
| 2428 | { |
| 2429 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2430 | ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
| 2431 | goto err; |
| 2432 | } |
| 2433 | ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ |
| 2434 | } |
| 2435 | else |
| 2436 | { |
| 2437 | /* Get client's public key from encoded point |
| 2438 | * in the ClientKeyExchange message. |
| 2439 | */ |
| 2440 | if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) |
| 2441 | { |
| 2442 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2443 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 2444 | goto err; |
| 2445 | } |
| 2446 | |
| 2447 | /* Get encoded point length */ |
| 2448 | i = *p; |
| 2449 | p += 1; |
| 2450 | if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, |
| 2451 | clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) |
| 2452 | { |
| 2453 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2454 | ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
| 2455 | goto err; |
| 2456 | } |
| 2457 | /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer |
| 2458 | * currently, so set it to the start |
| 2459 | */ |
| 2460 | p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; |
| 2461 | } |
| 2462 | |
| 2463 | /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ |
| 2464 | field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); |
| 2465 | if (field_size <= 0) |
| 2466 | { |
| 2467 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2468 | ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); |
| 2469 | goto err; |
| 2470 | } |
| 2471 | i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL); |
| 2472 | if (i <= 0) |
| 2473 | { |
| 2474 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2475 | ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); |
| 2476 | goto err; |
| 2477 | } |
| 2478 | |
| 2479 | EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); |
| 2480 | EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); |
| 2481 | EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); |
| 2482 | BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); |
| 2483 | EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); |
| 2484 | s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; |
| 2485 | |
| 2486 | /* Compute the master secret */ |
| 2487 | s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \ |
| 2488 | generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i); |
| 2489 | |
| 2490 | OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); |
| 2491 | return (ret); |
| 2492 | } |
| 2493 | else |
| 2494 | #endif |
| 2495 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
| 2496 | if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) |
| 2497 | { |
| 2498 | unsigned char *t = NULL; |
| 2499 | unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4]; |
| 2500 | unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; |
| 2501 | int psk_err = 1; |
| 2502 | char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1]; |
| 2503 | |
| 2504 | al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 2505 | |
| 2506 | n2s(p,i); |
| 2507 | if (n != i+2) |
| 2508 | { |
| 2509 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2510 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| 2511 | goto psk_err; |
| 2512 | } |
| 2513 | if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) |
| 2514 | { |
| 2515 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2516 | SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| 2517 | goto psk_err; |
| 2518 | } |
| 2519 | if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) |
| 2520 | { |
| 2521 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2522 | SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); |
| 2523 | goto psk_err; |
| 2524 | } |
| 2525 | |
| 2526 | /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity |
| 2527 | * string for the callback */ |
| 2528 | memcpy(tmp_id, p, i); |
| 2529 | memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i); |
| 2530 | psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id, |
| 2531 | psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); |
| 2532 | OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1); |
| 2533 | |
| 2534 | if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) |
| 2535 | { |
| 2536 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2537 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 2538 | goto psk_err; |
| 2539 | } |
| 2540 | else if (psk_len == 0) |
| 2541 | { |
| 2542 | /* PSK related to the given identity not found */ |
| 2543 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2544 | SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); |
| 2545 | al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; |
| 2546 | goto psk_err; |
| 2547 | } |
| 2548 | |
| 2549 | /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ |
| 2550 | pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len; |
| 2551 | t = psk_or_pre_ms; |
| 2552 | memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len); |
| 2553 | s2n(psk_len, t); |
| 2554 | memset(t, 0, psk_len); |
| 2555 | t+=psk_len; |
| 2556 | s2n(psk_len, t); |
| 2557 | |
| 2558 | if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) |
| 2559 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); |
| 2560 | s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p); |
| 2561 | if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) |
| 2562 | { |
| 2563 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2564 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 2565 | goto psk_err; |
| 2566 | } |
| 2567 | |
| 2568 | if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) |
| 2569 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); |
| 2570 | s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); |
| 2571 | if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL && |
| 2572 | s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) |
| 2573 | { |
| 2574 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2575 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 2576 | goto psk_err; |
| 2577 | } |
| 2578 | |
| 2579 | s->session->master_key_length= |
| 2580 | s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, |
| 2581 | s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len); |
| 2582 | psk_err = 0; |
| 2583 | psk_err: |
| 2584 | OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); |
| 2585 | if (psk_err != 0) |
| 2586 | goto f_err; |
| 2587 | } |
| 2588 | else |
| 2589 | #endif |
| 2590 | if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) |
| 2591 | { |
| 2592 | int ret = 0; |
| 2593 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; |
| 2594 | EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL; |
| 2595 | unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; |
| 2596 | size_t outlen=32, inlen; |
| 2597 | |
| 2598 | /* Get our certificate private key*/ |
| 2599 | pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(s->cert->key->privatekey,NULL); |
| 2600 | EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx); |
| 2601 | /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe |
| 2602 | * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from |
| 2603 | * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use |
| 2604 | * a client certificate for authorization only. */ |
| 2605 | client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); |
| 2606 | if (client_pub_pkey) |
| 2607 | { |
| 2608 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) |
| 2609 | ERR_clear_error(); |
| 2610 | } |
| 2611 | /* Decrypt session key */ |
| 2612 | if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED))) |
| 2613 | { |
| 2614 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
| 2615 | goto gerr; |
| 2616 | } |
| 2617 | if (p[1] == 0x81) |
| 2618 | { |
| 2619 | start = p+3; |
| 2620 | inlen = p[2]; |
| 2621 | } |
| 2622 | else if (p[1] < 0x80) |
| 2623 | { |
| 2624 | start = p+2; |
| 2625 | inlen = p[1]; |
| 2626 | } |
| 2627 | else |
| 2628 | { |
| 2629 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
| 2630 | goto gerr; |
| 2631 | } |
| 2632 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0) |
| 2633 | |
| 2634 | { |
| 2635 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
| 2636 | goto gerr; |
| 2637 | } |
| 2638 | /* Generate master secret */ |
| 2639 | s->session->master_key_length= |
| 2640 | s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, |
| 2641 | s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32); |
| 2642 | /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ |
| 2643 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) |
| 2644 | ret = 2; |
| 2645 | else |
| 2646 | ret = 1; |
| 2647 | gerr: |
| 2648 | EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); |
| 2649 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); |
| 2650 | if (ret) |
| 2651 | return ret; |
| 2652 | else |
| 2653 | goto err; |
| 2654 | } |
| 2655 | else |
| 2656 | { |
| 2657 | al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 2658 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| 2659 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); |
| 2660 | goto f_err; |
| 2661 | } |
| 2662 | |
| 2663 | return(1); |
| 2664 | f_err: |
| 2665 | ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| 2666 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) |
| 2667 | err: |
| 2668 | #endif |
| 2669 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
| 2670 | EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); |
| 2671 | EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); |
| 2672 | if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) |
| 2673 | EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); |
| 2674 | BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); |
| 2675 | #endif |
| 2676 | return(-1); |
| 2677 | } |
| 2678 | |
| 2679 | int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) |
| 2680 | { |
| 2681 | EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; |
| 2682 | unsigned char *p; |
| 2683 | int al,ok,ret=0; |
| 2684 | long n; |
| 2685 | int type=0,i,j; |
| 2686 | X509 *peer; |
| 2687 | |
| 2688 | n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, |
| 2689 | SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, |
| 2690 | SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, |
| 2691 | -1, |
| 2692 | 514, /* 514? */ |
| 2693 | &ok); |
| 2694 | |
| 2695 | if (!ok) return((int)n); |
| 2696 | |
| 2697 | if (s->session->peer != NULL) |
| 2698 | { |
| 2699 | peer=s->session->peer; |
| 2700 | pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer); |
| 2701 | type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey); |
| 2702 | } |
| 2703 | else |
| 2704 | { |
| 2705 | peer=NULL; |
| 2706 | pkey=NULL; |
| 2707 | } |
| 2708 | |
| 2709 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) |
| 2710 | { |
| 2711 | s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; |
| 2712 | if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) |
| 2713 | { |
| 2714 | al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| 2715 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); |
| 2716 | goto f_err; |
| 2717 | } |
| 2718 | ret=1; |
| 2719 | goto end; |
| 2720 | } |
| 2721 | |
| 2722 | if (peer == NULL) |
| 2723 | { |
| 2724 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); |
| 2725 | al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| 2726 | goto f_err; |
| 2727 | } |
| 2728 | |
| 2729 | if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) |
| 2730 | { |
| 2731 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); |
| 2732 | al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| 2733 | goto f_err; |
| 2734 | } |
| 2735 | |
| 2736 | if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) |
| 2737 | { |
| 2738 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); |
| 2739 | al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| 2740 | goto f_err; |
| 2741 | } |
| 2742 | |
| 2743 | /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ |
| 2744 | p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; |
| 2745 | /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ |
| 2746 | /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare |
| 2747 | * signature without length field */ |
| 2748 | if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 || |
| 2749 | pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) ) |
| 2750 | { |
| 2751 | i=64; |
| 2752 | } |
| 2753 | else |
| 2754 | { |
| 2755 | n2s(p,i); |
| 2756 | n-=2; |
| 2757 | if (i > n) |
| 2758 | { |
| 2759 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| 2760 | al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 2761 | goto f_err; |
| 2762 | } |
| 2763 | } |
| 2764 | j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); |
| 2765 | if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) |
| 2766 | { |
| 2767 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); |
| 2768 | al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 2769 | goto f_err; |
| 2770 | } |
| 2771 | |
| 2772 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
| 2773 | if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) |
| 2774 | { |
| 2775 | i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, |
| 2776 | MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, |
| 2777 | pkey->pkey.rsa); |
| 2778 | if (i < 0) |
| 2779 | { |
| 2780 | al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
| 2781 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); |
| 2782 | goto f_err; |
| 2783 | } |
| 2784 | if (i == 0) |
| 2785 | { |
| 2786 | al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
| 2787 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); |
| 2788 | goto f_err; |
| 2789 | } |
| 2790 | } |
| 2791 | else |
| 2792 | #endif |
| 2793 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA |
| 2794 | if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) |
| 2795 | { |
| 2796 | j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, |
| 2797 | &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), |
| 2798 | SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa); |
| 2799 | if (j <= 0) |
| 2800 | { |
| 2801 | /* bad signature */ |
| 2802 | al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
| 2803 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); |
| 2804 | goto f_err; |
| 2805 | } |
| 2806 | } |
| 2807 | else |
| 2808 | #endif |
| 2809 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA |
| 2810 | if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) |
| 2811 | { |
| 2812 | j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, |
| 2813 | &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), |
| 2814 | SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec); |
| 2815 | if (j <= 0) |
| 2816 | { |
| 2817 | /* bad signature */ |
| 2818 | al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
| 2819 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, |
| 2820 | SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); |
| 2821 | goto f_err; |
| 2822 | } |
| 2823 | } |
| 2824 | else |
| 2825 | #endif |
| 2826 | if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) |
| 2827 | { unsigned char signature[64]; |
| 2828 | int idx; |
| 2829 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL); |
| 2830 | EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx); |
| 2831 | if (i!=64) { |
| 2832 | fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i); |
| 2833 | } |
| 2834 | for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) { |
| 2835 | signature[63-idx]=p[idx]; |
| 2836 | } |
| 2837 | j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32); |
| 2838 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); |
| 2839 | if (j<=0) |
| 2840 | { |
| 2841 | al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
| 2842 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, |
| 2843 | SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); |
| 2844 | goto f_err; |
| 2845 | } |
| 2846 | } |
| 2847 | else |
| 2848 | { |
| 2849 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 2850 | al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; |
| 2851 | goto f_err; |
| 2852 | } |
| 2853 | |
| 2854 | |
| 2855 | ret=1; |
| 2856 | if (0) |
| 2857 | { |
| 2858 | f_err: |
| 2859 | ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| 2860 | } |
| 2861 | end: |
| 2862 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| 2863 | return(ret); |
| 2864 | } |
| 2865 | |
| 2866 | int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) |
| 2867 | { |
| 2868 | int i,ok,al,ret= -1; |
| 2869 | X509 *x=NULL; |
| 2870 | unsigned long l,nc,llen,n; |
| 2871 | const unsigned char *p,*q; |
| 2872 | unsigned char *d; |
| 2873 | STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL; |
| 2874 | |
| 2875 | n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, |
| 2876 | SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, |
| 2877 | SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, |
| 2878 | -1, |
| 2879 | s->max_cert_list, |
| 2880 | &ok); |
| 2881 | |
| 2882 | if (!ok) return((int)n); |
| 2883 | |
| 2884 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) |
| 2885 | { |
| 2886 | if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && |
| 2887 | (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) |
| 2888 | { |
| 2889 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); |
| 2890 | al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 2891 | goto f_err; |
| 2892 | } |
| 2893 | /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */ |
| 2894 | if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) |
| 2895 | { |
| 2896 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); |
| 2897 | al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| 2898 | goto f_err; |
| 2899 | } |
| 2900 | s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; |
| 2901 | return(1); |
| 2902 | } |
| 2903 | |
| 2904 | if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) |
| 2905 | { |
| 2906 | al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| 2907 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); |
| 2908 | goto f_err; |
| 2909 | } |
| 2910 | p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; |
| 2911 | |
| 2912 | if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) |
| 2913 | { |
| 2914 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 2915 | goto err; |
| 2916 | } |
| 2917 | |
| 2918 | n2l3(p,llen); |
| 2919 | if (llen+3 != n) |
| 2920 | { |
| 2921 | al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 2922 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| 2923 | goto f_err; |
| 2924 | } |
| 2925 | for (nc=0; nc<llen; ) |
| 2926 | { |
| 2927 | n2l3(p,l); |
| 2928 | if ((l+nc+3) > llen) |
| 2929 | { |
| 2930 | al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 2931 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| 2932 | goto f_err; |
| 2933 | } |
| 2934 | |
| 2935 | q=p; |
| 2936 | x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l); |
| 2937 | if (x == NULL) |
| 2938 | { |
| 2939 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); |
| 2940 | goto err; |
| 2941 | } |
| 2942 | if (p != (q+l)) |
| 2943 | { |
| 2944 | al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| 2945 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| 2946 | goto f_err; |
| 2947 | } |
| 2948 | if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x)) |
| 2949 | { |
| 2950 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 2951 | goto err; |
| 2952 | } |
| 2953 | x=NULL; |
| 2954 | nc+=l+3; |
| 2955 | } |
| 2956 | |
| 2957 | if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) |
| 2958 | { |
| 2959 | /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ |
| 2960 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) |
| 2961 | { |
| 2962 | al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 2963 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); |
| 2964 | goto f_err; |
| 2965 | } |
| 2966 | /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ |
| 2967 | else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && |
| 2968 | (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) |
| 2969 | { |
| 2970 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); |
| 2971 | al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| 2972 | goto f_err; |
| 2973 | } |
| 2974 | } |
| 2975 | else |
| 2976 | { |
| 2977 | i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); |
| 2978 | if (i <= 0) |
| 2979 | { |
| 2980 | al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); |
| 2981 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); |
| 2982 | goto f_err; |
| 2983 | } |
| 2984 | } |
| 2985 | |
| 2986 | if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ |
| 2987 | X509_free(s->session->peer); |
| 2988 | s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk); |
| 2989 | s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; |
| 2990 | |
| 2991 | /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL |
| 2992 | * when we arrive here. */ |
| 2993 | if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) |
| 2994 | { |
| 2995 | s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); |
| 2996 | if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) |
| 2997 | { |
| 2998 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| 2999 | goto err; |
| 3000 | } |
| 3001 | } |
| 3002 | if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) |
| 3003 | sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); |
| 3004 | s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk; |
| 3005 | /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the |
| 3006 | * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */ |
| 3007 | |
| 3008 | sk=NULL; |
| 3009 | |
| 3010 | ret=1; |
| 3011 | if (0) |
| 3012 | { |
| 3013 | f_err: |
| 3014 | ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| 3015 | } |
| 3016 | err: |
| 3017 | if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); |
| 3018 | if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free); |
| 3019 | return(ret); |
| 3020 | } |
| 3021 | |
| 3022 | int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) |
| 3023 | { |
| 3024 | unsigned long l; |
| 3025 | X509 *x; |
| 3026 | |
| 3027 | if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) |
| 3028 | { |
| 3029 | x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s); |
| 3030 | if (x == NULL) |
| 3031 | { |
| 3032 | /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ |
| 3033 | if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) || |
| 3034 | (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) |
| 3035 | { |
| 3036 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 3037 | return(0); |
| 3038 | } |
| 3039 | } |
| 3040 | |
| 3041 | l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x); |
| 3042 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; |
| 3043 | s->init_num=(int)l; |
| 3044 | s->init_off=0; |
| 3045 | } |
| 3046 | |
| 3047 | /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ |
| 3048 | return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); |
| 3049 | } |
| 3050 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| 3051 | int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) |
| 3052 | { |
| 3053 | if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) |
| 3054 | { |
| 3055 | unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart; |
| 3056 | int len, slen; |
| 3057 | unsigned int hlen; |
| 3058 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; |
| 3059 | HMAC_CTX hctx; |
| 3060 | SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; |
| 3061 | unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; |
| 3062 | unsigned char key_name[16]; |
| 3063 | |
| 3064 | /* get session encoding length */ |
| 3065 | slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); |
| 3066 | /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is |
| 3067 | * too long |
| 3068 | */ |
| 3069 | if (slen > 0xFF00) |
| 3070 | return -1; |
| 3071 | /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as |
| 3072 | * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length |
| 3073 | * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + |
| 3074 | * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + |
| 3075 | * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session |
| 3076 | * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). |
| 3077 | */ |
| 3078 | if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, |
| 3079 | 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + |
| 3080 | EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) |
| 3081 | return -1; |
| 3082 | senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen); |
| 3083 | if (!senc) |
| 3084 | return -1; |
| 3085 | p = senc; |
| 3086 | i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); |
| 3087 | |
| 3088 | p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; |
| 3089 | /* do the header */ |
| 3090 | *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; |
| 3091 | /* Skip message length for now */ |
| 3092 | p += 3; |
| 3093 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); |
| 3094 | HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); |
| 3095 | /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present |
| 3096 | * it does all the work otherwise use generated values |
| 3097 | * from parent ctx. |
| 3098 | */ |
| 3099 | if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) |
| 3100 | { |
| 3101 | if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, |
| 3102 | &hctx, 1) < 0) |
| 3103 | { |
| 3104 | OPENSSL_free(senc); |
| 3105 | return -1; |
| 3106 | } |
| 3107 | } |
| 3108 | else |
| 3109 | { |
| 3110 | RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16); |
| 3111 | EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, |
| 3112 | tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); |
| 3113 | HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, |
| 3114 | tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); |
| 3115 | memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); |
| 3116 | } |
| 3117 | l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p); |
| 3118 | /* Skip ticket length for now */ |
| 3119 | p += 2; |
| 3120 | /* Output key name */ |
| 3121 | macstart = p; |
| 3122 | memcpy(p, key_name, 16); |
| 3123 | p += 16; |
| 3124 | /* output IV */ |
| 3125 | memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); |
| 3126 | p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); |
| 3127 | /* Encrypt session data */ |
| 3128 | EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); |
| 3129 | p += len; |
| 3130 | EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len); |
| 3131 | p += len; |
| 3132 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
| 3133 | |
| 3134 | HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); |
| 3135 | HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); |
| 3136 | HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); |
| 3137 | |
| 3138 | p += hlen; |
| 3139 | /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ |
| 3140 | /* Total length */ |
| 3141 | len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; |
| 3142 | p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1; |
| 3143 | l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */ |
| 3144 | p += 4; |
| 3145 | s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */ |
| 3146 | |
| 3147 | /* number of bytes to write */ |
| 3148 | s->init_num= len; |
| 3149 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; |
| 3150 | s->init_off=0; |
| 3151 | OPENSSL_free(senc); |
| 3152 | } |
| 3153 | |
| 3154 | /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ |
| 3155 | return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); |
| 3156 | } |
| 3157 | |
| 3158 | int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) |
| 3159 | { |
| 3160 | if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) |
| 3161 | { |
| 3162 | unsigned char *p; |
| 3163 | /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as |
| 3164 | * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + |
| 3165 | * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) |
| 3166 | * + (ocsp response) |
| 3167 | */ |
| 3168 | if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) |
| 3169 | return -1; |
| 3170 | |
| 3171 | p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; |
| 3172 | |
| 3173 | /* do the header */ |
| 3174 | *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; |
| 3175 | /* message length */ |
| 3176 | l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); |
| 3177 | /* status type */ |
| 3178 | *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type; |
| 3179 | /* length of OCSP response */ |
| 3180 | l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); |
| 3181 | /* actual response */ |
| 3182 | memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); |
| 3183 | /* number of bytes to write */ |
| 3184 | s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; |
| 3185 | s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; |
| 3186 | s->init_off = 0; |
| 3187 | } |
| 3188 | |
| 3189 | /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ |
| 3190 | return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); |
| 3191 | } |
| 3192 | #endif |