| /* |
| * This file implements KASLR memory randomization for x86_64. It randomizes |
| * the virtual address space of kernel memory regions (physical memory |
| * mapping, vmalloc & vmemmap) for x86_64. This security feature mitigates |
| * exploits relying on predictable kernel addresses. |
| * |
| * Entropy is generated using the KASLR early boot functions now shared in |
| * the lib directory (originally written by Kees Cook). Randomization is |
| * done on PGD & PUD page table levels to increase possible addresses. The |
| * physical memory mapping code was adapted to support PUD level virtual |
| * addresses. This implementation on the best configuration provides 30,000 |
| * possible virtual addresses in average for each memory region. An additional |
| * low memory page is used to ensure each CPU can start with a PGD aligned |
| * virtual address (for realmode). |
| * |
| * The order of each memory region is not changed. The feature looks at |
| * the available space for the regions based on different configuration |
| * options and randomizes the base and space between each. The size of the |
| * physical memory mapping is the available physical memory. |
| */ |
| |
| #include <linux/kernel.h> |
| #include <linux/init.h> |
| #include <linux/random.h> |
| |
| #include <asm/pgalloc.h> |
| #include <asm/pgtable.h> |
| #include <asm/setup.h> |
| #include <asm/kaslr.h> |
| |
| #include "mm_internal.h" |
| |
| #define TB_SHIFT 40 |
| |
| /* |
| * Virtual address start and end range for randomization. The end changes base |
| * on configuration to have the highest amount of space for randomization. |
| * It increases the possible random position for each randomized region. |
| * |
| * You need to add an if/def entry if you introduce a new memory region |
| * compatible with KASLR. Your entry must be in logical order with memory |
| * layout. For example, ESPFIX is before EFI because its virtual address is |
| * before. You also need to add a BUILD_BUG_ON in kernel_randomize_memory to |
| * ensure that this order is correct and won't be changed. |
| */ |
| static const unsigned long vaddr_start; |
| static const unsigned long vaddr_end; |
| |
| /* |
| * Memory regions randomized by KASLR (except modules that use a separate logic |
| * earlier during boot). The list is ordered based on virtual addresses. This |
| * order is kept after randomization. |
| */ |
| static __initdata struct kaslr_memory_region { |
| unsigned long *base; |
| unsigned long size_tb; |
| } kaslr_regions[] = { |
| }; |
| |
| /* Get size in bytes used by the memory region */ |
| static inline unsigned long get_padding(struct kaslr_memory_region *region) |
| { |
| return (region->size_tb << TB_SHIFT); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Apply no randomization if KASLR was disabled at boot or if KASAN |
| * is enabled. KASAN shadow mappings rely on regions being PGD aligned. |
| */ |
| static inline bool kaslr_memory_enabled(void) |
| { |
| return kaslr_enabled() && !config_enabled(CONFIG_KASAN); |
| } |
| |
| /* Initialize base and padding for each memory region randomized with KASLR */ |
| void __init kernel_randomize_memory(void) |
| { |
| size_t i; |
| unsigned long vaddr = vaddr_start; |
| unsigned long rand; |
| struct rnd_state rand_state; |
| unsigned long remain_entropy; |
| |
| if (!kaslr_memory_enabled()) |
| return; |
| |
| /* Calculate entropy available between regions */ |
| remain_entropy = vaddr_end - vaddr_start; |
| for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kaslr_regions); i++) |
| remain_entropy -= get_padding(&kaslr_regions[i]); |
| |
| prandom_seed_state(&rand_state, kaslr_get_random_long("Memory")); |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kaslr_regions); i++) { |
| unsigned long entropy; |
| |
| /* |
| * Select a random virtual address using the extra entropy |
| * available. |
| */ |
| entropy = remain_entropy / (ARRAY_SIZE(kaslr_regions) - i); |
| prandom_bytes_state(&rand_state, &rand, sizeof(rand)); |
| entropy = (rand % (entropy + 1)) & PUD_MASK; |
| vaddr += entropy; |
| *kaslr_regions[i].base = vaddr; |
| |
| /* |
| * Jump the region and add a minimum padding based on |
| * randomization alignment. |
| */ |
| vaddr += get_padding(&kaslr_regions[i]); |
| vaddr = round_up(vaddr + 1, PUD_SIZE); |
| remain_entropy -= entropy; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Create PGD aligned trampoline table to allow real mode initialization |
| * of additional CPUs. Consume only 1 low memory page. |
| */ |
| void __meminit init_trampoline(void) |
| { |
| unsigned long paddr, paddr_next; |
| pgd_t *pgd; |
| pud_t *pud_page, *pud_page_tramp; |
| int i; |
| |
| if (!kaslr_memory_enabled()) { |
| init_trampoline_default(); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| pud_page_tramp = alloc_low_page(); |
| |
| paddr = 0; |
| pgd = pgd_offset_k((unsigned long)__va(paddr)); |
| pud_page = (pud_t *) pgd_page_vaddr(*pgd); |
| |
| for (i = pud_index(paddr); i < PTRS_PER_PUD; i++, paddr = paddr_next) { |
| pud_t *pud, *pud_tramp; |
| unsigned long vaddr = (unsigned long)__va(paddr); |
| |
| pud_tramp = pud_page_tramp + pud_index(paddr); |
| pud = pud_page + pud_index(vaddr); |
| paddr_next = (paddr & PUD_MASK) + PUD_SIZE; |
| |
| *pud_tramp = *pud; |
| } |
| |
| set_pgd(&trampoline_pgd_entry, |
| __pgd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(pud_page_tramp))); |
| } |