| /* |
| * AppArmor security module |
| * |
| * This file contains AppArmor policy attachment and domain transitions |
| * |
| * Copyright (C) 2002-2008 Novell/SUSE |
| * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. |
| * |
| * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or |
| * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as |
| * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the |
| * License. |
| */ |
| |
| #include <linux/errno.h> |
| #include <linux/fdtable.h> |
| #include <linux/file.h> |
| #include <linux/mount.h> |
| #include <linux/syscalls.h> |
| #include <linux/tracehook.h> |
| #include <linux/personality.h> |
| |
| #include "include/audit.h" |
| #include "include/apparmorfs.h" |
| #include "include/context.h" |
| #include "include/domain.h" |
| #include "include/file.h" |
| #include "include/ipc.h" |
| #include "include/match.h" |
| #include "include/path.h" |
| #include "include/policy.h" |
| |
| /** |
| * aa_free_domain_entries - free entries in a domain table |
| * @domain: the domain table to free (MAYBE NULL) |
| */ |
| void aa_free_domain_entries(struct aa_domain *domain) |
| { |
| int i; |
| if (domain) { |
| if (!domain->table) |
| return; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < domain->size; i++) |
| kzfree(domain->table[i]); |
| kzfree(domain->table); |
| domain->table = NULL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * may_change_ptraced_domain - check if can change profile on ptraced task |
| * @task: task we want to change profile of (NOT NULL) |
| * @to_profile: profile to change to (NOT NULL) |
| * |
| * Check if the task is ptraced and if so if the tracing task is allowed |
| * to trace the new domain |
| * |
| * Returns: %0 or error if change not allowed |
| */ |
| static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct task_struct *task, |
| struct aa_profile *to_profile) |
| { |
| struct task_struct *tracer; |
| struct aa_profile *tracerp = NULL; |
| int error = 0; |
| |
| rcu_read_lock(); |
| tracer = ptrace_parent(task); |
| if (tracer) |
| /* released below */ |
| tracerp = aa_get_task_profile(tracer); |
| |
| /* not ptraced */ |
| if (!tracer || unconfined(tracerp)) |
| goto out; |
| |
| error = aa_may_ptrace(tracerp, to_profile, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH); |
| |
| out: |
| rcu_read_unlock(); |
| aa_put_profile(tracerp); |
| |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * change_profile_perms - find permissions for change_profile |
| * @profile: the current profile (NOT NULL) |
| * @ns: the namespace being switched to (NOT NULL) |
| * @name: the name of the profile to change to (NOT NULL) |
| * @request: requested perms |
| * @start: state to start matching in |
| * |
| * Returns: permission set |
| */ |
| static struct file_perms change_profile_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, |
| struct aa_namespace *ns, |
| const char *name, u32 request, |
| unsigned int start) |
| { |
| struct file_perms perms; |
| struct path_cond cond = { }; |
| unsigned int state; |
| |
| if (unconfined(profile)) { |
| perms.allow = AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE | AA_MAY_ONEXEC; |
| perms.audit = perms.quiet = perms.kill = 0; |
| return perms; |
| } else if (!profile->file.dfa) { |
| return nullperms; |
| } else if ((ns == profile->ns)) { |
| /* try matching against rules with out namespace prepended */ |
| aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, start, name, &cond, &perms); |
| if (COMBINED_PERM_MASK(perms) & request) |
| return perms; |
| } |
| |
| /* try matching with namespace name and then profile */ |
| state = aa_dfa_match(profile->file.dfa, start, ns->base.name); |
| state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->file.dfa, state, ":", 1); |
| aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, name, &cond, &perms); |
| |
| return perms; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * __attach_match_ - find an attachment match |
| * @name - to match against (NOT NULL) |
| * @head - profile list to walk (NOT NULL) |
| * |
| * Do a linear search on the profiles in the list. There is a matching |
| * preference where an exact match is preferred over a name which uses |
| * expressions to match, and matching expressions with the greatest |
| * xmatch_len are preferred. |
| * |
| * Requires: @head not be shared or have appropriate locks held |
| * |
| * Returns: profile or NULL if no match found |
| */ |
| static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name, |
| struct list_head *head) |
| { |
| int len = 0; |
| struct aa_profile *profile, *candidate = NULL; |
| |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(profile, head, base.list) { |
| if (profile->flags & PFLAG_NULL) |
| continue; |
| if (profile->xmatch && profile->xmatch_len > len) { |
| unsigned int state = aa_dfa_match(profile->xmatch, |
| DFA_START, name); |
| u32 perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state); |
| /* any accepting state means a valid match. */ |
| if (perm & MAY_EXEC) { |
| candidate = profile; |
| len = profile->xmatch_len; |
| } |
| } else if (!strcmp(profile->base.name, name)) |
| /* exact non-re match, no more searching required */ |
| return profile; |
| } |
| |
| return candidate; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * find_attach - do attachment search for unconfined processes |
| * @ns: the current namespace (NOT NULL) |
| * @list: list to search (NOT NULL) |
| * @name: the executable name to match against (NOT NULL) |
| * |
| * Returns: profile or NULL if no match found |
| */ |
| static struct aa_profile *find_attach(struct aa_namespace *ns, |
| struct list_head *list, const char *name) |
| { |
| struct aa_profile *profile; |
| |
| rcu_read_lock(); |
| profile = aa_get_profile(__attach_match(name, list)); |
| rcu_read_unlock(); |
| |
| return profile; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * separate_fqname - separate the namespace and profile names |
| * @fqname: the fqname name to split (NOT NULL) |
| * @ns_name: the namespace name if it exists (NOT NULL) |
| * |
| * This is the xtable equivalent routine of aa_split_fqname. It finds the |
| * split in an xtable fqname which contains an embedded \0 instead of a : |
| * if a namespace is specified. This is done so the xtable is constant and |
| * isn't re-split on every lookup. |
| * |
| * Either the profile or namespace name may be optional but if the namespace |
| * is specified the profile name termination must be present. This results |
| * in the following possible encodings: |
| * profile_name\0 |
| * :ns_name\0profile_name\0 |
| * :ns_name\0\0 |
| * |
| * NOTE: the xtable fqname is pre-validated at load time in unpack_trans_table |
| * |
| * Returns: profile name if it is specified else NULL |
| */ |
| static const char *separate_fqname(const char *fqname, const char **ns_name) |
| { |
| const char *name; |
| |
| if (fqname[0] == ':') { |
| /* In this case there is guaranteed to be two \0 terminators |
| * in the string. They are verified at load time by |
| * by unpack_trans_table |
| */ |
| *ns_name = fqname + 1; /* skip : */ |
| name = *ns_name + strlen(*ns_name) + 1; |
| if (!*name) |
| name = NULL; |
| } else { |
| *ns_name = NULL; |
| name = fqname; |
| } |
| |
| return name; |
| } |
| |
| static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name) |
| { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * x_table_lookup - lookup an x transition name via transition table |
| * @profile: current profile (NOT NULL) |
| * @xindex: index into x transition table |
| * |
| * Returns: refcounted profile, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL) |
| */ |
| static struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex) |
| { |
| struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL; |
| struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns; |
| u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK; |
| int index = xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK; |
| const char *name; |
| |
| /* index is guaranteed to be in range, validated at load time */ |
| for (name = profile->file.trans.table[index]; !new_profile && name; |
| name = next_name(xtype, name)) { |
| struct aa_namespace *new_ns; |
| const char *xname = NULL; |
| |
| new_ns = NULL; |
| if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD) { |
| /* release by caller */ |
| new_profile = aa_find_child(profile, name); |
| continue; |
| } else if (*name == ':') { |
| /* switching namespace */ |
| const char *ns_name; |
| xname = name = separate_fqname(name, &ns_name); |
| if (!xname) |
| /* no name so use profile name */ |
| xname = profile->base.hname; |
| if (*ns_name == '@') { |
| /* TODO: variable support */ |
| ; |
| } |
| /* released below */ |
| new_ns = aa_find_namespace(ns, ns_name); |
| if (!new_ns) |
| continue; |
| } else if (*name == '@') { |
| /* TODO: variable support */ |
| continue; |
| } else { |
| /* basic namespace lookup */ |
| xname = name; |
| } |
| |
| /* released by caller */ |
| new_profile = aa_lookup_profile(new_ns ? new_ns : ns, xname); |
| aa_put_namespace(new_ns); |
| } |
| |
| /* released by caller */ |
| return new_profile; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * x_to_profile - get target profile for a given xindex |
| * @profile: current profile (NOT NULL) |
| * @name: name to lookup (NOT NULL) |
| * @xindex: index into x transition table |
| * |
| * find profile for a transition index |
| * |
| * Returns: refcounted profile or NULL if not found available |
| */ |
| static struct aa_profile *x_to_profile(struct aa_profile *profile, |
| const char *name, u32 xindex) |
| { |
| struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL; |
| struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns; |
| u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK; |
| |
| switch (xtype) { |
| case AA_X_NONE: |
| /* fail exec unless ix || ux fallback - handled by caller */ |
| return NULL; |
| case AA_X_NAME: |
| if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD) |
| /* released by caller */ |
| new_profile = find_attach(ns, &profile->base.profiles, |
| name); |
| else |
| /* released by caller */ |
| new_profile = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles, |
| name); |
| break; |
| case AA_X_TABLE: |
| /* released by caller */ |
| new_profile = x_table_lookup(profile, xindex); |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| /* released by caller */ |
| return new_profile; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * apparmor_bprm_set_creds - set the new creds on the bprm struct |
| * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL) |
| * |
| * Returns: %0 or error on failure |
| */ |
| int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
| { |
| struct aa_task_cxt *cxt; |
| struct aa_profile *profile, *new_profile = NULL; |
| struct aa_namespace *ns; |
| char *buffer = NULL; |
| unsigned int state; |
| struct file_perms perms = {}; |
| struct path_cond cond = { |
| file_inode(bprm->file)->i_uid, |
| file_inode(bprm->file)->i_mode |
| }; |
| const char *name = NULL, *target = NULL, *info = NULL; |
| int error = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm); |
| if (error) |
| return error; |
| |
| if (bprm->cred_prepared) |
| return 0; |
| |
| cxt = cred_cxt(bprm->cred); |
| BUG_ON(!cxt); |
| |
| profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->profile); |
| /* |
| * get the namespace from the replacement profile as replacement |
| * can change the namespace |
| */ |
| ns = profile->ns; |
| state = profile->file.start; |
| |
| /* buffer freed below, name is pointer into buffer */ |
| error = aa_path_name(&bprm->file->f_path, profile->path_flags, &buffer, |
| &name, &info); |
| if (error) { |
| if (unconfined(profile) || |
| (profile->flags & PFLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR)) |
| error = 0; |
| name = bprm->filename; |
| goto audit; |
| } |
| |
| /* Test for onexec first as onexec directives override other |
| * x transitions. |
| */ |
| if (unconfined(profile)) { |
| /* unconfined task */ |
| if (cxt->onexec) |
| /* change_profile on exec already been granted */ |
| new_profile = aa_get_profile(cxt->onexec); |
| else |
| new_profile = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles, name); |
| if (!new_profile) |
| goto cleanup; |
| /* |
| * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed |
| * even when no_new_privs is set because this aways results |
| * in a further reduction of permissions. |
| */ |
| goto apply; |
| } |
| |
| /* find exec permissions for name */ |
| state = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, name, &cond, &perms); |
| if (cxt->onexec) { |
| struct file_perms cp; |
| info = "change_profile onexec"; |
| if (!(perms.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC)) |
| goto audit; |
| |
| /* test if this exec can be paired with change_profile onexec. |
| * onexec permission is linked to exec with a standard pairing |
| * exec\0change_profile |
| */ |
| state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file.dfa, state); |
| cp = change_profile_perms(profile, cxt->onexec->ns, |
| cxt->onexec->base.name, |
| AA_MAY_ONEXEC, state); |
| |
| if (!(cp.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC)) |
| goto audit; |
| new_profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->onexec); |
| goto apply; |
| } |
| |
| if (perms.allow & MAY_EXEC) { |
| /* exec permission determine how to transition */ |
| new_profile = x_to_profile(profile, name, perms.xindex); |
| if (!new_profile) { |
| if (perms.xindex & AA_X_INHERIT) { |
| /* (p|c|n)ix - don't change profile but do |
| * use the newest version, which was picked |
| * up above when getting profile |
| */ |
| info = "ix fallback"; |
| new_profile = aa_get_profile(profile); |
| goto x_clear; |
| } else if (perms.xindex & AA_X_UNCONFINED) { |
| new_profile = aa_get_newest_profile(ns->unconfined); |
| info = "ux fallback"; |
| } else { |
| error = -ENOENT; |
| info = "profile not found"; |
| /* remove MAY_EXEC to audit as failure */ |
| perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC; |
| } |
| } |
| } else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) { |
| /* no exec permission - are we in learning mode */ |
| new_profile = aa_new_null_profile(profile, 0); |
| if (!new_profile) { |
| error = -ENOMEM; |
| info = "could not create null profile"; |
| } else { |
| error = -EACCES; |
| target = new_profile->base.hname; |
| } |
| perms.xindex |= AA_X_UNSAFE; |
| } else |
| /* fail exec */ |
| error = -EACCES; |
| |
| /* |
| * Policy has specified a domain transition, if no_new_privs then |
| * fail the exec. |
| */ |
| if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) { |
| aa_put_profile(new_profile); |
| error = -EPERM; |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| if (!new_profile) |
| goto audit; |
| |
| if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) { |
| /* FIXME: currently don't mediate shared state */ |
| ; |
| } |
| |
| if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) { |
| error = may_change_ptraced_domain(current, new_profile); |
| if (error) { |
| aa_put_profile(new_profile); |
| goto audit; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Determine if secure exec is needed. |
| * Can be at this point for the following reasons: |
| * 1. unconfined switching to confined |
| * 2. confined switching to different confinement |
| * 3. confined switching to unconfined |
| * |
| * Cases 2 and 3 are marked as requiring secure exec |
| * (unless policy specified "unsafe exec") |
| * |
| * bprm->unsafe is used to cache the AA_X_UNSAFE permission |
| * to avoid having to recompute in secureexec |
| */ |
| if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) { |
| AA_DEBUG("scrubbing environment variables for %s profile=%s\n", |
| name, new_profile->base.hname); |
| bprm->unsafe |= AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED; |
| } |
| apply: |
| target = new_profile->base.hname; |
| /* when transitioning profiles clear unsafe personality bits */ |
| bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; |
| |
| x_clear: |
| aa_put_profile(cxt->profile); |
| /* transfer new profile reference will be released when cxt is freed */ |
| cxt->profile = new_profile; |
| |
| /* clear out all temporary/transitional state from the context */ |
| aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(cxt); |
| |
| audit: |
| error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC, |
| name, target, cond.uid, info, error); |
| |
| cleanup: |
| aa_put_profile(profile); |
| kfree(buffer); |
| |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * apparmor_bprm_secureexec - determine if secureexec is needed |
| * @bprm: binprm for exec (NOT NULL) |
| * |
| * Returns: %1 if secureexec is needed else %0 |
| */ |
| int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
| { |
| int ret = cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm); |
| |
| /* the decision to use secure exec is computed in set_creds |
| * and stored in bprm->unsafe. |
| */ |
| if (!ret && (bprm->unsafe & AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED)) |
| ret = 1; |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds |
| * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL) |
| */ |
| void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
| { |
| struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile(); |
| struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = cred_cxt(bprm->cred); |
| |
| /* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */ |
| if ((new_cxt->profile == profile) || |
| (unconfined(new_cxt->profile))) |
| return; |
| |
| current->pdeath_signal = 0; |
| |
| /* reset soft limits and set hard limits for the new profile */ |
| __aa_transition_rlimits(profile, new_cxt->profile); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * apparmor_bprm_commited_cred - do cleanup after new creds committed |
| * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL) |
| */ |
| void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
| { |
| /* TODO: cleanup signals - ipc mediation */ |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Functions for self directed profile change |
| */ |
| |
| /** |
| * new_compound_name - create an hname with @n2 appended to @n1 |
| * @n1: base of hname (NOT NULL) |
| * @n2: name to append (NOT NULL) |
| * |
| * Returns: new name or NULL on error |
| */ |
| static char *new_compound_name(const char *n1, const char *n2) |
| { |
| char *name = kmalloc(strlen(n1) + strlen(n2) + 3, GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (name) |
| sprintf(name, "%s//%s", n1, n2); |
| return name; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * aa_change_hat - change hat to/from subprofile |
| * @hats: vector of hat names to try changing into (MAYBE NULL if @count == 0) |
| * @count: number of hat names in @hats |
| * @token: magic value to validate the hat change |
| * @permtest: true if this is just a permission test |
| * |
| * Change to the first profile specified in @hats that exists, and store |
| * the @hat_magic in the current task context. If the count == 0 and the |
| * @token matches that stored in the current task context, return to the |
| * top level profile. |
| * |
| * Returns %0 on success, error otherwise. |
| */ |
| int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, bool permtest) |
| { |
| const struct cred *cred; |
| struct aa_task_cxt *cxt; |
| struct aa_profile *profile, *previous_profile, *hat = NULL; |
| char *name = NULL; |
| int i; |
| struct file_perms perms = {}; |
| const char *target = NULL, *info = NULL; |
| int error = 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * Fail explicitly requested domain transitions if no_new_privs. |
| * There is no exception for unconfined as change_hat is not |
| * available. |
| */ |
| if (current->no_new_privs) |
| return -EPERM; |
| |
| /* released below */ |
| cred = get_current_cred(); |
| cxt = cred_cxt(cred); |
| profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); |
| previous_profile = cxt->previous; |
| |
| if (unconfined(profile)) { |
| info = "unconfined"; |
| error = -EPERM; |
| goto audit; |
| } |
| |
| if (count) { |
| /* attempting to change into a new hat or switch to a sibling */ |
| struct aa_profile *root; |
| if (PROFILE_IS_HAT(profile)) |
| root = aa_get_profile_rcu(&profile->parent); |
| else |
| root = aa_get_profile(profile); |
| |
| /* find first matching hat */ |
| for (i = 0; i < count && !hat; i++) |
| /* released below */ |
| hat = aa_find_child(root, hats[i]); |
| if (!hat) { |
| if (!COMPLAIN_MODE(root) || permtest) { |
| if (list_empty(&root->base.profiles)) |
| error = -ECHILD; |
| else |
| error = -ENOENT; |
| aa_put_profile(root); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * In complain mode and failed to match any hats. |
| * Audit the failure is based off of the first hat |
| * supplied. This is done due how userspace |
| * interacts with change_hat. |
| * |
| * TODO: Add logging of all failed hats |
| */ |
| |
| /* freed below */ |
| name = new_compound_name(root->base.hname, hats[0]); |
| aa_put_profile(root); |
| target = name; |
| /* released below */ |
| hat = aa_new_null_profile(profile, 1); |
| if (!hat) { |
| info = "failed null profile create"; |
| error = -ENOMEM; |
| goto audit; |
| } |
| } else { |
| aa_put_profile(root); |
| target = hat->base.hname; |
| if (!PROFILE_IS_HAT(hat)) { |
| info = "target not hat"; |
| error = -EPERM; |
| goto audit; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| error = may_change_ptraced_domain(current, hat); |
| if (error) { |
| info = "ptraced"; |
| error = -EPERM; |
| goto audit; |
| } |
| |
| if (!permtest) { |
| error = aa_set_current_hat(hat, token); |
| if (error == -EACCES) |
| /* kill task in case of brute force attacks */ |
| perms.kill = AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT; |
| else if (name && !error) |
| /* reset error for learning of new hats */ |
| error = -ENOENT; |
| } |
| } else if (previous_profile) { |
| /* Return to saved profile. Kill task if restore fails |
| * to avoid brute force attacks |
| */ |
| target = previous_profile->base.hname; |
| error = aa_restore_previous_profile(token); |
| perms.kill = AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT; |
| } else |
| /* ignore restores when there is no saved profile */ |
| goto out; |
| |
| audit: |
| if (!permtest) |
| error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, |
| OP_CHANGE_HAT, AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, NULL, |
| target, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error); |
| |
| out: |
| aa_put_profile(hat); |
| kfree(name); |
| put_cred(cred); |
| |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * aa_change_profile - perform a one-way profile transition |
| * @ns_name: name of the profile namespace to change to (MAYBE NULL) |
| * @hname: name of profile to change to (MAYBE NULL) |
| * @onexec: whether this transition is to take place immediately or at exec |
| * @permtest: true if this is just a permission test |
| * |
| * Change to new profile @name. Unlike with hats, there is no way |
| * to change back. If @name isn't specified the current profile name is |
| * used. |
| * If @onexec then the transition is delayed until |
| * the next exec. |
| * |
| * Returns %0 on success, error otherwise. |
| */ |
| int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *hname, bool onexec, |
| bool permtest) |
| { |
| const struct cred *cred; |
| struct aa_profile *profile, *target = NULL; |
| struct aa_namespace *ns = NULL; |
| struct file_perms perms = {}; |
| const char *name = NULL, *info = NULL; |
| int op, error = 0; |
| u32 request; |
| |
| if (!hname && !ns_name) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| if (onexec) { |
| request = AA_MAY_ONEXEC; |
| op = OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC; |
| } else { |
| request = AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE; |
| op = OP_CHANGE_PROFILE; |
| } |
| |
| cred = get_current_cred(); |
| profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); |
| |
| /* |
| * Fail explicitly requested domain transitions if no_new_privs |
| * and not unconfined. |
| * Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed even when |
| * no_new_privs is set because this aways results in a reduction |
| * of permissions. |
| */ |
| if (current->no_new_privs && !unconfined(profile)) { |
| put_cred(cred); |
| return -EPERM; |
| } |
| |
| if (ns_name) { |
| /* released below */ |
| ns = aa_find_namespace(profile->ns, ns_name); |
| if (!ns) { |
| /* we don't create new namespace in complain mode */ |
| name = ns_name; |
| info = "namespace not found"; |
| error = -ENOENT; |
| goto audit; |
| } |
| } else |
| /* released below */ |
| ns = aa_get_namespace(profile->ns); |
| |
| /* if the name was not specified, use the name of the current profile */ |
| if (!hname) { |
| if (unconfined(profile)) |
| hname = ns->unconfined->base.hname; |
| else |
| hname = profile->base.hname; |
| } |
| |
| perms = change_profile_perms(profile, ns, hname, request, |
| profile->file.start); |
| if (!(perms.allow & request)) { |
| error = -EACCES; |
| goto audit; |
| } |
| |
| /* released below */ |
| target = aa_lookup_profile(ns, hname); |
| if (!target) { |
| info = "profile not found"; |
| error = -ENOENT; |
| if (permtest || !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) |
| goto audit; |
| /* released below */ |
| target = aa_new_null_profile(profile, 0); |
| if (!target) { |
| info = "failed null profile create"; |
| error = -ENOMEM; |
| goto audit; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* check if tracing task is allowed to trace target domain */ |
| error = may_change_ptraced_domain(current, target); |
| if (error) { |
| info = "ptrace prevents transition"; |
| goto audit; |
| } |
| |
| if (permtest) |
| goto audit; |
| |
| if (onexec) |
| error = aa_set_current_onexec(target); |
| else |
| error = aa_replace_current_profile(target); |
| |
| audit: |
| if (!permtest) |
| error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, op, request, |
| name, hname, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error); |
| |
| aa_put_namespace(ns); |
| aa_put_profile(target); |
| put_cred(cred); |
| |
| return error; |
| } |