Miklos Szeredi | 334f485 | 2005-09-09 13:10:27 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | Definitions |
| 2 | ~~~~~~~~~~~ |
| 3 | |
| 4 | Userspace filesystem: |
| 5 | |
| 6 | A filesystem in which data and metadata are provided by an ordinary |
| 7 | userspace process. The filesystem can be accessed normally through |
| 8 | the kernel interface. |
| 9 | |
| 10 | Filesystem daemon: |
| 11 | |
| 12 | The process(es) providing the data and metadata of the filesystem. |
| 13 | |
| 14 | Non-privileged mount (or user mount): |
| 15 | |
| 16 | A userspace filesystem mounted by a non-privileged (non-root) user. |
| 17 | The filesystem daemon is running with the privileges of the mounting |
| 18 | user. NOTE: this is not the same as mounts allowed with the "user" |
| 19 | option in /etc/fstab, which is not discussed here. |
| 20 | |
| 21 | Mount owner: |
| 22 | |
| 23 | The user who does the mounting. |
| 24 | |
| 25 | User: |
| 26 | |
| 27 | The user who is performing filesystem operations. |
| 28 | |
| 29 | What is FUSE? |
| 30 | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
| 31 | |
| 32 | FUSE is a userspace filesystem framework. It consists of a kernel |
| 33 | module (fuse.ko), a userspace library (libfuse.*) and a mount utility |
| 34 | (fusermount). |
| 35 | |
| 36 | One of the most important features of FUSE is allowing secure, |
| 37 | non-privileged mounts. This opens up new possibilities for the use of |
| 38 | filesystems. A good example is sshfs: a secure network filesystem |
| 39 | using the sftp protocol. |
| 40 | |
| 41 | The userspace library and utilities are available from the FUSE |
| 42 | homepage: |
| 43 | |
| 44 | http://fuse.sourceforge.net/ |
| 45 | |
| 46 | Mount options |
| 47 | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
| 48 | |
| 49 | 'fd=N' |
| 50 | |
| 51 | The file descriptor to use for communication between the userspace |
| 52 | filesystem and the kernel. The file descriptor must have been |
| 53 | obtained by opening the FUSE device ('/dev/fuse'). |
| 54 | |
| 55 | 'rootmode=M' |
| 56 | |
| 57 | The file mode of the filesystem's root in octal representation. |
| 58 | |
| 59 | 'user_id=N' |
| 60 | |
| 61 | The numeric user id of the mount owner. |
| 62 | |
| 63 | 'group_id=N' |
| 64 | |
| 65 | The numeric group id of the mount owner. |
| 66 | |
| 67 | 'default_permissions' |
| 68 | |
| 69 | By default FUSE doesn't check file access permissions, the |
| 70 | filesystem is free to implement it's access policy or leave it to |
| 71 | the underlying file access mechanism (e.g. in case of network |
| 72 | filesystems). This option enables permission checking, restricting |
| 73 | access based on file mode. This is option is usually useful |
| 74 | together with the 'allow_other' mount option. |
| 75 | |
| 76 | 'allow_other' |
| 77 | |
| 78 | This option overrides the security measure restricting file access |
| 79 | to the user mounting the filesystem. This option is by default only |
| 80 | allowed to root, but this restriction can be removed with a |
| 81 | (userspace) configuration option. |
| 82 | |
Miklos Szeredi | 334f485 | 2005-09-09 13:10:27 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 83 | 'max_read=N' |
| 84 | |
| 85 | With this option the maximum size of read operations can be set. |
| 86 | The default is infinite. Note that the size of read requests is |
| 87 | limited anyway to 32 pages (which is 128kbyte on i386). |
| 88 | |
Miklos Szeredi | bacac38 | 2006-01-16 22:14:47 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 89 | Sysfs |
| 90 | ~~~~~ |
| 91 | |
| 92 | FUSE sets up the following hierarchy in sysfs: |
| 93 | |
| 94 | /sys/fs/fuse/connections/N/ |
| 95 | |
| 96 | where N is an increasing number allocated to each new connection. |
| 97 | |
| 98 | For each connection the following attributes are defined: |
| 99 | |
| 100 | 'waiting' |
| 101 | |
| 102 | The number of requests which are waiting to be transfered to |
| 103 | userspace or being processed by the filesystem daemon. If there is |
| 104 | no filesystem activity and 'waiting' is non-zero, then the |
| 105 | filesystem is hung or deadlocked. |
| 106 | |
| 107 | 'abort' |
| 108 | |
| 109 | Writing anything into this file will abort the filesystem |
| 110 | connection. This means that all waiting requests will be aborted an |
| 111 | error returned for all aborted and new requests. |
| 112 | |
| 113 | Only a privileged user may read or write these attributes. |
| 114 | |
| 115 | Aborting a filesystem connection |
| 116 | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
| 117 | |
| 118 | It is possible to get into certain situations where the filesystem is |
| 119 | not responding. Reasons for this may be: |
| 120 | |
| 121 | a) Broken userspace filesystem implementation |
| 122 | |
| 123 | b) Network connection down |
| 124 | |
| 125 | c) Accidental deadlock |
| 126 | |
| 127 | d) Malicious deadlock |
| 128 | |
| 129 | (For more on c) and d) see later sections) |
| 130 | |
| 131 | In either of these cases it may be useful to abort the connection to |
| 132 | the filesystem. There are several ways to do this: |
| 133 | |
| 134 | - Kill the filesystem daemon. Works in case of a) and b) |
| 135 | |
| 136 | - Kill the filesystem daemon and all users of the filesystem. Works |
| 137 | in all cases except some malicious deadlocks |
| 138 | |
| 139 | - Use forced umount (umount -f). Works in all cases but only if |
| 140 | filesystem is still attached (it hasn't been lazy unmounted) |
| 141 | |
| 142 | - Abort filesystem through the sysfs interface. Most powerful |
| 143 | method, always works. |
| 144 | |
Miklos Szeredi | 334f485 | 2005-09-09 13:10:27 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 145 | How do non-privileged mounts work? |
| 146 | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
| 147 | |
| 148 | Since the mount() system call is a privileged operation, a helper |
| 149 | program (fusermount) is needed, which is installed setuid root. |
| 150 | |
| 151 | The implication of providing non-privileged mounts is that the mount |
| 152 | owner must not be able to use this capability to compromise the |
| 153 | system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: |
| 154 | |
| 155 | A) mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the |
| 156 | help of the mounted filesystem |
| 157 | |
| 158 | B) mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from |
| 159 | other users' and the super user's processes |
| 160 | |
| 161 | C) mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in |
| 162 | other users' or the super user's processes |
| 163 | |
| 164 | How are requirements fulfilled? |
| 165 | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
| 166 | |
| 167 | A) The mount owner could gain elevated privileges by either: |
| 168 | |
| 169 | 1) creating a filesystem containing a device file, then opening |
| 170 | this device |
| 171 | |
| 172 | 2) creating a filesystem containing a suid or sgid application, |
| 173 | then executing this application |
| 174 | |
| 175 | The solution is not to allow opening device files and ignore |
| 176 | setuid and setgid bits when executing programs. To ensure this |
| 177 | fusermount always adds "nosuid" and "nodev" to the mount options |
| 178 | for non-privileged mounts. |
| 179 | |
| 180 | B) If another user is accessing files or directories in the |
| 181 | filesystem, the filesystem daemon serving requests can record the |
| 182 | exact sequence and timing of operations performed. This |
| 183 | information is otherwise inaccessible to the mount owner, so this |
| 184 | counts as an information leak. |
| 185 | |
| 186 | The solution to this problem will be presented in point 2) of C). |
| 187 | |
| 188 | C) There are several ways in which the mount owner can induce |
| 189 | undesired behavior in other users' processes, such as: |
| 190 | |
| 191 | 1) mounting a filesystem over a file or directory which the mount |
| 192 | owner could otherwise not be able to modify (or could only |
| 193 | make limited modifications). |
| 194 | |
| 195 | This is solved in fusermount, by checking the access |
| 196 | permissions on the mountpoint and only allowing the mount if |
| 197 | the mount owner can do unlimited modification (has write |
| 198 | access to the mountpoint, and mountpoint is not a "sticky" |
| 199 | directory) |
| 200 | |
| 201 | 2) Even if 1) is solved the mount owner can change the behavior |
| 202 | of other users' processes. |
| 203 | |
| 204 | i) It can slow down or indefinitely delay the execution of a |
| 205 | filesystem operation creating a DoS against the user or the |
| 206 | whole system. For example a suid application locking a |
| 207 | system file, and then accessing a file on the mount owner's |
| 208 | filesystem could be stopped, and thus causing the system |
| 209 | file to be locked forever. |
| 210 | |
| 211 | ii) It can present files or directories of unlimited length, or |
| 212 | directory structures of unlimited depth, possibly causing a |
| 213 | system process to eat up diskspace, memory or other |
| 214 | resources, again causing DoS. |
| 215 | |
| 216 | The solution to this as well as B) is not to allow processes |
| 217 | to access the filesystem, which could otherwise not be |
| 218 | monitored or manipulated by the mount owner. Since if the |
| 219 | mount owner can ptrace a process, it can do all of the above |
| 220 | without using a FUSE mount, the same criteria as used in |
| 221 | ptrace can be used to check if a process is allowed to access |
| 222 | the filesystem or not. |
| 223 | |
| 224 | Note that the ptrace check is not strictly necessary to |
| 225 | prevent B/2/i, it is enough to check if mount owner has enough |
| 226 | privilege to send signal to the process accessing the |
| 227 | filesystem, since SIGSTOP can be used to get a similar effect. |
| 228 | |
| 229 | I think these limitations are unacceptable? |
| 230 | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
| 231 | |
| 232 | If a sysadmin trusts the users enough, or can ensure through other |
| 233 | measures, that system processes will never enter non-privileged |
| 234 | mounts, it can relax the last limitation with a "user_allow_other" |
| 235 | config option. If this config option is set, the mounting user can |
| 236 | add the "allow_other" mount option which disables the check for other |
| 237 | users' processes. |
| 238 | |
| 239 | Kernel - userspace interface |
| 240 | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
| 241 | |
| 242 | The following diagram shows how a filesystem operation (in this |
| 243 | example unlink) is performed in FUSE. |
| 244 | |
| 245 | NOTE: everything in this description is greatly simplified |
| 246 | |
| 247 | | "rm /mnt/fuse/file" | FUSE filesystem daemon |
| 248 | | | |
| 249 | | | >sys_read() |
| 250 | | | >fuse_dev_read() |
| 251 | | | >request_wait() |
| 252 | | | [sleep on fc->waitq] |
| 253 | | | |
| 254 | | >sys_unlink() | |
| 255 | | >fuse_unlink() | |
| 256 | | [get request from | |
| 257 | | fc->unused_list] | |
| 258 | | >request_send() | |
| 259 | | [queue req on fc->pending] | |
| 260 | | [wake up fc->waitq] | [woken up] |
| 261 | | >request_wait_answer() | |
| 262 | | [sleep on req->waitq] | |
| 263 | | | <request_wait() |
| 264 | | | [remove req from fc->pending] |
| 265 | | | [copy req to read buffer] |
| 266 | | | [add req to fc->processing] |
| 267 | | | <fuse_dev_read() |
| 268 | | | <sys_read() |
| 269 | | | |
| 270 | | | [perform unlink] |
| 271 | | | |
| 272 | | | >sys_write() |
| 273 | | | >fuse_dev_write() |
| 274 | | | [look up req in fc->processing] |
| 275 | | | [remove from fc->processing] |
| 276 | | | [copy write buffer to req] |
| 277 | | [woken up] | [wake up req->waitq] |
| 278 | | | <fuse_dev_write() |
| 279 | | | <sys_write() |
| 280 | | <request_wait_answer() | |
| 281 | | <request_send() | |
| 282 | | [add request to | |
| 283 | | fc->unused_list] | |
| 284 | | <fuse_unlink() | |
| 285 | | <sys_unlink() | |
| 286 | |
| 287 | There are a couple of ways in which to deadlock a FUSE filesystem. |
| 288 | Since we are talking about unprivileged userspace programs, |
| 289 | something must be done about these. |
| 290 | |
| 291 | Scenario 1 - Simple deadlock |
| 292 | ----------------------------- |
| 293 | |
| 294 | | "rm /mnt/fuse/file" | FUSE filesystem daemon |
| 295 | | | |
| 296 | | >sys_unlink("/mnt/fuse/file") | |
| 297 | | [acquire inode semaphore | |
| 298 | | for "file"] | |
| 299 | | >fuse_unlink() | |
| 300 | | [sleep on req->waitq] | |
| 301 | | | <sys_read() |
| 302 | | | >sys_unlink("/mnt/fuse/file") |
| 303 | | | [acquire inode semaphore |
| 304 | | | for "file"] |
| 305 | | | *DEADLOCK* |
| 306 | |
| 307 | The solution for this is to allow requests to be interrupted while |
| 308 | they are in userspace: |
| 309 | |
| 310 | | [interrupted by signal] | |
| 311 | | <fuse_unlink() | |
| 312 | | [release semaphore] | [semaphore acquired] |
| 313 | | <sys_unlink() | |
| 314 | | | >fuse_unlink() |
| 315 | | | [queue req on fc->pending] |
| 316 | | | [wake up fc->waitq] |
| 317 | | | [sleep on req->waitq] |
| 318 | |
| 319 | If the filesystem daemon was single threaded, this will stop here, |
| 320 | since there's no other thread to dequeue and execute the request. |
| 321 | In this case the solution is to kill the FUSE daemon as well. If |
| 322 | there are multiple serving threads, you just have to kill them as |
| 323 | long as any remain. |
| 324 | |
| 325 | Moral: a filesystem which deadlocks, can soon find itself dead. |
| 326 | |
| 327 | Scenario 2 - Tricky deadlock |
| 328 | ---------------------------- |
| 329 | |
| 330 | This one needs a carefully crafted filesystem. It's a variation on |
| 331 | the above, only the call back to the filesystem is not explicit, |
| 332 | but is caused by a pagefault. |
| 333 | |
| 334 | | Kamikaze filesystem thread 1 | Kamikaze filesystem thread 2 |
| 335 | | | |
| 336 | | [fd = open("/mnt/fuse/file")] | [request served normally] |
| 337 | | [mmap fd to 'addr'] | |
| 338 | | [close fd] | [FLUSH triggers 'magic' flag] |
| 339 | | [read a byte from addr] | |
| 340 | | >do_page_fault() | |
| 341 | | [find or create page] | |
| 342 | | [lock page] | |
| 343 | | >fuse_readpage() | |
| 344 | | [queue READ request] | |
| 345 | | [sleep on req->waitq] | |
| 346 | | | [read request to buffer] |
| 347 | | | [create reply header before addr] |
| 348 | | | >sys_write(addr - headerlength) |
| 349 | | | >fuse_dev_write() |
| 350 | | | [look up req in fc->processing] |
| 351 | | | [remove from fc->processing] |
| 352 | | | [copy write buffer to req] |
| 353 | | | >do_page_fault() |
| 354 | | | [find or create page] |
| 355 | | | [lock page] |
| 356 | | | * DEADLOCK * |
| 357 | |
| 358 | Solution is again to let the the request be interrupted (not |
| 359 | elaborated further). |
| 360 | |
| 361 | An additional problem is that while the write buffer is being |
| 362 | copied to the request, the request must not be interrupted. This |
| 363 | is because the destination address of the copy may not be valid |
| 364 | after the request is interrupted. |
| 365 | |
| 366 | This is solved with doing the copy atomically, and allowing |
| 367 | interruption while the page(s) belonging to the write buffer are |
| 368 | faulted with get_user_pages(). The 'req->locked' flag indicates |
| 369 | when the copy is taking place, and interruption is delayed until |
| 370 | this flag is unset. |
| 371 | |
Miklos Szeredi | bacac38 | 2006-01-16 22:14:47 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 372 | Scenario 3 - Tricky deadlock with asynchronous read |
| 373 | --------------------------------------------------- |
| 374 | |
| 375 | The same situation as above, except thread-1 will wait on page lock |
| 376 | and hence it will be uninterruptible as well. The solution is to |
| 377 | abort the connection with forced umount (if mount is attached) or |
| 378 | through the abort attribute in sysfs. |