Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | # |
| 2 | # Security configuration |
| 3 | # |
| 4 | |
| 5 | menu "Security options" |
| 6 | |
| 7 | config KEYS |
| 8 | bool "Enable access key retention support" |
| 9 | help |
| 10 | This option provides support for retaining authentication tokens and |
| 11 | access keys in the kernel. |
| 12 | |
| 13 | It also includes provision of methods by which such keys might be |
| 14 | associated with a process so that network filesystems, encryption |
| 15 | support and the like can find them. |
| 16 | |
| 17 | Furthermore, a special type of key is available that acts as keyring: |
| 18 | a searchable sequence of keys. Each process is equipped with access |
| 19 | to five standard keyrings: UID-specific, GID-specific, session, |
| 20 | process and thread. |
| 21 | |
| 22 | If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. |
| 23 | |
Mimi Zohar | d00a1c7 | 2010-11-23 17:50:34 -0500 | [diff] [blame^] | 24 | config TRUSTED_KEYS |
| 25 | tristate "TRUSTED KEYS" |
| 26 | depends on KEYS && TCG_TPM |
| 27 | select CRYPTO |
| 28 | select CRYPTO_HMAC |
| 29 | select CRYPTO_SHA1 |
| 30 | help |
| 31 | This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing |
| 32 | keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys, |
| 33 | generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM only unseals the keys, |
| 34 | if the boot PCRs and other criteria match. Userspace will only ever |
| 35 | see encrypted blobs. |
| 36 | |
| 37 | If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. |
| 38 | |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 39 | config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS |
Michael LeMay | 06ec7be | 2006-06-26 00:24:56 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 40 | bool "Enable the /proc/keys file by which keys may be viewed" |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 41 | depends on KEYS |
| 42 | help |
Michael LeMay | 06ec7be | 2006-06-26 00:24:56 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 43 | This option turns on support for the /proc/keys file - through which |
| 44 | can be listed all the keys on the system that are viewable by the |
| 45 | reading process. |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 46 | |
Michael LeMay | 06ec7be | 2006-06-26 00:24:56 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 47 | The only keys included in the list are those that grant View |
| 48 | permission to the reading process whether or not it possesses them. |
| 49 | Note that LSM security checks are still performed, and may further |
| 50 | filter out keys that the current process is not authorised to view. |
| 51 | |
| 52 | Only key attributes are listed here; key payloads are not included in |
| 53 | the resulting table. |
| 54 | |
| 55 | If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 56 | |
Dan Rosenberg | eaf06b2 | 2010-11-11 14:05:18 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 57 | config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT |
| 58 | bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog" |
| 59 | default n |
| 60 | help |
| 61 | This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel |
| 62 | syslog via dmesg(8). |
| 63 | |
| 64 | If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced |
| 65 | unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1). |
| 66 | |
| 67 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. |
| 68 | |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 69 | config SECURITY |
| 70 | bool "Enable different security models" |
Adrian Bunk | 2c40579 | 2005-08-22 18:20:50 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 71 | depends on SYSFS |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 72 | help |
| 73 | This allows you to choose different security modules to be |
| 74 | configured into your kernel. |
| 75 | |
| 76 | If this option is not selected, the default Linux security |
| 77 | model will be used. |
| 78 | |
| 79 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. |
| 80 | |
Eric Paris | da31894 | 2008-08-22 11:35:57 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 81 | config SECURITYFS |
| 82 | bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem" |
| 83 | help |
| 84 | This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by |
Mimi Zohar | 3323eec | 2009-02-04 09:06:58 -0500 | [diff] [blame] | 85 | the TPM bios character driver and IMA, an integrity provider. It is |
| 86 | not used by SELinux or SMACK. |
Eric Paris | da31894 | 2008-08-22 11:35:57 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 87 | |
| 88 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. |
| 89 | |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 90 | config SECURITY_NETWORK |
| 91 | bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks" |
| 92 | depends on SECURITY |
| 93 | help |
| 94 | This enables the socket and networking security hooks. |
| 95 | If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to |
| 96 | implement socket and networking access controls. |
| 97 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. |
| 98 | |
Trent Jaeger | df71837 | 2005-12-13 23:12:27 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 99 | config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM |
| 100 | bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks" |
| 101 | depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK |
| 102 | help |
| 103 | This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks. |
| 104 | If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to |
| 105 | implement per-packet access controls based on labels |
| 106 | derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are |
| 107 | designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized |
| 108 | to communicate unlabelled data can send without using |
| 109 | IPSec. |
| 110 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. |
| 111 | |
Kentaro Takeda | be6d3e5 | 2008-12-17 13:24:15 +0900 | [diff] [blame] | 112 | config SECURITY_PATH |
| 113 | bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control" |
| 114 | depends on SECURITY |
| 115 | help |
| 116 | This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control. |
| 117 | If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to |
| 118 | implement pathname based access controls. |
| 119 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. |
| 120 | |
Joseph Cihula | 3162534 | 2009-06-30 19:30:59 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 121 | config INTEL_TXT |
| 122 | bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)" |
Shane Wang | 69575d3 | 2009-09-01 18:25:07 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 123 | depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT |
Joseph Cihula | 3162534 | 2009-06-30 19:30:59 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 124 | help |
| 125 | This option enables support for booting the kernel with the |
| 126 | Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize |
| 127 | Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch |
| 128 | of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this |
| 129 | will have no effect. |
| 130 | |
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo | 3c556e4 | 2009-08-12 12:00:40 -0300 | [diff] [blame] | 131 | Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and |
Joseph Cihula | 3162534 | 2009-06-30 19:30:59 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 132 | initial state as well as data reset protection. This is used to |
| 133 | create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which |
| 134 | helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning |
| 135 | correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside |
| 136 | of the kernel itself. |
| 137 | |
| 138 | Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having |
| 139 | confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that |
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo | 3c556e4 | 2009-08-12 12:00:40 -0300 | [diff] [blame] | 140 | it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for |
Joseph Cihula | 3162534 | 2009-06-30 19:30:59 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 141 | providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it. |
| 142 | |
| 143 | See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information |
| 144 | about Intel(R) TXT. |
| 145 | See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot. |
| 146 | See Documentation/intel_txt.txt for a description of how to enable |
| 147 | Intel TXT support in a kernel boot. |
| 148 | |
| 149 | If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. |
| 150 | |
Eric Paris | 788084a | 2009-07-31 12:54:11 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 151 | config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR |
Andreas Schwab | 024e6cb | 2009-08-18 22:14:29 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 152 | int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation" |
Eric Paris | 788084a | 2009-07-31 12:54:11 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 153 | depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX |
Dave Jones | a58578e | 2009-08-18 13:47:37 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 154 | default 65536 |
Eric Paris | 788084a | 2009-07-31 12:54:11 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 155 | help |
| 156 | This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected |
| 157 | from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages |
| 158 | can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs. |
| 159 | |
| 160 | For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space |
| 161 | a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems. |
| 162 | On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768. |
| 163 | Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map |
| 164 | this low address space will need the permission specific to the |
| 165 | systems running LSM. |
| 166 | |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 167 | source security/selinux/Kconfig |
Casey Schaufler | e114e47 | 2008-02-04 22:29:50 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 168 | source security/smack/Kconfig |
Kentaro Takeda | 00d7d6f | 2009-02-05 17:18:17 +0900 | [diff] [blame] | 169 | source security/tomoyo/Kconfig |
John Johansen | f9ad1af | 2010-07-29 14:48:08 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 170 | source security/apparmor/Kconfig |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 171 | |
Mimi Zohar | 3323eec | 2009-02-04 09:06:58 -0500 | [diff] [blame] | 172 | source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig |
| 173 | |
John Johansen | 6e65f92 | 2009-11-05 17:03:20 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 174 | choice |
| 175 | prompt "Default security module" |
| 176 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX |
| 177 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK |
| 178 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO |
John Johansen | f9ad1af | 2010-07-29 14:48:08 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 179 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR |
John Johansen | 6e65f92 | 2009-11-05 17:03:20 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 180 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC |
| 181 | |
| 182 | help |
| 183 | Select the security module that will be used by default if the |
| 184 | kernel parameter security= is not specified. |
| 185 | |
| 186 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX |
| 187 | bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y |
| 188 | |
| 189 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK |
| 190 | bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y |
| 191 | |
| 192 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO |
| 193 | bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y |
| 194 | |
John Johansen | f9ad1af | 2010-07-29 14:48:08 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 195 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR |
| 196 | bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y |
| 197 | |
John Johansen | 6e65f92 | 2009-11-05 17:03:20 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 198 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC |
| 199 | bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls" |
| 200 | |
| 201 | endchoice |
| 202 | |
| 203 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY |
| 204 | string |
| 205 | default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX |
| 206 | default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK |
| 207 | default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO |
John Johansen | f9ad1af | 2010-07-29 14:48:08 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 208 | default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR |
John Johansen | 6e65f92 | 2009-11-05 17:03:20 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 209 | default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC |
| 210 | |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 211 | endmenu |
| 212 | |