| |
| |
| "Good for you, you've decided to clean the elevator!" |
| - The Elevator, from Dark Star |
| |
| Smack is the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel. |
| Smack is a kernel based implementation of mandatory access |
| control that includes simplicity in its primary design goals. |
| |
| Smack is not the only Mandatory Access Control scheme |
| available for Linux. Those new to Mandatory Access Control |
| are encouraged to compare Smack with the other mechanisms |
| available to determine which is best suited to the problem |
| at hand. |
| |
| Smack consists of three major components: |
| - The kernel |
| - Basic utilities, which are helpful but not required |
| - Configuration data |
| |
| The kernel component of Smack is implemented as a Linux |
| Security Modules (LSM) module. It requires netlabel and |
| works best with file systems that support extended attributes, |
| although xattr support is not strictly required. |
| It is safe to run a Smack kernel under a "vanilla" distribution. |
| |
| Smack kernels use the CIPSO IP option. Some network |
| configurations are intolerant of IP options and can impede |
| access to systems that use them as Smack does. |
| |
| The current git repository for Smack user space is: |
| |
| git://github.com/smack-team/smack.git |
| |
| This should make and install on most modern distributions. |
| There are five commands included in smackutil: |
| |
| chsmack - display or set Smack extended attribute values |
| smackctl - load the Smack access rules |
| smackaccess - report if a process with one label has access |
| to an object with another |
| |
| These two commands are obsolete with the introduction of |
| the smackfs/load2 and smackfs/cipso2 interfaces. |
| |
| smackload - properly formats data for writing to smackfs/load |
| smackcipso - properly formats data for writing to smackfs/cipso |
| |
| In keeping with the intent of Smack, configuration data is |
| minimal and not strictly required. The most important |
| configuration step is mounting the smackfs pseudo filesystem. |
| If smackutil is installed the startup script will take care |
| of this, but it can be manually as well. |
| |
| Add this line to /etc/fstab: |
| |
| smackfs /sys/fs/smackfs smackfs defaults 0 0 |
| |
| The /sys/fs/smackfs directory is created by the kernel. |
| |
| Smack uses extended attributes (xattrs) to store labels on filesystem |
| objects. The attributes are stored in the extended attribute security |
| name space. A process must have CAP_MAC_ADMIN to change any of these |
| attributes. |
| |
| The extended attributes that Smack uses are: |
| |
| SMACK64 |
| Used to make access control decisions. In almost all cases |
| the label given to a new filesystem object will be the label |
| of the process that created it. |
| SMACK64EXEC |
| The Smack label of a process that execs a program file with |
| this attribute set will run with this attribute's value. |
| SMACK64MMAP |
| Don't allow the file to be mmapped by a process whose Smack |
| label does not allow all of the access permitted to a process |
| with the label contained in this attribute. This is a very |
| specific use case for shared libraries. |
| SMACK64TRANSMUTE |
| Can only have the value "TRUE". If this attribute is present |
| on a directory when an object is created in the directory and |
| the Smack rule (more below) that permitted the write access |
| to the directory includes the transmute ("t") mode the object |
| gets the label of the directory instead of the label of the |
| creating process. If the object being created is a directory |
| the SMACK64TRANSMUTE attribute is set as well. |
| SMACK64IPIN |
| This attribute is only available on file descriptors for sockets. |
| Use the Smack label in this attribute for access control |
| decisions on packets being delivered to this socket. |
| SMACK64IPOUT |
| This attribute is only available on file descriptors for sockets. |
| Use the Smack label in this attribute for access control |
| decisions on packets coming from this socket. |
| |
| There are multiple ways to set a Smack label on a file: |
| |
| # attr -S -s SMACK64 -V "value" path |
| # chsmack -a value path |
| |
| A process can see the Smack label it is running with by |
| reading /proc/self/attr/current. A process with CAP_MAC_ADMIN |
| can set the process Smack by writing there. |
| |
| Most Smack configuration is accomplished by writing to files |
| in the smackfs filesystem. This pseudo-filesystem is mounted |
| on /sys/fs/smackfs. |
| |
| access |
| This interface reports whether a subject with the specified |
| Smack label has a particular access to an object with a |
| specified Smack label. Write a fixed format access rule to |
| this file. The next read will indicate whether the access |
| would be permitted. The text will be either "1" indicating |
| access, or "0" indicating denial. |
| access2 |
| This interface reports whether a subject with the specified |
| Smack label has a particular access to an object with a |
| specified Smack label. Write a long format access rule to |
| this file. The next read will indicate whether the access |
| would be permitted. The text will be either "1" indicating |
| access, or "0" indicating denial. |
| ambient |
| This contains the Smack label applied to unlabeled network |
| packets. |
| change-rule |
| This interface allows modification of existing access control rules. |
| The format accepted on write is: |
| "%s %s %s %s" |
| where the first string is the subject label, the second the |
| object label, the third the access to allow and the fourth the |
| access to deny. The access strings may contain only the characters |
| "rwxat-". If a rule for a given subject and object exists it will be |
| modified by enabling the permissions in the third string and disabling |
| those in the fourth string. If there is no such rule it will be |
| created using the access specified in the third and the fourth strings. |
| cipso |
| This interface allows a specific CIPSO header to be assigned |
| to a Smack label. The format accepted on write is: |
| "%24s%4d%4d"["%4d"]... |
| The first string is a fixed Smack label. The first number is |
| the level to use. The second number is the number of categories. |
| The following numbers are the categories. |
| "level-3-cats-5-19 3 2 5 19" |
| cipso2 |
| This interface allows a specific CIPSO header to be assigned |
| to a Smack label. The format accepted on write is: |
| "%s%4d%4d"["%4d"]... |
| The first string is a long Smack label. The first number is |
| the level to use. The second number is the number of categories. |
| The following numbers are the categories. |
| "level-3-cats-5-19 3 2 5 19" |
| direct |
| This contains the CIPSO level used for Smack direct label |
| representation in network packets. |
| doi |
| This contains the CIPSO domain of interpretation used in |
| network packets. |
| load |
| This interface allows access control rules in addition to |
| the system defined rules to be specified. The format accepted |
| on write is: |
| "%24s%24s%5s" |
| where the first string is the subject label, the second the |
| object label, and the third the requested access. The access |
| string may contain only the characters "rwxat-", and specifies |
| which sort of access is allowed. The "-" is a placeholder for |
| permissions that are not allowed. The string "r-x--" would |
| specify read and execute access. Labels are limited to 23 |
| characters in length. |
| load2 |
| This interface allows access control rules in addition to |
| the system defined rules to be specified. The format accepted |
| on write is: |
| "%s %s %s" |
| where the first string is the subject label, the second the |
| object label, and the third the requested access. The access |
| string may contain only the characters "rwxat-", and specifies |
| which sort of access is allowed. The "-" is a placeholder for |
| permissions that are not allowed. The string "r-x--" would |
| specify read and execute access. |
| load-self |
| This interface allows process specific access rules to be |
| defined. These rules are only consulted if access would |
| otherwise be permitted, and are intended to provide additional |
| restrictions on the process. The format is the same as for |
| the load interface. |
| load-self2 |
| This interface allows process specific access rules to be |
| defined. These rules are only consulted if access would |
| otherwise be permitted, and are intended to provide additional |
| restrictions on the process. The format is the same as for |
| the load2 interface. |
| logging |
| This contains the Smack logging state. |
| mapped |
| This contains the CIPSO level used for Smack mapped label |
| representation in network packets. |
| netlabel |
| This interface allows specific internet addresses to be |
| treated as single label hosts. Packets are sent to single |
| label hosts without CIPSO headers, but only from processes |
| that have Smack write access to the host label. All packets |
| received from single label hosts are given the specified |
| label. The format accepted on write is: |
| "%d.%d.%d.%d label" or "%d.%d.%d.%d/%d label". |
| onlycap |
| This contains labels processes must have for CAP_MAC_ADMIN |
| and CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE to be effective. If this file is empty |
| these capabilities are effective at for processes with any |
| label. The values are set by writing the desired labels, separated |
| by spaces, to the file or cleared by writing "-" to the file. |
| ptrace |
| This is used to define the current ptrace policy |
| 0 - default: this is the policy that relies on Smack access rules. |
| For the PTRACE_READ a subject needs to have a read access on |
| object. For the PTRACE_ATTACH a read-write access is required. |
| 1 - exact: this is the policy that limits PTRACE_ATTACH. Attach is |
| only allowed when subject's and object's labels are equal. |
| PTRACE_READ is not affected. Can be overridden with CAP_SYS_PTRACE. |
| 2 - draconian: this policy behaves like the 'exact' above with an |
| exception that it can't be overridden with CAP_SYS_PTRACE. |
| revoke-subject |
| Writing a Smack label here sets the access to '-' for all access |
| rules with that subject label. |
| unconfined |
| If the kernel is configured with CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP |
| a process with CAP_MAC_ADMIN can write a label into this interface. |
| Thereafter, accesses that involve that label will be logged and |
| the access permitted if it wouldn't be otherwise. Note that this |
| is dangerous and can ruin the proper labeling of your system. |
| It should never be used in production. |
| |
| You can add access rules in /etc/smack/accesses. They take the form: |
| |
| subjectlabel objectlabel access |
| |
| access is a combination of the letters rwxatb which specify the |
| kind of access permitted a subject with subjectlabel on an |
| object with objectlabel. If there is no rule no access is allowed. |
| |
| Look for additional programs on http://schaufler-ca.com |
| |
| From the Smack Whitepaper: |
| |
| The Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel |
| |
| Casey Schaufler |
| casey@schaufler-ca.com |
| |
| Mandatory Access Control |
| |
| Computer systems employ a variety of schemes to constrain how information is |
| shared among the people and services using the machine. Some of these schemes |
| allow the program or user to decide what other programs or users are allowed |
| access to pieces of data. These schemes are called discretionary access |
| control mechanisms because the access control is specified at the discretion |
| of the user. Other schemes do not leave the decision regarding what a user or |
| program can access up to users or programs. These schemes are called mandatory |
| access control mechanisms because you don't have a choice regarding the users |
| or programs that have access to pieces of data. |
| |
| Bell & LaPadula |
| |
| From the middle of the 1980's until the turn of the century Mandatory Access |
| Control (MAC) was very closely associated with the Bell & LaPadula security |
| model, a mathematical description of the United States Department of Defense |
| policy for marking paper documents. MAC in this form enjoyed a following |
| within the Capital Beltway and Scandinavian supercomputer centers but was |
| often sited as failing to address general needs. |
| |
| Domain Type Enforcement |
| |
| Around the turn of the century Domain Type Enforcement (DTE) became popular. |
| This scheme organizes users, programs, and data into domains that are |
| protected from each other. This scheme has been widely deployed as a component |
| of popular Linux distributions. The administrative overhead required to |
| maintain this scheme and the detailed understanding of the whole system |
| necessary to provide a secure domain mapping leads to the scheme being |
| disabled or used in limited ways in the majority of cases. |
| |
| Smack |
| |
| Smack is a Mandatory Access Control mechanism designed to provide useful MAC |
| while avoiding the pitfalls of its predecessors. The limitations of Bell & |
| LaPadula are addressed by providing a scheme whereby access can be controlled |
| according to the requirements of the system and its purpose rather than those |
| imposed by an arcane government policy. The complexity of Domain Type |
| Enforcement and avoided by defining access controls in terms of the access |
| modes already in use. |
| |
| Smack Terminology |
| |
| The jargon used to talk about Smack will be familiar to those who have dealt |
| with other MAC systems and shouldn't be too difficult for the uninitiated to |
| pick up. There are four terms that are used in a specific way and that are |
| especially important: |
| |
| Subject: A subject is an active entity on the computer system. |
| On Smack a subject is a task, which is in turn the basic unit |
| of execution. |
| |
| Object: An object is a passive entity on the computer system. |
| On Smack files of all types, IPC, and tasks can be objects. |
| |
| Access: Any attempt by a subject to put information into or get |
| information from an object is an access. |
| |
| Label: Data that identifies the Mandatory Access Control |
| characteristics of a subject or an object. |
| |
| These definitions are consistent with the traditional use in the security |
| community. There are also some terms from Linux that are likely to crop up: |
| |
| Capability: A task that possesses a capability has permission to |
| violate an aspect of the system security policy, as identified by |
| the specific capability. A task that possesses one or more |
| capabilities is a privileged task, whereas a task with no |
| capabilities is an unprivileged task. |
| |
| Privilege: A task that is allowed to violate the system security |
| policy is said to have privilege. As of this writing a task can |
| have privilege either by possessing capabilities or by having an |
| effective user of root. |
| |
| Smack Basics |
| |
| Smack is an extension to a Linux system. It enforces additional restrictions |
| on what subjects can access which objects, based on the labels attached to |
| each of the subject and the object. |
| |
| Labels |
| |
| Smack labels are ASCII character strings. They can be up to 255 characters |
| long, but keeping them to twenty-three characters is recommended. |
| Single character labels using special characters, that being anything |
| other than a letter or digit, are reserved for use by the Smack development |
| team. Smack labels are unstructured, case sensitive, and the only operation |
| ever performed on them is comparison for equality. Smack labels cannot |
| contain unprintable characters, the "/" (slash), the "\" (backslash), the "'" |
| (quote) and '"' (double-quote) characters. |
| Smack labels cannot begin with a '-'. This is reserved for special options. |
| |
| There are some predefined labels: |
| |
| _ Pronounced "floor", a single underscore character. |
| ^ Pronounced "hat", a single circumflex character. |
| * Pronounced "star", a single asterisk character. |
| ? Pronounced "huh", a single question mark character. |
| @ Pronounced "web", a single at sign character. |
| |
| Every task on a Smack system is assigned a label. The Smack label |
| of a process will usually be assigned by the system initialization |
| mechanism. |
| |
| Access Rules |
| |
| Smack uses the traditional access modes of Linux. These modes are read, |
| execute, write, and occasionally append. There are a few cases where the |
| access mode may not be obvious. These include: |
| |
| Signals: A signal is a write operation from the subject task to |
| the object task. |
| Internet Domain IPC: Transmission of a packet is considered a |
| write operation from the source task to the destination task. |
| |
| Smack restricts access based on the label attached to a subject and the label |
| attached to the object it is trying to access. The rules enforced are, in |
| order: |
| |
| 1. Any access requested by a task labeled "*" is denied. |
| 2. A read or execute access requested by a task labeled "^" |
| is permitted. |
| 3. A read or execute access requested on an object labeled "_" |
| is permitted. |
| 4. Any access requested on an object labeled "*" is permitted. |
| 5. Any access requested by a task on an object with the same |
| label is permitted. |
| 6. Any access requested that is explicitly defined in the loaded |
| rule set is permitted. |
| 7. Any other access is denied. |
| |
| Smack Access Rules |
| |
| With the isolation provided by Smack access separation is simple. There are |
| many interesting cases where limited access by subjects to objects with |
| different labels is desired. One example is the familiar spy model of |
| sensitivity, where a scientist working on a highly classified project would be |
| able to read documents of lower classifications and anything she writes will |
| be "born" highly classified. To accommodate such schemes Smack includes a |
| mechanism for specifying rules allowing access between labels. |
| |
| Access Rule Format |
| |
| The format of an access rule is: |
| |
| subject-label object-label access |
| |
| Where subject-label is the Smack label of the task, object-label is the Smack |
| label of the thing being accessed, and access is a string specifying the sort |
| of access allowed. The access specification is searched for letters that |
| describe access modes: |
| |
| a: indicates that append access should be granted. |
| r: indicates that read access should be granted. |
| w: indicates that write access should be granted. |
| x: indicates that execute access should be granted. |
| t: indicates that the rule requests transmutation. |
| b: indicates that the rule should be reported for bring-up. |
| |
| Uppercase values for the specification letters are allowed as well. |
| Access mode specifications can be in any order. Examples of acceptable rules |
| are: |
| |
| TopSecret Secret rx |
| Secret Unclass R |
| Manager Game x |
| User HR w |
| Snap Crackle rwxatb |
| New Old rRrRr |
| Closed Off - |
| |
| Examples of unacceptable rules are: |
| |
| Top Secret Secret rx |
| Ace Ace r |
| Odd spells waxbeans |
| |
| Spaces are not allowed in labels. Since a subject always has access to files |
| with the same label specifying a rule for that case is pointless. Only |
| valid letters (rwxatbRWXATB) and the dash ('-') character are allowed in |
| access specifications. The dash is a placeholder, so "a-r" is the same |
| as "ar". A lone dash is used to specify that no access should be allowed. |
| |
| Applying Access Rules |
| |
| The developers of Linux rarely define new sorts of things, usually importing |
| schemes and concepts from other systems. Most often, the other systems are |
| variants of Unix. Unix has many endearing properties, but consistency of |
| access control models is not one of them. Smack strives to treat accesses as |
| uniformly as is sensible while keeping with the spirit of the underlying |
| mechanism. |
| |
| File system objects including files, directories, named pipes, symbolic links, |
| and devices require access permissions that closely match those used by mode |
| bit access. To open a file for reading read access is required on the file. To |
| search a directory requires execute access. Creating a file with write access |
| requires both read and write access on the containing directory. Deleting a |
| file requires read and write access to the file and to the containing |
| directory. It is possible that a user may be able to see that a file exists |
| but not any of its attributes by the circumstance of having read access to the |
| containing directory but not to the differently labeled file. This is an |
| artifact of the file name being data in the directory, not a part of the file. |
| |
| If a directory is marked as transmuting (SMACK64TRANSMUTE=TRUE) and the |
| access rule that allows a process to create an object in that directory |
| includes 't' access the label assigned to the new object will be that |
| of the directory, not the creating process. This makes it much easier |
| for two processes with different labels to share data without granting |
| access to all of their files. |
| |
| IPC objects, message queues, semaphore sets, and memory segments exist in flat |
| namespaces and access requests are only required to match the object in |
| question. |
| |
| Process objects reflect tasks on the system and the Smack label used to access |
| them is the same Smack label that the task would use for its own access |
| attempts. Sending a signal via the kill() system call is a write operation |
| from the signaler to the recipient. Debugging a process requires both reading |
| and writing. Creating a new task is an internal operation that results in two |
| tasks with identical Smack labels and requires no access checks. |
| |
| Sockets are data structures attached to processes and sending a packet from |
| one process to another requires that the sender have write access to the |
| receiver. The receiver is not required to have read access to the sender. |
| |
| Setting Access Rules |
| |
| The configuration file /etc/smack/accesses contains the rules to be set at |
| system startup. The contents are written to the special file |
| /sys/fs/smackfs/load2. Rules can be added at any time and take effect |
| immediately. For any pair of subject and object labels there can be only |
| one rule, with the most recently specified overriding any earlier |
| specification. |
| |
| Task Attribute |
| |
| The Smack label of a process can be read from /proc/<pid>/attr/current. A |
| process can read its own Smack label from /proc/self/attr/current. A |
| privileged process can change its own Smack label by writing to |
| /proc/self/attr/current but not the label of another process. |
| |
| File Attribute |
| |
| The Smack label of a filesystem object is stored as an extended attribute |
| named SMACK64 on the file. This attribute is in the security namespace. It can |
| only be changed by a process with privilege. |
| |
| Privilege |
| |
| A process with CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE or CAP_MAC_ADMIN is privileged. |
| CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE allows the process access to objects it would |
| be denied otherwise. CAP_MAC_ADMIN allows a process to change |
| Smack data, including rules and attributes. |
| |
| Smack Networking |
| |
| As mentioned before, Smack enforces access control on network protocol |
| transmissions. Every packet sent by a Smack process is tagged with its Smack |
| label. This is done by adding a CIPSO tag to the header of the IP packet. Each |
| packet received is expected to have a CIPSO tag that identifies the label and |
| if it lacks such a tag the network ambient label is assumed. Before the packet |
| is delivered a check is made to determine that a subject with the label on the |
| packet has write access to the receiving process and if that is not the case |
| the packet is dropped. |
| |
| CIPSO Configuration |
| |
| It is normally unnecessary to specify the CIPSO configuration. The default |
| values used by the system handle all internal cases. Smack will compose CIPSO |
| label values to match the Smack labels being used without administrative |
| intervention. Unlabeled packets that come into the system will be given the |
| ambient label. |
| |
| Smack requires configuration in the case where packets from a system that is |
| not Smack that speaks CIPSO may be encountered. Usually this will be a Trusted |
| Solaris system, but there are other, less widely deployed systems out there. |
| CIPSO provides 3 important values, a Domain Of Interpretation (DOI), a level, |
| and a category set with each packet. The DOI is intended to identify a group |
| of systems that use compatible labeling schemes, and the DOI specified on the |
| Smack system must match that of the remote system or packets will be |
| discarded. The DOI is 3 by default. The value can be read from |
| /sys/fs/smackfs/doi and can be changed by writing to /sys/fs/smackfs/doi. |
| |
| The label and category set are mapped to a Smack label as defined in |
| /etc/smack/cipso. |
| |
| A Smack/CIPSO mapping has the form: |
| |
| smack level [category [category]*] |
| |
| Smack does not expect the level or category sets to be related in any |
| particular way and does not assume or assign accesses based on them. Some |
| examples of mappings: |
| |
| TopSecret 7 |
| TS:A,B 7 1 2 |
| SecBDE 5 2 4 6 |
| RAFTERS 7 12 26 |
| |
| The ":" and "," characters are permitted in a Smack label but have no special |
| meaning. |
| |
| The mapping of Smack labels to CIPSO values is defined by writing to |
| /sys/fs/smackfs/cipso2. |
| |
| In addition to explicit mappings Smack supports direct CIPSO mappings. One |
| CIPSO level is used to indicate that the category set passed in the packet is |
| in fact an encoding of the Smack label. The level used is 250 by default. The |
| value can be read from /sys/fs/smackfs/direct and changed by writing to |
| /sys/fs/smackfs/direct. |
| |
| Socket Attributes |
| |
| There are two attributes that are associated with sockets. These attributes |
| can only be set by privileged tasks, but any task can read them for their own |
| sockets. |
| |
| SMACK64IPIN: The Smack label of the task object. A privileged |
| program that will enforce policy may set this to the star label. |
| |
| SMACK64IPOUT: The Smack label transmitted with outgoing packets. |
| A privileged program may set this to match the label of another |
| task with which it hopes to communicate. |
| |
| Smack Netlabel Exceptions |
| |
| You will often find that your labeled application has to talk to the outside, |
| unlabeled world. To do this there's a special file /sys/fs/smackfs/netlabel |
| where you can add some exceptions in the form of : |
| @IP1 LABEL1 or |
| @IP2/MASK LABEL2 |
| |
| It means that your application will have unlabeled access to @IP1 if it has |
| write access on LABEL1, and access to the subnet @IP2/MASK if it has write |
| access on LABEL2. |
| |
| Entries in the /sys/fs/smackfs/netlabel file are matched by longest mask |
| first, like in classless IPv4 routing. |
| |
| A special label '@' and an option '-CIPSO' can be used there : |
| @ means Internet, any application with any label has access to it |
| -CIPSO means standard CIPSO networking |
| |
| If you don't know what CIPSO is and don't plan to use it, you can just do : |
| echo 127.0.0.1 -CIPSO > /sys/fs/smackfs/netlabel |
| echo 0.0.0.0/0 @ > /sys/fs/smackfs/netlabel |
| |
| If you use CIPSO on your 192.168.0.0/16 local network and need also unlabeled |
| Internet access, you can have : |
| echo 127.0.0.1 -CIPSO > /sys/fs/smackfs/netlabel |
| echo 192.168.0.0/16 -CIPSO > /sys/fs/smackfs/netlabel |
| echo 0.0.0.0/0 @ > /sys/fs/smackfs/netlabel |
| |
| |
| Writing Applications for Smack |
| |
| There are three sorts of applications that will run on a Smack system. How an |
| application interacts with Smack will determine what it will have to do to |
| work properly under Smack. |
| |
| Smack Ignorant Applications |
| |
| By far the majority of applications have no reason whatever to care about the |
| unique properties of Smack. Since invoking a program has no impact on the |
| Smack label associated with the process the only concern likely to arise is |
| whether the process has execute access to the program. |
| |
| Smack Relevant Applications |
| |
| Some programs can be improved by teaching them about Smack, but do not make |
| any security decisions themselves. The utility ls(1) is one example of such a |
| program. |
| |
| Smack Enforcing Applications |
| |
| These are special programs that not only know about Smack, but participate in |
| the enforcement of system policy. In most cases these are the programs that |
| set up user sessions. There are also network services that provide information |
| to processes running with various labels. |
| |
| File System Interfaces |
| |
| Smack maintains labels on file system objects using extended attributes. The |
| Smack label of a file, directory, or other file system object can be obtained |
| using getxattr(2). |
| |
| len = getxattr("/", "security.SMACK64", value, sizeof (value)); |
| |
| will put the Smack label of the root directory into value. A privileged |
| process can set the Smack label of a file system object with setxattr(2). |
| |
| len = strlen("Rubble"); |
| rc = setxattr("/foo", "security.SMACK64", "Rubble", len, 0); |
| |
| will set the Smack label of /foo to "Rubble" if the program has appropriate |
| privilege. |
| |
| Socket Interfaces |
| |
| The socket attributes can be read using fgetxattr(2). |
| |
| A privileged process can set the Smack label of outgoing packets with |
| fsetxattr(2). |
| |
| len = strlen("Rubble"); |
| rc = fsetxattr(fd, "security.SMACK64IPOUT", "Rubble", len, 0); |
| |
| will set the Smack label "Rubble" on packets going out from the socket if the |
| program has appropriate privilege. |
| |
| rc = fsetxattr(fd, "security.SMACK64IPIN, "*", strlen("*"), 0); |
| |
| will set the Smack label "*" as the object label against which incoming |
| packets will be checked if the program has appropriate privilege. |
| |
| Administration |
| |
| Smack supports some mount options: |
| |
| smackfsdef=label: specifies the label to give files that lack |
| the Smack label extended attribute. |
| |
| smackfsroot=label: specifies the label to assign the root of the |
| file system if it lacks the Smack extended attribute. |
| |
| smackfshat=label: specifies a label that must have read access to |
| all labels set on the filesystem. Not yet enforced. |
| |
| smackfsfloor=label: specifies a label to which all labels set on the |
| filesystem must have read access. Not yet enforced. |
| |
| These mount options apply to all file system types. |
| |
| Smack auditing |
| |
| If you want Smack auditing of security events, you need to set CONFIG_AUDIT |
| in your kernel configuration. |
| By default, all denied events will be audited. You can change this behavior by |
| writing a single character to the /sys/fs/smackfs/logging file : |
| 0 : no logging |
| 1 : log denied (default) |
| 2 : log accepted |
| 3 : log denied & accepted |
| |
| Events are logged as 'key=value' pairs, for each event you at least will get |
| the subject, the object, the rights requested, the action, the kernel function |
| that triggered the event, plus other pairs depending on the type of event |
| audited. |
| |
| Bringup Mode |
| |
| Bringup mode provides logging features that can make application |
| configuration and system bringup easier. Configure the kernel with |
| CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP to enable these features. When bringup |
| mode is enabled accesses that succeed due to rules marked with the "b" |
| access mode will logged. When a new label is introduced for processes |
| rules can be added aggressively, marked with the "b". The logging allows |
| tracking of which rules actual get used for that label. |
| |
| Another feature of bringup mode is the "unconfined" option. Writing |
| a label to /sys/fs/smackfs/unconfined makes subjects with that label |
| able to access any object, and objects with that label accessible to |
| all subjects. Any access that is granted because a label is unconfined |
| is logged. This feature is dangerous, as files and directories may |
| be created in places they couldn't if the policy were being enforced. |