security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c - kernel/msm-4.9 - Gitiles

 /*
  * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
  * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
  * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
  *
  * ima_policy.c
  * 	- initialize default measure policy rules
  *
  */
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/magic.h>
 #include <linux/parser.h>

 #include "ima.h"

 /* flags definitions */
 #define IMA_FUNC 	0x0001
 #define IMA_MASK 	0x0002
 #define IMA_FSMAGIC	0x0004
 #define IMA_UID		0x0008

 enum ima_action { UNKNOWN = -1, DONT_MEASURE = 0, MEASURE };

 #define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
 enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
 	LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
 };

 struct ima_measure_rule_entry {
 	struct list_head list;
 	enum ima_action action;
 	unsigned int flags;
 	enum ima_hooks func;
 	int mask;
 	unsigned long fsmagic;
 	uid_t uid;
 	struct {
 		void *rule;	/* LSM file metadata specific */
 		int type;	/* audit type */
 	} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
 };

 /* Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
  * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, and .uid
  */
 static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,
 	 .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,
 	 .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = 0xF97CFF8C,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_MMAP,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
 	{.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
 	{.action = MEASURE,.func = PATH_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0,
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID}
 };

 static LIST_HEAD(measure_default_rules);
 static LIST_HEAD(measure_policy_rules);
 static struct list_head *ima_measure;

 static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_measure_mutex);

 /**
  * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
  * @rule: a pointer to a rule
  * @inode: a pointer to an inode
  * @func: LIM hook identifier
  * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
  *
  * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
  */
 static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
 			    struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
 {
 	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
 	int i;

 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && rule->func != func)
 		return false;
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && rule->mask != mask)
 		return false;
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
 	    && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
 		return false;
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && rule->uid != tsk->cred->uid)
 		return false;
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
 		int rc;
 		u32 osid, sid;

 		if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
 			continue;

 		switch (i) {
 		case LSM_OBJ_USER:
 		case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
 		case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
 			security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
 			rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
 							rule->lsm[i].type,
 							AUDIT_EQUAL,
 							rule->lsm[i].rule,
 							NULL);
 			break;
 		case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
 			security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
 			rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid,
 							rule->lsm[i].type,
 							AUDIT_EQUAL,
 							rule->lsm[i].rule,
 							NULL);
 		default:
 			break;
 		}
 		if (!rc)
 			return false;
 	}
 	return true;
 }

 /**
  * ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions
  * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
  * @func: IMA hook identifier
  * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
  *
  * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
  * conditions.
  *
  * (There is no need for locking when walking the policy list,
  * as elements in the list are never deleted, nor does the list
  * change.)
  */
 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
 {
 	struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry;

 	list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_measure, list) {
 		bool rc;

 		rc = ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask);
 		if (rc)
 			return entry->action;
 	}
 	return 0;
 }

 /**
  * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
  *
  * ima_measure points to either the measure_default_rules or the
  * the new measure_policy_rules.
  */
 void ima_init_policy(void)
 {
 	int i;

 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules); i++)
 		list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, &measure_default_rules);
 	ima_measure = &measure_default_rules;
 }

 /**
  * ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules
  *
  * Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new
  * policy.  Once updated, the policy is locked, no additional rules can be
  * added to the policy.
  */
 void ima_update_policy(void)
 {
 	const char *op = "policy_update";
 	const char *cause = "already exists";
 	int result = 1;
 	int audit_info = 0;

 	if (ima_measure == &measure_default_rules) {
 		ima_measure = &measure_policy_rules;
 		cause = "complete";
 		result = 0;
 	}
 	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
 			    NULL, op, cause, result, audit_info);
 }

 enum {
 	Opt_err = -1,
 	Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure,
 	Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
 	Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
 	Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid
 };

 static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
 	{Opt_measure, "measure"},
 	{Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"},
 	{Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"},
 	{Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"},
 	{Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"},
 	{Opt_subj_user, "subj_user=%s"},
 	{Opt_subj_role, "subj_role=%s"},
 	{Opt_subj_type, "subj_type=%s"},
 	{Opt_func, "func=%s"},
 	{Opt_mask, "mask=%s"},
 	{Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
 	{Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
 	{Opt_err, NULL}
 };

 static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry,
 			     char *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type)
 {
 	int result;

 	entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
 	result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
 					   AUDIT_EQUAL, args,
 					   &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
 	return result;
 }

 static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
 	char *p;
 	int result = 0;

 	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);

 	entry->action = -1;
 	while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \n")) != NULL) {
 		substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
 		int token;
 		unsigned long lnum;

 		if (result < 0)
 			break;
 		if (!*p)
 			continue;
 		token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args);
 		switch (token) {
 		case Opt_measure:
 			audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", "measure");
 			entry->action = MEASURE;
 			break;
 		case Opt_dont_measure:
 			audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", "dont_measure");
 			entry->action = DONT_MEASURE;
 			break;
 		case Opt_func:
 			audit_log_format(ab, "func=%s ", args[0].from);
 			if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
 				entry->func = PATH_CHECK;
 			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
 				entry->func = FILE_MMAP;
 			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
 				entry->func = BPRM_CHECK;
 			else
 				result = -EINVAL;
 			if (!result)
 				entry->flags |= IMA_FUNC;
 			break;
 		case Opt_mask:
 			audit_log_format(ab, "mask=%s ", args[0].from);
 			if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
 				entry->mask = MAY_EXEC;
 			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
 				entry->mask = MAY_WRITE;
 			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_READ") == 0)
 				entry->mask = MAY_READ;
 			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
 				entry->mask = MAY_APPEND;
 			else
 				result = -EINVAL;
 			if (!result)
 				entry->flags |= IMA_MASK;
 			break;
 		case Opt_fsmagic:
 			audit_log_format(ab, "fsmagic=%s ", args[0].from);
 			result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16,
 						&entry->fsmagic);
 			if (!result)
 				entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
 			break;
 		case Opt_uid:
 			audit_log_format(ab, "uid=%s ", args[0].from);
 			result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
 			if (!result) {
 				entry->uid = (uid_t) lnum;
 				if (entry->uid != lnum)
 					result = -EINVAL;
 				else
 					entry->flags |= IMA_UID;
 			}
 			break;
 		case Opt_obj_user:
 			audit_log_format(ab, "obj_user=%s ", args[0].from);
 			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
 						   LSM_OBJ_USER,
 						   AUDIT_OBJ_USER);
 			break;
 		case Opt_obj_role:
 			audit_log_format(ab, "obj_role=%s ", args[0].from);
 			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
 						   LSM_OBJ_ROLE,
 						   AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE);
 			break;
 		case Opt_obj_type:
 			audit_log_format(ab, "obj_type=%s ", args[0].from);
 			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
 						   LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
 						   AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE);
 			break;
 		case Opt_subj_user:
 			audit_log_format(ab, "subj_user=%s ", args[0].from);
 			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
 						   LSM_SUBJ_USER,
 						   AUDIT_SUBJ_USER);
 			break;
 		case Opt_subj_role:
 			audit_log_format(ab, "subj_role=%s ", args[0].from);
 			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
 						   LSM_SUBJ_ROLE,
 						   AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE);
 			break;
 		case Opt_subj_type:
 			audit_log_format(ab, "subj_type=%s ", args[0].from);
 			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
 						   LSM_SUBJ_TYPE,
 						   AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE);
 			break;
 		case Opt_err:
 			audit_log_format(ab, "UNKNOWN=%s ", p);
 			break;
 		}
 	}
 	if (entry->action == UNKNOWN)
 		result = -EINVAL;

 	audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result ? 0 : 1);
 	audit_log_end(ab);
 	return result;
 }

 /**
  * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to measure_policy_rules
  * @rule - ima measurement policy rule
  *
  * Uses a mutex to protect the policy list from multiple concurrent writers.
  * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure.
  */
 int ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 {
 	const char *op = "update_policy";
 	struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry;
 	int result = 0;
 	int audit_info = 0;

 	/* Prevent installed policy from changing */
 	if (ima_measure != &measure_default_rules) {
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
 				    NULL, op, "already exists",
 				    -EACCES, audit_info);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}

 	entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!entry) {
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
 				    NULL, op, "-ENOMEM", -ENOMEM, audit_info);
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}

 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);

 	result = ima_parse_rule(rule, entry);
 	if (!result) {
 		mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
 		list_add_tail(&entry->list, &measure_policy_rules);
 		mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
 	} else {
 		kfree(entry);
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
 				    NULL, op, "invalid policy", result,
 				    audit_info);
 	}
 	return result;
 }

 /* ima_delete_rules called to cleanup invalid policy */
 void ima_delete_rules(void)
 {
 	struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;

 	mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &measure_policy_rules, list) {
 		list_del(&entry->list);
 		kfree(entry);
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
 }
	/*
	* Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
	* Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
	*
	* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
	* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
	* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
	*
	* ima_policy.c
	* - initialize default measure policy rules
	*
	*/
	#include <linux/module.h>
	#include <linux/list.h>
	#include <linux/security.h>
	#include <linux/magic.h>
	#include <linux/parser.h>

	#include "ima.h"

	/* flags definitions */
	#define IMA_FUNC 0x0001
	#define IMA_MASK 0x0002
	#define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
	#define IMA_UID 0x0008

	enum ima_action { UNKNOWN = -1, DONT_MEASURE = 0, MEASURE };

	#define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
	enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
	LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
	};

	struct ima_measure_rule_entry {
	struct list_head list;
	enum ima_action action;
	unsigned int flags;
	enum ima_hooks func;
	int mask;
	unsigned long fsmagic;
	uid_t uid;
	struct {
	void rule; / LSM file metadata specific */
	int type; /* audit type */
	} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
	};

	/* Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
	* written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, and .uid
	*/
	static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,
	.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,
	.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = 0xF97CFF8C,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
	{.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_MMAP,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
	.flags = IMA_FUNC \| IMA_MASK},
	{.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
	.flags = IMA_FUNC \| IMA_MASK},
	{.action = MEASURE,.func = PATH_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0,
	.flags = IMA_FUNC \| IMA_MASK \| IMA_UID}
	};

	static LIST_HEAD(measure_default_rules);
	static LIST_HEAD(measure_policy_rules);
	static struct list_head *ima_measure;

	static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_measure_mutex);

	/**
	* ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
	* @rule: a pointer to a rule
	* @inode: a pointer to an inode
	* @func: LIM hook identifier
	* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ \| MAY_WRITE \| MAY_APPEND \| MAY_EXEC)
	*
	* Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
	*/
	static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
	struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
	{
	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
	int i;

	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && rule->func != func)
	return false;
	if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && rule->mask != mask)
	return false;
	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
	&& rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
	return false;
	if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && rule->uid != tsk->cred->uid)
	return false;
	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
	int rc;
	u32 osid, sid;

	if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
	continue;

	switch (i) {
	case LSM_OBJ_USER:
	case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
	case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
	rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
	rule->lsm[i].type,
	AUDIT_EQUAL,
	rule->lsm[i].rule,
	NULL);
	break;
	case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
	case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
	case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
	security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
	rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid,
	rule->lsm[i].type,
	AUDIT_EQUAL,
	rule->lsm[i].rule,
	NULL);
	default:
	break;
	}
	if (!rc)
	return false;
	}
	return true;
	}

	/**
	* ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions
	* @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
	* @func: IMA hook identifier
	* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ \| MAY_WRITE \| MAY_APPEND \| MAY_EXEC)
	*
	* Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
	* conditions.
	*
	* (There is no need for locking when walking the policy list,
	* as elements in the list are never deleted, nor does the list
	* change.)
	*/
	int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
	{
	struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry;

	list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_measure, list) {
	bool rc;

	rc = ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask);
	if (rc)
	return entry->action;
	}
	return 0;
	}

	/**
	* ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
	*
	* ima_measure points to either the measure_default_rules or the
	* the new measure_policy_rules.
	*/
	void ima_init_policy(void)
	{
	int i;

	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules); i++)
	list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, &measure_default_rules);
	ima_measure = &measure_default_rules;
	}

	/**
	* ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules
	*
	* Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new
	* policy. Once updated, the policy is locked, no additional rules can be
	* added to the policy.
	*/
	void ima_update_policy(void)
	{
	const char *op = "policy_update";
	const char *cause = "already exists";
	int result = 1;
	int audit_info = 0;

	if (ima_measure == &measure_default_rules) {
	ima_measure = &measure_policy_rules;
	cause = "complete";
	result = 0;
	}
	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
	NULL, op, cause, result, audit_info);
	}

	enum {
	Opt_err = -1,
	Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure,
	Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
	Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
	Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid
	};

	static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
	{Opt_measure, "measure"},
	{Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"},
	{Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"},
	{Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"},
	{Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"},
	{Opt_subj_user, "subj_user=%s"},
	{Opt_subj_role, "subj_role=%s"},
	{Opt_subj_type, "subj_type=%s"},
	{Opt_func, "func=%s"},
	{Opt_mask, "mask=%s"},
	{Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
	{Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
	{Opt_err, NULL}
	};

	static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry,
	char *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type)
	{
	int result;

	entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
	result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
	AUDIT_EQUAL, args,
	&entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
	return result;
	}

	static int ima_parse_rule(char rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry entry)
	{
	struct audit_buffer *ab;
	char *p;
	int result = 0;

	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);

	entry->action = -1;
	while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \n")) != NULL) {
	substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
	int token;
	unsigned long lnum;

	if (result < 0)
	break;
	if (!*p)
	continue;
	token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args);
	switch (token) {
	case Opt_measure:
	audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", "measure");
	entry->action = MEASURE;
	break;
	case Opt_dont_measure:
	audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", "dont_measure");
	entry->action = DONT_MEASURE;
	break;
	case Opt_func:
	audit_log_format(ab, "func=%s ", args[0].from);
	if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
	entry->func = PATH_CHECK;
	else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
	entry->func = FILE_MMAP;
	else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
	entry->func = BPRM_CHECK;
	else
	result = -EINVAL;
	if (!result)
	entry->flags \|= IMA_FUNC;
	break;
	case Opt_mask:
	audit_log_format(ab, "mask=%s ", args[0].from);
	if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
	entry->mask = MAY_EXEC;
	else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
	entry->mask = MAY_WRITE;
	else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_READ") == 0)
	entry->mask = MAY_READ;
	else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
	entry->mask = MAY_APPEND;
	else
	result = -EINVAL;
	if (!result)
	entry->flags \|= IMA_MASK;
	break;
	case Opt_fsmagic:
	audit_log_format(ab, "fsmagic=%s ", args[0].from);
	result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16,
	&entry->fsmagic);
	if (!result)
	entry->flags \|= IMA_FSMAGIC;
	break;
	case Opt_uid:
	audit_log_format(ab, "uid=%s ", args[0].from);
	result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
	if (!result) {
	entry->uid = (uid_t) lnum;
	if (entry->uid != lnum)
	result = -EINVAL;
	else
	entry->flags \|= IMA_UID;
	}
	break;
	case Opt_obj_user:
	audit_log_format(ab, "obj_user=%s ", args[0].from);
	result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
	LSM_OBJ_USER,
	AUDIT_OBJ_USER);
	break;
	case Opt_obj_role:
	audit_log_format(ab, "obj_role=%s ", args[0].from);
	result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
	LSM_OBJ_ROLE,
	AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE);
	break;
	case Opt_obj_type:
	audit_log_format(ab, "obj_type=%s ", args[0].from);
	result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
	LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
	AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE);
	break;
	case Opt_subj_user:
	audit_log_format(ab, "subj_user=%s ", args[0].from);
	result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
	LSM_SUBJ_USER,
	AUDIT_SUBJ_USER);
	break;
	case Opt_subj_role:
	audit_log_format(ab, "subj_role=%s ", args[0].from);
	result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
	LSM_SUBJ_ROLE,
	AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE);
	break;
	case Opt_subj_type:
	audit_log_format(ab, "subj_type=%s ", args[0].from);
	result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
	LSM_SUBJ_TYPE,
	AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE);
	break;
	case Opt_err:
	audit_log_format(ab, "UNKNOWN=%s ", p);
	break;
	}
	}
	if (entry->action == UNKNOWN)
	result = -EINVAL;

	audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result ? 0 : 1);
	audit_log_end(ab);
	return result;
	}

	/**
	* ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to measure_policy_rules
	* @rule - ima measurement policy rule
	*
	* Uses a mutex to protect the policy list from multiple concurrent writers.
	* Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure.
	*/
	int ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
	{
	const char *op = "update_policy";
	struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry;
	int result = 0;
	int audit_info = 0;

	/* Prevent installed policy from changing */
	if (ima_measure != &measure_default_rules) {
	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
	NULL, op, "already exists",
	-EACCES, audit_info);
	return -EACCES;
	}

	entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!entry) {
	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
	NULL, op, "-ENOMEM", -ENOMEM, audit_info);
	return -ENOMEM;
	}

	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);

	result = ima_parse_rule(rule, entry);
	if (!result) {
	mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
	list_add_tail(&entry->list, &measure_policy_rules);
	mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
	} else {
	kfree(entry);
	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
	NULL, op, "invalid policy", result,
	audit_info);
	}
	return result;
	}

	/* ima_delete_rules called to cleanup invalid policy */
	void ima_delete_rules(void)
	{
	struct ima_measure_rule_entry entry, tmp;

	mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
	list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &measure_policy_rules, list) {
	list_del(&entry->list);
	kfree(entry);
	}
	mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
	}