Merge tag 'usercopy-v4.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull usercopy protection from Kees Cook:
"Tbhis implements HARDENED_USERCOPY verification of copy_to_user and
copy_from_user bounds checking for most architectures on SLAB and
SLUB"
* tag 'usercopy-v4.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support
mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support
s390/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
sparc/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
powerpc/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
ia64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
arm64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
ARM: uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
mm: Hardened usercopy
mm: Implement stack frame object validation
mm: Add is_migrate_cma_page
diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index bd8056b..e9c9334 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -461,6 +461,15 @@
endchoice
+config HAVE_ARCH_WITHIN_STACK_FRAMES
+ bool
+ help
+ An architecture should select this if it can walk the kernel stack
+ frames to determine if an object is part of either the arguments
+ or local variables (i.e. that it excludes saved return addresses,
+ and similar) by implementing an inline arch_within_stack_frames(),
+ which is used by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
+
config HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING
bool
help
diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig
index 2d601d7..a9c4e48 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
select HARDIRQS_SW_RESEND
select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL if (AEABI && !OABI_COMPAT)
select HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE if (CPU_32v7M || CPU_32v7) && !CPU_32v6
+ select HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL if !XIP_KERNEL && !CPU_ENDIAN_BE32 && MMU
select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB if !CPU_ENDIAN_BE32 && MMU
select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS if MMU
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 62a6f65..a93c0f9 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -480,7 +480,10 @@
static inline unsigned long __must_check
__copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
{
- unsigned int __ua_flags = uaccess_save_and_enable();
+ unsigned int __ua_flags;
+
+ check_object_size(to, n, false);
+ __ua_flags = uaccess_save_and_enable();
n = arm_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
uaccess_restore(__ua_flags);
return n;
@@ -495,11 +498,15 @@
__copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
{
#ifndef CONFIG_UACCESS_WITH_MEMCPY
- unsigned int __ua_flags = uaccess_save_and_enable();
+ unsigned int __ua_flags;
+
+ check_object_size(from, n, true);
+ __ua_flags = uaccess_save_and_enable();
n = arm_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
uaccess_restore(__ua_flags);
return n;
#else
+ check_object_size(from, n, true);
return arm_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
#endif
}
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index 69c8787..bc3f00f 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
select HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE if SLUB
select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
select HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE
+ select HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
select HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP
select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL
select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN if SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP && !(ARM64_16K_PAGES && ARM64_VA_BITS_48)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 5e834d1..c47257c 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -265,22 +265,25 @@
static inline unsigned long __must_check __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
{
kasan_check_write(to, n);
- return __arch_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
+ check_object_size(to, n, false);
+ return __arch_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
}
static inline unsigned long __must_check __copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
{
kasan_check_read(from, n);
- return __arch_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
+ check_object_size(from, n, true);
+ return __arch_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
}
static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
{
kasan_check_write(to, n);
- if (access_ok(VERIFY_READ, from, n))
+ if (access_ok(VERIFY_READ, from, n)) {
+ check_object_size(to, n, false);
n = __arch_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
- else /* security hole - plug it */
+ } else /* security hole - plug it */
memset(to, 0, n);
return n;
}
@@ -289,8 +292,10 @@
{
kasan_check_read(from, n);
- if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n))
+ if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n)) {
+ check_object_size(from, n, true);
n = __arch_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
+ }
return n;
}
diff --git a/arch/ia64/Kconfig b/arch/ia64/Kconfig
index 6a15083..18ca6a9 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/ia64/Kconfig
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA
select ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF
select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
+ select HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
default y
help
The Itanium Processor Family is Intel's 64-bit successor to
diff --git a/arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 2189d5d..465c709 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -241,12 +241,18 @@
static inline unsigned long
__copy_to_user (void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long count)
{
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(count))
+ check_object_size(from, count, true);
+
return __copy_user(to, (__force void __user *) from, count);
}
static inline unsigned long
__copy_from_user (void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long count)
{
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(count))
+ check_object_size(to, count, false);
+
return __copy_user((__force void __user *) to, from, count);
}
@@ -258,8 +264,11 @@
const void *__cu_from = (from); \
long __cu_len = (n); \
\
- if (__access_ok(__cu_to, __cu_len, get_fs())) \
- __cu_len = __copy_user(__cu_to, (__force void __user *) __cu_from, __cu_len); \
+ if (__access_ok(__cu_to, __cu_len, get_fs())) { \
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(n)) \
+ check_object_size(__cu_from, __cu_len, true); \
+ __cu_len = __copy_user(__cu_to, (__force void __user *) __cu_from, __cu_len); \
+ } \
__cu_len; \
})
@@ -270,8 +279,11 @@
long __cu_len = (n); \
\
__chk_user_ptr(__cu_from); \
- if (__access_ok(__cu_from, __cu_len, get_fs())) \
+ if (__access_ok(__cu_from, __cu_len, get_fs())) { \
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(n)) \
+ check_object_size(__cu_to, __cu_len, false); \
__cu_len = __copy_user((__force void __user *) __cu_to, __cu_from, __cu_len); \
+ } \
__cu_len; \
})
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
index ec4047e..927d2ab 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
@@ -166,6 +166,7 @@
select HAVE_LIVEPATCH if HAVE_DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS
select GENERIC_CPU_AUTOPROBE
select HAVE_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING
+ select HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
config GENERIC_CSUM
def_bool CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h
index b7c20f0..c1dc6c1 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -310,10 +310,15 @@
{
unsigned long over;
- if (access_ok(VERIFY_READ, from, n))
+ if (access_ok(VERIFY_READ, from, n)) {
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(n))
+ check_object_size(to, n, false);
return __copy_tofrom_user((__force void __user *)to, from, n);
+ }
if ((unsigned long)from < TASK_SIZE) {
over = (unsigned long)from + n - TASK_SIZE;
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(n - over))
+ check_object_size(to, n - over, false);
return __copy_tofrom_user((__force void __user *)to, from,
n - over) + over;
}
@@ -325,10 +330,15 @@
{
unsigned long over;
- if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n))
+ if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n)) {
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(n))
+ check_object_size(from, n, true);
return __copy_tofrom_user(to, (__force void __user *)from, n);
+ }
if ((unsigned long)to < TASK_SIZE) {
over = (unsigned long)to + n - TASK_SIZE;
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(n))
+ check_object_size(from, n - over, true);
return __copy_tofrom_user(to, (__force void __user *)from,
n - over) + over;
}
@@ -372,6 +382,10 @@
if (ret == 0)
return 0;
}
+
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(n))
+ check_object_size(to, n, false);
+
return __copy_tofrom_user((__force void __user *)to, from, n);
}
@@ -398,6 +412,9 @@
if (ret == 0)
return 0;
}
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(n))
+ check_object_size(from, n, true);
+
return __copy_tofrom_user(to, (__force const void __user *)from, n);
}
diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
index 9e607bf..0e34878 100644
--- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@
select HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE if SLUB
select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
select HAVE_ARCH_EARLY_PFN_TO_NID
+ select HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL
select CPU_NO_EFFICIENT_FFS if !HAVE_MARCH_Z9_109_FEATURES
select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
diff --git a/arch/s390/lib/uaccess.c b/arch/s390/lib/uaccess.c
index d965961..f481fcd 100644
--- a/arch/s390/lib/uaccess.c
+++ b/arch/s390/lib/uaccess.c
@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@
unsigned long __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
{
+ check_object_size(to, n, false);
if (static_branch_likely(&have_mvcos))
return copy_from_user_mvcos(to, from, n);
return copy_from_user_mvcp(to, from, n);
@@ -177,6 +178,7 @@
unsigned long __copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
{
+ check_object_size(from, n, true);
if (static_branch_likely(&have_mvcos))
return copy_to_user_mvcos(to, from, n);
return copy_to_user_mvcs(to, from, n);
diff --git a/arch/sparc/Kconfig b/arch/sparc/Kconfig
index 546293d..59b0960 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/sparc/Kconfig
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
select OLD_SIGSUSPEND
select ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN
select CPU_NO_EFFICIENT_FFS
+ select HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
config SPARC32
def_bool !64BIT
diff --git a/arch/sparc/include/asm/uaccess_32.h b/arch/sparc/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
index 57aca27..341a5a1 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
+++ b/arch/sparc/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
@@ -248,22 +248,28 @@
static inline unsigned long copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
{
- if (n && __access_ok((unsigned long) to, n))
+ if (n && __access_ok((unsigned long) to, n)) {
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(n))
+ check_object_size(from, n, true);
return __copy_user(to, (__force void __user *) from, n);
- else
+ } else
return n;
}
static inline unsigned long __copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
{
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(n))
+ check_object_size(from, n, true);
return __copy_user(to, (__force void __user *) from, n);
}
static inline unsigned long copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
{
- if (n && __access_ok((unsigned long) from, n))
+ if (n && __access_ok((unsigned long) from, n)) {
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(n))
+ check_object_size(to, n, false);
return __copy_user((__force void __user *) to, from, n);
- else
+ } else
return n;
}
diff --git a/arch/sparc/include/asm/uaccess_64.h b/arch/sparc/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
index e9a51d6..8bda94f 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
+++ b/arch/sparc/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
@@ -210,8 +210,12 @@
static inline unsigned long __must_check
copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long size)
{
- unsigned long ret = ___copy_from_user(to, from, size);
+ unsigned long ret;
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(size))
+ check_object_size(to, size, false);
+
+ ret = ___copy_from_user(to, from, size);
if (unlikely(ret))
ret = copy_from_user_fixup(to, from, size);
@@ -227,8 +231,11 @@
static inline unsigned long __must_check
copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long size)
{
- unsigned long ret = ___copy_to_user(to, from, size);
+ unsigned long ret;
+ if (!__builtin_constant_p(size))
+ check_object_size(from, size, true);
+ ret = ___copy_to_user(to, from, size);
if (unlikely(ret))
ret = copy_to_user_fixup(to, from, size);
return ret;
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 5c6e747..c580d8c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@
select HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE if SLUB
select HAVE_AOUT if X86_32
select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
+ select HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
select HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP if X86_64 || X86_PAE
select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL
select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN if X86_64 && SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP
@@ -91,6 +92,7 @@
select HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY if X86_64
select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
+ select HAVE_ARCH_WITHIN_STACK_FRAMES
select HAVE_EBPF_JIT if X86_64
select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
select HAVE_CMPXCHG_DOUBLE
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
index 84b5984..8b7c8d8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -176,6 +176,50 @@
return sp;
}
+/*
+ * Walks up the stack frames to make sure that the specified object is
+ * entirely contained by a single stack frame.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 1 if within a frame
+ * -1 if placed across a frame boundary (or outside stack)
+ * 0 unable to determine (no frame pointers, etc)
+ */
+static inline int arch_within_stack_frames(const void * const stack,
+ const void * const stackend,
+ const void *obj, unsigned long len)
+{
+#if defined(CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER)
+ const void *frame = NULL;
+ const void *oldframe;
+
+ oldframe = __builtin_frame_address(1);
+ if (oldframe)
+ frame = __builtin_frame_address(2);
+ /*
+ * low ----------------------------------------------> high
+ * [saved bp][saved ip][args][local vars][saved bp][saved ip]
+ * ^----------------^
+ * allow copies only within here
+ */
+ while (stack <= frame && frame < stackend) {
+ /*
+ * If obj + len extends past the last frame, this
+ * check won't pass and the next frame will be 0,
+ * causing us to bail out and correctly report
+ * the copy as invalid.
+ */
+ if (obj + len <= frame)
+ return obj >= oldframe + 2 * sizeof(void *) ? 1 : -1;
+ oldframe = frame;
+ frame = *(const void * const *)frame;
+ }
+ return -1;
+#else
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
#else /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 52f2300..a0ae610 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -761,9 +761,10 @@
* case, and do only runtime checking for non-constant sizes.
*/
- if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n))
+ if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n)) {
+ check_object_size(to, n, false);
n = _copy_from_user(to, from, n);
- else if(__builtin_constant_p(n))
+ } else if (__builtin_constant_p(n))
copy_from_user_overflow();
else
__copy_from_user_overflow(sz, n);
@@ -781,9 +782,10 @@
might_fault();
/* See the comment in copy_from_user() above. */
- if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n))
+ if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n)) {
+ check_object_size(from, n, true);
n = _copy_to_user(to, from, n);
- else if(__builtin_constant_p(n))
+ } else if (__builtin_constant_p(n))
copy_to_user_overflow();
else
__copy_to_user_overflow(sz, n);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
index 4b32da24..7d3bdd1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check
__copy_to_user_inatomic(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
{
+ check_object_size(from, n, true);
return __copy_to_user_ll(to, from, n);
}
@@ -95,6 +96,7 @@
__copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
{
might_fault();
+ check_object_size(to, n, false);
if (__builtin_constant_p(n)) {
unsigned long ret;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
index 2eac2aa..673059a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
{
int ret = 0;
+ check_object_size(dst, size, false);
if (!__builtin_constant_p(size))
return copy_user_generic(dst, (__force void *)src, size);
switch (size) {
@@ -119,6 +120,7 @@
{
int ret = 0;
+ check_object_size(src, size, true);
if (!__builtin_constant_p(size))
return copy_user_generic((__force void *)dst, src, size);
switch (size) {
diff --git a/include/linux/mmzone.h b/include/linux/mmzone.h
index f2e4e90..d572b78 100644
--- a/include/linux/mmzone.h
+++ b/include/linux/mmzone.h
@@ -68,8 +68,10 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_CMA
# define is_migrate_cma(migratetype) unlikely((migratetype) == MIGRATE_CMA)
+# define is_migrate_cma_page(_page) (get_pageblock_migratetype(_page) == MIGRATE_CMA)
#else
# define is_migrate_cma(migratetype) false
+# define is_migrate_cma_page(_page) false
#endif
#define for_each_migratetype_order(order, type) \
diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h
index 1a4ea55..4293808 100644
--- a/include/linux/slab.h
+++ b/include/linux/slab.h
@@ -155,6 +155,18 @@
void kzfree(const void *);
size_t ksize(const void *);
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
+const char *__check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
+ struct page *page);
+#else
+static inline const char *__check_heap_object(const void *ptr,
+ unsigned long n,
+ struct page *page)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+#endif
+
/*
* Some archs want to perform DMA into kmalloc caches and need a guaranteed
* alignment larger than the alignment of a 64-bit integer.
diff --git a/include/linux/thread_info.h b/include/linux/thread_info.h
index 352b154..cbd8990 100644
--- a/include/linux/thread_info.h
+++ b/include/linux/thread_info.h
@@ -105,6 +105,30 @@
#define tif_need_resched() test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
+#ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_WITHIN_STACK_FRAMES
+static inline int arch_within_stack_frames(const void * const stack,
+ const void * const stackend,
+ const void *obj, unsigned long len)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY
+extern void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
+ bool to_user);
+
+static inline void check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
+ bool to_user)
+{
+ __check_object_size(ptr, n, to_user);
+}
+#else
+static inline void check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
+ bool to_user)
+{ }
+#endif /* CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY */
+
#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
#endif /* _LINUX_THREAD_INFO_H */
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 6988649..cac3f09 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1761,6 +1761,7 @@
config SLAB
bool "SLAB"
+ select HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
help
The regular slab allocator that is established and known to work
well in all environments. It organizes cache hot objects in
@@ -1768,6 +1769,7 @@
config SLUB
bool "SLUB (Unqueued Allocator)"
+ select HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
help
SLUB is a slab allocator that minimizes cache line usage
instead of managing queues of cached objects (SLAB approach).
diff --git a/mm/Makefile b/mm/Makefile
index fc05966..2ca1faf 100644
--- a/mm/Makefile
+++ b/mm/Makefile
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_mmzone.o := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_vmstat.o := n
+# Since __builtin_frame_address does work as used, disable the warning.
+CFLAGS_usercopy.o += $(call cc-disable-warning, frame-address)
+
mmu-y := nommu.o
mmu-$(CONFIG_MMU) := gup.o highmem.o memory.o mincore.o \
mlock.o mmap.o mprotect.o mremap.o msync.o rmap.o \
@@ -99,3 +102,4 @@
obj-$(CONFIG_IDLE_PAGE_TRACKING) += page_idle.o
obj-$(CONFIG_FRAME_VECTOR) += frame_vector.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGE_REF) += debug_page_ref.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY) += usercopy.o
diff --git a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c
index 261147b..b672710 100644
--- a/mm/slab.c
+++ b/mm/slab.c
@@ -4441,6 +4441,36 @@
module_init(slab_proc_init);
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY
+/*
+ * Rejects objects that are incorrectly sized.
+ *
+ * Returns NULL if check passes, otherwise const char * to name of cache
+ * to indicate an error.
+ */
+const char *__check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
+ struct page *page)
+{
+ struct kmem_cache *cachep;
+ unsigned int objnr;
+ unsigned long offset;
+
+ /* Find and validate object. */
+ cachep = page->slab_cache;
+ objnr = obj_to_index(cachep, page, (void *)ptr);
+ BUG_ON(objnr >= cachep->num);
+
+ /* Find offset within object. */
+ offset = ptr - index_to_obj(cachep, page, objnr) - obj_offset(cachep);
+
+ /* Allow address range falling entirely within object size. */
+ if (offset <= cachep->object_size && n <= cachep->object_size - offset)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return cachep->name;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY */
+
/**
* ksize - get the actual amount of memory allocated for a given object
* @objp: Pointer to the object
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index 850737b..cead063 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -3764,6 +3764,46 @@
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kmalloc_node);
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY
+/*
+ * Rejects objects that are incorrectly sized.
+ *
+ * Returns NULL if check passes, otherwise const char * to name of cache
+ * to indicate an error.
+ */
+const char *__check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
+ struct page *page)
+{
+ struct kmem_cache *s;
+ unsigned long offset;
+ size_t object_size;
+
+ /* Find object and usable object size. */
+ s = page->slab_cache;
+ object_size = slab_ksize(s);
+
+ /* Reject impossible pointers. */
+ if (ptr < page_address(page))
+ return s->name;
+
+ /* Find offset within object. */
+ offset = (ptr - page_address(page)) % s->size;
+
+ /* Adjust for redzone and reject if within the redzone. */
+ if (kmem_cache_debug(s) && s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) {
+ if (offset < s->red_left_pad)
+ return s->name;
+ offset -= s->red_left_pad;
+ }
+
+ /* Allow address range falling entirely within object size. */
+ if (offset <= object_size && n <= object_size - offset)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return s->name;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY */
+
static size_t __ksize(const void *object)
{
struct page *page;
diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8ebae91
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/usercopy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+/*
+ * This implements the various checks for CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY*,
+ * which are designed to protect kernel memory from needless exposure
+ * and overwrite under many unintended conditions. This code is based
+ * on PAX_USERCOPY, which is:
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2001-2016 PaX Team, Bradley Spengler, Open Source
+ * Security Inc.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <asm/sections.h>
+
+enum {
+ BAD_STACK = -1,
+ NOT_STACK = 0,
+ GOOD_FRAME,
+ GOOD_STACK,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Checks if a given pointer and length is contained by the current
+ * stack frame (if possible).
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * NOT_STACK: not at all on the stack
+ * GOOD_FRAME: fully within a valid stack frame
+ * GOOD_STACK: fully on the stack (when can't do frame-checking)
+ * BAD_STACK: error condition (invalid stack position or bad stack frame)
+ */
+static noinline int check_stack_object(const void *obj, unsigned long len)
+{
+ const void * const stack = task_stack_page(current);
+ const void * const stackend = stack + THREAD_SIZE;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Object is not on the stack at all. */
+ if (obj + len <= stack || stackend <= obj)
+ return NOT_STACK;
+
+ /*
+ * Reject: object partially overlaps the stack (passing the
+ * the check above means at least one end is within the stack,
+ * so if this check fails, the other end is outside the stack).
+ */
+ if (obj < stack || stackend < obj + len)
+ return BAD_STACK;
+
+ /* Check if object is safely within a valid frame. */
+ ret = arch_within_stack_frames(stack, stackend, obj, len);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ return GOOD_STACK;
+}
+
+static void report_usercopy(const void *ptr, unsigned long len,
+ bool to_user, const char *type)
+{
+ pr_emerg("kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %p (%s) (%lu bytes)\n",
+ to_user ? "exposure" : "overwrite",
+ to_user ? "from" : "to", ptr, type ? : "unknown", len);
+ /*
+ * For greater effect, it would be nice to do do_group_exit(),
+ * but BUG() actually hooks all the lock-breaking and per-arch
+ * Oops code, so that is used here instead.
+ */
+ BUG();
+}
+
+/* Returns true if any portion of [ptr,ptr+n) over laps with [low,high). */
+static bool overlaps(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, unsigned long low,
+ unsigned long high)
+{
+ unsigned long check_low = (uintptr_t)ptr;
+ unsigned long check_high = check_low + n;
+
+ /* Does not overlap if entirely above or entirely below. */
+ if (check_low >= high || check_high < low)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/* Is this address range in the kernel text area? */
+static inline const char *check_kernel_text_object(const void *ptr,
+ unsigned long n)
+{
+ unsigned long textlow = (unsigned long)_stext;
+ unsigned long texthigh = (unsigned long)_etext;
+ unsigned long textlow_linear, texthigh_linear;
+
+ if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh))
+ return "<kernel text>";
+
+ /*
+ * Some architectures have virtual memory mappings with a secondary
+ * mapping of the kernel text, i.e. there is more than one virtual
+ * kernel address that points to the kernel image. It is usually
+ * when there is a separate linear physical memory mapping, in that
+ * __pa() is not just the reverse of __va(). This can be detected
+ * and checked:
+ */
+ textlow_linear = (unsigned long)__va(__pa(textlow));
+ /* No different mapping: we're done. */
+ if (textlow_linear == textlow)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* Check the secondary mapping... */
+ texthigh_linear = (unsigned long)__va(__pa(texthigh));
+ if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow_linear, texthigh_linear))
+ return "<linear kernel text>";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline const char *check_bogus_address(const void *ptr, unsigned long n)
+{
+ /* Reject if object wraps past end of memory. */
+ if (ptr + n < ptr)
+ return "<wrapped address>";
+
+ /* Reject if NULL or ZERO-allocation. */
+ if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(ptr))
+ return "<null>";
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline const char *check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
+ bool to_user)
+{
+ struct page *page, *endpage;
+ const void *end = ptr + n - 1;
+ bool is_reserved, is_cma;
+
+ /*
+ * Some architectures (arm64) return true for virt_addr_valid() on
+ * vmalloced addresses. Work around this by checking for vmalloc
+ * first.
+ */
+ if (is_vmalloc_addr(ptr))
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (!virt_addr_valid(ptr))
+ return NULL;
+
+ page = virt_to_head_page(ptr);
+
+ /* Check slab allocator for flags and size. */
+ if (PageSlab(page))
+ return __check_heap_object(ptr, n, page);
+
+ /*
+ * Sometimes the kernel data regions are not marked Reserved (see
+ * check below). And sometimes [_sdata,_edata) does not cover
+ * rodata and/or bss, so check each range explicitly.
+ */
+
+ /* Allow reads of kernel rodata region (if not marked as Reserved). */
+ if (ptr >= (const void *)__start_rodata &&
+ end <= (const void *)__end_rodata) {
+ if (!to_user)
+ return "<rodata>";
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Allow kernel data region (if not marked as Reserved). */
+ if (ptr >= (const void *)_sdata && end <= (const void *)_edata)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* Allow kernel bss region (if not marked as Reserved). */
+ if (ptr >= (const void *)__bss_start &&
+ end <= (const void *)__bss_stop)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* Is the object wholly within one base page? */
+ if (likely(((unsigned long)ptr & (unsigned long)PAGE_MASK) ==
+ ((unsigned long)end & (unsigned long)PAGE_MASK)))
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* Allow if start and end are inside the same compound page. */
+ endpage = virt_to_head_page(end);
+ if (likely(endpage == page))
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Reject if range is entirely either Reserved (i.e. special or
+ * device memory), or CMA. Otherwise, reject since the object spans
+ * several independently allocated pages.
+ */
+ is_reserved = PageReserved(page);
+ is_cma = is_migrate_cma_page(page);
+ if (!is_reserved && !is_cma)
+ goto reject;
+
+ for (ptr += PAGE_SIZE; ptr <= end; ptr += PAGE_SIZE) {
+ page = virt_to_head_page(ptr);
+ if (is_reserved && !PageReserved(page))
+ goto reject;
+ if (is_cma && !is_migrate_cma_page(page))
+ goto reject;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+
+reject:
+ return "<spans multiple pages>";
+}
+
+/*
+ * Validates that the given object is:
+ * - not bogus address
+ * - known-safe heap or stack object
+ * - not in kernel text
+ */
+void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool to_user)
+{
+ const char *err;
+
+ /* Skip all tests if size is zero. */
+ if (!n)
+ return;
+
+ /* Check for invalid addresses. */
+ err = check_bogus_address(ptr, n);
+ if (err)
+ goto report;
+
+ /* Check for bad heap object. */
+ err = check_heap_object(ptr, n, to_user);
+ if (err)
+ goto report;
+
+ /* Check for bad stack object. */
+ switch (check_stack_object(ptr, n)) {
+ case NOT_STACK:
+ /* Object is not touching the current process stack. */
+ break;
+ case GOOD_FRAME:
+ case GOOD_STACK:
+ /*
+ * Object is either in the correct frame (when it
+ * is possible to check) or just generally on the
+ * process stack (when frame checking not available).
+ */
+ return;
+ default:
+ err = "<process stack>";
+ goto report;
+ }
+
+ /* Check for object in kernel to avoid text exposure. */
+ err = check_kernel_text_object(ptr, n);
+ if (!err)
+ return;
+
+report:
+ report_usercopy(ptr, n, to_user, err);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__check_object_size);
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 176758c..df28f2b 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -118,6 +118,34 @@
this low address space will need the permission specific to the
systems running LSM.
+config HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
+ bool
+ help
+ The heap allocator implements __check_heap_object() for
+ validating memory ranges against heap object sizes in
+ support of CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
+
+config HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
+ bool
+ help
+ The architecture supports CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY by
+ calling check_object_size() just before performing the
+ userspace copies in the low level implementation of
+ copy_to_user() and copy_from_user().
+
+config HARDENED_USERCOPY
+ bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
+ depends on HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
+ select BUG
+ help
+ This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
+ copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
+ copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that
+ are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple
+ separately allocates pages, are not on the process stack,
+ or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes
+ of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.
+
source security/selinux/Kconfig
source security/smack/Kconfig
source security/tomoyo/Kconfig