| /* |
| * Encryption policy functions for per-file encryption support. |
| * |
| * Copyright (C) 2015, Google, Inc. |
| * Copyright (C) 2015, Motorola Mobility. |
| * |
| * Written by Michael Halcrow, 2015. |
| * Modified by Jaegeuk Kim, 2015. |
| */ |
| |
| #include <linux/random.h> |
| #include <linux/string.h> |
| #include <linux/fscrypto.h> |
| #include <linux/mount.h> |
| |
| static int inode_has_encryption_context(struct inode *inode) |
| { |
| if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context) |
| return 0; |
| return (inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, NULL, 0L) > 0); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * check whether the policy is consistent with the encryption context |
| * for the inode |
| */ |
| static int is_encryption_context_consistent_with_policy(struct inode *inode, |
| const struct fscrypt_policy *policy) |
| { |
| struct fscrypt_context ctx; |
| int res; |
| |
| if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context) |
| return 0; |
| |
| res = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx)); |
| if (res != sizeof(ctx)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return (memcmp(ctx.master_key_descriptor, policy->master_key_descriptor, |
| FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) == 0 && |
| (ctx.flags == policy->flags) && |
| (ctx.contents_encryption_mode == |
| policy->contents_encryption_mode) && |
| (ctx.filenames_encryption_mode == |
| policy->filenames_encryption_mode)); |
| } |
| |
| static int create_encryption_context_from_policy(struct inode *inode, |
| const struct fscrypt_policy *policy) |
| { |
| struct fscrypt_context ctx; |
| int res; |
| |
| if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->set_context) |
| return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
| |
| if (inode->i_sb->s_cop->prepare_context) { |
| res = inode->i_sb->s_cop->prepare_context(inode); |
| if (res) |
| return res; |
| } |
| |
| ctx.format = FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1; |
| memcpy(ctx.master_key_descriptor, policy->master_key_descriptor, |
| FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE); |
| |
| if (!fscrypt_valid_contents_enc_mode( |
| policy->contents_encryption_mode)) { |
| printk(KERN_WARNING |
| "%s: Invalid contents encryption mode %d\n", __func__, |
| policy->contents_encryption_mode); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (!fscrypt_valid_filenames_enc_mode( |
| policy->filenames_encryption_mode)) { |
| printk(KERN_WARNING |
| "%s: Invalid filenames encryption mode %d\n", __func__, |
| policy->filenames_encryption_mode); |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| if (policy->flags & ~FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| ctx.contents_encryption_mode = policy->contents_encryption_mode; |
| ctx.filenames_encryption_mode = policy->filenames_encryption_mode; |
| ctx.flags = policy->flags; |
| BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ctx.nonce) != FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE); |
| get_random_bytes(ctx.nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE); |
| |
| return inode->i_sb->s_cop->set_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx), NULL); |
| } |
| |
| int fscrypt_process_policy(struct file *filp, |
| const struct fscrypt_policy *policy) |
| { |
| struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp); |
| int ret; |
| |
| if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode)) |
| return -EACCES; |
| |
| if (policy->version != 0) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| ret = mnt_want_write_file(filp); |
| if (ret) |
| return ret; |
| |
| inode_lock(inode); |
| |
| if (!inode_has_encryption_context(inode)) { |
| if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) |
| ret = -ENOTDIR; |
| else if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->empty_dir) |
| ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; |
| else if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->empty_dir(inode)) |
| ret = -ENOTEMPTY; |
| else |
| ret = create_encryption_context_from_policy(inode, |
| policy); |
| } else if (!is_encryption_context_consistent_with_policy(inode, |
| policy)) { |
| printk(KERN_WARNING |
| "%s: Policy inconsistent with encryption context\n", |
| __func__); |
| ret = -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| inode_unlock(inode); |
| |
| mnt_drop_write_file(filp); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_process_policy); |
| |
| int fscrypt_get_policy(struct inode *inode, struct fscrypt_policy *policy) |
| { |
| struct fscrypt_context ctx; |
| int res; |
| |
| if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context || |
| !inode->i_sb->s_cop->is_encrypted(inode)) |
| return -ENODATA; |
| |
| res = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx)); |
| if (res != sizeof(ctx)) |
| return -ENODATA; |
| if (ctx.format != FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| policy->version = 0; |
| policy->contents_encryption_mode = ctx.contents_encryption_mode; |
| policy->filenames_encryption_mode = ctx.filenames_encryption_mode; |
| policy->flags = ctx.flags; |
| memcpy(&policy->master_key_descriptor, ctx.master_key_descriptor, |
| FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_get_policy); |
| |
| /** |
| * fscrypt_has_permitted_context() - is a file's encryption policy permitted |
| * within its directory? |
| * |
| * @parent: inode for parent directory |
| * @child: inode for file being looked up, opened, or linked into @parent |
| * |
| * Filesystems must call this before permitting access to an inode in a |
| * situation where the parent directory is encrypted (either before allowing |
| * ->lookup() to succeed, or for a regular file before allowing it to be opened) |
| * and before any operation that involves linking an inode into an encrypted |
| * directory, including link, rename, and cross rename. It enforces the |
| * constraint that within a given encrypted directory tree, all files use the |
| * same encryption policy. The pre-access check is needed to detect potentially |
| * malicious offline violations of this constraint, while the link and rename |
| * checks are needed to prevent online violations of this constraint. |
| * |
| * Return: 1 if permitted, 0 if forbidden. If forbidden, the caller must fail |
| * the filesystem operation with EPERM. |
| */ |
| int fscrypt_has_permitted_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child) |
| { |
| const struct fscrypt_operations *cops = parent->i_sb->s_cop; |
| const struct fscrypt_info *parent_ci, *child_ci; |
| struct fscrypt_context parent_ctx, child_ctx; |
| int res; |
| |
| /* No restrictions on file types which are never encrypted */ |
| if (!S_ISREG(child->i_mode) && !S_ISDIR(child->i_mode) && |
| !S_ISLNK(child->i_mode)) |
| return 1; |
| |
| /* No restrictions if the parent directory is unencrypted */ |
| if (!cops->is_encrypted(parent)) |
| return 1; |
| |
| /* Encrypted directories must not contain unencrypted files */ |
| if (!cops->is_encrypted(child)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * Both parent and child are encrypted, so verify they use the same |
| * encryption policy. Compare the fscrypt_info structs if the keys are |
| * available, otherwise retrieve and compare the fscrypt_contexts. |
| * |
| * Note that the fscrypt_context retrieval will be required frequently |
| * when accessing an encrypted directory tree without the key. |
| * Performance-wise this is not a big deal because we already don't |
| * really optimize for file access without the key (to the extent that |
| * such access is even possible), given that any attempted access |
| * already causes a fscrypt_context retrieval and keyring search. |
| * |
| * In any case, if an unexpected error occurs, fall back to "forbidden". |
| */ |
| |
| res = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(parent); |
| if (res) |
| return 0; |
| res = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(child); |
| if (res) |
| return 0; |
| parent_ci = parent->i_crypt_info; |
| child_ci = child->i_crypt_info; |
| |
| if (parent_ci && child_ci) { |
| return memcmp(parent_ci->ci_master_key, child_ci->ci_master_key, |
| FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) == 0 && |
| (parent_ci->ci_data_mode == child_ci->ci_data_mode) && |
| (parent_ci->ci_filename_mode == |
| child_ci->ci_filename_mode) && |
| (parent_ci->ci_flags == child_ci->ci_flags); |
| } |
| |
| res = cops->get_context(parent, &parent_ctx, sizeof(parent_ctx)); |
| if (res != sizeof(parent_ctx)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| res = cops->get_context(child, &child_ctx, sizeof(child_ctx)); |
| if (res != sizeof(child_ctx)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return memcmp(parent_ctx.master_key_descriptor, |
| child_ctx.master_key_descriptor, |
| FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) == 0 && |
| (parent_ctx.contents_encryption_mode == |
| child_ctx.contents_encryption_mode) && |
| (parent_ctx.filenames_encryption_mode == |
| child_ctx.filenames_encryption_mode) && |
| (parent_ctx.flags == child_ctx.flags); |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_has_permitted_context); |
| |
| /** |
| * fscrypt_inherit_context() - Sets a child context from its parent |
| * @parent: Parent inode from which the context is inherited. |
| * @child: Child inode that inherits the context from @parent. |
| * @fs_data: private data given by FS. |
| * @preload: preload child i_crypt_info |
| * |
| * Return: Zero on success, non-zero otherwise |
| */ |
| int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child, |
| void *fs_data, bool preload) |
| { |
| struct fscrypt_context ctx; |
| struct fscrypt_info *ci; |
| int res; |
| |
| if (!parent->i_sb->s_cop->set_context) |
| return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
| |
| res = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(parent); |
| if (res < 0) |
| return res; |
| |
| ci = parent->i_crypt_info; |
| if (ci == NULL) |
| return -ENOKEY; |
| |
| ctx.format = FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1; |
| if (fscrypt_dummy_context_enabled(parent)) { |
| ctx.contents_encryption_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS; |
| ctx.filenames_encryption_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS; |
| ctx.flags = 0; |
| memset(ctx.master_key_descriptor, 0x42, FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE); |
| res = 0; |
| } else { |
| ctx.contents_encryption_mode = ci->ci_data_mode; |
| ctx.filenames_encryption_mode = ci->ci_filename_mode; |
| ctx.flags = ci->ci_flags; |
| memcpy(ctx.master_key_descriptor, ci->ci_master_key, |
| FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE); |
| } |
| get_random_bytes(ctx.nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE); |
| res = parent->i_sb->s_cop->set_context(child, &ctx, |
| sizeof(ctx), fs_data); |
| if (res) |
| return res; |
| return preload ? fscrypt_get_encryption_info(child): 0; |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_inherit_context); |