| /* |
| * Copyright 2002-2005, Instant802 Networks, Inc. |
| * Copyright 2005-2006, Devicescape Software, Inc. |
| * Copyright 2006-2007 Jiri Benc <jbenc@suse.cz> |
| * Copyright 2007-2008 Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> |
| * |
| * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify |
| * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as |
| * published by the Free Software Foundation. |
| */ |
| |
| #include <linux/if_ether.h> |
| #include <linux/etherdevice.h> |
| #include <linux/list.h> |
| #include <linux/rcupdate.h> |
| #include <linux/rtnetlink.h> |
| #include <linux/slab.h> |
| #include <linux/export.h> |
| #include <net/mac80211.h> |
| #include <asm/unaligned.h> |
| #include "ieee80211_i.h" |
| #include "driver-ops.h" |
| #include "debugfs_key.h" |
| #include "aes_ccm.h" |
| #include "aes_cmac.h" |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * DOC: Key handling basics |
| * |
| * Key handling in mac80211 is done based on per-interface (sub_if_data) |
| * keys and per-station keys. Since each station belongs to an interface, |
| * each station key also belongs to that interface. |
| * |
| * Hardware acceleration is done on a best-effort basis for algorithms |
| * that are implemented in software, for each key the hardware is asked |
| * to enable that key for offloading but if it cannot do that the key is |
| * simply kept for software encryption (unless it is for an algorithm |
| * that isn't implemented in software). |
| * There is currently no way of knowing whether a key is handled in SW |
| * or HW except by looking into debugfs. |
| * |
| * All key management is internally protected by a mutex. Within all |
| * other parts of mac80211, key references are, just as STA structure |
| * references, protected by RCU. Note, however, that some things are |
| * unprotected, namely the key->sta dereferences within the hardware |
| * acceleration functions. This means that sta_info_destroy() must |
| * remove the key which waits for an RCU grace period. |
| */ |
| |
| static const u8 bcast_addr[ETH_ALEN] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF }; |
| |
| static void assert_key_lock(struct ieee80211_local *local) |
| { |
| lockdep_assert_held(&local->key_mtx); |
| } |
| |
| static void increment_tailroom_need_count(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) |
| { |
| /* |
| * When this count is zero, SKB resizing for allocating tailroom |
| * for IV or MMIC is skipped. But, this check has created two race |
| * cases in xmit path while transiting from zero count to one: |
| * |
| * 1. SKB resize was skipped because no key was added but just before |
| * the xmit key is added and SW encryption kicks off. |
| * |
| * 2. SKB resize was skipped because all the keys were hw planted but |
| * just before xmit one of the key is deleted and SW encryption kicks |
| * off. |
| * |
| * In both the above case SW encryption will find not enough space for |
| * tailroom and exits with WARN_ON. (See WARN_ONs at wpa.c) |
| * |
| * Solution has been explained at |
| * http://mid.gmane.org/1308590980.4322.19.camel@jlt3.sipsolutions.net |
| */ |
| |
| if (!sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt++) { |
| /* |
| * Flush all XMIT packets currently using HW encryption or no |
| * encryption at all if the count transition is from 0 -> 1. |
| */ |
| synchronize_net(); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key) |
| { |
| struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata; |
| struct sta_info *sta; |
| int ret; |
| |
| might_sleep(); |
| |
| if (!key->local->ops->set_key) |
| goto out_unsupported; |
| |
| assert_key_lock(key->local); |
| |
| sta = key->sta; |
| |
| /* |
| * If this is a per-STA GTK, check if it |
| * is supported; if not, return. |
| */ |
| if (sta && !(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE) && |
| !(key->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_SUPPORTS_PER_STA_GTK)) |
| goto out_unsupported; |
| |
| if (sta && !sta->uploaded) |
| goto out_unsupported; |
| |
| sdata = key->sdata; |
| if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) { |
| /* |
| * The driver doesn't know anything about VLAN interfaces. |
| * Hence, don't send GTKs for VLAN interfaces to the driver. |
| */ |
| if (!(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE)) |
| goto out_unsupported; |
| } |
| |
| ret = drv_set_key(key->local, SET_KEY, sdata, |
| sta ? &sta->sta : NULL, &key->conf); |
| |
| if (!ret) { |
| key->flags |= KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE; |
| |
| if (!((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC) || |
| (key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) || |
| (key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))) |
| sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt--; |
| |
| WARN_ON((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) && |
| (key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (ret != -ENOSPC && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP) |
| sdata_err(sdata, |
| "failed to set key (%d, %pM) to hardware (%d)\n", |
| key->conf.keyidx, |
| sta ? sta->sta.addr : bcast_addr, ret); |
| |
| out_unsupported: |
| switch (key->conf.cipher) { |
| case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40: |
| case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104: |
| case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP: |
| case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP: |
| case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC: |
| /* all of these we can do in software */ |
| return 0; |
| default: |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static void ieee80211_key_disable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key) |
| { |
| struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata; |
| struct sta_info *sta; |
| int ret; |
| |
| might_sleep(); |
| |
| if (!key || !key->local->ops->set_key) |
| return; |
| |
| assert_key_lock(key->local); |
| |
| if (!(key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE)) |
| return; |
| |
| sta = key->sta; |
| sdata = key->sdata; |
| |
| if (!((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC) || |
| (key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) || |
| (key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))) |
| increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata); |
| |
| ret = drv_set_key(key->local, DISABLE_KEY, sdata, |
| sta ? &sta->sta : NULL, &key->conf); |
| |
| if (ret) |
| sdata_err(sdata, |
| "failed to remove key (%d, %pM) from hardware (%d)\n", |
| key->conf.keyidx, |
| sta ? sta->sta.addr : bcast_addr, ret); |
| |
| key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE; |
| } |
| |
| void ieee80211_key_removed(struct ieee80211_key_conf *key_conf) |
| { |
| struct ieee80211_key *key; |
| |
| key = container_of(key_conf, struct ieee80211_key, conf); |
| |
| might_sleep(); |
| assert_key_lock(key->local); |
| |
| key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE; |
| |
| /* |
| * Flush TX path to avoid attempts to use this key |
| * after this function returns. Until then, drivers |
| * must be prepared to handle the key. |
| */ |
| synchronize_rcu(); |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_key_removed); |
| |
| static void __ieee80211_set_default_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, |
| int idx, bool uni, bool multi) |
| { |
| struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL; |
| |
| assert_key_lock(sdata->local); |
| |
| if (idx >= 0 && idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS) |
| key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sdata->keys[idx]); |
| |
| if (uni) |
| rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->default_unicast_key, key); |
| if (multi) |
| rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->default_multicast_key, key); |
| |
| ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata); |
| } |
| |
| void ieee80211_set_default_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int idx, |
| bool uni, bool multi) |
| { |
| mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx); |
| __ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, idx, uni, multi); |
| mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx); |
| } |
| |
| static void |
| __ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int idx) |
| { |
| struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL; |
| |
| assert_key_lock(sdata->local); |
| |
| if (idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS && |
| idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS) |
| key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sdata->keys[idx]); |
| |
| rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->default_mgmt_key, key); |
| |
| ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata); |
| } |
| |
| void ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, |
| int idx) |
| { |
| mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx); |
| __ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(sdata, idx); |
| mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static void __ieee80211_key_replace(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, |
| struct sta_info *sta, |
| bool pairwise, |
| struct ieee80211_key *old, |
| struct ieee80211_key *new) |
| { |
| int idx; |
| bool defunikey, defmultikey, defmgmtkey; |
| |
| if (new) |
| list_add_tail(&new->list, &sdata->key_list); |
| |
| if (sta && pairwise) { |
| rcu_assign_pointer(sta->ptk, new); |
| } else if (sta) { |
| if (old) |
| idx = old->conf.keyidx; |
| else |
| idx = new->conf.keyidx; |
| rcu_assign_pointer(sta->gtk[idx], new); |
| } else { |
| WARN_ON(new && old && new->conf.keyidx != old->conf.keyidx); |
| |
| if (old) |
| idx = old->conf.keyidx; |
| else |
| idx = new->conf.keyidx; |
| |
| defunikey = old && |
| old == key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, |
| sdata->default_unicast_key); |
| defmultikey = old && |
| old == key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, |
| sdata->default_multicast_key); |
| defmgmtkey = old && |
| old == key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, |
| sdata->default_mgmt_key); |
| |
| if (defunikey && !new) |
| __ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, -1, true, false); |
| if (defmultikey && !new) |
| __ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, -1, false, true); |
| if (defmgmtkey && !new) |
| __ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(sdata, -1); |
| |
| rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->keys[idx], new); |
| if (defunikey && new) |
| __ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, new->conf.keyidx, |
| true, false); |
| if (defmultikey && new) |
| __ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, new->conf.keyidx, |
| false, true); |
| if (defmgmtkey && new) |
| __ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(sdata, |
| new->conf.keyidx); |
| } |
| |
| if (old) |
| list_del(&old->list); |
| } |
| |
| struct ieee80211_key *ieee80211_key_alloc(u32 cipher, int idx, size_t key_len, |
| const u8 *key_data, |
| size_t seq_len, const u8 *seq) |
| { |
| struct ieee80211_key *key; |
| int i, j, err; |
| |
| BUG_ON(idx < 0 || idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS); |
| |
| key = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ieee80211_key) + key_len, GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!key) |
| return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); |
| |
| /* |
| * Default to software encryption; we'll later upload the |
| * key to the hardware if possible. |
| */ |
| key->conf.flags = 0; |
| key->flags = 0; |
| |
| key->conf.cipher = cipher; |
| key->conf.keyidx = idx; |
| key->conf.keylen = key_len; |
| switch (cipher) { |
| case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40: |
| case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104: |
| key->conf.iv_len = WEP_IV_LEN; |
| key->conf.icv_len = WEP_ICV_LEN; |
| break; |
| case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP: |
| key->conf.iv_len = TKIP_IV_LEN; |
| key->conf.icv_len = TKIP_ICV_LEN; |
| if (seq) { |
| for (i = 0; i < NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES; i++) { |
| key->u.tkip.rx[i].iv32 = |
| get_unaligned_le32(&seq[2]); |
| key->u.tkip.rx[i].iv16 = |
| get_unaligned_le16(seq); |
| } |
| } |
| spin_lock_init(&key->u.tkip.txlock); |
| break; |
| case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP: |
| key->conf.iv_len = CCMP_HDR_LEN; |
| key->conf.icv_len = CCMP_MIC_LEN; |
| if (seq) { |
| for (i = 0; i < NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES + 1; i++) |
| for (j = 0; j < CCMP_PN_LEN; j++) |
| key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[i][j] = |
| seq[CCMP_PN_LEN - j - 1]; |
| } |
| /* |
| * Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that |
| * it does not need to be initialized for every packet. |
| */ |
| key->u.ccmp.tfm = ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(key_data); |
| if (IS_ERR(key->u.ccmp.tfm)) { |
| err = PTR_ERR(key->u.ccmp.tfm); |
| kfree(key); |
| return ERR_PTR(err); |
| } |
| break; |
| case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC: |
| key->conf.iv_len = 0; |
| key->conf.icv_len = sizeof(struct ieee80211_mmie); |
| if (seq) |
| for (j = 0; j < 6; j++) |
| key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn[j] = seq[6 - j - 1]; |
| /* |
| * Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that |
| * it does not need to be initialized for every packet. |
| */ |
| key->u.aes_cmac.tfm = |
| ieee80211_aes_cmac_key_setup(key_data); |
| if (IS_ERR(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm)) { |
| err = PTR_ERR(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm); |
| kfree(key); |
| return ERR_PTR(err); |
| } |
| break; |
| } |
| memcpy(key->conf.key, key_data, key_len); |
| INIT_LIST_HEAD(&key->list); |
| |
| return key; |
| } |
| |
| static void __ieee80211_key_destroy(struct ieee80211_key *key) |
| { |
| if (!key) |
| return; |
| |
| /* |
| * Synchronize so the TX path can no longer be using |
| * this key before we free/remove it. |
| */ |
| synchronize_rcu(); |
| |
| if (key->local) |
| ieee80211_key_disable_hw_accel(key); |
| |
| if (key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP) |
| ieee80211_aes_key_free(key->u.ccmp.tfm); |
| if (key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC) |
| ieee80211_aes_cmac_key_free(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm); |
| if (key->local) { |
| ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove(key); |
| key->sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt--; |
| } |
| |
| kfree(key); |
| } |
| |
| int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_key *key, |
| struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, |
| struct sta_info *sta) |
| { |
| struct ieee80211_key *old_key; |
| int idx, ret; |
| bool pairwise; |
| |
| BUG_ON(!sdata); |
| BUG_ON(!key); |
| |
| pairwise = key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE; |
| idx = key->conf.keyidx; |
| key->local = sdata->local; |
| key->sdata = sdata; |
| key->sta = sta; |
| |
| if (sta) { |
| /* |
| * some hardware cannot handle TKIP with QoS, so |
| * we indicate whether QoS could be in use. |
| */ |
| if (test_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_WME)) |
| key->conf.flags |= IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA; |
| } else { |
| if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION) { |
| struct sta_info *ap; |
| |
| /* |
| * We're getting a sta pointer in, so must be under |
| * appropriate locking for sta_info_get(). |
| */ |
| |
| /* same here, the AP could be using QoS */ |
| ap = sta_info_get(key->sdata, key->sdata->u.mgd.bssid); |
| if (ap) { |
| if (test_sta_flag(ap, WLAN_STA_WME)) |
| key->conf.flags |= |
| IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx); |
| |
| if (sta && pairwise) |
| old_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sta->ptk); |
| else if (sta) |
| old_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sta->gtk[idx]); |
| else |
| old_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sdata->keys[idx]); |
| |
| increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata); |
| |
| __ieee80211_key_replace(sdata, sta, pairwise, old_key, key); |
| __ieee80211_key_destroy(old_key); |
| |
| ieee80211_debugfs_key_add(key); |
| |
| ret = ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(key); |
| |
| mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx); |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| void __ieee80211_key_free(struct ieee80211_key *key) |
| { |
| if (!key) |
| return; |
| |
| /* |
| * Replace key with nothingness if it was ever used. |
| */ |
| if (key->sdata) |
| __ieee80211_key_replace(key->sdata, key->sta, |
| key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE, |
| key, NULL); |
| __ieee80211_key_destroy(key); |
| } |
| |
| void ieee80211_key_free(struct ieee80211_local *local, |
| struct ieee80211_key *key) |
| { |
| mutex_lock(&local->key_mtx); |
| __ieee80211_key_free(key); |
| mutex_unlock(&local->key_mtx); |
| } |
| |
| void ieee80211_enable_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) |
| { |
| struct ieee80211_key *key; |
| |
| ASSERT_RTNL(); |
| |
| if (WARN_ON(!ieee80211_sdata_running(sdata))) |
| return; |
| |
| mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx); |
| |
| sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt = 0; |
| |
| list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list) { |
| increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata); |
| ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(key); |
| } |
| |
| mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx); |
| } |
| |
| void ieee80211_iter_keys(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, |
| struct ieee80211_vif *vif, |
| void (*iter)(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, |
| struct ieee80211_vif *vif, |
| struct ieee80211_sta *sta, |
| struct ieee80211_key_conf *key, |
| void *data), |
| void *iter_data) |
| { |
| struct ieee80211_local *local = hw_to_local(hw); |
| struct ieee80211_key *key; |
| struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata; |
| |
| ASSERT_RTNL(); |
| |
| mutex_lock(&local->key_mtx); |
| if (vif) { |
| sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif); |
| list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list) |
| iter(hw, &sdata->vif, |
| key->sta ? &key->sta->sta : NULL, |
| &key->conf, iter_data); |
| } else { |
| list_for_each_entry(sdata, &local->interfaces, list) |
| list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list) |
| iter(hw, &sdata->vif, |
| key->sta ? &key->sta->sta : NULL, |
| &key->conf, iter_data); |
| } |
| mutex_unlock(&local->key_mtx); |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_iter_keys); |
| |
| void ieee80211_disable_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) |
| { |
| struct ieee80211_key *key; |
| |
| ASSERT_RTNL(); |
| |
| mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx); |
| |
| list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list) |
| ieee80211_key_disable_hw_accel(key); |
| |
| mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx); |
| } |
| |
| void ieee80211_free_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) |
| { |
| struct ieee80211_key *key, *tmp; |
| |
| mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx); |
| |
| ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove_mgmt_default(sdata); |
| |
| list_for_each_entry_safe(key, tmp, &sdata->key_list, list) |
| __ieee80211_key_free(key); |
| |
| ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata); |
| |
| mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx); |
| } |
| |
| |
| void ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify(struct ieee80211_vif *vif, const u8 *bssid, |
| const u8 *replay_ctr, gfp_t gfp) |
| { |
| struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif); |
| |
| trace_api_gtk_rekey_notify(sdata, bssid, replay_ctr); |
| |
| cfg80211_gtk_rekey_notify(sdata->dev, bssid, replay_ctr, gfp); |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify); |
| |
| void ieee80211_get_key_tx_seq(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf, |
| struct ieee80211_key_seq *seq) |
| { |
| struct ieee80211_key *key; |
| u64 pn64; |
| |
| if (WARN_ON(!(keyconf->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV))) |
| return; |
| |
| key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf); |
| |
| switch (key->conf.cipher) { |
| case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP: |
| seq->tkip.iv32 = key->u.tkip.tx.iv32; |
| seq->tkip.iv16 = key->u.tkip.tx.iv16; |
| break; |
| case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP: |
| pn64 = atomic64_read(&key->u.ccmp.tx_pn); |
| seq->ccmp.pn[5] = pn64; |
| seq->ccmp.pn[4] = pn64 >> 8; |
| seq->ccmp.pn[3] = pn64 >> 16; |
| seq->ccmp.pn[2] = pn64 >> 24; |
| seq->ccmp.pn[1] = pn64 >> 32; |
| seq->ccmp.pn[0] = pn64 >> 40; |
| break; |
| case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC: |
| pn64 = atomic64_read(&key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn); |
| seq->ccmp.pn[5] = pn64; |
| seq->ccmp.pn[4] = pn64 >> 8; |
| seq->ccmp.pn[3] = pn64 >> 16; |
| seq->ccmp.pn[2] = pn64 >> 24; |
| seq->ccmp.pn[1] = pn64 >> 32; |
| seq->ccmp.pn[0] = pn64 >> 40; |
| break; |
| default: |
| WARN_ON(1); |
| } |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_get_key_tx_seq); |
| |
| void ieee80211_get_key_rx_seq(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf, |
| int tid, struct ieee80211_key_seq *seq) |
| { |
| struct ieee80211_key *key; |
| const u8 *pn; |
| |
| key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf); |
| |
| switch (key->conf.cipher) { |
| case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP: |
| if (WARN_ON(tid < 0 || tid >= NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES)) |
| return; |
| seq->tkip.iv32 = key->u.tkip.rx[tid].iv32; |
| seq->tkip.iv16 = key->u.tkip.rx[tid].iv16; |
| break; |
| case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP: |
| if (WARN_ON(tid < -1 || tid >= NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES)) |
| return; |
| if (tid < 0) |
| pn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES]; |
| else |
| pn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[tid]; |
| memcpy(seq->ccmp.pn, pn, CCMP_PN_LEN); |
| break; |
| case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC: |
| if (WARN_ON(tid != 0)) |
| return; |
| pn = key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn; |
| memcpy(seq->aes_cmac.pn, pn, CMAC_PN_LEN); |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_get_key_rx_seq); |