security/Kconfig - kernel/msm-4.9 - Gitiles

 #
 # Security configuration
 #

 menu "Security options"

 config KEYS
 	bool "Enable access key retention support"
 	help
 	  This option provides support for retaining authentication tokens and
 	  access keys in the kernel.

 	  It also includes provision of methods by which such keys might be
 	  associated with a process so that network filesystems, encryption
 	  support and the like can find them.

 	  Furthermore, a special type of key is available that acts as keyring:
 	  a searchable sequence of keys. Each process is equipped with access
 	  to five standard keyrings: UID-specific, GID-specific, session,
 	  process and thread.

 	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.

 config TRUSTED_KEYS
 	tristate "TRUSTED KEYS"
 	depends on KEYS && TCG_TPM
 	select CRYPTO
 	select CRYPTO_HMAC
 	select CRYPTO_SHA1
 	help
 	  This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing
 	  keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys,
 	  generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM only unseals the keys,
 	  if the boot PCRs and other criteria match.  Userspace will only ever
 	  see encrypted blobs.

 	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.

 config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
 	tristate "ENCRYPTED KEYS"
 	depends on KEYS && TRUSTED_KEYS
 	select CRYPTO_AES
 	select CRYPTO_CBC
 	select CRYPTO_SHA256
 	select CRYPTO_RNG
 	help
 	  This option provides support for create/encrypting/decrypting keys
 	  in the kernel.  Encrypted keys are kernel generated random numbers,
 	  which are encrypted/decrypted with a 'master' symmetric key. The
 	  'master' key can be either a trusted-key or user-key type.
 	  Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs.

 	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.

 config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
 	bool "Enable the /proc/keys file by which keys may be viewed"
 	depends on KEYS
 	help
 	  This option turns on support for the /proc/keys file - through which
 	  can be listed all the keys on the system that are viewable by the
 	  reading process.

 	  The only keys included in the list are those that grant View
 	  permission to the reading process whether or not it possesses them.
 	  Note that LSM security checks are still performed, and may further
 	  filter out keys that the current process is not authorised to view.

 	  Only key attributes are listed here; key payloads are not included in
 	  the resulting table.

 	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.

 config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
 	bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
 	default n
 	help
 	  This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
 	  syslog via dmesg(8).

 	  If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
 	  unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).

 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

 config SECURITY
 	bool "Enable different security models"
 	depends on SYSFS
 	help
 	  This allows you to choose different security modules to be
 	  configured into your kernel.

 	  If this option is not selected, the default Linux security
 	  model will be used.

 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

 config SECURITYFS
 	bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
 	help
 	  This will build the securityfs filesystem.  It is currently used by
 	  the TPM bios character driver and IMA, an integrity provider.  It is
 	  not used by SELinux or SMACK.

 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

 config SECURITY_NETWORK
 	bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
 	depends on SECURITY
 	help
 	  This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
 	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
 	  implement socket and networking access controls.
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

 config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
 	bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks"
 	depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK
 	help
 	  This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks.
 	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
 	  implement per-packet access controls based on labels
 	  derived from IPSec policy.  Non-IPSec communications are
 	  designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized
 	  to communicate unlabelled data can send without using
 	  IPSec.
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

 config SECURITY_PATH
 	bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
 	depends on SECURITY
 	help
 	  This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
 	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
 	  implement pathname based access controls.
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

 config INTEL_TXT
 	bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
 	depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT
 	help
 	  This option enables support for booting the kernel with the
 	  Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize
 	  Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch
 	  of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this
 	  will have no effect.

 	  Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and
 	  initial state as well as data reset protection.  This is used to
 	  create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which
 	  helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning
 	  correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside
 	  of the kernel itself.

 	  Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having
 	  confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that
 	  it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for
 	  providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it.

 	  See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information
 	  about Intel(R) TXT.
 	  See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.
 	  See Documentation/intel_txt.txt for a description of how to enable
 	  Intel TXT support in a kernel boot.

 	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.

 config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
 	int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"
 	depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX
 	default 65536
 	help
 	  This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
 	  from userspace allocation.  Keeping a user from writing to low pages
 	  can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.

 	  For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
 	  a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
 	  On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
 	  Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map
 	  this low address space will need the permission specific to the
 	  systems running LSM.

 source security/selinux/Kconfig
 source security/smack/Kconfig
 source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
 source security/apparmor/Kconfig

 source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig

 choice
 	prompt "Default security module"
 	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
 	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
 	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
 	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
 	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC

 	help
 	  Select the security module that will be used by default if the
 	  kernel parameter security= is not specified.

 	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
 		bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y

 	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
 		bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y

 	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
 		bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y

 	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
 		bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y

 	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
 		bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"

 endchoice

 config DEFAULT_SECURITY
 	string
 	default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
 	default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
 	default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
 	default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
 	default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC

 endmenu
	#
	# Security configuration
	#

	menu "Security options"

	config KEYS
	bool "Enable access key retention support"
	help
	This option provides support for retaining authentication tokens and
	access keys in the kernel.

	It also includes provision of methods by which such keys might be
	associated with a process so that network filesystems, encryption
	support and the like can find them.

	Furthermore, a special type of key is available that acts as keyring:
	a searchable sequence of keys. Each process is equipped with access
	to five standard keyrings: UID-specific, GID-specific, session,
	process and thread.

	If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.

	config TRUSTED_KEYS
	tristate "TRUSTED KEYS"
	depends on KEYS && TCG_TPM
	select CRYPTO
	select CRYPTO_HMAC
	select CRYPTO_SHA1
	help
	This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing
	keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys,
	generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM only unseals the keys,
	if the boot PCRs and other criteria match. Userspace will only ever
	see encrypted blobs.

	If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.

	config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
	tristate "ENCRYPTED KEYS"
	depends on KEYS && TRUSTED_KEYS
	select CRYPTO_AES
	select CRYPTO_CBC
	select CRYPTO_SHA256
	select CRYPTO_RNG
	help
	This option provides support for create/encrypting/decrypting keys
	in the kernel. Encrypted keys are kernel generated random numbers,
	which are encrypted/decrypted with a 'master' symmetric key. The
	'master' key can be either a trusted-key or user-key type.
	Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs.

	If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.

	config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
	bool "Enable the /proc/keys file by which keys may be viewed"
	depends on KEYS
	help
	This option turns on support for the /proc/keys file - through which
	can be listed all the keys on the system that are viewable by the
	reading process.

	The only keys included in the list are those that grant View
	permission to the reading process whether or not it possesses them.
	Note that LSM security checks are still performed, and may further
	filter out keys that the current process is not authorised to view.

	Only key attributes are listed here; key payloads are not included in
	the resulting table.

	If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.

	config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
	bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
	default n
	help
	This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
	syslog via dmesg(8).

	If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
	unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).

	If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

	config SECURITY
	bool "Enable different security models"
	depends on SYSFS
	help
	This allows you to choose different security modules to be
	configured into your kernel.

	If this option is not selected, the default Linux security
	model will be used.

	If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

	config SECURITYFS
	bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
	help
	This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by
	the TPM bios character driver and IMA, an integrity provider. It is
	not used by SELinux or SMACK.

	If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

	config SECURITY_NETWORK
	bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
	depends on SECURITY
	help
	This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
	If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
	implement socket and networking access controls.
	If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

	config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
	bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks"
	depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK
	help
	This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks.
	If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
	implement per-packet access controls based on labels
	derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are
	designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized
	to communicate unlabelled data can send without using
	IPSec.
	If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

	config SECURITY_PATH
	bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
	depends on SECURITY
	help
	This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
	If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
	implement pathname based access controls.
	If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

	config INTEL_TXT
	bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
	depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT
	help
	This option enables support for booting the kernel with the
	Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize
	Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch
	of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this
	will have no effect.

	Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and
	initial state as well as data reset protection. This is used to
	create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which
	helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning
	correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside
	of the kernel itself.

	Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having
	confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that
	it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for
	providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it.

	See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information
	about Intel(R) TXT.
	See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.
	See Documentation/intel_txt.txt for a description of how to enable
	Intel TXT support in a kernel boot.

	If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.

	config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
	int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"
	depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX
	default 65536
	help
	This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
	from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages
	can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.

	For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
	a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
	On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
	Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map
	this low address space will need the permission specific to the
	systems running LSM.

	source security/selinux/Kconfig
	source security/smack/Kconfig
	source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
	source security/apparmor/Kconfig

	source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig

	choice
	prompt "Default security module"
	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC

	help
	Select the security module that will be used by default if the
	kernel parameter security= is not specified.

	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
	bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y

	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
	bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y

	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
	bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y

	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
	bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y

	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
	bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"

	endchoice

	config DEFAULT_SECURITY
	string
	default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
	default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
	default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
	default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
	default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC

	endmenu