| /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support |
| * Handles all system-call specific auditing features. |
| * |
| * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina. |
| * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. |
| * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation |
| * All Rights Reserved. |
| * |
| * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify |
| * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by |
| * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or |
| * (at your option) any later version. |
| * |
| * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, |
| * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of |
| * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the |
| * GNU General Public License for more details. |
| * |
| * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License |
| * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software |
| * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA |
| * |
| * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com> |
| * |
| * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie, |
| * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname. |
| * |
| * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in |
| * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by |
| * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG. |
| * |
| * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>, |
| * 2006. |
| * |
| * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was |
| * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005. |
| * |
| * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional |
| * filesystem information. |
| * |
| * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com> |
| * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance. |
| */ |
| |
| #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt |
| |
| #include <linux/init.h> |
| #include <asm/types.h> |
| #include <linux/atomic.h> |
| #include <linux/fs.h> |
| #include <linux/namei.h> |
| #include <linux/mm.h> |
| #include <linux/export.h> |
| #include <linux/slab.h> |
| #include <linux/mount.h> |
| #include <linux/socket.h> |
| #include <linux/mqueue.h> |
| #include <linux/audit.h> |
| #include <linux/personality.h> |
| #include <linux/time.h> |
| #include <linux/netlink.h> |
| #include <linux/compiler.h> |
| #include <asm/unistd.h> |
| #include <linux/security.h> |
| #include <linux/list.h> |
| #include <linux/tty.h> |
| #include <linux/binfmts.h> |
| #include <linux/highmem.h> |
| #include <linux/syscalls.h> |
| #include <asm/syscall.h> |
| #include <linux/capability.h> |
| #include <linux/fs_struct.h> |
| #include <linux/compat.h> |
| #include <linux/ctype.h> |
| #include <linux/string.h> |
| #include <uapi/linux/limits.h> |
| |
| #include "audit.h" |
| |
| /* flags stating the success for a syscall */ |
| #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0 |
| #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1 |
| #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2 |
| |
| /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */ |
| #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500 |
| |
| /* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */ |
| #define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128 |
| |
| /* number of audit rules */ |
| int audit_n_rules; |
| |
| /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */ |
| int audit_signals; |
| |
| struct audit_aux_data { |
| struct audit_aux_data *next; |
| int type; |
| }; |
| |
| #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0 |
| |
| /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */ |
| #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16 |
| |
| struct audit_aux_data_pids { |
| struct audit_aux_data d; |
| pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
| kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
| kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
| unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
| u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; |
| char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN]; |
| int pid_count; |
| }; |
| |
| struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps { |
| struct audit_aux_data d; |
| struct audit_cap_data fcap; |
| unsigned int fcap_ver; |
| struct audit_cap_data old_pcap; |
| struct audit_cap_data new_pcap; |
| }; |
| |
| struct audit_tree_refs { |
| struct audit_tree_refs *next; |
| struct audit_chunk *c[31]; |
| }; |
| |
| static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask) |
| { |
| unsigned n; |
| if (unlikely(!ctx)) |
| return 0; |
| n = ctx->major; |
| |
| switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) { |
| case 0: /* native */ |
| if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && |
| audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n)) |
| return 1; |
| if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) && |
| audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n)) |
| return 1; |
| if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) && |
| audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n)) |
| return 1; |
| return 0; |
| case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */ |
| if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && |
| audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n)) |
| return 1; |
| if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) && |
| audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n)) |
| return 1; |
| if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) && |
| audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n)) |
| return 1; |
| return 0; |
| case 2: /* open */ |
| return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]); |
| case 3: /* openat */ |
| return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]); |
| case 4: /* socketcall */ |
| return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND); |
| case 5: /* execve */ |
| return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC; |
| default: |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val) |
| { |
| struct audit_names *n; |
| umode_t mode = (umode_t)val; |
| |
| if (unlikely(!ctx)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
| if ((n->ino != -1) && |
| ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode)) |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *; |
| * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data. |
| * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees. |
| * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL, |
| * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously, |
| * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself. |
| * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff. |
| */ |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE |
| static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx) |
| { |
| if (!ctx->prio) { |
| ctx->prio = 1; |
| ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk) |
| { |
| struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; |
| int left = ctx->tree_count; |
| if (likely(left)) { |
| p->c[--left] = chunk; |
| ctx->tree_count = left; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| if (!p) |
| return 0; |
| p = p->next; |
| if (p) { |
| p->c[30] = chunk; |
| ctx->trees = p; |
| ctx->tree_count = 30; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx) |
| { |
| struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; |
| ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!ctx->trees) { |
| ctx->trees = p; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (p) |
| p->next = ctx->trees; |
| else |
| ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees; |
| ctx->tree_count = 31; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, |
| struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count) |
| { |
| #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE |
| struct audit_tree_refs *q; |
| int n; |
| if (!p) { |
| /* we started with empty chain */ |
| p = ctx->first_trees; |
| count = 31; |
| /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */ |
| if (!p) |
| return; |
| } |
| n = count; |
| for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) { |
| while (n--) { |
| audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]); |
| q->c[n] = NULL; |
| } |
| } |
| while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) { |
| audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]); |
| q->c[n] = NULL; |
| } |
| ctx->trees = p; |
| ctx->tree_count = count; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx) |
| { |
| struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q; |
| for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) { |
| q = p->next; |
| kfree(p); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree) |
| { |
| #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE |
| struct audit_tree_refs *p; |
| int n; |
| if (!tree) |
| return 0; |
| /* full ones */ |
| for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) { |
| for (n = 0; n < 31; n++) |
| if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree)) |
| return 1; |
| } |
| /* partial */ |
| if (p) { |
| for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++) |
| if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree)) |
| return 1; |
| } |
| #endif |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid, |
| struct audit_names *name, |
| struct audit_field *f, |
| struct audit_context *ctx) |
| { |
| struct audit_names *n; |
| int rc; |
| |
| if (name) { |
| rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid); |
| if (rc) |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| if (ctx) { |
| list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
| rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid); |
| if (rc) |
| return rc; |
| } |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid, |
| struct audit_names *name, |
| struct audit_field *f, |
| struct audit_context *ctx) |
| { |
| struct audit_names *n; |
| int rc; |
| |
| if (name) { |
| rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid); |
| if (rc) |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| if (ctx) { |
| list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
| rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid); |
| if (rc) |
| return rc; |
| } |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk, |
| const struct cred *cred, |
| struct audit_field *f, |
| struct audit_context *ctx, |
| struct audit_names *name) |
| { |
| switch (f->val) { |
| /* process to file object comparisons */ |
| case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID: |
| return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx); |
| case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID: |
| return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx); |
| case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID: |
| return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx); |
| case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID: |
| return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx); |
| case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID: |
| return audit_compare_uid(tsk->loginuid, name, f, ctx); |
| case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID: |
| return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx); |
| case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID: |
| return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx); |
| case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID: |
| return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx); |
| case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID: |
| return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx); |
| /* uid comparisons */ |
| case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID: |
| return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, tsk->loginuid); |
| case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID: |
| return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid); |
| case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID: |
| return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid); |
| case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID: |
| return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid); |
| /* auid comparisons */ |
| case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID: |
| return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->euid); |
| case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID: |
| return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->suid); |
| case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID: |
| return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->fsuid); |
| /* euid comparisons */ |
| case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID: |
| return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid); |
| case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID: |
| return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid); |
| /* suid comparisons */ |
| case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID: |
| return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid); |
| /* gid comparisons */ |
| case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID: |
| return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid); |
| case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID: |
| return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid); |
| case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID: |
| return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid); |
| /* egid comparisons */ |
| case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID: |
| return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid); |
| case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID: |
| return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid); |
| /* sgid comparison */ |
| case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID: |
| return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid); |
| default: |
| WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */ |
| /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0 |
| * otherwise. |
| * |
| * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are |
| * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are |
| * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock. |
| */ |
| static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, |
| struct audit_krule *rule, |
| struct audit_context *ctx, |
| struct audit_names *name, |
| enum audit_state *state, |
| bool task_creation) |
| { |
| const struct cred *cred; |
| int i, need_sid = 1; |
| u32 sid; |
| |
| cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation); |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { |
| struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; |
| struct audit_names *n; |
| int result = 0; |
| pid_t pid; |
| |
| switch (f->type) { |
| case AUDIT_PID: |
| pid = task_pid_nr(tsk); |
| result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val); |
| break; |
| case AUDIT_PPID: |
| if (ctx) { |
| if (!ctx->ppid) |
| ctx->ppid = task_ppid_nr(tsk); |
| result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val); |
| } |
| break; |
| case AUDIT_UID: |
| result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid); |
| break; |
| case AUDIT_EUID: |
| result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid); |
| break; |
| case AUDIT_SUID: |
| result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid); |
| break; |
| case AUDIT_FSUID: |
| result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid); |
| break; |
| case AUDIT_GID: |
| result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid); |
| if (f->op == Audit_equal) { |
| if (!result) |
| result = in_group_p(f->gid); |
| } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) { |
| if (result) |
| result = !in_group_p(f->gid); |
| } |
| break; |
| case AUDIT_EGID: |
| result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid); |
| if (f->op == Audit_equal) { |
| if (!result) |
| result = in_egroup_p(f->gid); |
| } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) { |
| if (result) |
| result = !in_egroup_p(f->gid); |
| } |
| break; |
| case AUDIT_SGID: |
| result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid); |
| break; |
| case AUDIT_FSGID: |
| result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid); |
| break; |
| case AUDIT_PERS: |
| result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val); |
| break; |
| case AUDIT_ARCH: |
| if (ctx) |
| result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val); |
| break; |
| |
| case AUDIT_EXIT: |
| if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) |
| result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val); |
| break; |
| case AUDIT_SUCCESS: |
| if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) { |
| if (f->val) |
| result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS); |
| else |
| result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE); |
| } |
| break; |
| case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR: |
| if (name) { |
| if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) || |
| audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val)) |
| ++result; |
| } else if (ctx) { |
| list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
| if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) || |
| audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) { |
| ++result; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| break; |
| case AUDIT_DEVMINOR: |
| if (name) { |
| if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) || |
| audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val)) |
| ++result; |
| } else if (ctx) { |
| list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
| if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) || |
| audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) { |
| ++result; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| break; |
| case AUDIT_INODE: |
| if (name) |
| result = audit_comparator(name->ino, f->op, f->val); |
| else if (ctx) { |
| list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
| if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) { |
| ++result; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| break; |
| case AUDIT_OBJ_UID: |
| if (name) { |
| result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid); |
| } else if (ctx) { |
| list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
| if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) { |
| ++result; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| break; |
| case AUDIT_OBJ_GID: |
| if (name) { |
| result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid); |
| } else if (ctx) { |
| list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
| if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) { |
| ++result; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| break; |
| case AUDIT_WATCH: |
| if (name) |
| result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, name->ino, name->dev); |
| break; |
| case AUDIT_DIR: |
| if (ctx) |
| result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree); |
| break; |
| case AUDIT_LOGINUID: |
| result = 0; |
| if (ctx) |
| result = audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->uid); |
| break; |
| case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET: |
| result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val); |
| break; |
| case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: |
| case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: |
| case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: |
| case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: |
| case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: |
| /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating |
| a temporary error. We simply treat this as a |
| match for now to avoid losing information that |
| may be wanted. An error message will also be |
| logged upon error */ |
| if (f->lsm_rule) { |
| if (need_sid) { |
| security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); |
| need_sid = 0; |
| } |
| result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, |
| f->op, |
| f->lsm_rule, |
| ctx); |
| } |
| break; |
| case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: |
| case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: |
| case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: |
| case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: |
| case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: |
| /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR |
| also applies here */ |
| if (f->lsm_rule) { |
| /* Find files that match */ |
| if (name) { |
| result = security_audit_rule_match( |
| name->osid, f->type, f->op, |
| f->lsm_rule, ctx); |
| } else if (ctx) { |
| list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
| if (security_audit_rule_match(n->osid, f->type, |
| f->op, f->lsm_rule, |
| ctx)) { |
| ++result; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| /* Find ipc objects that match */ |
| if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC) |
| break; |
| if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid, |
| f->type, f->op, |
| f->lsm_rule, ctx)) |
| ++result; |
| } |
| break; |
| case AUDIT_ARG0: |
| case AUDIT_ARG1: |
| case AUDIT_ARG2: |
| case AUDIT_ARG3: |
| if (ctx) |
| result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val); |
| break; |
| case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: |
| /* ignore this field for filtering */ |
| result = 1; |
| break; |
| case AUDIT_PERM: |
| result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val); |
| break; |
| case AUDIT_FILETYPE: |
| result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val); |
| break; |
| case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE: |
| result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name); |
| break; |
| } |
| if (!result) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (ctx) { |
| if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio) |
| return 0; |
| if (rule->filterkey) { |
| kfree(ctx->filterkey); |
| ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); |
| } |
| ctx->prio = rule->prio; |
| } |
| switch (rule->action) { |
| case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break; |
| case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is |
| * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task |
| * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid. |
| */ |
| static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key) |
| { |
| struct audit_entry *e; |
| enum audit_state state; |
| |
| rcu_read_lock(); |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) { |
| if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, |
| &state, true)) { |
| if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) |
| *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); |
| rcu_read_unlock(); |
| return state; |
| } |
| } |
| rcu_read_unlock(); |
| return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; |
| } |
| |
| static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val) |
| { |
| int word, bit; |
| |
| if (val > 0xffffffff) |
| return false; |
| |
| word = AUDIT_WORD(val); |
| if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE) |
| return false; |
| |
| bit = AUDIT_BIT(val); |
| |
| return rule->mask[word] & bit; |
| } |
| |
| /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the |
| * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is |
| * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit |
| * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT). |
| */ |
| static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, |
| struct audit_context *ctx, |
| struct list_head *list) |
| { |
| struct audit_entry *e; |
| enum audit_state state; |
| |
| if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid) |
| return AUDIT_DISABLED; |
| |
| rcu_read_lock(); |
| if (!list_empty(list)) { |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { |
| if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) && |
| audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL, |
| &state, false)) { |
| rcu_read_unlock(); |
| ctx->current_state = state; |
| return state; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| rcu_read_unlock(); |
| return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match. |
| * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash |
| */ |
| static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk, |
| struct audit_names *n, |
| struct audit_context *ctx) { |
| int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino); |
| struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h]; |
| struct audit_entry *e; |
| enum audit_state state; |
| |
| if (list_empty(list)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { |
| if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) && |
| audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) { |
| ctx->current_state = state; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been |
| * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash |
| * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names. |
| * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall(). |
| */ |
| void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx) |
| { |
| struct audit_names *n; |
| |
| if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid) |
| return; |
| |
| rcu_read_lock(); |
| |
| list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { |
| if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx)) |
| break; |
| } |
| rcu_read_unlock(); |
| } |
| |
| /* Transfer the audit context pointer to the caller, clearing it in the tsk's struct */ |
| static inline struct audit_context *audit_take_context(struct task_struct *tsk, |
| int return_valid, |
| long return_code) |
| { |
| struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; |
| |
| if (!context) |
| return NULL; |
| context->return_valid = return_valid; |
| |
| /* |
| * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual |
| * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific |
| * signal handlers |
| * |
| * This is actually a test for: |
| * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) || |
| * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) |
| * |
| * but is faster than a bunch of || |
| */ |
| if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) && |
| (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) && |
| (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD)) |
| context->return_code = -EINTR; |
| else |
| context->return_code = return_code; |
| |
| if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) { |
| audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]); |
| audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context); |
| } |
| |
| tsk->audit_context = NULL; |
| return context; |
| } |
| |
| static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context *context) |
| { |
| kfree(context->proctitle.value); |
| context->proctitle.value = NULL; |
| context->proctitle.len = 0; |
| } |
| |
| static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context) |
| { |
| struct audit_names *n, *next; |
| |
| #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 |
| if (context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) { |
| int i = 0; |
| |
| pr_err("%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d" |
| " name_count=%d put_count=%d ino_count=%d" |
| " [NOT freeing]\n", __FILE__, __LINE__, |
| context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall, |
| context->name_count, context->put_count, |
| context->ino_count); |
| list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { |
| pr_err("names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i++, n->name, |
| n->name->name ?: "(null)"); |
| } |
| dump_stack(); |
| return; |
| } |
| #endif |
| #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
| context->put_count = 0; |
| context->ino_count = 0; |
| #endif |
| |
| list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) { |
| list_del(&n->list); |
| if (n->name && n->name_put) |
| final_putname(n->name); |
| if (n->should_free) |
| kfree(n); |
| } |
| context->name_count = 0; |
| path_put(&context->pwd); |
| context->pwd.dentry = NULL; |
| context->pwd.mnt = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context) |
| { |
| struct audit_aux_data *aux; |
| |
| while ((aux = context->aux)) { |
| context->aux = aux->next; |
| kfree(aux); |
| } |
| while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) { |
| context->aux_pids = aux->next; |
| kfree(aux); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state) |
| { |
| struct audit_context *context; |
| |
| context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!context) |
| return NULL; |
| context->state = state; |
| context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0; |
| INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees); |
| INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list); |
| return context; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task |
| * @tsk: task |
| * |
| * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context |
| * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the |
| * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is |
| * needed. |
| */ |
| int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) |
| { |
| struct audit_context *context; |
| enum audit_state state; |
| char *key = NULL; |
| |
| if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled)) |
| return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */ |
| |
| state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key); |
| if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) { |
| clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) { |
| kfree(key); |
| audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc"); |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| } |
| context->filterkey = key; |
| |
| tsk->audit_context = context; |
| set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) |
| { |
| audit_free_names(context); |
| unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0); |
| free_tree_refs(context); |
| audit_free_aux(context); |
| kfree(context->filterkey); |
| kfree(context->sockaddr); |
| audit_proctitle_free(context); |
| kfree(context); |
| } |
| |
| static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, |
| kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid, |
| u32 sid, char *comm) |
| { |
| struct audit_buffer *ab; |
| char *ctx = NULL; |
| u32 len; |
| int rc = 0; |
| |
| ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID); |
| if (!ab) |
| return rc; |
| |
| audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, |
| from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid), |
| from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid); |
| if (sid) { |
| if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) { |
| audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)"); |
| rc = 1; |
| } else { |
| audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); |
| security_release_secctx(ctx, len); |
| } |
| } |
| audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm="); |
| audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm); |
| audit_log_end(ab); |
| |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't |
| * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being |
| * within about 500 bytes (next page boundary) |
| * |
| * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when |
| * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting |
| * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to |
| * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space |
| * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was. |
| */ |
| static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context, |
| struct audit_buffer **ab, |
| int arg_num, |
| size_t *len_sent, |
| const char __user *p, |
| char *buf) |
| { |
| char arg_num_len_buf[12]; |
| const char __user *tmp_p = p; |
| /* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */ |
| size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 5; |
| size_t len, len_left, to_send; |
| size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN; |
| unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0; |
| int ret; |
| |
| /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */ |
| len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1; |
| |
| /* |
| * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings |
| * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar |
| * for strings that are too long, we should not have created |
| * any. |
| */ |
| if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) { |
| WARN_ON(1); |
| send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */ |
| do { |
| if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN) |
| to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN; |
| else |
| to_send = len_left; |
| ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send); |
| /* |
| * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just |
| * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user- |
| * space yet. |
| */ |
| if (ret) { |
| WARN_ON(1); |
| send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| buf[to_send] = '\0'; |
| has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send); |
| if (has_cntl) { |
| /* |
| * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only |
| * send half as much in each message |
| */ |
| max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2; |
| break; |
| } |
| len_left -= to_send; |
| tmp_p += to_send; |
| } while (len_left > 0); |
| |
| len_left = len; |
| |
| if (len > max_execve_audit_len) |
| too_long = 1; |
| |
| /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */ |
| for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) { |
| int room_left; |
| |
| if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len) |
| to_send = max_execve_audit_len; |
| else |
| to_send = len_left; |
| |
| /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */ |
| room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent; |
| if (has_cntl) |
| room_left -= (to_send * 2); |
| else |
| room_left -= to_send; |
| if (room_left < 0) { |
| *len_sent = 0; |
| audit_log_end(*ab); |
| *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE); |
| if (!*ab) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * first record needs to say how long the original string was |
| * so we can be sure nothing was lost. |
| */ |
| if ((i == 0) && (too_long)) |
| audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num, |
| has_cntl ? 2*len : len); |
| |
| /* |
| * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already |
| * filled buf above when we checked for control characters |
| * so don't bother with another copy_from_user |
| */ |
| if (len >= max_execve_audit_len) |
| ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send); |
| else |
| ret = 0; |
| if (ret) { |
| WARN_ON(1); |
| send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| buf[to_send] = '\0'; |
| |
| /* actually log it */ |
| audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d", arg_num); |
| if (too_long) |
| audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i); |
| audit_log_format(*ab, "="); |
| if (has_cntl) |
| audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send); |
| else |
| audit_log_string(*ab, buf); |
| |
| p += to_send; |
| len_left -= to_send; |
| *len_sent += arg_num_len; |
| if (has_cntl) |
| *len_sent += to_send * 2; |
| else |
| *len_sent += to_send; |
| } |
| /* include the null we didn't log */ |
| return len + 1; |
| } |
| |
| static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context, |
| struct audit_buffer **ab) |
| { |
| int i, len; |
| size_t len_sent = 0; |
| const char __user *p; |
| char *buf; |
| |
| p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start; |
| |
| audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc); |
| |
| /* |
| * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just |
| * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size |
| * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg() |
| * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe. |
| */ |
| buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!buf) { |
| audit_panic("out of memory for argv string"); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < context->execve.argc; i++) { |
| len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i, |
| &len_sent, p, buf); |
| if (len <= 0) |
| break; |
| p += len; |
| } |
| kfree(buf); |
| } |
| |
| static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) |
| { |
| struct audit_buffer *ab; |
| int i; |
| |
| ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type); |
| if (!ab) |
| return; |
| |
| switch (context->type) { |
| case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: { |
| int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs; |
| audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs); |
| for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) |
| audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, |
| context->socketcall.args[i]); |
| break; } |
| case AUDIT_IPC: { |
| u32 osid = context->ipc.osid; |
| |
| audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho", |
| from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid), |
| from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid), |
| context->ipc.mode); |
| if (osid) { |
| char *ctx = NULL; |
| u32 len; |
| if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) { |
| audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid); |
| *call_panic = 1; |
| } else { |
| audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); |
| security_release_secctx(ctx, len); |
| } |
| } |
| if (context->ipc.has_perm) { |
| audit_log_end(ab); |
| ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, |
| AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM); |
| if (unlikely(!ab)) |
| return; |
| audit_log_format(ab, |
| "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho", |
| context->ipc.qbytes, |
| context->ipc.perm_uid, |
| context->ipc.perm_gid, |
| context->ipc.perm_mode); |
| } |
| break; } |
| case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: { |
| audit_log_format(ab, |
| "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld " |
| "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld", |
| context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode, |
| context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags, |
| context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg, |
| context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize, |
| context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs); |
| break; } |
| case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: { |
| audit_log_format(ab, |
| "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u " |
| "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld", |
| context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes, |
| context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len, |
| context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio, |
| context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec, |
| context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec); |
| break; } |
| case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: { |
| audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d", |
| context->mq_notify.mqdes, |
| context->mq_notify.sigev_signo); |
| break; } |
| case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: { |
| struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat; |
| audit_log_format(ab, |
| "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld " |
| "mq_curmsgs=%ld ", |
| context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes, |
| attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg, |
| attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs); |
| break; } |
| case AUDIT_CAPSET: { |
| audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid); |
| audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable); |
| audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted); |
| audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective); |
| break; } |
| case AUDIT_MMAP: { |
| audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd, |
| context->mmap.flags); |
| break; } |
| case AUDIT_EXECVE: { |
| audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab); |
| break; } |
| } |
| audit_log_end(ab); |
| } |
| |
| static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len) |
| { |
| char *end = proctitle + len - 1; |
| while (end > proctitle && !isprint(*end)) |
| end--; |
| |
| /* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */ |
| len = end - proctitle + 1; |
| len -= isprint(proctitle[len-1]) == 0; |
| return len; |
| } |
| |
| static void audit_log_proctitle(struct task_struct *tsk, |
| struct audit_context *context) |
| { |
| int res; |
| char *buf; |
| char *msg = "(null)"; |
| int len = strlen(msg); |
| struct audit_buffer *ab; |
| |
| ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PROCTITLE); |
| if (!ab) |
| return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */ |
| |
| audit_log_format(ab, "proctitle="); |
| |
| /* Not cached */ |
| if (!context->proctitle.value) { |
| buf = kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!buf) |
| goto out; |
| /* Historically called this from procfs naming */ |
| res = get_cmdline(tsk, buf, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN); |
| if (res == 0) { |
| kfree(buf); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| res = audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf, res); |
| if (res == 0) { |
| kfree(buf); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| context->proctitle.value = buf; |
| context->proctitle.len = res; |
| } |
| msg = context->proctitle.value; |
| len = context->proctitle.len; |
| out: |
| audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, msg, len); |
| audit_log_end(ab); |
| } |
| |
| static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk) |
| { |
| int i, call_panic = 0; |
| struct audit_buffer *ab; |
| struct audit_aux_data *aux; |
| struct audit_names *n; |
| |
| /* tsk == current */ |
| context->personality = tsk->personality; |
| |
| ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL); |
| if (!ab) |
| return; /* audit_panic has been called */ |
| audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d", |
| context->arch, context->major); |
| if (context->personality != PER_LINUX) |
| audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality); |
| if (context->return_valid) |
| audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", |
| (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no", |
| context->return_code); |
| |
| audit_log_format(ab, |
| " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d", |
| context->argv[0], |
| context->argv[1], |
| context->argv[2], |
| context->argv[3], |
| context->name_count); |
| |
| audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk); |
| audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey); |
| audit_log_end(ab); |
| |
| for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) { |
| |
| ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type); |
| if (!ab) |
| continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ |
| |
| switch (aux->type) { |
| |
| case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: { |
| struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux; |
| audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver); |
| audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted); |
| audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable); |
| audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE); |
| audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted); |
| audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable); |
| audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective); |
| audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted); |
| audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable); |
| audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective); |
| break; } |
| |
| } |
| audit_log_end(ab); |
| } |
| |
| if (context->type) |
| show_special(context, &call_panic); |
| |
| if (context->fds[0] >= 0) { |
| ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR); |
| if (ab) { |
| audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", |
| context->fds[0], context->fds[1]); |
| audit_log_end(ab); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (context->sockaddr_len) { |
| ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR); |
| if (ab) { |
| audit_log_format(ab, "saddr="); |
| audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr, |
| context->sockaddr_len); |
| audit_log_end(ab); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) { |
| struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) |
| if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i], |
| axs->target_auid[i], |
| axs->target_uid[i], |
| axs->target_sessionid[i], |
| axs->target_sid[i], |
| axs->target_comm[i])) |
| call_panic = 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (context->target_pid && |
| audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, |
| context->target_auid, context->target_uid, |
| context->target_sessionid, |
| context->target_sid, context->target_comm)) |
| call_panic = 1; |
| |
| if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) { |
| ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD); |
| if (ab) { |
| audit_log_d_path(ab, " cwd=", &context->pwd); |
| audit_log_end(ab); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| i = 0; |
| list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { |
| if (n->hidden) |
| continue; |
| audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic); |
| } |
| |
| audit_log_proctitle(tsk, context); |
| |
| /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */ |
| ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE); |
| if (ab) |
| audit_log_end(ab); |
| if (call_panic) |
| audit_panic("error converting sid to string"); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * audit_free - free a per-task audit context |
| * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free |
| * |
| * Called from copy_process and do_exit |
| */ |
| void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) |
| { |
| struct audit_context *context; |
| |
| context = audit_take_context(tsk, 0, 0); |
| if (!context) |
| return; |
| |
| /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit |
| * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. |
| * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this |
| * in the context of the idle thread */ |
| /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */ |
| if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) |
| audit_log_exit(context, tsk); |
| if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) |
| audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees); |
| |
| audit_free_context(context); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry |
| * @major: major syscall type (function) |
| * @a1: additional syscall register 1 |
| * @a2: additional syscall register 2 |
| * @a3: additional syscall register 3 |
| * @a4: additional syscall register 4 |
| * |
| * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the |
| * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or |
| * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the |
| * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT, |
| * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it |
| * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it |
| * be written). |
| */ |
| void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2, |
| unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4) |
| { |
| struct task_struct *tsk = current; |
| struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; |
| enum audit_state state; |
| |
| if (!context) |
| return; |
| |
| BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count); |
| |
| if (!audit_enabled) |
| return; |
| |
| context->arch = syscall_get_arch(); |
| context->major = major; |
| context->argv[0] = a1; |
| context->argv[1] = a2; |
| context->argv[2] = a3; |
| context->argv[3] = a4; |
| |
| state = context->state; |
| context->dummy = !audit_n_rules; |
| if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) { |
| context->prio = 0; |
| state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]); |
| } |
| if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) |
| return; |
| |
| context->serial = 0; |
| context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME; |
| context->in_syscall = 1; |
| context->current_state = state; |
| context->ppid = 0; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call |
| * @success: success value of the syscall |
| * @return_code: return value of the syscall |
| * |
| * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as |
| * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from |
| * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit |
| * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases, |
| * free the names stored from getname(). |
| */ |
| void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code) |
| { |
| struct task_struct *tsk = current; |
| struct audit_context *context; |
| |
| if (success) |
| success = AUDITSC_SUCCESS; |
| else |
| success = AUDITSC_FAILURE; |
| |
| context = audit_take_context(tsk, success, return_code); |
| if (!context) |
| return; |
| |
| if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) |
| audit_log_exit(context, tsk); |
| |
| context->in_syscall = 0; |
| context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0; |
| |
| if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) |
| audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees); |
| |
| audit_free_names(context); |
| unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0); |
| audit_free_aux(context); |
| context->aux = NULL; |
| context->aux_pids = NULL; |
| context->target_pid = 0; |
| context->target_sid = 0; |
| context->sockaddr_len = 0; |
| context->type = 0; |
| context->fds[0] = -1; |
| if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) { |
| kfree(context->filterkey); |
| context->filterkey = NULL; |
| } |
| tsk->audit_context = context; |
| } |
| |
| static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode) |
| { |
| #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE |
| struct audit_context *context; |
| struct audit_tree_refs *p; |
| struct audit_chunk *chunk; |
| int count; |
| if (likely(hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks))) |
| return; |
| context = current->audit_context; |
| p = context->trees; |
| count = context->tree_count; |
| rcu_read_lock(); |
| chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode); |
| rcu_read_unlock(); |
| if (!chunk) |
| return; |
| if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) |
| return; |
| if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) { |
| pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n"); |
| audit_set_auditable(context); |
| audit_put_chunk(chunk); |
| unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); |
| return; |
| } |
| put_tree_ref(context, chunk); |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry) |
| { |
| #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE |
| struct audit_context *context; |
| struct audit_tree_refs *p; |
| const struct dentry *d, *parent; |
| struct audit_chunk *drop; |
| unsigned long seq; |
| int count; |
| |
| context = current->audit_context; |
| p = context->trees; |
| count = context->tree_count; |
| retry: |
| drop = NULL; |
| d = dentry; |
| rcu_read_lock(); |
| seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock); |
| for(;;) { |
| struct inode *inode = d->d_inode; |
| if (inode && unlikely(!hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks))) { |
| struct audit_chunk *chunk; |
| chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode); |
| if (chunk) { |
| if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) { |
| drop = chunk; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| parent = d->d_parent; |
| if (parent == d) |
| break; |
| d = parent; |
| } |
| if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */ |
| rcu_read_unlock(); |
| if (!drop) { |
| /* just a race with rename */ |
| unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); |
| goto retry; |
| } |
| audit_put_chunk(drop); |
| if (grow_tree_refs(context)) { |
| /* OK, got more space */ |
| unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); |
| goto retry; |
| } |
| /* too bad */ |
| pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n"); |
| unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); |
| audit_set_auditable(context); |
| return; |
| } |
| rcu_read_unlock(); |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context, |
| unsigned char type) |
| { |
| struct audit_names *aname; |
| |
| if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) { |
| aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count]; |
| memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname)); |
| } else { |
| aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS); |
| if (!aname) |
| return NULL; |
| aname->should_free = true; |
| } |
| |
| aname->ino = (unsigned long)-1; |
| aname->type = type; |
| list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list); |
| |
| context->name_count++; |
| #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
| context->ino_count++; |
| #endif |
| return aname; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry |
| * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname |
| * |
| * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an |
| * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename |
| * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL. |
| */ |
| struct filename * |
| __audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr) |
| { |
| struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
| struct audit_names *n; |
| |
| list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { |
| if (!n->name) |
| continue; |
| if (n->name->uptr == uptr) |
| return n->name; |
| } |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * audit_getname - add a name to the list |
| * @name: name to add |
| * |
| * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context. |
| * Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). |
| */ |
| void __audit_getname(struct filename *name) |
| { |
| struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
| struct audit_names *n; |
| |
| if (!context->in_syscall) { |
| #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 |
| pr_err("%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n", |
| __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); |
| dump_stack(); |
| #endif |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
| /* The filename _must_ have a populated ->name */ |
| BUG_ON(!name->name); |
| #endif |
| |
| n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN); |
| if (!n) |
| return; |
| |
| n->name = name; |
| n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; |
| n->name_put = true; |
| name->aname = n; |
| |
| if (!context->pwd.dentry) |
| get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd); |
| } |
| |
| /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request |
| * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname |
| * |
| * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context, |
| * then we delay the putname until syscall exit. |
| * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname(). |
| */ |
| void audit_putname(struct filename *name) |
| { |
| struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
| |
| BUG_ON(!context); |
| if (!name->aname || !context->in_syscall) { |
| #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 |
| pr_err("%s:%d(:%d): final_putname(%p)\n", |
| __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); |
| if (context->name_count) { |
| struct audit_names *n; |
| int i = 0; |
| |
| list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) |
| pr_err("name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i++, n->name, |
| n->name->name ?: "(null)"); |
| } |
| #endif |
| final_putname(name); |
| } |
| #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
| else { |
| ++context->put_count; |
| if (context->put_count > context->name_count) { |
| pr_err("%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d putname(%p)" |
| " name_count=%d put_count=%d\n", |
| __FILE__, __LINE__, |
| context->serial, context->major, |
| context->in_syscall, name->name, |
| context->name_count, context->put_count); |
| dump_stack(); |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup |
| * @name: name being audited |
| * @dentry: dentry being audited |
| * @flags: attributes for this particular entry |
| */ |
| void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry, |
| unsigned int flags) |
| { |
| struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
| const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; |
| struct audit_names *n; |
| bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT; |
| |
| if (!context->in_syscall) |
| return; |
| |
| if (!name) |
| goto out_alloc; |
| |
| #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
| /* The struct filename _must_ have a populated ->name */ |
| BUG_ON(!name->name); |
| #endif |
| /* |
| * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can |
| * just use it directly if the type is correct. |
| */ |
| n = name->aname; |
| if (n) { |
| if (parent) { |
| if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT || |
| n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) |
| goto out; |
| } else { |
| if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT) |
| goto out; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) { |
| if (!n->name || strcmp(n->name->name, name->name)) |
| continue; |
| |
| /* match the correct record type */ |
| if (parent) { |
| if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT || |
| n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) |
| goto out; |
| } else { |
| if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT) |
| goto out; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| out_alloc: |
| /* unable to find an entry with both a matching name and type */ |
| n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN); |
| if (!n) |
| return; |
| /* unfortunately, while we may have a path name to record with the |
| * inode, we can't always rely on the string lasting until the end of |
| * the syscall so we need to create our own copy, it may fail due to |
| * memory allocation issues, but we do our best */ |
| if (name) { |
| /* we can't use getname_kernel() due to size limits */ |
| size_t len = strlen(name->name) + 1; |
| struct filename *new = __getname(); |
| |
| if (unlikely(!new)) |
| goto out; |
| |
| if (len <= (PATH_MAX - sizeof(*new))) { |
| new->name = (char *)(new) + sizeof(*new); |
| new->separate = false; |
| } else if (len <= PATH_MAX) { |
| /* this looks odd, but is due to final_putname() */ |
| struct filename *new2; |
| |
| new2 = kmalloc(sizeof(*new2), GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (unlikely(!new2)) { |
| __putname(new); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| new2->name = (char *)new; |
| new2->separate = true; |
| new = new2; |
| } else { |
| /* we should never get here, but let's be safe */ |
| __putname(new); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| strlcpy((char *)new->name, name->name, len); |
| new->uptr = NULL; |
| new->aname = n; |
| n->name = new; |
| n->name_put = true; |
| } |
| out: |
| if (parent) { |
| n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL; |
| n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT; |
| if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN) |
| n->hidden = true; |
| } else { |
| n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; |
| n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL; |
| } |
| handle_path(dentry); |
| audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode); |
| } |
| |
| void __audit_file(const struct file *file) |
| { |
| __audit_inode(NULL, file->f_path.dentry, 0); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects |
| * @parent: inode of dentry parent |
| * @dentry: dentry being audited |
| * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for |
| * |
| * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode |
| * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent. |
| * This call updates the audit context with the child's information. |
| * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after |
| * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object |
| * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during |
| * unsuccessful attempts. |
| */ |
| void __audit_inode_child(const struct inode *parent, |
| const struct dentry *dentry, |
| const unsigned char type) |
| { |
| struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
| const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; |
| const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name; |
| struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL; |
| |
| if (!context->in_syscall) |
| return; |
| |
| if (inode) |
| handle_one(inode); |
| |
| /* look for a parent entry first */ |
| list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { |
| if (!n->name || n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT) |
| continue; |
| |
| if (n->ino == parent->i_ino && |
| !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name, n->name_len)) { |
| found_parent = n; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* is there a matching child entry? */ |
| list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { |
| /* can only match entries that have a name */ |
| if (!n->name || n->type != type) |
| continue; |
| |
| /* if we found a parent, make sure this one is a child of it */ |
| if (found_parent && (n->name != found_parent->name)) |
| continue; |
| |
| if (!strcmp(dname, n->name->name) || |
| !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name, |
| found_parent ? |
| found_parent->name_len : |
| AUDIT_NAME_FULL)) { |
| found_child = n; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!found_parent) { |
| /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */ |
| n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT); |
| if (!n) |
| return; |
| audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent); |
| } |
| |
| if (!found_child) { |
| found_child = audit_alloc_name(context, type); |
| if (!found_child) |
| return; |
| |
| /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent |
| * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in |
| * audit_free_names() */ |
| if (found_parent) { |
| found_child->name = found_parent->name; |
| found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; |
| /* don't call __putname() */ |
| found_child->name_put = false; |
| } |
| } |
| if (inode) |
| audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode); |
| else |
| found_child->ino = (unsigned long)-1; |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child); |
| |
| /** |
| * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values |
| * @ctx: audit_context for the task |
| * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context |
| * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context |
| * |
| * Also sets the context as auditable. |
| */ |
| int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, |
| struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial) |
| { |
| if (!ctx->in_syscall) |
| return 0; |
| if (!ctx->serial) |
| ctx->serial = audit_serial(); |
| t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec; |
| t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec; |
| *serial = ctx->serial; |
| if (!ctx->prio) { |
| ctx->prio = 1; |
| ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */ |
| static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0); |
| |
| static int audit_set_loginuid_perm(kuid_t loginuid) |
| { |
| /* if we are unset, we don't need privs */ |
| if (!audit_loginuid_set(current)) |
| return 0; |
| /* if AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE means never ever allow a change*/ |
| if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE)) |
| return -EPERM; |
| /* it is set, you need permission */ |
| if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) |
| return -EPERM; |
| /* reject if this is not an unset and we don't allow that */ |
| if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_ONLY_UNSET_LOGINUID) && uid_valid(loginuid)) |
| return -EPERM; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid, |
| unsigned int oldsessionid, unsigned int sessionid, |
| int rc) |
| { |
| struct audit_buffer *ab; |
| uid_t uid, oldloginuid, loginuid; |
| |
| if (!audit_enabled) |
| return; |
| |
| uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current)); |
| oldloginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, koldloginuid); |
| loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, kloginuid), |
| |
| ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN); |
| if (!ab) |
| return; |
| audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u", task_pid_nr(current), uid); |
| audit_log_task_context(ab); |
| audit_log_format(ab, " old-auid=%u auid=%u old-ses=%u ses=%u res=%d", |
| oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc); |
| audit_log_end(ab); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's audit_context loginuid |
| * @loginuid: loginuid value |
| * |
| * Returns 0. |
| * |
| * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write(). |
| */ |
| int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) |
| { |
| struct task_struct *task = current; |
| unsigned int oldsessionid, sessionid = (unsigned int)-1; |
| kuid_t oldloginuid; |
| int rc; |
| |
| oldloginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current); |
| oldsessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); |
| |
| rc = audit_set_loginuid_perm(loginuid); |
| if (rc) |
| goto out; |
| |
| /* are we setting or clearing? */ |
| if (uid_valid(loginuid)) |
| sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id); |
| |
| task->sessionid = sessionid; |
| task->loginuid = loginuid; |
| out: |
| audit_log_set_loginuid(oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, rc); |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open |
| * @oflag: open flag |
| * @mode: mode bits |
| * @attr: queue attributes |
| * |
| */ |
| void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr) |
| { |
| struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
| |
| if (attr) |
| memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr)); |
| else |
| memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr)); |
| |
| context->mq_open.oflag = oflag; |
| context->mq_open.mode = mode; |
| |
| context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive |
| * @mqdes: MQ descriptor |
| * @msg_len: Message length |
| * @msg_prio: Message priority |
| * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time |
| * |
| */ |
| void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio, |
| const struct timespec *abs_timeout) |
| { |
| struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
| struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout; |
| |
| if (abs_timeout) |
| memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec)); |
| else |
| memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec)); |
| |
| context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes; |
| context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len; |
| context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio; |
| |
| context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify |
| * @mqdes: MQ descriptor |
| * @notification: Notification event |
| * |
| */ |
| |
| void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification) |
| { |
| struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
| |
| if (notification) |
| context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo; |
| else |
| context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0; |
| |
| context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes; |
| context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute |
| * @mqdes: MQ descriptor |
| * @mqstat: MQ flags |
| * |
| */ |
| void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat) |
| { |
| struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
| context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes; |
| context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat; |
| context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object |
| * @ipcp: ipc permissions |
| * |
| */ |
| void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) |
| { |
| struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
| context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid; |
| context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid; |
| context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode; |
| context->ipc.has_perm = 0; |
| security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid); |
| context->type = AUDIT_IPC; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions |
| * @qbytes: msgq bytes |
| * @uid: msgq user id |
| * @gid: msgq group id |
| * @mode: msgq mode (permissions) |
| * |
| * Called only after audit_ipc_obj(). |
| */ |
| void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode) |
| { |
| struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
| |
| context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes; |
| context->ipc.perm_uid = uid; |
| context->ipc.perm_gid = gid; |
| context->ipc.perm_mode = mode; |
| context->ipc.has_perm = 1; |
| } |
| |
| void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
| { |
| struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
| |
| context->type = AUDIT_EXECVE; |
| context->execve.argc = bprm->argc; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall |
| * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS. |
| * @args: args array |
| * |
| */ |
| int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args) |
| { |
| struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
| |
| if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL; |
| context->socketcall.nargs = nargs; |
| memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long)); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair |
| * @fd1: the first file descriptor |
| * @fd2: the second file descriptor |
| * |
| */ |
| void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2) |
| { |
| struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
| context->fds[0] = fd1; |
| context->fds[1] = fd2; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto |
| * @len: data length in user space |
| * @a: data address in kernel space |
| * |
| * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. |
| */ |
| int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) |
| { |
| struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
| |
| if (!context->sockaddr) { |
| void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!p) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| context->sockaddr = p; |
| } |
| |
| context->sockaddr_len = len; |
| memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) |
| { |
| struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
| |
| context->target_pid = task_pid_nr(t); |
| context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); |
| context->target_uid = task_uid(t); |
| context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); |
| security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid); |
| memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem |
| * @sig: signal value |
| * @t: task being signaled |
| * |
| * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid) |
| * and uid that is doing that. |
| */ |
| int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) |
| { |
| struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp; |
| struct task_struct *tsk = current; |
| struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context; |
| kuid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t); |
| |
| if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) { |
| if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) { |
| audit_sig_pid = task_pid_nr(tsk); |
| if (uid_valid(tsk->loginuid)) |
| audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid; |
| else |
| audit_sig_uid = uid; |
| security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid); |
| } |
| if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly |
| * in audit_context */ |
| if (!ctx->target_pid) { |
| ctx->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t); |
| ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); |
| ctx->target_uid = t_uid; |
| ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); |
| security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid); |
| memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids; |
| if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) { |
| axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC); |
| if (!axp) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID; |
| axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids; |
| ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp; |
| } |
| BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS); |
| |
| axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = task_tgid_nr(t); |
| axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t); |
| axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; |
| axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); |
| security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); |
| memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); |
| axp->pid_count++; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps |
| * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed |
| * @new: the proposed new credentials |
| * @old: the old credentials |
| * |
| * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not |
| * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall |
| * |
| * -Eric |
| */ |
| int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, |
| const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) |
| { |
| struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax; |
| struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
| struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps; |
| struct dentry *dentry; |
| |
| ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!ax) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS; |
| ax->d.next = context->aux; |
| context->aux = (void *)ax; |
| |
| dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_path.dentry); |
| get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps); |
| dput(dentry); |
| |
| ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted; |
| ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable; |
| ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE); |
| ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT; |
| |
| ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted; |
| ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable; |
| ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective; |
| |
| ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted; |
| ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable; |
| ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall |
| * @new: the new credentials |
| * @old: the old (current) credentials |
| * |
| * Record the arguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the |
| * audit system if applicable |
| */ |
| void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) |
| { |
| struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
| context->capset.pid = task_pid_nr(current); |
| context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective; |
| context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective; |
| context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted; |
| context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET; |
| } |
| |
| void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags) |
| { |
| struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; |
| context->mmap.fd = fd; |
| context->mmap.flags = flags; |
| context->type = AUDIT_MMAP; |
| } |
| |
| static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab) |
| { |
| kuid_t auid, uid; |
| kgid_t gid; |
| unsigned int sessionid; |
| struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; |
| char comm[sizeof(current->comm)]; |
| |
| auid = audit_get_loginuid(current); |
| sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); |
| current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid); |
| |
| audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u", |
| from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid), |
| from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), |
| from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid), |
| sessionid); |
| audit_log_task_context(ab); |
| audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_pid_nr(current)); |
| audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current)); |
| if (mm) { |
| down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); |
| if (mm->exe_file) |
| audit_log_d_path(ab, " exe=", &mm->exe_file->f_path); |
| up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); |
| } else |
| audit_log_format(ab, " exe=(null)"); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally |
| * @signr: signal value |
| * |
| * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we |
| * should record the event for investigation. |
| */ |
| void audit_core_dumps(long signr) |
| { |
| struct audit_buffer *ab; |
| |
| if (!audit_enabled) |
| return; |
| |
| if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */ |
| return; |
| |
| ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND); |
| if (unlikely(!ab)) |
| return; |
| audit_log_task(ab); |
| audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr); |
| audit_log_end(ab); |
| } |
| |
| void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code) |
| { |
| struct audit_buffer *ab; |
| |
| ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP); |
| if (unlikely(!ab)) |
| return; |
| audit_log_task(ab); |
| audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x", |
| signr, syscall_get_arch(), syscall, is_compat_task(), |
| KSTK_EIP(current), code); |
| audit_log_end(ab); |
| } |
| |
| struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void) |
| { |
| struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context; |
| if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall)) |
| return NULL; |
| return &ctx->killed_trees; |
| } |