Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | # |
| 2 | # Security configuration |
| 3 | # |
| 4 | |
| 5 | menu "Security options" |
| 6 | |
| 7 | config KEYS |
| 8 | bool "Enable access key retention support" |
| 9 | help |
| 10 | This option provides support for retaining authentication tokens and |
| 11 | access keys in the kernel. |
| 12 | |
| 13 | It also includes provision of methods by which such keys might be |
| 14 | associated with a process so that network filesystems, encryption |
| 15 | support and the like can find them. |
| 16 | |
| 17 | Furthermore, a special type of key is available that acts as keyring: |
| 18 | a searchable sequence of keys. Each process is equipped with access |
| 19 | to five standard keyrings: UID-specific, GID-specific, session, |
| 20 | process and thread. |
| 21 | |
| 22 | If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. |
| 23 | |
| 24 | config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS |
Michael LeMay | 06ec7be | 2006-06-26 00:24:56 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 25 | bool "Enable the /proc/keys file by which keys may be viewed" |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 26 | depends on KEYS |
| 27 | help |
Michael LeMay | 06ec7be | 2006-06-26 00:24:56 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 28 | This option turns on support for the /proc/keys file - through which |
| 29 | can be listed all the keys on the system that are viewable by the |
| 30 | reading process. |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 31 | |
Michael LeMay | 06ec7be | 2006-06-26 00:24:56 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 32 | The only keys included in the list are those that grant View |
| 33 | permission to the reading process whether or not it possesses them. |
| 34 | Note that LSM security checks are still performed, and may further |
| 35 | filter out keys that the current process is not authorised to view. |
| 36 | |
| 37 | Only key attributes are listed here; key payloads are not included in |
| 38 | the resulting table. |
| 39 | |
| 40 | If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 41 | |
| 42 | config SECURITY |
| 43 | bool "Enable different security models" |
Adrian Bunk | 2c40579 | 2005-08-22 18:20:50 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 44 | depends on SYSFS |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 45 | help |
| 46 | This allows you to choose different security modules to be |
| 47 | configured into your kernel. |
| 48 | |
| 49 | If this option is not selected, the default Linux security |
| 50 | model will be used. |
| 51 | |
| 52 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. |
| 53 | |
Eric Paris | da31894 | 2008-08-22 11:35:57 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 54 | config SECURITYFS |
| 55 | bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem" |
| 56 | help |
| 57 | This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by |
| 58 | the TPM bios character driver. It is not used by SELinux or SMACK. |
| 59 | |
| 60 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. |
| 61 | |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 62 | config SECURITY_NETWORK |
| 63 | bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks" |
| 64 | depends on SECURITY |
| 65 | help |
| 66 | This enables the socket and networking security hooks. |
| 67 | If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to |
| 68 | implement socket and networking access controls. |
| 69 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. |
| 70 | |
Trent Jaeger | df71837 | 2005-12-13 23:12:27 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 71 | config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM |
| 72 | bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks" |
| 73 | depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK |
| 74 | help |
| 75 | This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks. |
| 76 | If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to |
| 77 | implement per-packet access controls based on labels |
| 78 | derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are |
| 79 | designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized |
| 80 | to communicate unlabelled data can send without using |
| 81 | IPSec. |
| 82 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. |
| 83 | |
Kentaro Takeda | be6d3e5 | 2008-12-17 13:24:15 +0900 | [diff] [blame] | 84 | config SECURITY_PATH |
| 85 | bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control" |
| 86 | depends on SECURITY |
| 87 | help |
| 88 | This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control. |
| 89 | If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to |
| 90 | implement pathname based access controls. |
| 91 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. |
| 92 | |
Serge E. Hallyn | b537677 | 2007-10-16 23:31:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 93 | config SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES |
Andrew G. Morgan | 84aaa7a | 2008-07-23 21:28:25 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 94 | bool "File POSIX Capabilities" |
Serge E. Hallyn | b537677 | 2007-10-16 23:31:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 95 | default n |
| 96 | help |
| 97 | This enables filesystem capabilities, allowing you to give |
| 98 | binaries a subset of root's powers without using setuid 0. |
| 99 | |
| 100 | If in doubt, answer N. |
| 101 | |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 102 | config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG |
James Morris | 20510f2 | 2007-10-16 23:31:32 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 103 | bool "Root Plug Support" |
| 104 | depends on USB=y && SECURITY |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 105 | help |
| 106 | This is a sample LSM module that should only be used as such. |
| 107 | It prevents any programs running with egid == 0 if a specific |
| 108 | USB device is not present in the system. |
| 109 | |
| 110 | See <http://www.linuxjournal.com/article.php?sid=6279> for |
| 111 | more information about this module. |
| 112 | |
| 113 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. |
| 114 | |
Eric Paris | a5ecbcb | 2008-01-31 15:11:22 -0500 | [diff] [blame] | 115 | config SECURITY_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR |
| 116 | int "Low address space to protect from user allocation" |
| 117 | depends on SECURITY |
| 118 | default 0 |
| 119 | help |
| 120 | This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected |
| 121 | from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages |
| 122 | can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs. |
| 123 | |
maximilian attems | 5f46ce1 | 2008-04-16 19:36:36 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 124 | For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space |
| 125 | a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems. |
| 126 | On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768. |
| 127 | Programs which use vm86 functionality would either need additional |
| 128 | permissions from either the LSM or the capabilities module or have |
| 129 | this protection disabled. |
Eric Paris | a5ecbcb | 2008-01-31 15:11:22 -0500 | [diff] [blame] | 130 | |
| 131 | This value can be changed after boot using the |
| 132 | /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr tunable. |
| 133 | |
| 134 | |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 135 | source security/selinux/Kconfig |
Casey Schaufler | e114e47 | 2008-02-04 22:29:50 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 136 | source security/smack/Kconfig |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 137 | |
| 138 | endmenu |
| 139 | |