blob: f8700e935b33360b49bb01f16e4cd04b5313fa6b [file] [log] [blame]
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001/**
2 * BSD Secure Levels LSM
3 *
4 * Maintainers:
5 * Michael A. Halcrow <mike@halcrow.us>
6 * Serge Hallyn <hallyn@cs.wm.edu>
7 *
8 * Copyright (c) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com>
9 * Copyright (c) 2001 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
10 * Copyright (c) 2002 International Business Machines <robb@austin.ibm.com>
11 *
12 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
13 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
14 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
15 * (at your option) any later version.
16 */
17
18#include <linux/config.h>
19#include <linux/module.h>
20#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
21#include <linux/kernel.h>
22#include <linux/init.h>
23#include <linux/security.h>
24#include <linux/netlink.h>
25#include <linux/fs.h>
26#include <linux/namei.h>
27#include <linux/mount.h>
28#include <linux/capability.h>
29#include <linux/time.h>
30#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
31#include <linux/kobject.h>
32#include <linux/crypto.h>
33#include <asm/scatterlist.h>
34#include <linux/gfp.h>
35#include <linux/sysfs.h>
36
37#define SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE 20
38
39/**
40 * Module parameter that defines the initial secure level.
41 *
42 * When built as a module, it defaults to seclvl 1, which is the
43 * behavior of BSD secure levels. Note that this default behavior
44 * wrecks havoc on a machine when the seclvl module is compiled into
45 * the kernel. In that case, we default to seclvl 0.
46 */
47#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SECLVL_MODULE
48static int initlvl = 1;
49#else
50static int initlvl;
51#endif
52module_param(initlvl, int, 0);
53MODULE_PARM_DESC(initlvl, "Initial secure level (defaults to 1)");
54
55/* Module parameter that defines the verbosity level */
56static int verbosity;
57module_param(verbosity, int, 0);
58MODULE_PARM_DESC(verbosity, "Initial verbosity level (0 or 1; defaults to "
59 "0, which is Quiet)");
60
61/**
62 * Optional password which can be passed in to bring seclvl to 0
63 * (i.e., for halt/reboot). Defaults to NULL (the passwd attribute
64 * file will not be registered in sysfs).
65 *
66 * This gets converted to its SHA1 hash when stored. It's probably
67 * not a good idea to use this parameter when loading seclvl from a
68 * script; use sha1_passwd instead.
69 */
70
71#define MAX_PASSWD_SIZE 32
72static char passwd[MAX_PASSWD_SIZE];
73module_param_string(passwd, passwd, sizeof(passwd), 0);
74MODULE_PARM_DESC(passwd,
75 "Plaintext of password that sets seclvl=0 when written to "
76 "(sysfs mount point)/seclvl/passwd\n");
77
78/**
79 * SHA1 hashed version of the optional password which can be passed in
80 * to bring seclvl to 0 (i.e., for halt/reboot). Must be in
81 * hexadecimal format (40 characters). Defaults to NULL (the passwd
82 * attribute file will not be registered in sysfs).
83 *
84 * Use the sha1sum utility to generate the SHA1 hash of a password:
85 *
86 * echo -n "secret" | sha1sum
87 */
88#define MAX_SHA1_PASSWD 41
89static char sha1_passwd[MAX_SHA1_PASSWD];
90module_param_string(sha1_passwd, sha1_passwd, sizeof(sha1_passwd), 0);
91MODULE_PARM_DESC(sha1_passwd,
92 "SHA1 hash (40 hexadecimal characters) of password that "
93 "sets seclvl=0 when plaintext password is written to "
94 "(sysfs mount point)/seclvl/passwd\n");
95
96static int hideHash = 1;
97module_param(hideHash, int, 0);
98MODULE_PARM_DESC(hideHash, "When set to 0, reading seclvl/passwd from sysfs "
99 "will return the SHA1-hashed value of the password that "
100 "lowers the secure level to 0.\n");
101
102#define MY_NAME "seclvl"
103
104/**
105 * This time-limits log writes to one per second.
106 */
107#define seclvl_printk(verb, type, fmt, arg...) \
108 do { \
109 if (verbosity >= verb) { \
110 static unsigned long _prior; \
111 unsigned long _now = jiffies; \
112 if ((_now - _prior) > HZ) { \
113 printk(type "%s: %s: " fmt, \
114 MY_NAME, __FUNCTION__ , \
115 ## arg); \
116 _prior = _now; \
117 } \
118 } \
119 } while (0)
120
121/**
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700122 * The actual security level. Ranges between -1 and 2 inclusive.
123 */
124static int seclvl;
125
126/**
127 * flag to keep track of how we were registered
128 */
129static int secondary;
130
131/**
132 * Verifies that the requested secure level is valid, given the current
133 * secure level.
134 */
135static int seclvl_sanity(int reqlvl)
136{
137 if ((reqlvl < -1) || (reqlvl > 2)) {
138 seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to set seclvl out of "
139 "range: [%d]\n", reqlvl);
140 return -EINVAL;
141 }
142 if ((seclvl == 0) && (reqlvl == -1))
143 return 0;
144 if (reqlvl < seclvl) {
145 seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to lower seclvl to "
146 "[%d]\n", reqlvl);
147 return -EPERM;
148 }
149 return 0;
150}
151
152/**
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700153 * security level advancement rules:
154 * Valid levels are -1 through 2, inclusive.
155 * From -1, stuck. [ in case compiled into kernel ]
156 * From 0 or above, can only increment.
157 */
serue@us.ibm.com5a73c302005-07-08 15:44:19 -0500158static void do_seclvl_advance(void *data, u64 val)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700159{
serue@us.ibm.com5a73c302005-07-08 15:44:19 -0500160 int ret;
161 int newlvl = (int)val;
162
163 ret = seclvl_sanity(newlvl);
164 if (ret)
165 return;
166
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700167 if (newlvl > 2) {
168 seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Cannot advance to seclvl "
169 "[%d]\n", newlvl);
serue@us.ibm.com5a73c302005-07-08 15:44:19 -0500170 return;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700171 }
172 if (seclvl == -1) {
173 seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Not allowed to advance to "
174 "seclvl [%d]\n", seclvl);
serue@us.ibm.com5a73c302005-07-08 15:44:19 -0500175 return;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700176 }
serue@us.ibm.com5a73c302005-07-08 15:44:19 -0500177 seclvl = newlvl; /* would it be more "correct" to set *data? */
178 return;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700179}
180
serue@us.ibm.com5a73c302005-07-08 15:44:19 -0500181static u64 seclvl_int_get(void *data)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700182{
serue@us.ibm.com5a73c302005-07-08 15:44:19 -0500183 return *(int *)data;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700184}
185
serue@us.ibm.com5a73c302005-07-08 15:44:19 -0500186DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(seclvl_file_ops, seclvl_int_get, do_seclvl_advance, "%lld\n");
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700187
188static unsigned char hashedPassword[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
189
190/**
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700191 * Converts a block of plaintext of into its SHA1 hashed value.
192 *
193 * It would be nice if crypto had a wrapper to do this for us linear
194 * people...
195 */
196static int
197plaintext_to_sha1(unsigned char *hash, const char *plaintext, int len)
198{
199 char *pgVirtAddr;
200 struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
201 struct scatterlist sg[1];
202 if (len > PAGE_SIZE) {
203 seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Plaintext password too large (%d "
204 "characters). Largest possible is %lu "
205 "bytes.\n", len, PAGE_SIZE);
206 return -ENOMEM;
207 }
208 tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm("sha1", 0);
209 if (tfm == NULL) {
210 seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR,
211 "Failed to load transform for SHA1\n");
212 return -ENOSYS;
213 }
214 // Just get a new page; don't play around with page boundaries
215 // and scatterlists.
216 pgVirtAddr = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
217 sg[0].page = virt_to_page(pgVirtAddr);
218 sg[0].offset = 0;
219 sg[0].length = len;
220 strncpy(pgVirtAddr, plaintext, len);
221 crypto_digest_init(tfm);
222 crypto_digest_update(tfm, sg, 1);
223 crypto_digest_final(tfm, hash);
224 crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
225 free_page((unsigned long)pgVirtAddr);
226 return 0;
227}
228
229/**
230 * Called whenever the user writes to the sysfs passwd handle to this kernel
231 * object. It hashes the password and compares the hashed results.
232 */
233static ssize_t
serue@us.ibm.com5a73c302005-07-08 15:44:19 -0500234passwd_write_file(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
235 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700236{
237 int i;
238 unsigned char tmp[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
serue@us.ibm.com5a73c302005-07-08 15:44:19 -0500239 char *page;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700240 int rc;
241 int len;
serue@us.ibm.com5a73c302005-07-08 15:44:19 -0500242
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700243 if (!*passwd && !*sha1_passwd) {
244 seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Attempt to password-unlock the "
245 "seclvl module, but neither a plain text "
246 "password nor a SHA1 hashed password was "
247 "passed in as a module parameter! This is a "
248 "bug, since it should not be possible to be in "
249 "this part of the module; please tell a "
250 "maintainer about this event.\n");
251 return -EINVAL;
252 }
serue@us.ibm.com5a73c302005-07-08 15:44:19 -0500253
254 if (count < 0 || count >= PAGE_SIZE)
255 return -ENOMEM;
256 if (*ppos != 0) {
257 return -EINVAL;
258 }
259 page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
260 if (!page)
261 return -ENOMEM;
262 len = -EFAULT;
263 if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
264 goto out;
265
266 len = strlen(page);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700267 /* ``echo "secret" > seclvl/passwd'' includes a newline */
serue@us.ibm.com5a73c302005-07-08 15:44:19 -0500268 if (page[len - 1] == '\n') {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700269 len--;
270 }
271 /* Hash the password, then compare the hashed values */
serue@us.ibm.com5a73c302005-07-08 15:44:19 -0500272 if ((rc = plaintext_to_sha1(tmp, page, len))) {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700273 seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error hashing password: rc = "
274 "[%d]\n", rc);
275 return rc;
276 }
277 for (i = 0; i < SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; i++) {
278 if (hashedPassword[i] != tmp[i]) {
279 return -EPERM;
280 }
281 }
282 seclvl_printk(0, KERN_INFO,
283 "Password accepted; seclvl reduced to 0.\n");
284 seclvl = 0;
serue@us.ibm.com5a73c302005-07-08 15:44:19 -0500285 len = count;
286
287out:
288 free_page((unsigned long)page);
289 return len;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700290}
291
serue@us.ibm.com5a73c302005-07-08 15:44:19 -0500292static struct file_operations passwd_file_ops = {
293 .write = passwd_write_file,
294};
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700295
296/**
297 * Explicitely disallow ptrace'ing the init process.
298 */
299static int seclvl_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
300{
301 if (seclvl >= 0) {
302 if (child->pid == 1) {
303 seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to ptrace "
304 "the init process dissallowed in "
305 "secure level %d\n", seclvl);
306 return -EPERM;
307 }
308 }
309 return 0;
310}
311
312/**
313 * Capability checks for seclvl. The majority of the policy
314 * enforcement for seclvl takes place here.
315 */
316static int seclvl_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
317{
318 /* init can do anything it wants */
319 if (tsk->pid == 1)
320 return 0;
321
322 switch (seclvl) {
323 case 2:
324 /* fall through */
325 case 1:
326 if (cap == CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) {
327 seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to modify "
328 "the IMMUTABLE and/or APPEND extended "
329 "attribute on a file with the IMMUTABLE "
330 "and/or APPEND extended attribute set "
331 "denied in seclvl [%d]\n", seclvl);
332 return -EPERM;
333 } else if (cap == CAP_SYS_RAWIO) { // Somewhat broad...
334 seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to perform "
335 "raw I/O while in secure level [%d] "
336 "denied\n", seclvl);
337 return -EPERM;
338 } else if (cap == CAP_NET_ADMIN) {
339 seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to perform "
340 "network administrative task while "
341 "in secure level [%d] denied\n", seclvl);
342 return -EPERM;
343 } else if (cap == CAP_SETUID) {
344 seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to setuid "
345 "while in secure level [%d] denied\n",
346 seclvl);
347 return -EPERM;
348 } else if (cap == CAP_SETGID) {
349 seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to setgid "
350 "while in secure level [%d] denied\n",
351 seclvl);
352 } else if (cap == CAP_SYS_MODULE) {
353 seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to perform "
354 "a module operation while in secure "
355 "level [%d] denied\n", seclvl);
356 return -EPERM;
357 }
358 break;
359 default:
360 break;
361 }
362 /* from dummy.c */
363 if (cap_is_fs_cap(cap) ? tsk->fsuid == 0 : tsk->euid == 0)
364 return 0; /* capability granted */
365 seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Capability denied\n");
366 return -EPERM; /* capability denied */
367}
368
369/**
370 * Disallow reversing the clock in seclvl > 1
371 */
372static int seclvl_settime(struct timespec *tv, struct timezone *tz)
373{
374 struct timespec now;
375 if (seclvl > 1) {
376 now = current_kernel_time();
377 if (tv->tv_sec < now.tv_sec ||
378 (tv->tv_sec == now.tv_sec && tv->tv_nsec < now.tv_nsec)) {
379 seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to decrement "
380 "time in secure level %d denied: "
381 "current->pid = [%d], "
382 "current->group_leader->pid = [%d]\n",
383 seclvl, current->pid,
384 current->group_leader->pid);
385 return -EPERM;
386 } /* if attempt to decrement time */
387 } /* if seclvl > 1 */
388 return 0;
389}
390
391/* claim the blockdev to exclude mounters, release on file close */
392static int seclvl_bd_claim(struct inode *inode)
393{
394 int holder;
395 struct block_device *bdev = NULL;
396 dev_t dev = inode->i_rdev;
397 bdev = open_by_devnum(dev, FMODE_WRITE);
398 if (bdev) {
399 if (bd_claim(bdev, &holder)) {
400 blkdev_put(bdev);
401 return -EPERM;
402 }
403 /* claimed, mark it to release on close */
404 inode->i_security = current;
405 }
406 return 0;
407}
408
409/* release the blockdev if you claimed it */
410static void seclvl_bd_release(struct inode *inode)
411{
412 if (inode && S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_security == current) {
413 struct block_device *bdev = inode->i_bdev;
414 if (bdev) {
415 bd_release(bdev);
416 blkdev_put(bdev);
417 inode->i_security = NULL;
418 }
419 }
420}
421
422/**
423 * Security for writes to block devices is regulated by this seclvl
424 * function. Deny all writes to block devices in seclvl 2. In
425 * seclvl 1, we only deny writes to *mounted* block devices.
426 */
427static int
428seclvl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd)
429{
430 if (current->pid != 1 && S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) && (mask & MAY_WRITE)) {
431 switch (seclvl) {
432 case 2:
433 seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Write to block device "
434 "denied in secure level [%d]\n", seclvl);
435 return -EPERM;
436 case 1:
437 if (seclvl_bd_claim(inode)) {
438 seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING,
439 "Write to mounted block device "
440 "denied in secure level [%d]\n",
441 seclvl);
442 return -EPERM;
443 }
444 }
445 }
446 return 0;
447}
448
449/**
450 * The SUID and SGID bits cannot be set in seclvl >= 1
451 */
452static int seclvl_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
453{
454 if (seclvl > 0) {
455 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)
456 if (iattr->ia_mode & S_ISUID ||
457 iattr->ia_mode & S_ISGID) {
458 seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to "
459 "modify SUID or SGID bit "
460 "denied in seclvl [%d]\n",
461 seclvl);
462 return -EPERM;
463 }
464 }
465 return 0;
466}
467
468/* release busied block devices */
469static void seclvl_file_free_security(struct file *filp)
470{
471 struct dentry *dentry = filp->f_dentry;
472 struct inode *inode = NULL;
473
474 if (dentry) {
475 inode = dentry->d_inode;
476 seclvl_bd_release(inode);
477 }
478}
479
480/**
481 * Cannot unmount in secure level 2
482 */
483static int seclvl_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
484{
485 if (current->pid == 1) {
486 return 0;
487 }
488 if (seclvl == 2) {
489 seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to unmount in secure "
490 "level %d\n", seclvl);
491 return -EPERM;
492 }
493 return 0;
494}
495
496static struct security_operations seclvl_ops = {
497 .ptrace = seclvl_ptrace,
498 .capable = seclvl_capable,
499 .inode_permission = seclvl_inode_permission,
500 .inode_setattr = seclvl_inode_setattr,
501 .file_free_security = seclvl_file_free_security,
502 .settime = seclvl_settime,
503 .sb_umount = seclvl_umount,
504};
505
506/**
507 * Process the password-related module parameters
508 */
509static int processPassword(void)
510{
511 int rc = 0;
512 hashedPassword[0] = '\0';
513 if (*passwd) {
514 if (*sha1_passwd) {
515 seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error: Both "
516 "passwd and sha1_passwd "
517 "were set, but they are mutually "
518 "exclusive.\n");
519 return -EINVAL;
520 }
521 if ((rc = plaintext_to_sha1(hashedPassword, passwd,
522 strlen(passwd)))) {
523 seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error: SHA1 support not "
524 "in kernel\n");
525 return rc;
526 }
527 /* All static data goes to the BSS, which zero's the
528 * plaintext password out for us. */
529 } else if (*sha1_passwd) { // Base 16
530 int i;
531 i = strlen(sha1_passwd);
532 if (i != (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2)) {
533 seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Received [%d] bytes; "
534 "expected [%d] for the hexadecimal "
535 "representation of the SHA1 hash of "
536 "the password.\n",
537 i, (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2));
538 return -EINVAL;
539 }
540 while ((i -= 2) + 2) {
541 unsigned char tmp;
542 tmp = sha1_passwd[i + 2];
543 sha1_passwd[i + 2] = '\0';
544 hashedPassword[i / 2] = (unsigned char)
545 simple_strtol(&sha1_passwd[i], NULL, 16);
546 sha1_passwd[i + 2] = tmp;
547 }
548 }
549 return 0;
550}
551
552/**
serue@us.ibm.com5a73c302005-07-08 15:44:19 -0500553 * securityfs registrations
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700554 */
serue@us.ibm.com5a73c302005-07-08 15:44:19 -0500555struct dentry *dir_ino, *seclvl_ino, *passwd_ino;
556
557static int seclvlfs_register(void)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700558{
serue@us.ibm.com5a73c302005-07-08 15:44:19 -0500559 dir_ino = securityfs_create_dir("seclvl", NULL);
560 if (!dir_ino)
561 return -EFAULT;
562
563 seclvl_ino = securityfs_create_file("seclvl", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR,
564 dir_ino, &seclvl, &seclvl_file_ops);
565 if (!seclvl_ino)
566 goto out_deldir;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700567 if (*passwd || *sha1_passwd) {
serue@us.ibm.com5a73c302005-07-08 15:44:19 -0500568 passwd_ino = securityfs_create_file("passwd", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR,
569 dir_ino, NULL, &passwd_file_ops);
570 if (!passwd_ino)
571 goto out_delf;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700572 }
573 return 0;
serue@us.ibm.com5a73c302005-07-08 15:44:19 -0500574
575out_deldir:
576 securityfs_remove(dir_ino);
577out_delf:
578 securityfs_remove(seclvl_ino);
579
580 return -EFAULT;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700581}
582
583/**
584 * Initialize the seclvl module.
585 */
586static int __init seclvl_init(void)
587{
588 int rc = 0;
589 if (verbosity < 0 || verbosity > 1) {
590 printk(KERN_ERR "Error: bad verbosity [%d]; only 0 or 1 "
591 "are valid values\n", verbosity);
592 rc = -EINVAL;
593 goto exit;
594 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700595 if (initlvl < -1 || initlvl > 2) {
596 seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error: bad initial securelevel "
597 "[%d].\n", initlvl);
598 rc = -EINVAL;
599 goto exit;
600 }
601 seclvl = initlvl;
602 if ((rc = processPassword())) {
603 seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error processing the password "
604 "module parameter(s): rc = [%d]\n", rc);
605 goto exit;
606 }
607 /* register ourselves with the security framework */
608 if (register_security(&seclvl_ops)) {
609 seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR,
610 "seclvl: Failure registering with the "
611 "kernel.\n");
612 /* try registering with primary module */
613 rc = mod_reg_security(MY_NAME, &seclvl_ops);
614 if (rc) {
615 seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "seclvl: Failure "
616 "registering with primary security "
617 "module.\n");
618 goto exit;
619 } /* if primary module registered */
620 secondary = 1;
621 } /* if we registered ourselves with the security framework */
serue@us.ibm.com5a73c302005-07-08 15:44:19 -0500622 if ((rc = seclvlfs_register())) {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700623 seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error registering with sysfs\n");
624 goto exit;
625 }
626 seclvl_printk(0, KERN_INFO, "seclvl: Successfully initialized.\n");
627 exit:
628 if (rc) {
629 printk(KERN_ERR "seclvl: Error during initialization: rc = "
630 "[%d]\n", rc);
631 }
632 return rc;
633}
634
635/**
636 * Remove the seclvl module.
637 */
638static void __exit seclvl_exit(void)
639{
serue@us.ibm.com5a73c302005-07-08 15:44:19 -0500640 securityfs_remove(seclvl_ino);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700641 if (*passwd || *sha1_passwd) {
serue@us.ibm.com5a73c302005-07-08 15:44:19 -0500642 securityfs_remove(passwd_ino);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700643 }
serue@us.ibm.com5a73c302005-07-08 15:44:19 -0500644 securityfs_remove(dir_ino);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700645 if (secondary == 1) {
646 mod_unreg_security(MY_NAME, &seclvl_ops);
647 } else if (unregister_security(&seclvl_ops)) {
648 seclvl_printk(0, KERN_INFO,
649 "seclvl: Failure unregistering with the "
650 "kernel\n");
651 }
652}
653
654module_init(seclvl_init);
655module_exit(seclvl_exit);
656
657MODULE_AUTHOR("Michael A. Halcrow <mike@halcrow.us>");
658MODULE_DESCRIPTION("LSM implementation of the BSD Secure Levels");
659MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");