Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | /* |
| 2 | * linux/fs/posix_acl.c |
| 3 | * |
| 4 | * Copyright (C) 2002 by Andreas Gruenbacher <a.gruenbacher@computer.org> |
| 5 | * |
| 6 | * Fixes from William Schumacher incorporated on 15 March 2001. |
| 7 | * (Reported by Charles Bertsch, <CBertsch@microtest.com>). |
| 8 | */ |
| 9 | |
| 10 | /* |
| 11 | * This file contains generic functions for manipulating |
| 12 | * POSIX 1003.1e draft standard 17 ACLs. |
| 13 | */ |
| 14 | |
| 15 | #include <linux/kernel.h> |
| 16 | #include <linux/slab.h> |
| 17 | #include <asm/atomic.h> |
| 18 | #include <linux/fs.h> |
| 19 | #include <linux/sched.h> |
| 20 | #include <linux/posix_acl.h> |
| 21 | #include <linux/module.h> |
| 22 | |
| 23 | #include <linux/errno.h> |
| 24 | |
| 25 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_alloc); |
| 26 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_clone); |
| 27 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_valid); |
| 28 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_equiv_mode); |
| 29 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_from_mode); |
| 30 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_create_masq); |
| 31 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_chmod_masq); |
| 32 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_permission); |
| 33 | |
| 34 | /* |
| 35 | * Allocate a new ACL with the specified number of entries. |
| 36 | */ |
| 37 | struct posix_acl * |
Al Viro | dd0fc66 | 2005-10-07 07:46:04 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 38 | posix_acl_alloc(int count, gfp_t flags) |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 39 | { |
| 40 | const size_t size = sizeof(struct posix_acl) + |
| 41 | count * sizeof(struct posix_acl_entry); |
| 42 | struct posix_acl *acl = kmalloc(size, flags); |
| 43 | if (acl) { |
| 44 | atomic_set(&acl->a_refcount, 1); |
| 45 | acl->a_count = count; |
| 46 | } |
| 47 | return acl; |
| 48 | } |
| 49 | |
| 50 | /* |
| 51 | * Clone an ACL. |
| 52 | */ |
| 53 | struct posix_acl * |
Al Viro | dd0fc66 | 2005-10-07 07:46:04 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 54 | posix_acl_clone(const struct posix_acl *acl, gfp_t flags) |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 55 | { |
| 56 | struct posix_acl *clone = NULL; |
| 57 | |
| 58 | if (acl) { |
| 59 | int size = sizeof(struct posix_acl) + acl->a_count * |
| 60 | sizeof(struct posix_acl_entry); |
Alexey Dobriyan | 52978be | 2006-09-30 23:27:21 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 61 | clone = kmemdup(acl, size, flags); |
| 62 | if (clone) |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 63 | atomic_set(&clone->a_refcount, 1); |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 64 | } |
| 65 | return clone; |
| 66 | } |
| 67 | |
| 68 | /* |
| 69 | * Check if an acl is valid. Returns 0 if it is, or -E... otherwise. |
| 70 | */ |
| 71 | int |
| 72 | posix_acl_valid(const struct posix_acl *acl) |
| 73 | { |
| 74 | const struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *pe; |
| 75 | int state = ACL_USER_OBJ; |
| 76 | unsigned int id = 0; /* keep gcc happy */ |
| 77 | int needs_mask = 0; |
| 78 | |
| 79 | FOREACH_ACL_ENTRY(pa, acl, pe) { |
| 80 | if (pa->e_perm & ~(ACL_READ|ACL_WRITE|ACL_EXECUTE)) |
| 81 | return -EINVAL; |
| 82 | switch (pa->e_tag) { |
| 83 | case ACL_USER_OBJ: |
| 84 | if (state == ACL_USER_OBJ) { |
| 85 | id = 0; |
| 86 | state = ACL_USER; |
| 87 | break; |
| 88 | } |
| 89 | return -EINVAL; |
| 90 | |
| 91 | case ACL_USER: |
| 92 | if (state != ACL_USER) |
| 93 | return -EINVAL; |
| 94 | if (pa->e_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID || |
| 95 | pa->e_id < id) |
| 96 | return -EINVAL; |
| 97 | id = pa->e_id + 1; |
| 98 | needs_mask = 1; |
| 99 | break; |
| 100 | |
| 101 | case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: |
| 102 | if (state == ACL_USER) { |
| 103 | id = 0; |
| 104 | state = ACL_GROUP; |
| 105 | break; |
| 106 | } |
| 107 | return -EINVAL; |
| 108 | |
| 109 | case ACL_GROUP: |
| 110 | if (state != ACL_GROUP) |
| 111 | return -EINVAL; |
| 112 | if (pa->e_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID || |
| 113 | pa->e_id < id) |
| 114 | return -EINVAL; |
| 115 | id = pa->e_id + 1; |
| 116 | needs_mask = 1; |
| 117 | break; |
| 118 | |
| 119 | case ACL_MASK: |
| 120 | if (state != ACL_GROUP) |
| 121 | return -EINVAL; |
| 122 | state = ACL_OTHER; |
| 123 | break; |
| 124 | |
| 125 | case ACL_OTHER: |
| 126 | if (state == ACL_OTHER || |
| 127 | (state == ACL_GROUP && !needs_mask)) { |
| 128 | state = 0; |
| 129 | break; |
| 130 | } |
| 131 | return -EINVAL; |
| 132 | |
| 133 | default: |
| 134 | return -EINVAL; |
| 135 | } |
| 136 | } |
| 137 | if (state == 0) |
| 138 | return 0; |
| 139 | return -EINVAL; |
| 140 | } |
| 141 | |
| 142 | /* |
| 143 | * Returns 0 if the acl can be exactly represented in the traditional |
| 144 | * file mode permission bits, or else 1. Returns -E... on error. |
| 145 | */ |
| 146 | int |
| 147 | posix_acl_equiv_mode(const struct posix_acl *acl, mode_t *mode_p) |
| 148 | { |
| 149 | const struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *pe; |
| 150 | mode_t mode = 0; |
| 151 | int not_equiv = 0; |
| 152 | |
| 153 | FOREACH_ACL_ENTRY(pa, acl, pe) { |
| 154 | switch (pa->e_tag) { |
| 155 | case ACL_USER_OBJ: |
| 156 | mode |= (pa->e_perm & S_IRWXO) << 6; |
| 157 | break; |
| 158 | case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: |
| 159 | mode |= (pa->e_perm & S_IRWXO) << 3; |
| 160 | break; |
| 161 | case ACL_OTHER: |
| 162 | mode |= pa->e_perm & S_IRWXO; |
| 163 | break; |
| 164 | case ACL_MASK: |
| 165 | mode = (mode & ~S_IRWXG) | |
| 166 | ((pa->e_perm & S_IRWXO) << 3); |
| 167 | not_equiv = 1; |
| 168 | break; |
| 169 | case ACL_USER: |
| 170 | case ACL_GROUP: |
| 171 | not_equiv = 1; |
| 172 | break; |
| 173 | default: |
| 174 | return -EINVAL; |
| 175 | } |
| 176 | } |
| 177 | if (mode_p) |
| 178 | *mode_p = (*mode_p & ~S_IRWXUGO) | mode; |
| 179 | return not_equiv; |
| 180 | } |
| 181 | |
| 182 | /* |
| 183 | * Create an ACL representing the file mode permission bits of an inode. |
| 184 | */ |
| 185 | struct posix_acl * |
Al Viro | dd0fc66 | 2005-10-07 07:46:04 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 186 | posix_acl_from_mode(mode_t mode, gfp_t flags) |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 187 | { |
| 188 | struct posix_acl *acl = posix_acl_alloc(3, flags); |
| 189 | if (!acl) |
| 190 | return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); |
| 191 | |
| 192 | acl->a_entries[0].e_tag = ACL_USER_OBJ; |
| 193 | acl->a_entries[0].e_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; |
| 194 | acl->a_entries[0].e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXU) >> 6; |
| 195 | |
| 196 | acl->a_entries[1].e_tag = ACL_GROUP_OBJ; |
| 197 | acl->a_entries[1].e_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; |
| 198 | acl->a_entries[1].e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXG) >> 3; |
| 199 | |
| 200 | acl->a_entries[2].e_tag = ACL_OTHER; |
| 201 | acl->a_entries[2].e_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; |
| 202 | acl->a_entries[2].e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXO); |
| 203 | return acl; |
| 204 | } |
| 205 | |
| 206 | /* |
| 207 | * Return 0 if current is granted want access to the inode |
| 208 | * by the acl. Returns -E... otherwise. |
| 209 | */ |
| 210 | int |
| 211 | posix_acl_permission(struct inode *inode, const struct posix_acl *acl, int want) |
| 212 | { |
| 213 | const struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *pe, *mask_obj; |
| 214 | int found = 0; |
| 215 | |
| 216 | FOREACH_ACL_ENTRY(pa, acl, pe) { |
| 217 | switch(pa->e_tag) { |
| 218 | case ACL_USER_OBJ: |
| 219 | /* (May have been checked already) */ |
David Howells | da9592e | 2008-11-14 10:39:05 +1100 | [diff] [blame] | 220 | if (inode->i_uid == current_fsuid()) |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 221 | goto check_perm; |
| 222 | break; |
| 223 | case ACL_USER: |
David Howells | da9592e | 2008-11-14 10:39:05 +1100 | [diff] [blame] | 224 | if (pa->e_id == current_fsuid()) |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 225 | goto mask; |
| 226 | break; |
| 227 | case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: |
| 228 | if (in_group_p(inode->i_gid)) { |
| 229 | found = 1; |
| 230 | if ((pa->e_perm & want) == want) |
| 231 | goto mask; |
| 232 | } |
| 233 | break; |
| 234 | case ACL_GROUP: |
| 235 | if (in_group_p(pa->e_id)) { |
| 236 | found = 1; |
| 237 | if ((pa->e_perm & want) == want) |
| 238 | goto mask; |
| 239 | } |
| 240 | break; |
| 241 | case ACL_MASK: |
| 242 | break; |
| 243 | case ACL_OTHER: |
| 244 | if (found) |
| 245 | return -EACCES; |
| 246 | else |
| 247 | goto check_perm; |
| 248 | default: |
| 249 | return -EIO; |
| 250 | } |
| 251 | } |
| 252 | return -EIO; |
| 253 | |
| 254 | mask: |
| 255 | for (mask_obj = pa+1; mask_obj != pe; mask_obj++) { |
| 256 | if (mask_obj->e_tag == ACL_MASK) { |
| 257 | if ((pa->e_perm & mask_obj->e_perm & want) == want) |
| 258 | return 0; |
| 259 | return -EACCES; |
| 260 | } |
| 261 | } |
| 262 | |
| 263 | check_perm: |
| 264 | if ((pa->e_perm & want) == want) |
| 265 | return 0; |
| 266 | return -EACCES; |
| 267 | } |
| 268 | |
| 269 | /* |
| 270 | * Modify acl when creating a new inode. The caller must ensure the acl is |
| 271 | * only referenced once. |
| 272 | * |
| 273 | * mode_p initially must contain the mode parameter to the open() / creat() |
| 274 | * system calls. All permissions that are not granted by the acl are removed. |
| 275 | * The permissions in the acl are changed to reflect the mode_p parameter. |
| 276 | */ |
| 277 | int |
| 278 | posix_acl_create_masq(struct posix_acl *acl, mode_t *mode_p) |
| 279 | { |
| 280 | struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *pe; |
| 281 | struct posix_acl_entry *group_obj = NULL, *mask_obj = NULL; |
| 282 | mode_t mode = *mode_p; |
| 283 | int not_equiv = 0; |
| 284 | |
| 285 | /* assert(atomic_read(acl->a_refcount) == 1); */ |
| 286 | |
| 287 | FOREACH_ACL_ENTRY(pa, acl, pe) { |
| 288 | switch(pa->e_tag) { |
| 289 | case ACL_USER_OBJ: |
| 290 | pa->e_perm &= (mode >> 6) | ~S_IRWXO; |
| 291 | mode &= (pa->e_perm << 6) | ~S_IRWXU; |
| 292 | break; |
| 293 | |
| 294 | case ACL_USER: |
| 295 | case ACL_GROUP: |
| 296 | not_equiv = 1; |
| 297 | break; |
| 298 | |
| 299 | case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: |
| 300 | group_obj = pa; |
| 301 | break; |
| 302 | |
| 303 | case ACL_OTHER: |
| 304 | pa->e_perm &= mode | ~S_IRWXO; |
| 305 | mode &= pa->e_perm | ~S_IRWXO; |
| 306 | break; |
| 307 | |
| 308 | case ACL_MASK: |
| 309 | mask_obj = pa; |
| 310 | not_equiv = 1; |
| 311 | break; |
| 312 | |
| 313 | default: |
| 314 | return -EIO; |
| 315 | } |
| 316 | } |
| 317 | |
| 318 | if (mask_obj) { |
| 319 | mask_obj->e_perm &= (mode >> 3) | ~S_IRWXO; |
| 320 | mode &= (mask_obj->e_perm << 3) | ~S_IRWXG; |
| 321 | } else { |
| 322 | if (!group_obj) |
| 323 | return -EIO; |
| 324 | group_obj->e_perm &= (mode >> 3) | ~S_IRWXO; |
| 325 | mode &= (group_obj->e_perm << 3) | ~S_IRWXG; |
| 326 | } |
| 327 | |
| 328 | *mode_p = (*mode_p & ~S_IRWXUGO) | mode; |
| 329 | return not_equiv; |
| 330 | } |
| 331 | |
| 332 | /* |
| 333 | * Modify the ACL for the chmod syscall. |
| 334 | */ |
| 335 | int |
| 336 | posix_acl_chmod_masq(struct posix_acl *acl, mode_t mode) |
| 337 | { |
| 338 | struct posix_acl_entry *group_obj = NULL, *mask_obj = NULL; |
| 339 | struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *pe; |
| 340 | |
| 341 | /* assert(atomic_read(acl->a_refcount) == 1); */ |
| 342 | |
| 343 | FOREACH_ACL_ENTRY(pa, acl, pe) { |
| 344 | switch(pa->e_tag) { |
| 345 | case ACL_USER_OBJ: |
| 346 | pa->e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXU) >> 6; |
| 347 | break; |
| 348 | |
| 349 | case ACL_USER: |
| 350 | case ACL_GROUP: |
| 351 | break; |
| 352 | |
| 353 | case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: |
| 354 | group_obj = pa; |
| 355 | break; |
| 356 | |
| 357 | case ACL_MASK: |
| 358 | mask_obj = pa; |
| 359 | break; |
| 360 | |
| 361 | case ACL_OTHER: |
| 362 | pa->e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXO); |
| 363 | break; |
| 364 | |
| 365 | default: |
| 366 | return -EIO; |
| 367 | } |
| 368 | } |
| 369 | |
| 370 | if (mask_obj) { |
| 371 | mask_obj->e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXG) >> 3; |
| 372 | } else { |
| 373 | if (!group_obj) |
| 374 | return -EIO; |
| 375 | group_obj->e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXG) >> 3; |
| 376 | } |
| 377 | |
| 378 | return 0; |
| 379 | } |