David Howells | 607ca46 | 2012-10-13 10:46:48 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | #ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H |
| 2 | #define _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H |
| 3 | |
| 4 | /* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies |
| 5 | whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the |
| 6 | setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be |
| 7 | changed from user-level. */ |
| 8 | #define issecure_mask(X) (1 << (X)) |
| 9 | |
| 10 | #define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000 |
| 11 | |
| 12 | /* When set UID 0 has no special privileges. When unset, we support |
| 13 | inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root executable under |
| 14 | compatibility mode. We raise the effective and inheritable bitmasks |
| 15 | *of the executable file* if the effective uid of the new process is |
| 16 | 0. If the real uid is 0, we raise the effective (legacy) bit of the |
| 17 | executable file. */ |
| 18 | #define SECURE_NOROOT 0 |
| 19 | #define SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED 1 /* make bit-0 immutable */ |
| 20 | |
| 21 | #define SECBIT_NOROOT (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT)) |
| 22 | #define SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED)) |
| 23 | |
| 24 | /* When set, setuid to/from uid 0 does not trigger capability-"fixup". |
| 25 | When unset, to provide compatiblility with old programs relying on |
| 26 | set*uid to gain/lose privilege, transitions to/from uid 0 cause |
| 27 | capabilities to be gained/lost. */ |
| 28 | #define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP 2 |
| 29 | #define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED 3 /* make bit-2 immutable */ |
| 30 | |
| 31 | #define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) |
| 32 | #define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED \ |
| 33 | (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED)) |
| 34 | |
| 35 | /* When set, a process can retain its capabilities even after |
| 36 | transitioning to a non-root user (the set-uid fixup suppressed by |
| 37 | bit 2). Bit-4 is cleared when a process calls exec(); setting both |
| 38 | bit 4 and 5 will create a barrier through exec that no exec()'d |
| 39 | child can use this feature again. */ |
| 40 | #define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS 4 |
| 41 | #define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED 5 /* make bit-4 immutable */ |
| 42 | |
| 43 | #define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) |
| 44 | #define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED)) |
| 45 | |
Andy Lutomirski | 746bf6d | 2015-09-04 15:42:51 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 46 | /* When set, a process cannot add new capabilities to its ambient set. */ |
| 47 | #define SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE 6 |
| 48 | #define SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED 7 /* make bit-6 immutable */ |
| 49 | |
| 50 | #define SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE)) |
| 51 | #define SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED \ |
| 52 | (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED)) |
| 53 | |
David Howells | 607ca46 | 2012-10-13 10:46:48 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 54 | #define SECURE_ALL_BITS (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \ |
| 55 | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \ |
Andy Lutomirski | 746bf6d | 2015-09-04 15:42:51 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 56 | issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS) | \ |
| 57 | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE)) |
David Howells | 607ca46 | 2012-10-13 10:46:48 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 58 | #define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS (SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1) |
| 59 | |
| 60 | #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */ |