Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | # |
| 2 | # Security configuration |
| 3 | # |
| 4 | |
| 5 | menu "Security options" |
| 6 | |
David Howells | f089494 | 2012-05-11 10:56:56 +0100 | [diff] [blame] | 7 | source security/keys/Kconfig |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 8 | |
Neeraj Soni | 7b93926 | 2017-11-15 16:31:27 +0530 | [diff] [blame] | 9 | if ARCH_QCOM |
| 10 | source security/pfe/Kconfig |
| 11 | endif |
| 12 | |
| 13 | |
Dan Rosenberg | eaf06b2 | 2010-11-11 14:05:18 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 14 | config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT |
| 15 | bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog" |
| 16 | default n |
| 17 | help |
| 18 | This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel |
| 19 | syslog via dmesg(8). |
| 20 | |
| 21 | If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced |
| 22 | unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1). |
| 23 | |
| 24 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. |
| 25 | |
Jeff Vander Stoep | 4375d06 | 2016-05-29 14:22:32 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 26 | config SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT |
| 27 | bool "Restrict unprivileged use of performance events" |
| 28 | depends on PERF_EVENTS |
| 29 | help |
| 30 | If you say Y here, the kernel.perf_event_paranoid sysctl |
| 31 | will be set to 3 by default, and no unprivileged use of the |
| 32 | perf_event_open syscall will be permitted unless it is |
| 33 | changed. |
| 34 | |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 35 | config SECURITY |
| 36 | bool "Enable different security models" |
Adrian Bunk | 2c40579 | 2005-08-22 18:20:50 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 37 | depends on SYSFS |
Iulia Manda | 2813893 | 2015-04-15 16:16:41 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 38 | depends on MULTIUSER |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 39 | help |
| 40 | This allows you to choose different security modules to be |
| 41 | configured into your kernel. |
| 42 | |
| 43 | If this option is not selected, the default Linux security |
| 44 | model will be used. |
| 45 | |
| 46 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. |
| 47 | |
James Morris | 4535105 | 2017-02-15 00:17:24 +1100 | [diff] [blame] | 48 | config SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS |
| 49 | depends on SECURITY |
| 50 | bool |
| 51 | default n |
| 52 | |
Eric Paris | da31894 | 2008-08-22 11:35:57 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 53 | config SECURITYFS |
| 54 | bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem" |
| 55 | help |
| 56 | This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by |
Mimi Zohar | 3323eec9 | 2009-02-04 09:06:58 -0500 | [diff] [blame] | 57 | the TPM bios character driver and IMA, an integrity provider. It is |
| 58 | not used by SELinux or SMACK. |
Eric Paris | da31894 | 2008-08-22 11:35:57 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 59 | |
| 60 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. |
| 61 | |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 62 | config SECURITY_NETWORK |
| 63 | bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks" |
| 64 | depends on SECURITY |
| 65 | help |
| 66 | This enables the socket and networking security hooks. |
| 67 | If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to |
| 68 | implement socket and networking access controls. |
| 69 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. |
| 70 | |
Trent Jaeger | df71837 | 2005-12-13 23:12:27 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 71 | config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM |
| 72 | bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks" |
| 73 | depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK |
| 74 | help |
| 75 | This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks. |
| 76 | If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to |
| 77 | implement per-packet access controls based on labels |
| 78 | derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are |
| 79 | designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized |
| 80 | to communicate unlabelled data can send without using |
| 81 | IPSec. |
| 82 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. |
| 83 | |
Kentaro Takeda | be6d3e5 | 2008-12-17 13:24:15 +0900 | [diff] [blame] | 84 | config SECURITY_PATH |
| 85 | bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control" |
| 86 | depends on SECURITY |
| 87 | help |
| 88 | This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control. |
| 89 | If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to |
| 90 | implement pathname based access controls. |
| 91 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. |
| 92 | |
Joseph Cihula | 3162534 | 2009-06-30 19:30:59 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 93 | config INTEL_TXT |
| 94 | bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)" |
Shane Wang | 69575d3 | 2009-09-01 18:25:07 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 95 | depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT |
Joseph Cihula | 3162534 | 2009-06-30 19:30:59 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 96 | help |
| 97 | This option enables support for booting the kernel with the |
| 98 | Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize |
| 99 | Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch |
| 100 | of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this |
| 101 | will have no effect. |
| 102 | |
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo | 3c556e4 | 2009-08-12 12:00:40 -0300 | [diff] [blame] | 103 | Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and |
Joseph Cihula | 3162534 | 2009-06-30 19:30:59 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 104 | initial state as well as data reset protection. This is used to |
| 105 | create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which |
| 106 | helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning |
| 107 | correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside |
| 108 | of the kernel itself. |
| 109 | |
| 110 | Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having |
| 111 | confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that |
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo | 3c556e4 | 2009-08-12 12:00:40 -0300 | [diff] [blame] | 112 | it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for |
Joseph Cihula | 3162534 | 2009-06-30 19:30:59 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 113 | providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it. |
| 114 | |
| 115 | See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information |
| 116 | about Intel(R) TXT. |
| 117 | See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot. |
| 118 | See Documentation/intel_txt.txt for a description of how to enable |
| 119 | Intel TXT support in a kernel boot. |
| 120 | |
| 121 | If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. |
| 122 | |
Eric Paris | 788084a | 2009-07-31 12:54:11 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 123 | config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR |
Andreas Schwab | 024e6cb | 2009-08-18 22:14:29 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 124 | int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation" |
Eric Paris | 788084a | 2009-07-31 12:54:11 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 125 | depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX |
Colin Cross | 530b099 | 2014-02-04 02:15:32 +0000 | [diff] [blame] | 126 | default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT) |
Dave Jones | a58578e | 2009-08-18 13:47:37 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 127 | default 65536 |
Eric Paris | 788084a | 2009-07-31 12:54:11 -0400 | [diff] [blame] | 128 | help |
| 129 | This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected |
| 130 | from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages |
| 131 | can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs. |
| 132 | |
| 133 | For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space |
| 134 | a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems. |
| 135 | On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768. |
| 136 | Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map |
| 137 | this low address space will need the permission specific to the |
| 138 | systems running LSM. |
| 139 | |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 140 | config HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR |
| 141 | bool |
| 142 | help |
| 143 | The heap allocator implements __check_heap_object() for |
| 144 | validating memory ranges against heap object sizes in |
| 145 | support of CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. |
| 146 | |
| 147 | config HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY |
| 148 | bool |
| 149 | help |
| 150 | The architecture supports CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY by |
| 151 | calling check_object_size() just before performing the |
| 152 | userspace copies in the low level implementation of |
| 153 | copy_to_user() and copy_from_user(). |
| 154 | |
| 155 | config HARDENED_USERCOPY |
| 156 | bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace" |
| 157 | depends on HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY |
Linus Torvalds | 6040e57 | 2016-08-19 12:47:01 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 158 | depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR |
Kees Cook | f5509cc | 2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 159 | select BUG |
| 160 | help |
| 161 | This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when |
| 162 | copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and |
| 163 | copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that |
| 164 | are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple |
| 165 | separately allocates pages, are not on the process stack, |
| 166 | or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes |
| 167 | of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures. |
| 168 | |
Kees Cook | 8e1f74e | 2016-09-07 09:54:34 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 169 | config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN |
| 170 | bool "Refuse to copy allocations that span multiple pages" |
| 171 | depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY |
Linus Torvalds | 80a7704 | 2016-09-07 14:03:49 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 172 | depends on EXPERT |
Kees Cook | 8e1f74e | 2016-09-07 09:54:34 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 173 | help |
| 174 | When a multi-page allocation is done without __GFP_COMP, |
| 175 | hardened usercopy will reject attempts to copy it. There are, |
| 176 | however, several cases of this in the kernel that have not all |
| 177 | been removed. This config is intended to be used only while |
| 178 | trying to find such users. |
| 179 | |
Daniel Micay | 0f51310 | 2017-07-12 14:36:10 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 180 | config FORTIFY_SOURCE |
| 181 | bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows" |
| 182 | depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE |
| 183 | help |
| 184 | Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions |
| 185 | where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes. |
| 186 | |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 187 | source security/selinux/Kconfig |
Casey Schaufler | e114e47 | 2008-02-04 22:29:50 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 188 | source security/smack/Kconfig |
Kentaro Takeda | 00d7d6f | 2009-02-05 17:18:17 +0900 | [diff] [blame] | 189 | source security/tomoyo/Kconfig |
John Johansen | f9ad1af | 2010-07-29 14:48:08 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 190 | source security/apparmor/Kconfig |
Kees Cook | 9b09155 | 2016-04-20 15:46:28 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 191 | source security/loadpin/Kconfig |
Kees Cook | 2d51448 | 2011-12-21 12:17:04 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 192 | source security/yama/Kconfig |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 193 | |
Mimi Zohar | f381c27 | 2011-03-09 14:13:22 -0500 | [diff] [blame] | 194 | source security/integrity/Kconfig |
Mimi Zohar | 3323eec9 | 2009-02-04 09:06:58 -0500 | [diff] [blame] | 195 | |
John Johansen | 6e65f92 | 2009-11-05 17:03:20 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 196 | choice |
| 197 | prompt "Default security module" |
| 198 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX |
| 199 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK |
| 200 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO |
John Johansen | f9ad1af | 2010-07-29 14:48:08 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 201 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR |
John Johansen | 6e65f92 | 2009-11-05 17:03:20 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 202 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC |
| 203 | |
| 204 | help |
| 205 | Select the security module that will be used by default if the |
| 206 | kernel parameter security= is not specified. |
| 207 | |
| 208 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX |
| 209 | bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y |
| 210 | |
| 211 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK |
| 212 | bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y |
| 213 | |
| 214 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO |
| 215 | bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y |
| 216 | |
John Johansen | f9ad1af | 2010-07-29 14:48:08 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 217 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR |
| 218 | bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y |
| 219 | |
John Johansen | 6e65f92 | 2009-11-05 17:03:20 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 220 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC |
| 221 | bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls" |
| 222 | |
| 223 | endchoice |
| 224 | |
| 225 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY |
| 226 | string |
| 227 | default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX |
| 228 | default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK |
| 229 | default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO |
John Johansen | f9ad1af | 2010-07-29 14:48:08 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 230 | default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR |
John Johansen | 6e65f92 | 2009-11-05 17:03:20 -0800 | [diff] [blame] | 231 | default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC |
| 232 | |
Linus Torvalds | 1da177e | 2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 233 | endmenu |
| 234 | |