kernel/seccomp.c

/*
 * linux/kernel/seccomp.c
 *
 * Copyright 2004-2005  Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@cpushare.com>
 *
 * Copyright (C) 2012 Google, Inc.
 * Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
 *
 * This defines a simple but solid secure-computing facility.
 *
 * Mode 1 uses a fixed list of allowed system calls.
 * Mode 2 allows user-defined system call filters in the form
 *        of Berkeley Packet Filters/Linux Socket Filters.
 */

#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>

#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
#include <asm/syscall.h>
#endif

#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/pid.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/tracehook.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>

/**
 * struct seccomp_filter - container for seccomp BPF programs
 *
 * @usage: reference count to manage the object lifetime.
 *         get/put helpers should be used when accessing an instance
 *         outside of a lifetime-guarded section.  In general, this
 *         is only needed for handling filters shared across tasks.
 * @prev: points to a previously installed, or inherited, filter
 * @len: the number of instructions in the program
 * @insnsi: the BPF program instructions to evaluate
 *
 * seccomp_filter objects are organized in a tree linked via the @prev
 * pointer.  For any task, it appears to be a singly-linked list starting
 * with current->seccomp.filter, the most recently attached or inherited filter.
 * However, multiple filters may share a @prev node, by way of fork(), which
 * results in a unidirectional tree existing in memory.  This is similar to
 * how namespaces work.
 *
 * seccomp_filter objects should never be modified after being attached
 * to a task_struct (other than @usage).
 */
struct seccomp_filter {
	atomic_t usage;
	struct seccomp_filter *prev;
	struct bpf_prog *prog;
};

/* Limit any path through the tree to 256KB worth of instructions. */
#define MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH ((1 << 18) / sizeof(struct sock_filter))

/*
 * Endianness is explicitly ignored and left for BPF program authors to manage
 * as per the specific architecture.
 */
static void populate_seccomp_data(struct seccomp_data *sd)
{
	struct task_struct *task = current;
	struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(task);
	unsigned long args[6];

	sd->nr = syscall_get_nr(task, regs);
	sd->arch = syscall_get_arch();
	syscall_get_arguments(task, regs, 0, 6, args);
	sd->args[0] = args[0];
	sd->args[1] = args[1];
	sd->args[2] = args[2];
	sd->args[3] = args[3];
	sd->args[4] = args[4];
	sd->args[5] = args[5];
	sd->instruction_pointer = KSTK_EIP(task);
}

/**
 *	seccomp_check_filter - verify seccomp filter code
 *	@filter: filter to verify
 *	@flen: length of filter
 *
 * Takes a previously checked filter (by bpf_check_classic) and
 * redirects all filter code that loads struct sk_buff data
 * and related data through seccomp_bpf_load.  It also
 * enforces length and alignment checking of those loads.
 *
 * Returns 0 if the rule set is legal or -EINVAL if not.
 */
static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen)
{
	int pc;
	for (pc = 0; pc < flen; pc++) {
		struct sock_filter *ftest = &filter[pc];
		u16 code = ftest->code;
		u32 k = ftest->k;

		switch (code) {
		case BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS:
			ftest->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_W | BPF_ABS;
			/* 32-bit aligned and not out of bounds. */
			if (k >= sizeof(struct seccomp_data) || k & 3)
				return -EINVAL;
			continue;
		case BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_LEN:
			ftest->code = BPF_LD | BPF_IMM;
			ftest->k = sizeof(struct seccomp_data);
			continue;
		case BPF_LDX | BPF_W | BPF_LEN:
			ftest->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_IMM;
			ftest->k = sizeof(struct seccomp_data);
			continue;
		/* Explicitly include allowed calls. */
		case BPF_RET | BPF_K:
		case BPF_RET | BPF_A:
		case BPF_ALU | BPF_ADD | BPF_K:
		case BPF_ALU | BPF_ADD | BPF_X:
		case BPF_ALU | BPF_SUB | BPF_K:
		case BPF_ALU | BPF_SUB | BPF_X:
		case BPF_ALU | BPF_MUL | BPF_K:
		case BPF_ALU | BPF_MUL | BPF_X:
		case BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_K:
		case BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_X:
		case BPF_ALU | BPF_AND | BPF_K:
		case BPF_ALU | BPF_AND | BPF_X:
		case BPF_ALU | BPF_OR | BPF_K:
		case BPF_ALU | BPF_OR | BPF_X:
		case BPF_ALU | BPF_XOR | BPF_K:
		case BPF_ALU | BPF_XOR | BPF_X:
		case BPF_ALU | BPF_LSH | BPF_K:
		case BPF_ALU | BPF_LSH | BPF_X:
		case BPF_ALU | BPF_RSH | BPF_K:
		case BPF_ALU | BPF_RSH | BPF_X:
		case BPF_ALU | BPF_NEG:
		case BPF_LD | BPF_IMM:
		case BPF_LDX | BPF_IMM:
		case BPF_MISC | BPF_TAX:
		case BPF_MISC | BPF_TXA:
		case BPF_LD | BPF_MEM:
		case BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM:
		case BPF_ST:
		case BPF_STX:
		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JA:
		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K:
		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_X:
		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGE | BPF_K:
		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGE | BPF_X:
		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGT | BPF_K:
		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGT | BPF_X:
		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSET | BPF_K:
		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSET | BPF_X:
			continue;
		default:
			return -EINVAL;
		}
	}
	return 0;
}

/**
 * seccomp_run_filters - evaluates all seccomp filters against @syscall
 * @syscall: number of the current system call
 *
 * Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes.
 */
static u32 seccomp_run_filters(struct seccomp_data *sd)
{
	struct seccomp_data sd_local;
	u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
	/* Make sure cross-thread synced filter points somewhere sane. */
	struct seccomp_filter *f =
			lockless_dereference(current->seccomp.filter);

	/* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
	if (unlikely(WARN_ON(f == NULL)))
		return SECCOMP_RET_KILL;

	if (!sd) {
		populate_seccomp_data(&sd_local);
		sd = &sd_local;
	}

	/*
	 * All filters in the list are evaluated and the lowest BPF return
	 * value always takes priority (ignoring the DATA).
	 */
	for (; f; f = f->prev) {
		u32 cur_ret = BPF_PROG_RUN(f->prog, (void *)sd);

		if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION))
			ret = cur_ret;
	}
	return ret;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */

static inline bool seccomp_may_assign_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode)
{
	assert_spin_locked(&current->sighand->siglock);

	if (current->seccomp.mode && current->seccomp.mode != seccomp_mode)
		return false;

	return true;
}

static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(struct task_struct *task,
				       unsigned long seccomp_mode)
{
	assert_spin_locked(&task->sighand->siglock);

	task->seccomp.mode = seccomp_mode;
	/*
	 * Make sure TIF_SECCOMP cannot be set before the mode (and
	 * filter) is set.
	 */
	smp_mb__before_atomic();
	set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SECCOMP);
}

#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
/* Returns 1 if the parent is an ancestor of the child. */
static int is_ancestor(struct seccomp_filter *parent,
		       struct seccomp_filter *child)
{
	/* NULL is the root ancestor. */
	if (parent == NULL)
		return 1;
	for (; child; child = child->prev)
		if (child == parent)
			return 1;
	return 0;
}

/**
 * seccomp_can_sync_threads: checks if all threads can be synchronized
 *
 * Expects sighand and cred_guard_mutex locks to be held.
 *
 * Returns 0 on success, -ve on error, or the pid of a thread which was
 * either not in the correct seccomp mode or it did not have an ancestral
 * seccomp filter.
 */
static inline pid_t seccomp_can_sync_threads(void)
{
	struct task_struct *thread, *caller;

	BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex));
	assert_spin_locked(&current->sighand->siglock);

	/* Validate all threads being eligible for synchronization. */
	caller = current;
	for_each_thread(caller, thread) {
		pid_t failed;

		/* Skip current, since it is initiating the sync. */
		if (thread == caller)
			continue;

		if (thread->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED ||
		    (thread->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER &&
		     is_ancestor(thread->seccomp.filter,
				 caller->seccomp.filter)))
			continue;

		/* Return the first thread that cannot be synchronized. */
		failed = task_pid_vnr(thread);
		/* If the pid cannot be resolved, then return -ESRCH */
		if (unlikely(WARN_ON(failed == 0)))
			failed = -ESRCH;
		return failed;
	}

	return 0;
}

/**
 * seccomp_sync_threads: sets all threads to use current's filter
 *
 * Expects sighand and cred_guard_mutex locks to be held, and for
 * seccomp_can_sync_threads() to have returned success already
 * without dropping the locks.
 *
 */
static inline void seccomp_sync_threads(void)
{
	struct task_struct *thread, *caller;

	BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex));
	assert_spin_locked(&current->sighand->siglock);

	/* Synchronize all threads. */
	caller = current;
	for_each_thread(caller, thread) {
		/* Skip current, since it needs no changes. */
		if (thread == caller)
			continue;

		/* Get a task reference for the new leaf node. */
		get_seccomp_filter(caller);
		/*
		 * Drop the task reference to the shared ancestor since
		 * current's path will hold a reference.  (This also
		 * allows a put before the assignment.)
		 */
		put_seccomp_filter(thread);
		smp_store_release(&thread->seccomp.filter,
				  caller->seccomp.filter);
		/*
		 * Opt the other thread into seccomp if needed.
		 * As threads are considered to be trust-realm
		 * equivalent (see ptrace_may_access), it is safe to
		 * allow one thread to transition the other.
		 */
		if (thread->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED) {
			/*
			 * Don't let an unprivileged task work around
			 * the no_new_privs restriction by creating
			 * a thread that sets it up, enters seccomp,
			 * then dies.
			 */
			if (task_no_new_privs(caller))
				task_set_no_new_privs(thread);

			seccomp_assign_mode(thread, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER);
		}
	}
}

/**
 * seccomp_prepare_filter: Prepares a seccomp filter for use.
 * @fprog: BPF program to install
 *
 * Returns filter on success or an ERR_PTR on failure.
 */
static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
{
	struct seccomp_filter *sfilter;
	int ret;

	if (fprog->len == 0 || fprog->len > BPF_MAXINSNS)
		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);

	BUG_ON(INT_MAX / fprog->len < sizeof(struct sock_filter));

	/*
	 * Installing a seccomp filter requires that the task has
	 * CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its namespace or be running with no_new_privs.
	 * This avoids scenarios where unprivileged tasks can affect the
	 * behavior of privileged children.
	 */
	if (!task_no_new_privs(current) &&
	    security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), current_user_ns(),
				     CAP_SYS_ADMIN) != 0)
		return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);

	/* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */
	sfilter = kzalloc(sizeof(*sfilter), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
	if (!sfilter)
		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);

	ret = bpf_prog_create_from_user(&sfilter->prog, fprog,
					seccomp_check_filter, false);
	if (ret < 0) {
		kfree(sfilter);
		return ERR_PTR(ret);
	}

	atomic_set(&sfilter->usage, 1);

	return sfilter;
}

/**
 * seccomp_prepare_user_filter - prepares a user-supplied sock_fprog
 * @user_filter: pointer to the user data containing a sock_fprog.
 *
 * Returns 0 on success and non-zero otherwise.
 */
static struct seccomp_filter *
seccomp_prepare_user_filter(const char __user *user_filter)
{
	struct sock_fprog fprog;
	struct seccomp_filter *filter = ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);

#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
	if (is_compat_task()) {
		struct compat_sock_fprog fprog32;
		if (copy_from_user(&fprog32, user_filter, sizeof(fprog32)))
			goto out;
		fprog.len = fprog32.len;
		fprog.filter = compat_ptr(fprog32.filter);
	} else /* falls through to the if below. */
#endif
	if (copy_from_user(&fprog, user_filter, sizeof(fprog)))
		goto out;
	filter = seccomp_prepare_filter(&fprog);
out:
	return filter;
}

/**
 * seccomp_attach_filter: validate and attach filter
 * @flags:  flags to change filter behavior
 * @filter: seccomp filter to add to the current process
 *
 * Caller must be holding current->sighand->siglock lock.
 *
 * Returns 0 on success, -ve on error.
 */
static long seccomp_attach_filter(unsigned int flags,
				  struct seccomp_filter *filter)
{
	unsigned long total_insns;
	struct seccomp_filter *walker;

	assert_spin_locked(&current->sighand->siglock);

	/* Validate resulting filter length. */
	total_insns = filter->prog->len;
	for (walker = current->seccomp.filter; walker; walker = walker->prev)
		total_insns += walker->prog->len + 4;  /* 4 instr penalty */
	if (total_insns > MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH)
		return -ENOMEM;

	/* If thread sync has been requested, check that it is possible. */
	if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC) {
		int ret;

		ret = seccomp_can_sync_threads();
		if (ret)
			return ret;
	}

	/*
	 * If there is an existing filter, make it the prev and don't drop its
	 * task reference.
	 */
	filter->prev = current->seccomp.filter;
	current->seccomp.filter = filter;

	/* Now that the new filter is in place, synchronize to all threads. */
	if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC)
		seccomp_sync_threads();

	return 0;
}

/* get_seccomp_filter - increments the reference count of the filter on @tsk */
void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
	struct seccomp_filter *orig = tsk->seccomp.filter;
	if (!orig)
		return;
	/* Reference count is bounded by the number of total processes. */
	atomic_inc(&orig->usage);
}

static inline void seccomp_filter_free(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
{
	if (filter) {
		bpf_prog_destroy(filter->prog);
		kfree(filter);
	}
}

/* put_seccomp_filter - decrements the ref count of tsk->seccomp.filter */
void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
	struct seccomp_filter *orig = tsk->seccomp.filter;
	/* Clean up single-reference branches iteratively. */
	while (orig && atomic_dec_and_test(&orig->usage)) {
		struct seccomp_filter *freeme = orig;
		orig = orig->prev;
		seccomp_filter_free(freeme);
	}
}

/**
 * seccomp_send_sigsys - signals the task to allow in-process syscall emulation
 * @syscall: syscall number to send to userland
 * @reason: filter-supplied reason code to send to userland (via si_errno)
 *
 * Forces a SIGSYS with a code of SYS_SECCOMP and related sigsys info.
 */
static void seccomp_send_sigsys(int syscall, int reason)
{
	struct siginfo info;
	memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
	info.si_signo = SIGSYS;
	info.si_code = SYS_SECCOMP;
	info.si_call_addr = (void __user *)KSTK_EIP(current);
	info.si_errno = reason;
	info.si_arch = syscall_get_arch();
	info.si_syscall = syscall;
	force_sig_info(SIGSYS, &info, current);
}
#endif	/* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */

/*
 * Secure computing mode 1 allows only read/write/exit/sigreturn.
 * To be fully secure this must be combined with rlimit
 * to limit the stack allocations too.
 */
static int mode1_syscalls[] = {
	__NR_seccomp_read, __NR_seccomp_write, __NR_seccomp_exit, __NR_seccomp_sigreturn,
	0, /* null terminated */
};

#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
static int mode1_syscalls_32[] = {
	__NR_seccomp_read_32, __NR_seccomp_write_32, __NR_seccomp_exit_32, __NR_seccomp_sigreturn_32,
	0, /* null terminated */
};
#endif

static void __secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
{
	int *syscall_whitelist = mode1_syscalls;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
	if (is_compat_task())
		syscall_whitelist = mode1_syscalls_32;
#endif
	do {
		if (*syscall_whitelist == this_syscall)
			return;
	} while (*++syscall_whitelist);

#ifdef SECCOMP_DEBUG
	dump_stack();
#endif
	audit_seccomp(this_syscall, SIGKILL, SECCOMP_RET_KILL);
	do_exit(SIGKILL);
}

#ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
{
	int mode = current->seccomp.mode;

	if (config_enabled(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) &&
	    unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP))
		return;

	if (mode == SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED)
		return;
	else if (mode == SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT)
		__secure_computing_strict(this_syscall);
	else
		BUG();
}
#else
int __secure_computing(void)
{
	u32 phase1_result = seccomp_phase1(NULL);

	if (likely(phase1_result == SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK))
		return 0;
	else if (likely(phase1_result == SECCOMP_PHASE1_SKIP))
		return -1;
	else
		return seccomp_phase2(phase1_result);
}

#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
static u32 __seccomp_phase1_filter(int this_syscall, struct seccomp_data *sd)
{
	u32 filter_ret, action;
	int data;

	/*
	 * Make sure that any changes to mode from another thread have
	 * been seen after TIF_SECCOMP was seen.
	 */
	rmb();

	filter_ret = seccomp_run_filters(sd);
	data = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA;
	action = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION;

	switch (action) {
	case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO:
		/* Set low-order bits as an errno, capped at MAX_ERRNO. */
		if (data > MAX_ERRNO)
			data = MAX_ERRNO;
		syscall_set_return_value(current, task_pt_regs(current),
					 -data, 0);
		goto skip;

	case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP:
		/* Show the handler the original registers. */
		syscall_rollback(current, task_pt_regs(current));
		/* Let the filter pass back 16 bits of data. */
		seccomp_send_sigsys(this_syscall, data);
		goto skip;

	case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
		return filter_ret;  /* Save the rest for phase 2. */

	case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
		return SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK;

	case SECCOMP_RET_KILL:
	default:
		audit_seccomp(this_syscall, SIGSYS, action);
		do_exit(SIGSYS);
	}

	unreachable();

skip:
	audit_seccomp(this_syscall, 0, action);
	return SECCOMP_PHASE1_SKIP;
}
#endif

/**
 * seccomp_phase1() - run fast path seccomp checks on the current syscall
 * @arg sd: The seccomp_data or NULL
 *
 * This only reads pt_regs via the syscall_xyz helpers.  The only change
 * it will make to pt_regs is via syscall_set_return_value, and it will
 * only do that if it returns SECCOMP_PHASE1_SKIP.
 *
 * If sd is provided, it will not read pt_regs at all.
 *
 * It may also call do_exit or force a signal; these actions must be
 * safe.
 *
 * If it returns SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK, the syscall passes checks and should
 * be processed normally.
 *
 * If it returns SECCOMP_PHASE1_SKIP, then the syscall should not be
 * invoked.  In this case, seccomp_phase1 will have set the return value
 * using syscall_set_return_value.
 *
 * If it returns anything else, then the return value should be passed
 * to seccomp_phase2 from a context in which ptrace hooks are safe.
 */
u32 seccomp_phase1(struct seccomp_data *sd)
{
	int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
	int this_syscall = sd ? sd->nr :
		syscall_get_nr(current, task_pt_regs(current));

	if (config_enabled(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) &&
	    unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP))
		return SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK;

	switch (mode) {
	case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
		__secure_computing_strict(this_syscall);  /* may call do_exit */
		return SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
	case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
		return __seccomp_phase1_filter(this_syscall, sd);
#endif
	default:
		BUG();
	}
}

/**
 * seccomp_phase2() - finish slow path seccomp work for the current syscall
 * @phase1_result: The return value from seccomp_phase1()
 *
 * This must be called from a context in which ptrace hooks can be used.
 *
 * Returns 0 if the syscall should be processed or -1 to skip the syscall.
 */
int seccomp_phase2(u32 phase1_result)
{
	struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);
	u32 action = phase1_result & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION;
	int data = phase1_result & SECCOMP_RET_DATA;

	BUG_ON(action != SECCOMP_RET_TRACE);

	audit_seccomp(syscall_get_nr(current, regs), 0, action);

	/* Skip these calls if there is no tracer. */
	if (!ptrace_event_enabled(current, PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)) {
		syscall_set_return_value(current, regs,
					 -ENOSYS, 0);
		return -1;
	}

	/* Allow the BPF to provide the event message */
	ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, data);
	/*
	 * The delivery of a fatal signal during event
	 * notification may silently skip tracer notification.
	 * Terminating the task now avoids executing a system
	 * call that may not be intended.
	 */
	if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
		do_exit(SIGSYS);
	if (syscall_get_nr(current, regs) < 0)
		return -1;  /* Explicit request to skip. */

	return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER */

long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
{
	return current->seccomp.mode;
}

/**
 * seccomp_set_mode_strict: internal function for setting strict seccomp
 *
 * Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed.
 *
 * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
 */
static long seccomp_set_mode_strict(void)
{
	const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT;
	long ret = -EINVAL;

	spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);

	if (!seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode))
		goto out;

#ifdef TIF_NOTSC
	disable_TSC();
#endif
	seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode);
	ret = 0;

out:
	spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);

	return ret;
}

#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
/**
 * seccomp_set_mode_filter: internal function for setting seccomp filter
 * @flags:  flags to change filter behavior
 * @filter: struct sock_fprog containing filter
 *
 * This function may be called repeatedly to install additional filters.
 * Every filter successfully installed will be evaluated (in reverse order)
 * for each system call the task makes.
 *
 * Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed.
 *
 * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
 */
static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
				    const char __user *filter)
{
	const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER;
	struct seccomp_filter *prepared = NULL;
	long ret = -EINVAL;

	/* Validate flags. */
	if (flags & ~SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_MASK)
		return -EINVAL;

	/* Prepare the new filter before holding any locks. */
	prepared = seccomp_prepare_user_filter(filter);
	if (IS_ERR(prepared))
		return PTR_ERR(prepared);

	/*
	 * Make sure we cannot change seccomp or nnp state via TSYNC
	 * while another thread is in the middle of calling exec.
	 */
	if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC &&
	    mutex_lock_killable(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
		goto out_free;

	spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);

	if (!seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode))
		goto out;

	ret = seccomp_attach_filter(flags, prepared);
	if (ret)
		goto out;
	/* Do not free the successfully attached filter. */
	prepared = NULL;

	seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode);
out:
	spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
	if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC)
		mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
out_free:
	seccomp_filter_free(prepared);
	return ret;
}
#else
static inline long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
					   const char __user *filter)
{
	return -EINVAL;
}
#endif

/* Common entry point for both prctl and syscall. */
static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags,
		       const char __user *uargs)
{
	switch (op) {
	case SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT:
		if (flags != 0 || uargs != NULL)
			return -EINVAL;
		return seccomp_set_mode_strict();
	case SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER:
		return seccomp_set_mode_filter(flags, uargs);
	default:
		return -EINVAL;
	}
}

SYSCALL_DEFINE3(seccomp, unsigned int, op, unsigned int, flags,
			 const char __user *, uargs)
{
	return do_seccomp(op, flags, uargs);
}

/**
 * prctl_set_seccomp: configures current->seccomp.mode
 * @seccomp_mode: requested mode to use
 * @filter: optional struct sock_fprog for use with SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
 *
 * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
 */
long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter)
{
	unsigned int op;
	char __user *uargs;

	switch (seccomp_mode) {
	case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
		op = SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT;
		/*
		 * Setting strict mode through prctl always ignored filter,
		 * so make sure it is always NULL here to pass the internal
		 * check in do_seccomp().
		 */
		uargs = NULL;
		break;
	case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
		op = SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER;
		uargs = filter;
		break;
	default:
		return -EINVAL;
	}

	/* prctl interface doesn't have flags, so they are always zero. */
	return do_seccomp(op, 0, uargs);
}