Alexei Starovoitov | 51580e7 | 2014-09-26 00:17:02 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | /* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com |
| 2 | * |
| 3 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or |
| 4 | * modify it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public |
| 5 | * License as published by the Free Software Foundation. |
| 6 | * |
| 7 | * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but |
| 8 | * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of |
| 9 | * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU |
| 10 | * General Public License for more details. |
| 11 | */ |
| 12 | #include <linux/kernel.h> |
| 13 | #include <linux/types.h> |
| 14 | #include <linux/slab.h> |
| 15 | #include <linux/bpf.h> |
| 16 | #include <linux/filter.h> |
| 17 | #include <net/netlink.h> |
| 18 | #include <linux/file.h> |
| 19 | #include <linux/vmalloc.h> |
| 20 | |
| 21 | /* bpf_check() is a static code analyzer that walks eBPF program |
| 22 | * instruction by instruction and updates register/stack state. |
| 23 | * All paths of conditional branches are analyzed until 'bpf_exit' insn. |
| 24 | * |
| 25 | * The first pass is depth-first-search to check that the program is a DAG. |
| 26 | * It rejects the following programs: |
| 27 | * - larger than BPF_MAXINSNS insns |
| 28 | * - if loop is present (detected via back-edge) |
| 29 | * - unreachable insns exist (shouldn't be a forest. program = one function) |
| 30 | * - out of bounds or malformed jumps |
| 31 | * The second pass is all possible path descent from the 1st insn. |
| 32 | * Since it's analyzing all pathes through the program, the length of the |
| 33 | * analysis is limited to 32k insn, which may be hit even if total number of |
| 34 | * insn is less then 4K, but there are too many branches that change stack/regs. |
| 35 | * Number of 'branches to be analyzed' is limited to 1k |
| 36 | * |
| 37 | * On entry to each instruction, each register has a type, and the instruction |
| 38 | * changes the types of the registers depending on instruction semantics. |
| 39 | * If instruction is BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_5), then type of R5 is |
| 40 | * copied to R1. |
| 41 | * |
| 42 | * All registers are 64-bit. |
| 43 | * R0 - return register |
| 44 | * R1-R5 argument passing registers |
| 45 | * R6-R9 callee saved registers |
| 46 | * R10 - frame pointer read-only |
| 47 | * |
| 48 | * At the start of BPF program the register R1 contains a pointer to bpf_context |
| 49 | * and has type PTR_TO_CTX. |
| 50 | * |
| 51 | * Verifier tracks arithmetic operations on pointers in case: |
| 52 | * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10), |
| 53 | * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -20), |
| 54 | * 1st insn copies R10 (which has FRAME_PTR) type into R1 |
| 55 | * and 2nd arithmetic instruction is pattern matched to recognize |
| 56 | * that it wants to construct a pointer to some element within stack. |
| 57 | * So after 2nd insn, the register R1 has type PTR_TO_STACK |
| 58 | * (and -20 constant is saved for further stack bounds checking). |
| 59 | * Meaning that this reg is a pointer to stack plus known immediate constant. |
| 60 | * |
| 61 | * Most of the time the registers have UNKNOWN_VALUE type, which |
| 62 | * means the register has some value, but it's not a valid pointer. |
| 63 | * (like pointer plus pointer becomes UNKNOWN_VALUE type) |
| 64 | * |
| 65 | * When verifier sees load or store instructions the type of base register |
| 66 | * can be: PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_CTX, FRAME_PTR. These are three pointer |
| 67 | * types recognized by check_mem_access() function. |
| 68 | * |
| 69 | * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE means that this register is pointing to 'map element value' |
| 70 | * and the range of [ptr, ptr + map's value_size) is accessible. |
| 71 | * |
| 72 | * registers used to pass values to function calls are checked against |
| 73 | * function argument constraints. |
| 74 | * |
| 75 | * ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY is one of such argument constraints. |
| 76 | * It means that the register type passed to this function must be |
| 77 | * PTR_TO_STACK and it will be used inside the function as |
| 78 | * 'pointer to map element key' |
| 79 | * |
| 80 | * For example the argument constraints for bpf_map_lookup_elem(): |
| 81 | * .ret_type = RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, |
| 82 | * .arg1_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR, |
| 83 | * .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, |
| 84 | * |
| 85 | * ret_type says that this function returns 'pointer to map elem value or null' |
| 86 | * function expects 1st argument to be a const pointer to 'struct bpf_map' and |
| 87 | * 2nd argument should be a pointer to stack, which will be used inside |
| 88 | * the helper function as a pointer to map element key. |
| 89 | * |
| 90 | * On the kernel side the helper function looks like: |
| 91 | * u64 bpf_map_lookup_elem(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5) |
| 92 | * { |
| 93 | * struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r1; |
| 94 | * void *key = (void *) (unsigned long) r2; |
| 95 | * void *value; |
| 96 | * |
| 97 | * here kernel can access 'key' and 'map' pointers safely, knowing that |
| 98 | * [key, key + map->key_size) bytes are valid and were initialized on |
| 99 | * the stack of eBPF program. |
| 100 | * } |
| 101 | * |
| 102 | * Corresponding eBPF program may look like: |
| 103 | * BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), // after this insn R2 type is FRAME_PTR |
| 104 | * BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), // after this insn R2 type is PTR_TO_STACK |
| 105 | * BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, map_fd), // after this insn R1 type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP |
| 106 | * BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), |
| 107 | * here verifier looks at prototype of map_lookup_elem() and sees: |
| 108 | * .arg1_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR and R1->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, which is ok, |
| 109 | * Now verifier knows that this map has key of R1->map_ptr->key_size bytes |
| 110 | * |
| 111 | * Then .arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY and R2->type == PTR_TO_STACK, ok so far, |
| 112 | * Now verifier checks that [R2, R2 + map's key_size) are within stack limits |
| 113 | * and were initialized prior to this call. |
| 114 | * If it's ok, then verifier allows this BPF_CALL insn and looks at |
| 115 | * .ret_type which is RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, so it sets |
| 116 | * R0->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL which means bpf_map_lookup_elem() function |
| 117 | * returns ether pointer to map value or NULL. |
| 118 | * |
| 119 | * When type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL passes through 'if (reg != 0) goto +off' |
| 120 | * insn, the register holding that pointer in the true branch changes state to |
| 121 | * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and the same register changes state to CONST_IMM in the false |
| 122 | * branch. See check_cond_jmp_op(). |
| 123 | * |
| 124 | * After the call R0 is set to return type of the function and registers R1-R5 |
| 125 | * are set to NOT_INIT to indicate that they are no longer readable. |
| 126 | */ |
| 127 | |
Alexei Starovoitov | cbd3570 | 2014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700 | [diff] [blame^] | 128 | /* single container for all structs |
| 129 | * one verifier_env per bpf_check() call |
| 130 | */ |
| 131 | struct verifier_env { |
| 132 | }; |
| 133 | |
| 134 | /* verbose verifier prints what it's seeing |
| 135 | * bpf_check() is called under lock, so no race to access these global vars |
| 136 | */ |
| 137 | static u32 log_level, log_size, log_len; |
| 138 | static char *log_buf; |
| 139 | |
| 140 | static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock); |
| 141 | |
| 142 | /* log_level controls verbosity level of eBPF verifier. |
| 143 | * verbose() is used to dump the verification trace to the log, so the user |
| 144 | * can figure out what's wrong with the program |
| 145 | */ |
| 146 | static void verbose(const char *fmt, ...) |
| 147 | { |
| 148 | va_list args; |
| 149 | |
| 150 | if (log_level == 0 || log_len >= log_size - 1) |
| 151 | return; |
| 152 | |
| 153 | va_start(args, fmt); |
| 154 | log_len += vscnprintf(log_buf + log_len, log_size - log_len, fmt, args); |
| 155 | va_end(args); |
| 156 | } |
| 157 | |
| 158 | static const char *const bpf_class_string[] = { |
| 159 | [BPF_LD] = "ld", |
| 160 | [BPF_LDX] = "ldx", |
| 161 | [BPF_ST] = "st", |
| 162 | [BPF_STX] = "stx", |
| 163 | [BPF_ALU] = "alu", |
| 164 | [BPF_JMP] = "jmp", |
| 165 | [BPF_RET] = "BUG", |
| 166 | [BPF_ALU64] = "alu64", |
| 167 | }; |
| 168 | |
| 169 | static const char *const bpf_alu_string[] = { |
| 170 | [BPF_ADD >> 4] = "+=", |
| 171 | [BPF_SUB >> 4] = "-=", |
| 172 | [BPF_MUL >> 4] = "*=", |
| 173 | [BPF_DIV >> 4] = "/=", |
| 174 | [BPF_OR >> 4] = "|=", |
| 175 | [BPF_AND >> 4] = "&=", |
| 176 | [BPF_LSH >> 4] = "<<=", |
| 177 | [BPF_RSH >> 4] = ">>=", |
| 178 | [BPF_NEG >> 4] = "neg", |
| 179 | [BPF_MOD >> 4] = "%=", |
| 180 | [BPF_XOR >> 4] = "^=", |
| 181 | [BPF_MOV >> 4] = "=", |
| 182 | [BPF_ARSH >> 4] = "s>>=", |
| 183 | [BPF_END >> 4] = "endian", |
| 184 | }; |
| 185 | |
| 186 | static const char *const bpf_ldst_string[] = { |
| 187 | [BPF_W >> 3] = "u32", |
| 188 | [BPF_H >> 3] = "u16", |
| 189 | [BPF_B >> 3] = "u8", |
| 190 | [BPF_DW >> 3] = "u64", |
| 191 | }; |
| 192 | |
| 193 | static const char *const bpf_jmp_string[] = { |
| 194 | [BPF_JA >> 4] = "jmp", |
| 195 | [BPF_JEQ >> 4] = "==", |
| 196 | [BPF_JGT >> 4] = ">", |
| 197 | [BPF_JGE >> 4] = ">=", |
| 198 | [BPF_JSET >> 4] = "&", |
| 199 | [BPF_JNE >> 4] = "!=", |
| 200 | [BPF_JSGT >> 4] = "s>", |
| 201 | [BPF_JSGE >> 4] = "s>=", |
| 202 | [BPF_CALL >> 4] = "call", |
| 203 | [BPF_EXIT >> 4] = "exit", |
| 204 | }; |
| 205 | |
| 206 | static void print_bpf_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn) |
| 207 | { |
| 208 | u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); |
| 209 | |
| 210 | if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { |
| 211 | if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) |
| 212 | verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %sr%d\n", |
| 213 | insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "", |
| 214 | insn->dst_reg, |
| 215 | bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4], |
| 216 | class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "", |
| 217 | insn->src_reg); |
| 218 | else |
| 219 | verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %s%d\n", |
| 220 | insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "", |
| 221 | insn->dst_reg, |
| 222 | bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4], |
| 223 | class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "", |
| 224 | insn->imm); |
| 225 | } else if (class == BPF_STX) { |
| 226 | if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM) |
| 227 | verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = r%d\n", |
| 228 | insn->code, |
| 229 | bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], |
| 230 | insn->dst_reg, |
| 231 | insn->off, insn->src_reg); |
| 232 | else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD) |
| 233 | verbose("(%02x) lock *(%s *)(r%d %+d) += r%d\n", |
| 234 | insn->code, |
| 235 | bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], |
| 236 | insn->dst_reg, insn->off, |
| 237 | insn->src_reg); |
| 238 | else |
| 239 | verbose("BUG_%02x\n", insn->code); |
| 240 | } else if (class == BPF_ST) { |
| 241 | if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) { |
| 242 | verbose("BUG_st_%02x\n", insn->code); |
| 243 | return; |
| 244 | } |
| 245 | verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = %d\n", |
| 246 | insn->code, |
| 247 | bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], |
| 248 | insn->dst_reg, |
| 249 | insn->off, insn->imm); |
| 250 | } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { |
| 251 | if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) { |
| 252 | verbose("BUG_ldx_%02x\n", insn->code); |
| 253 | return; |
| 254 | } |
| 255 | verbose("(%02x) r%d = *(%s *)(r%d %+d)\n", |
| 256 | insn->code, insn->dst_reg, |
| 257 | bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], |
| 258 | insn->src_reg, insn->off); |
| 259 | } else if (class == BPF_LD) { |
| 260 | if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS) { |
| 261 | verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[%d]\n", |
| 262 | insn->code, |
| 263 | bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], |
| 264 | insn->imm); |
| 265 | } else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND) { |
| 266 | verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[r%d + %d]\n", |
| 267 | insn->code, |
| 268 | bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3], |
| 269 | insn->src_reg, insn->imm); |
| 270 | } else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IMM) { |
| 271 | verbose("(%02x) r%d = 0x%x\n", |
| 272 | insn->code, insn->dst_reg, insn->imm); |
| 273 | } else { |
| 274 | verbose("BUG_ld_%02x\n", insn->code); |
| 275 | return; |
| 276 | } |
| 277 | } else if (class == BPF_JMP) { |
| 278 | u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); |
| 279 | |
| 280 | if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { |
| 281 | verbose("(%02x) call %d\n", insn->code, insn->imm); |
| 282 | } else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) { |
| 283 | verbose("(%02x) goto pc%+d\n", |
| 284 | insn->code, insn->off); |
| 285 | } else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT)) { |
| 286 | verbose("(%02x) exit\n", insn->code); |
| 287 | } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { |
| 288 | verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s r%d goto pc%+d\n", |
| 289 | insn->code, insn->dst_reg, |
| 290 | bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4], |
| 291 | insn->src_reg, insn->off); |
| 292 | } else { |
| 293 | verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s 0x%x goto pc%+d\n", |
| 294 | insn->code, insn->dst_reg, |
| 295 | bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4], |
| 296 | insn->imm, insn->off); |
| 297 | } |
| 298 | } else { |
| 299 | verbose("(%02x) %s\n", insn->code, bpf_class_string[class]); |
| 300 | } |
| 301 | } |
| 302 | |
Alexei Starovoitov | 51580e7 | 2014-09-26 00:17:02 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 303 | int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr) |
| 304 | { |
Alexei Starovoitov | cbd3570 | 2014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700 | [diff] [blame^] | 305 | char __user *log_ubuf = NULL; |
| 306 | struct verifier_env *env; |
Alexei Starovoitov | 51580e7 | 2014-09-26 00:17:02 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 307 | int ret = -EINVAL; |
| 308 | |
Alexei Starovoitov | cbd3570 | 2014-09-26 00:17:03 -0700 | [diff] [blame^] | 309 | if (prog->len <= 0 || prog->len > BPF_MAXINSNS) |
| 310 | return -E2BIG; |
| 311 | |
| 312 | /* 'struct verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small, |
| 313 | * allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called |
| 314 | */ |
| 315 | env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL); |
| 316 | if (!env) |
| 317 | return -ENOMEM; |
| 318 | |
| 319 | /* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */ |
| 320 | mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); |
| 321 | |
| 322 | if (attr->log_level || attr->log_buf || attr->log_size) { |
| 323 | /* user requested verbose verifier output |
| 324 | * and supplied buffer to store the verification trace |
| 325 | */ |
| 326 | log_level = attr->log_level; |
| 327 | log_ubuf = (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf; |
| 328 | log_size = attr->log_size; |
| 329 | log_len = 0; |
| 330 | |
| 331 | ret = -EINVAL; |
| 332 | /* log_* values have to be sane */ |
| 333 | if (log_size < 128 || log_size > UINT_MAX >> 8 || |
| 334 | log_level == 0 || log_ubuf == NULL) |
| 335 | goto free_env; |
| 336 | |
| 337 | ret = -ENOMEM; |
| 338 | log_buf = vmalloc(log_size); |
| 339 | if (!log_buf) |
| 340 | goto free_env; |
| 341 | } else { |
| 342 | log_level = 0; |
| 343 | } |
| 344 | |
| 345 | /* ret = do_check(env); */ |
| 346 | |
| 347 | if (log_level && log_len >= log_size - 1) { |
| 348 | BUG_ON(log_len >= log_size); |
| 349 | /* verifier log exceeded user supplied buffer */ |
| 350 | ret = -ENOSPC; |
| 351 | /* fall through to return what was recorded */ |
| 352 | } |
| 353 | |
| 354 | /* copy verifier log back to user space including trailing zero */ |
| 355 | if (log_level && copy_to_user(log_ubuf, log_buf, log_len + 1) != 0) { |
| 356 | ret = -EFAULT; |
| 357 | goto free_log_buf; |
| 358 | } |
| 359 | |
| 360 | |
| 361 | free_log_buf: |
| 362 | if (log_level) |
| 363 | vfree(log_buf); |
| 364 | free_env: |
| 365 | kfree(env); |
| 366 | mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); |
Alexei Starovoitov | 51580e7 | 2014-09-26 00:17:02 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 367 | return ret; |
| 368 | } |