net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c - kernel/msm-5.4 - Gitiles

 #include <linux/crypto.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
 #include <linux/tcp.h>
 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
 #include <linux/rculist.h>
 #include <net/inetpeer.h>
 #include <net/tcp.h>

 int sysctl_tcp_fastopen __read_mostly = TFO_CLIENT_ENABLE;

 struct tcp_fastopen_context __rcu *tcp_fastopen_ctx;

 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(tcp_fastopen_ctx_lock);

 void tcp_fastopen_init_key_once(bool publish)
 {
 	static u8 key[TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH];

 	/* tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher publishes the new context
 	 * atomically, so we allow this race happening here.
 	 *
 	 * All call sites of tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen also check
 	 * for a valid cookie, so this is an acceptable risk.
 	 */
 	if (net_get_random_once(key, sizeof(key)) && publish)
 		tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(key, sizeof(key));
 }

 static void tcp_fastopen_ctx_free(struct rcu_head *head)
 {
 	struct tcp_fastopen_context *ctx =
 	    container_of(head, struct tcp_fastopen_context, rcu);
 	crypto_free_cipher(ctx->tfm);
 	kfree(ctx);
 }

 int tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(void *key, unsigned int len)
 {
 	int err;
 	struct tcp_fastopen_context *ctx, *octx;

 	ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!ctx)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	ctx->tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, 0);

 	if (IS_ERR(ctx->tfm)) {
 		err = PTR_ERR(ctx->tfm);
 error:		kfree(ctx);
 		pr_err("TCP: TFO aes cipher alloc error: %d\n", err);
 		return err;
 	}
 	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(ctx->tfm, key, len);
 	if (err) {
 		pr_err("TCP: TFO cipher key error: %d\n", err);
 		crypto_free_cipher(ctx->tfm);
 		goto error;
 	}
 	memcpy(ctx->key, key, len);

 	spin_lock(&tcp_fastopen_ctx_lock);

 	octx = rcu_dereference_protected(tcp_fastopen_ctx,
 				lockdep_is_held(&tcp_fastopen_ctx_lock));
 	rcu_assign_pointer(tcp_fastopen_ctx, ctx);
 	spin_unlock(&tcp_fastopen_ctx_lock);

 	if (octx)
 		call_rcu(&octx->rcu, tcp_fastopen_ctx_free);
 	return err;
 }

 static bool __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(const void *path,
 				      struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *foc)
 {
 	struct tcp_fastopen_context *ctx;
 	bool ok = false;

 	rcu_read_lock();
 	ctx = rcu_dereference(tcp_fastopen_ctx);
 	if (ctx) {
 		crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->tfm, foc->val, path);
 		foc->len = TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_SIZE;
 		ok = true;
 	}
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	return ok;
 }

 /* Generate the fastopen cookie by doing aes128 encryption on both
  * the source and destination addresses. Pad 0s for IPv4 or IPv4-mapped-IPv6
  * addresses. For the longer IPv6 addresses use CBC-MAC.
  *
  * XXX (TFO) - refactor when TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_SIZE != AES_BLOCK_SIZE.
  */
 static bool tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(struct request_sock *req,
 				    struct sk_buff *syn,
 				    struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *foc)
 {
 	if (req->rsk_ops->family == AF_INET) {
 		const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(syn);

 		__be32 path[4] = { iph->saddr, iph->daddr, 0, 0 };
 		return __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(path, foc);
 	}

 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
 	if (req->rsk_ops->family == AF_INET6) {
 		const struct ipv6hdr *ip6h = ipv6_hdr(syn);
 		struct tcp_fastopen_cookie tmp;

 		if (__tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(&ip6h->saddr, &tmp)) {
 			struct in6_addr *buf = &tmp.addr;
 			int i;

 			for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
 				buf->s6_addr32[i] ^= ip6h->daddr.s6_addr32[i];
 			return __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(buf, foc);
 		}
 	}
 #endif
 	return false;
 }


 /* If an incoming SYN or SYNACK frame contains a payload and/or FIN,
  * queue this additional data / FIN.
  */
 void tcp_fastopen_add_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);

 	if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq == tp->rcv_nxt)
 		return;

 	skb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!skb)
 		return;

 	skb_dst_drop(skb);
 	/* segs_in has been initialized to 1 in tcp_create_openreq_child().
 	 * Hence, reset segs_in to 0 before calling tcp_segs_in()
 	 * to avoid double counting.  Also, tcp_segs_in() expects
 	 * skb->len to include the tcp_hdrlen.  Hence, it should
 	 * be called before __skb_pull().
 	 */
 	tp->segs_in = 0;
 	tcp_segs_in(tp, skb);
 	__skb_pull(skb, tcp_hdrlen(skb));
 	sk_forced_mem_schedule(sk, skb->truesize);
 	skb_set_owner_r(skb, sk);

 	TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq++;
 	TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags &= ~TCPHDR_SYN;

 	tp->rcv_nxt = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq;
 	__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
 	tp->syn_data_acked = 1;

 	/* u64_stats_update_begin(&tp->syncp) not needed here,
 	 * as we certainly are not changing upper 32bit value (0)
 	 */
 	tp->bytes_received = skb->len;

 	if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags & TCPHDR_FIN)
 		tcp_fin(sk);
 }

 static struct sock *tcp_fastopen_create_child(struct sock *sk,
 					      struct sk_buff *skb,
 					      struct dst_entry *dst,
 					      struct request_sock *req)
 {
 	struct tcp_sock *tp;
 	struct request_sock_queue *queue = &inet_csk(sk)->icsk_accept_queue;
 	struct sock *child;
 	bool own_req;

 	req->num_retrans = 0;
 	req->num_timeout = 0;
 	req->sk = NULL;

 	child = inet_csk(sk)->icsk_af_ops->syn_recv_sock(sk, skb, req, NULL,
 							 NULL, &own_req);
 	if (!child)
 		return NULL;

 	spin_lock(&queue->fastopenq.lock);
 	queue->fastopenq.qlen++;
 	spin_unlock(&queue->fastopenq.lock);

 	/* Initialize the child socket. Have to fix some values to take
 	 * into account the child is a Fast Open socket and is created
 	 * only out of the bits carried in the SYN packet.
 	 */
 	tp = tcp_sk(child);

 	tp->fastopen_rsk = req;
 	tcp_rsk(req)->tfo_listener = true;

 	/* RFC1323: The window in SYN & SYN/ACK segments is never
 	 * scaled. So correct it appropriately.
 	 */
 	tp->snd_wnd = ntohs(tcp_hdr(skb)->window);
 	tp->max_window = tp->snd_wnd;

 	/* Activate the retrans timer so that SYNACK can be retransmitted.
 	 * The request socket is not added to the ehash
 	 * because it's been added to the accept queue directly.
 	 */
 	inet_csk_reset_xmit_timer(child, ICSK_TIME_RETRANS,
 				  TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT, TCP_RTO_MAX);

 	atomic_set(&req->rsk_refcnt, 2);

 	/* Now finish processing the fastopen child socket. */
 	inet_csk(child)->icsk_af_ops->rebuild_header(child);
 	tcp_init_congestion_control(child);
 	tcp_mtup_init(child);
 	tcp_init_metrics(child);
 	tcp_init_buffer_space(child);

 	tp->rcv_nxt = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + 1;

 	tcp_fastopen_add_skb(child, skb);

 	tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_nxt = tp->rcv_nxt;
 	tp->rcv_wup = tp->rcv_nxt;
 	/* tcp_conn_request() is sending the SYNACK,
 	 * and queues the child into listener accept queue.
 	 */
 	return child;
 }

 static bool tcp_fastopen_queue_check(struct sock *sk)
 {
 	struct fastopen_queue *fastopenq;

 	/* Make sure the listener has enabled fastopen, and we don't
 	 * exceed the max # of pending TFO requests allowed before trying
 	 * to validating the cookie in order to avoid burning CPU cycles
 	 * unnecessarily.
 	 *
 	 * XXX (TFO) - The implication of checking the max_qlen before
 	 * processing a cookie request is that clients can't differentiate
 	 * between qlen overflow causing Fast Open to be disabled
 	 * temporarily vs a server not supporting Fast Open at all.
 	 */
 	fastopenq = &inet_csk(sk)->icsk_accept_queue.fastopenq;
 	if (fastopenq->max_qlen == 0)
 		return false;

 	if (fastopenq->qlen >= fastopenq->max_qlen) {
 		struct request_sock *req1;
 		spin_lock(&fastopenq->lock);
 		req1 = fastopenq->rskq_rst_head;
 		if (!req1 || time_after(req1->rsk_timer.expires, jiffies)) {
 			__NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk),
 					LINUX_MIB_TCPFASTOPENLISTENOVERFLOW);
 			spin_unlock(&fastopenq->lock);
 			return false;
 		}
 		fastopenq->rskq_rst_head = req1->dl_next;
 		fastopenq->qlen--;
 		spin_unlock(&fastopenq->lock);
 		reqsk_put(req1);
 	}
 	return true;
 }

 /* Returns true if we should perform Fast Open on the SYN. The cookie (foc)
  * may be updated and return the client in the SYN-ACK later. E.g., Fast Open
  * cookie request (foc->len == 0).
  */
 struct sock *tcp_try_fastopen(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 			      struct request_sock *req,
 			      struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *foc,
 			      struct dst_entry *dst)
 {
 	struct tcp_fastopen_cookie valid_foc = { .len = -1 };
 	bool syn_data = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq != TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + 1;
 	struct sock *child;

 	if (foc->len == 0) /* Client requests a cookie */
 		NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPFASTOPENCOOKIEREQD);

 	if (!((sysctl_tcp_fastopen & TFO_SERVER_ENABLE) &&
 	      (syn_data || foc->len >= 0) &&
 	      tcp_fastopen_queue_check(sk))) {
 		foc->len = -1;
 		return NULL;
 	}

 	if (syn_data && (sysctl_tcp_fastopen & TFO_SERVER_COOKIE_NOT_REQD))
 		goto fastopen;

 	if (foc->len >= 0 &&  /* Client presents or requests a cookie */
 	    tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(req, skb, &valid_foc) &&
 	    foc->len == TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_SIZE &&
 	    foc->len == valid_foc.len &&
 	    !memcmp(foc->val, valid_foc.val, foc->len)) {
 		/* Cookie is valid. Create a (full) child socket to accept
 		 * the data in SYN before returning a SYN-ACK to ack the
 		 * data. If we fail to create the socket, fall back and
 		 * ack the ISN only but includes the same cookie.
 		 *
 		 * Note: Data-less SYN with valid cookie is allowed to send
 		 * data in SYN_RECV state.
 		 */
 fastopen:
 		child = tcp_fastopen_create_child(sk, skb, dst, req);
 		if (child) {
 			foc->len = -1;
 			NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk),
 				      LINUX_MIB_TCPFASTOPENPASSIVE);
 			return child;
 		}
 		NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPFASTOPENPASSIVEFAIL);
 	} else if (foc->len > 0) /* Client presents an invalid cookie */
 		NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPFASTOPENPASSIVEFAIL);

 	valid_foc.exp = foc->exp;
 	*foc = valid_foc;
 	return NULL;
 }

 bool tcp_fastopen_cookie_check(struct sock *sk, u16 *mss,
 			       struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *cookie)
 {
 	unsigned long last_syn_loss = 0;
 	int syn_loss = 0;

 	tcp_fastopen_cache_get(sk, mss, cookie, &syn_loss, &last_syn_loss);

 	/* Recurring FO SYN losses: no cookie or data in SYN */
 	if (syn_loss > 1 &&
 	    time_before(jiffies, last_syn_loss + (60*HZ << syn_loss))) {
 		cookie->len = -1;
 		return false;
 	}

 	/* Firewall blackhole issue check */
 	if (tcp_fastopen_active_should_disable(sk)) {
 		cookie->len = -1;
 		return false;
 	}

 	if (sysctl_tcp_fastopen & TFO_CLIENT_NO_COOKIE) {
 		cookie->len = -1;
 		return true;
 	}
 	return cookie->len > 0;
 }

 /* This function checks if we want to defer sending SYN until the first
  * write().  We defer under the following conditions:
  * 1. fastopen_connect sockopt is set
  * 2. we have a valid cookie
  * Return value: return true if we want to defer until application writes data
  *               return false if we want to send out SYN immediately
  */
 bool tcp_fastopen_defer_connect(struct sock *sk, int *err)
 {
 	struct tcp_fastopen_cookie cookie = { .len = 0 };
 	struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
 	u16 mss;

 	if (tp->fastopen_connect && !tp->fastopen_req) {
 		if (tcp_fastopen_cookie_check(sk, &mss, &cookie)) {
 			inet_sk(sk)->defer_connect = 1;
 			return true;
 		}

 		/* Alloc fastopen_req in order for FO option to be included
 		 * in SYN
 		 */
 		tp->fastopen_req = kzalloc(sizeof(*tp->fastopen_req),
 					   sk->sk_allocation);
 		if (tp->fastopen_req)
 			tp->fastopen_req->cookie = cookie;
 		else
 			*err = -ENOBUFS;
 	}
 	return false;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_fastopen_defer_connect);

 /*
  * The following code block is to deal with middle box issues with TFO:
  * Middlebox firewall issues can potentially cause server's data being
  * blackholed after a successful 3WHS using TFO.
  * The proposed solution is to disable active TFO globally under the
  * following circumstances:
  *   1. client side TFO socket receives out of order FIN
  *   2. client side TFO socket receives out of order RST
  * We disable active side TFO globally for 1hr at first. Then if it
  * happens again, we disable it for 2h, then 4h, 8h, ...
  * And we reset the timeout back to 1hr when we see a successful active
  * TFO connection with data exchanges.
  */

 /* Default to 1hr */
 unsigned int sysctl_tcp_fastopen_blackhole_timeout __read_mostly = 60 * 60;
 static atomic_t tfo_active_disable_times __read_mostly = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
 static unsigned long tfo_active_disable_stamp __read_mostly;

 /* Disable active TFO and record current jiffies and
  * tfo_active_disable_times
  */
 void tcp_fastopen_active_disable(struct sock *sk)
 {
 	atomic_inc(&tfo_active_disable_times);
 	tfo_active_disable_stamp = jiffies;
 	NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPFASTOPENBLACKHOLE);
 }

 /* Reset tfo_active_disable_times to 0 */
 void tcp_fastopen_active_timeout_reset(void)
 {
 	atomic_set(&tfo_active_disable_times, 0);
 }

 /* Calculate timeout for tfo active disable
  * Return true if we are still in the active TFO disable period
  * Return false if timeout already expired and we should use active TFO
  */
 bool tcp_fastopen_active_should_disable(struct sock *sk)
 {
 	int tfo_da_times = atomic_read(&tfo_active_disable_times);
 	int multiplier;
 	unsigned long timeout;

 	if (!tfo_da_times)
 		return false;

 	/* Limit timout to max: 2^6 * initial timeout */
 	multiplier = 1 << min(tfo_da_times - 1, 6);
 	timeout = multiplier * sysctl_tcp_fastopen_blackhole_timeout * HZ;
 	if (time_before(jiffies, tfo_active_disable_stamp + timeout))
 		return true;

 	/* Mark check bit so we can check for successful active TFO
 	 * condition and reset tfo_active_disable_times
 	 */
 	tcp_sk(sk)->syn_fastopen_ch = 1;
 	return false;
 }

 /* Disable active TFO if FIN is the only packet in the ofo queue
  * and no data is received.
  * Also check if we can reset tfo_active_disable_times if data is
  * received successfully on a marked active TFO sockets opened on
  * a non-loopback interface
  */
 void tcp_fastopen_active_disable_ofo_check(struct sock *sk)
 {
 	struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
 	struct rb_node *p;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 	struct dst_entry *dst;

 	if (!tp->syn_fastopen)
 		return;

 	if (!tp->data_segs_in) {
 		p = rb_first(&tp->out_of_order_queue);
 		if (p && !rb_next(p)) {
 			skb = rb_entry(p, struct sk_buff, rbnode);
 			if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags & TCPHDR_FIN) {
 				tcp_fastopen_active_disable(sk);
 				return;
 			}
 		}
 	} else if (tp->syn_fastopen_ch &&
 		   atomic_read(&tfo_active_disable_times)) {
 		dst = sk_dst_get(sk);
 		if (!(dst && dst->dev && (dst->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)))
 			tcp_fastopen_active_timeout_reset();
 		dst_release(dst);
 	}
 }
	#include <linux/crypto.h>
	#include <linux/err.h>
	#include <linux/init.h>
	#include <linux/kernel.h>
	#include <linux/list.h>
	#include <linux/tcp.h>
	#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
	#include <linux/rculist.h>
	#include <net/inetpeer.h>
	#include <net/tcp.h>

	int sysctl_tcp_fastopen __read_mostly = TFO_CLIENT_ENABLE;

	struct tcp_fastopen_context __rcu *tcp_fastopen_ctx;

	static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(tcp_fastopen_ctx_lock);

	void tcp_fastopen_init_key_once(bool publish)
	{
	static u8 key[TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH];

	/* tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher publishes the new context
	* atomically, so we allow this race happening here.
	*
	* All call sites of tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen also check
	* for a valid cookie, so this is an acceptable risk.
	*/
	if (net_get_random_once(key, sizeof(key)) && publish)
	tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(key, sizeof(key));
	}

	static void tcp_fastopen_ctx_free(struct rcu_head *head)
	{
	struct tcp_fastopen_context *ctx =
	container_of(head, struct tcp_fastopen_context, rcu);
	crypto_free_cipher(ctx->tfm);
	kfree(ctx);
	}

	int tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(void *key, unsigned int len)
	{
	int err;
	struct tcp_fastopen_context ctx, octx;

	ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!ctx)
	return -ENOMEM;
	ctx->tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, 0);

	if (IS_ERR(ctx->tfm)) {
	err = PTR_ERR(ctx->tfm);
	error: kfree(ctx);
	pr_err("TCP: TFO aes cipher alloc error: %d\n", err);
	return err;
	}
	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(ctx->tfm, key, len);
	if (err) {
	pr_err("TCP: TFO cipher key error: %d\n", err);
	crypto_free_cipher(ctx->tfm);
	goto error;
	}
	memcpy(ctx->key, key, len);

	spin_lock(&tcp_fastopen_ctx_lock);

	octx = rcu_dereference_protected(tcp_fastopen_ctx,
	lockdep_is_held(&tcp_fastopen_ctx_lock));
	rcu_assign_pointer(tcp_fastopen_ctx, ctx);
	spin_unlock(&tcp_fastopen_ctx_lock);

	if (octx)
	call_rcu(&octx->rcu, tcp_fastopen_ctx_free);
	return err;
	}

	static bool __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(const void *path,
	struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *foc)
	{
	struct tcp_fastopen_context *ctx;
	bool ok = false;

	rcu_read_lock();
	ctx = rcu_dereference(tcp_fastopen_ctx);
	if (ctx) {
	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->tfm, foc->val, path);
	foc->len = TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_SIZE;
	ok = true;
	}
	rcu_read_unlock();
	return ok;
	}

	/* Generate the fastopen cookie by doing aes128 encryption on both
	* the source and destination addresses. Pad 0s for IPv4 or IPv4-mapped-IPv6
	* addresses. For the longer IPv6 addresses use CBC-MAC.
	*
	* XXX (TFO) - refactor when TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_SIZE != AES_BLOCK_SIZE.
	*/
	static bool tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(struct request_sock *req,
	struct sk_buff *syn,
	struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *foc)
	{
	if (req->rsk_ops->family == AF_INET) {
	const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(syn);

	__be32 path[4] = { iph->saddr, iph->daddr, 0, 0 };
	return __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(path, foc);
	}

	#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
	if (req->rsk_ops->family == AF_INET6) {
	const struct ipv6hdr *ip6h = ipv6_hdr(syn);
	struct tcp_fastopen_cookie tmp;

	if (__tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(&ip6h->saddr, &tmp)) {
	struct in6_addr *buf = &tmp.addr;
	int i;

	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
	buf->s6_addr32[i] ^= ip6h->daddr.s6_addr32[i];
	return __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(buf, foc);
	}
	}
	#endif
	return false;
	}


	/* If an incoming SYN or SYNACK frame contains a payload and/or FIN,
	* queue this additional data / FIN.
	*/
	void tcp_fastopen_add_skb(struct sock sk, struct sk_buff skb)
	{
	struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);

	if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq == tp->rcv_nxt)
	return;

	skb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
	if (!skb)
	return;

	skb_dst_drop(skb);
	/* segs_in has been initialized to 1 in tcp_create_openreq_child().
	* Hence, reset segs_in to 0 before calling tcp_segs_in()
	* to avoid double counting. Also, tcp_segs_in() expects
	* skb->len to include the tcp_hdrlen. Hence, it should
	* be called before __skb_pull().
	*/
	tp->segs_in = 0;
	tcp_segs_in(tp, skb);
	__skb_pull(skb, tcp_hdrlen(skb));
	sk_forced_mem_schedule(sk, skb->truesize);
	skb_set_owner_r(skb, sk);

	TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq++;
	TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags &= ~TCPHDR_SYN;

	tp->rcv_nxt = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq;
	__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
	tp->syn_data_acked = 1;

	/* u64_stats_update_begin(&tp->syncp) not needed here,
	* as we certainly are not changing upper 32bit value (0)
	*/
	tp->bytes_received = skb->len;

	if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags & TCPHDR_FIN)
	tcp_fin(sk);
	}

	static struct sock tcp_fastopen_create_child(struct sock sk,
	struct sk_buff *skb,
	struct dst_entry *dst,
	struct request_sock *req)
	{
	struct tcp_sock *tp;
	struct request_sock_queue *queue = &inet_csk(sk)->icsk_accept_queue;
	struct sock *child;
	bool own_req;

	req->num_retrans = 0;
	req->num_timeout = 0;
	req->sk = NULL;

	child = inet_csk(sk)->icsk_af_ops->syn_recv_sock(sk, skb, req, NULL,
	NULL, &own_req);
	if (!child)
	return NULL;

	spin_lock(&queue->fastopenq.lock);
	queue->fastopenq.qlen++;
	spin_unlock(&queue->fastopenq.lock);

	/* Initialize the child socket. Have to fix some values to take
	* into account the child is a Fast Open socket and is created
	* only out of the bits carried in the SYN packet.
	*/
	tp = tcp_sk(child);

	tp->fastopen_rsk = req;
	tcp_rsk(req)->tfo_listener = true;

	/* RFC1323: The window in SYN & SYN/ACK segments is never
	* scaled. So correct it appropriately.
	*/
	tp->snd_wnd = ntohs(tcp_hdr(skb)->window);
	tp->max_window = tp->snd_wnd;

	/* Activate the retrans timer so that SYNACK can be retransmitted.
	* The request socket is not added to the ehash
	* because it's been added to the accept queue directly.
	*/
	inet_csk_reset_xmit_timer(child, ICSK_TIME_RETRANS,
	TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT, TCP_RTO_MAX);

	atomic_set(&req->rsk_refcnt, 2);

	/* Now finish processing the fastopen child socket. */
	inet_csk(child)->icsk_af_ops->rebuild_header(child);
	tcp_init_congestion_control(child);
	tcp_mtup_init(child);
	tcp_init_metrics(child);
	tcp_init_buffer_space(child);

	tp->rcv_nxt = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + 1;

	tcp_fastopen_add_skb(child, skb);

	tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_nxt = tp->rcv_nxt;
	tp->rcv_wup = tp->rcv_nxt;
	/* tcp_conn_request() is sending the SYNACK,
	* and queues the child into listener accept queue.
	*/
	return child;
	}

	static bool tcp_fastopen_queue_check(struct sock *sk)
	{
	struct fastopen_queue *fastopenq;

	/* Make sure the listener has enabled fastopen, and we don't
	* exceed the max # of pending TFO requests allowed before trying
	* to validating the cookie in order to avoid burning CPU cycles
	* unnecessarily.
	*
	* XXX (TFO) - The implication of checking the max_qlen before
	* processing a cookie request is that clients can't differentiate
	* between qlen overflow causing Fast Open to be disabled
	* temporarily vs a server not supporting Fast Open at all.
	*/
	fastopenq = &inet_csk(sk)->icsk_accept_queue.fastopenq;
	if (fastopenq->max_qlen == 0)
	return false;

	if (fastopenq->qlen >= fastopenq->max_qlen) {
	struct request_sock *req1;
	spin_lock(&fastopenq->lock);
	req1 = fastopenq->rskq_rst_head;
	if (!req1 \|\| time_after(req1->rsk_timer.expires, jiffies)) {
	__NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk),
	LINUX_MIB_TCPFASTOPENLISTENOVERFLOW);
	spin_unlock(&fastopenq->lock);
	return false;
	}
	fastopenq->rskq_rst_head = req1->dl_next;
	fastopenq->qlen--;
	spin_unlock(&fastopenq->lock);
	reqsk_put(req1);
	}
	return true;
	}

	/* Returns true if we should perform Fast Open on the SYN. The cookie (foc)
	* may be updated and return the client in the SYN-ACK later. E.g., Fast Open
	* cookie request (foc->len == 0).
	*/
	struct sock tcp_try_fastopen(struct sock sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
	struct request_sock *req,
	struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *foc,
	struct dst_entry *dst)
	{
	struct tcp_fastopen_cookie valid_foc = { .len = -1 };
	bool syn_data = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq != TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + 1;
	struct sock *child;

	if (foc->len == 0) /* Client requests a cookie */
	NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPFASTOPENCOOKIEREQD);

	if (!((sysctl_tcp_fastopen & TFO_SERVER_ENABLE) &&
	(syn_data \|\| foc->len >= 0) &&
	tcp_fastopen_queue_check(sk))) {
	foc->len = -1;
	return NULL;
	}

	if (syn_data && (sysctl_tcp_fastopen & TFO_SERVER_COOKIE_NOT_REQD))
	goto fastopen;

	if (foc->len >= 0 && /* Client presents or requests a cookie */
	tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen(req, skb, &valid_foc) &&
	foc->len == TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_SIZE &&
	foc->len == valid_foc.len &&
	!memcmp(foc->val, valid_foc.val, foc->len)) {
	/* Cookie is valid. Create a (full) child socket to accept
	* the data in SYN before returning a SYN-ACK to ack the
	* data. If we fail to create the socket, fall back and
	* ack the ISN only but includes the same cookie.
	*
	* Note: Data-less SYN with valid cookie is allowed to send
	* data in SYN_RECV state.
	*/
	fastopen:
	child = tcp_fastopen_create_child(sk, skb, dst, req);
	if (child) {
	foc->len = -1;
	NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk),
	LINUX_MIB_TCPFASTOPENPASSIVE);
	return child;
	}
	NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPFASTOPENPASSIVEFAIL);
	} else if (foc->len > 0) /* Client presents an invalid cookie */
	NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPFASTOPENPASSIVEFAIL);

	valid_foc.exp = foc->exp;
	*foc = valid_foc;
	return NULL;
	}

	bool tcp_fastopen_cookie_check(struct sock sk, u16 mss,
	struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *cookie)
	{
	unsigned long last_syn_loss = 0;
	int syn_loss = 0;

	tcp_fastopen_cache_get(sk, mss, cookie, &syn_loss, &last_syn_loss);

	/* Recurring FO SYN losses: no cookie or data in SYN */
	if (syn_loss > 1 &&
	time_before(jiffies, last_syn_loss + (60*HZ << syn_loss))) {
	cookie->len = -1;
	return false;
	}

	/* Firewall blackhole issue check */
	if (tcp_fastopen_active_should_disable(sk)) {
	cookie->len = -1;
	return false;
	}

	if (sysctl_tcp_fastopen & TFO_CLIENT_NO_COOKIE) {
	cookie->len = -1;
	return true;
	}
	return cookie->len > 0;
	}

	/* This function checks if we want to defer sending SYN until the first
	* write(). We defer under the following conditions:
	* 1. fastopen_connect sockopt is set
	* 2. we have a valid cookie
	* Return value: return true if we want to defer until application writes data
	* return false if we want to send out SYN immediately
	*/
	bool tcp_fastopen_defer_connect(struct sock sk, int err)
	{
	struct tcp_fastopen_cookie cookie = { .len = 0 };
	struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
	u16 mss;

	if (tp->fastopen_connect && !tp->fastopen_req) {
	if (tcp_fastopen_cookie_check(sk, &mss, &cookie)) {
	inet_sk(sk)->defer_connect = 1;
	return true;
	}

	/* Alloc fastopen_req in order for FO option to be included
	* in SYN
	*/
	tp->fastopen_req = kzalloc(sizeof(*tp->fastopen_req),
	sk->sk_allocation);
	if (tp->fastopen_req)
	tp->fastopen_req->cookie = cookie;
	else
	*err = -ENOBUFS;
	}
	return false;
	}
	EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_fastopen_defer_connect);

	/*
	* The following code block is to deal with middle box issues with TFO:
	* Middlebox firewall issues can potentially cause server's data being
	* blackholed after a successful 3WHS using TFO.
	* The proposed solution is to disable active TFO globally under the
	* following circumstances:
	* 1. client side TFO socket receives out of order FIN
	* 2. client side TFO socket receives out of order RST
	* We disable active side TFO globally for 1hr at first. Then if it
	* happens again, we disable it for 2h, then 4h, 8h, ...
	* And we reset the timeout back to 1hr when we see a successful active
	* TFO connection with data exchanges.
	*/

	/* Default to 1hr */
	unsigned int sysctl_tcp_fastopen_blackhole_timeout __read_mostly = 60 * 60;
	static atomic_t tfo_active_disable_times __read_mostly = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
	static unsigned long tfo_active_disable_stamp __read_mostly;

	/* Disable active TFO and record current jiffies and
	* tfo_active_disable_times
	*/
	void tcp_fastopen_active_disable(struct sock *sk)
	{
	atomic_inc(&tfo_active_disable_times);
	tfo_active_disable_stamp = jiffies;
	NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPFASTOPENBLACKHOLE);
	}

	/* Reset tfo_active_disable_times to 0 */
	void tcp_fastopen_active_timeout_reset(void)
	{
	atomic_set(&tfo_active_disable_times, 0);
	}

	/* Calculate timeout for tfo active disable
	* Return true if we are still in the active TFO disable period
	* Return false if timeout already expired and we should use active TFO
	*/
	bool tcp_fastopen_active_should_disable(struct sock *sk)
	{
	int tfo_da_times = atomic_read(&tfo_active_disable_times);
	int multiplier;
	unsigned long timeout;

	if (!tfo_da_times)
	return false;

	/* Limit timout to max: 2^6 * initial timeout */
	multiplier = 1 << min(tfo_da_times - 1, 6);
	timeout = multiplier * sysctl_tcp_fastopen_blackhole_timeout * HZ;
	if (time_before(jiffies, tfo_active_disable_stamp + timeout))
	return true;

	/* Mark check bit so we can check for successful active TFO
	* condition and reset tfo_active_disable_times
	*/
	tcp_sk(sk)->syn_fastopen_ch = 1;
	return false;
	}

	/* Disable active TFO if FIN is the only packet in the ofo queue
	* and no data is received.
	* Also check if we can reset tfo_active_disable_times if data is
	* received successfully on a marked active TFO sockets opened on
	* a non-loopback interface
	*/
	void tcp_fastopen_active_disable_ofo_check(struct sock *sk)
	{
	struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
	struct rb_node *p;
	struct sk_buff *skb;
	struct dst_entry *dst;

	if (!tp->syn_fastopen)
	return;

	if (!tp->data_segs_in) {
	p = rb_first(&tp->out_of_order_queue);
	if (p && !rb_next(p)) {
	skb = rb_entry(p, struct sk_buff, rbnode);
	if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags & TCPHDR_FIN) {
	tcp_fastopen_active_disable(sk);
	return;
	}
	}
	} else if (tp->syn_fastopen_ch &&
	atomic_read(&tfo_active_disable_times)) {
	dst = sk_dst_get(sk);
	if (!(dst && dst->dev && (dst->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)))
	tcp_fastopen_active_timeout_reset();
	dst_release(dst);
	}
	}