blob: 54037c9f2def0a74285ce69a2e833d0c2684b419 [file] [log] [blame]
Kees Cook7de828d2016-04-18 09:42:14 -07001/*
2 * kaslr.c
3 *
4 * This contains the routines needed to generate a reasonable level of
5 * entropy to choose a randomized kernel base address offset in support
6 * of Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization (KASLR). Additionally
7 * handles walking the physical memory maps (and tracking memory regions
8 * to avoid) in order to select a physical memory location that can
9 * contain the entire properly aligned running kernel image.
10 *
11 */
Kees Cook8ab38202013-10-10 17:18:14 -070012#include "misc.h"
Kees Cookdc425a62016-05-02 15:51:00 -070013#include "error.h"
Kees Cook8ab38202013-10-10 17:18:14 -070014
Kees Cook5bfce5e2013-10-10 17:18:15 -070015#include <asm/msr.h>
16#include <asm/archrandom.h>
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -070017#include <asm/e820.h>
Kees Cook5bfce5e2013-10-10 17:18:15 -070018
Kees Cooka653f352013-11-11 14:28:39 -080019#include <generated/compile.h>
20#include <linux/module.h>
21#include <linux/uts.h>
22#include <linux/utsname.h>
23#include <generated/utsrelease.h>
Kees Cooka653f352013-11-11 14:28:39 -080024
25/* Simplified build-specific string for starting entropy. */
Kees Cook327f7d72013-11-12 08:56:07 -080026static const char build_str[] = UTS_RELEASE " (" LINUX_COMPILE_BY "@"
Kees Cooka653f352013-11-11 14:28:39 -080027 LINUX_COMPILE_HOST ") (" LINUX_COMPILER ") " UTS_VERSION;
28
Kees Cook5bfce5e2013-10-10 17:18:15 -070029#define I8254_PORT_CONTROL 0x43
30#define I8254_PORT_COUNTER0 0x40
31#define I8254_CMD_READBACK 0xC0
32#define I8254_SELECT_COUNTER0 0x02
33#define I8254_STATUS_NOTREADY 0x40
34static inline u16 i8254(void)
35{
36 u16 status, timer;
37
38 do {
39 outb(I8254_PORT_CONTROL,
40 I8254_CMD_READBACK | I8254_SELECT_COUNTER0);
41 status = inb(I8254_PORT_COUNTER0);
42 timer = inb(I8254_PORT_COUNTER0);
43 timer |= inb(I8254_PORT_COUNTER0) << 8;
44 } while (status & I8254_STATUS_NOTREADY);
45
46 return timer;
47}
48
Kees Cooka653f352013-11-11 14:28:39 -080049static unsigned long rotate_xor(unsigned long hash, const void *area,
50 size_t size)
51{
52 size_t i;
53 unsigned long *ptr = (unsigned long *)area;
54
55 for (i = 0; i < size / sizeof(hash); i++) {
56 /* Rotate by odd number of bits and XOR. */
57 hash = (hash << ((sizeof(hash) * 8) - 7)) | (hash >> 7);
58 hash ^= ptr[i];
59 }
60
61 return hash;
62}
63
64/* Attempt to create a simple but unpredictable starting entropy. */
65static unsigned long get_random_boot(void)
66{
67 unsigned long hash = 0;
68
69 hash = rotate_xor(hash, build_str, sizeof(build_str));
Kees Cook6655e0a2016-04-18 09:42:12 -070070 hash = rotate_xor(hash, boot_params, sizeof(*boot_params));
Kees Cooka653f352013-11-11 14:28:39 -080071
72 return hash;
73}
74
Kees Cookd2d34622016-05-09 13:22:09 -070075static unsigned long get_random_long(const char *purpose)
Kees Cook5bfce5e2013-10-10 17:18:15 -070076{
H. Peter Anvine8236c42013-11-11 22:45:20 -080077#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
78 const unsigned long mix_const = 0x5d6008cbf3848dd3UL;
79#else
80 const unsigned long mix_const = 0x3f39e593UL;
81#endif
Kees Cooka653f352013-11-11 14:28:39 -080082 unsigned long raw, random = get_random_boot();
83 bool use_i8254 = true;
84
Kees Cookd2d34622016-05-09 13:22:09 -070085 debug_putstr(purpose);
86 debug_putstr(" KASLR using");
Kees Cook5bfce5e2013-10-10 17:18:15 -070087
88 if (has_cpuflag(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND)) {
Kees Cooka653f352013-11-11 14:28:39 -080089 debug_putstr(" RDRAND");
90 if (rdrand_long(&raw)) {
91 random ^= raw;
92 use_i8254 = false;
93 }
Kees Cook5bfce5e2013-10-10 17:18:15 -070094 }
95
96 if (has_cpuflag(X86_FEATURE_TSC)) {
Kees Cooka653f352013-11-11 14:28:39 -080097 debug_putstr(" RDTSC");
Andy Lutomirski4ea16362015-06-25 18:44:07 +020098 raw = rdtsc();
Kees Cook5bfce5e2013-10-10 17:18:15 -070099
Kees Cooka653f352013-11-11 14:28:39 -0800100 random ^= raw;
101 use_i8254 = false;
Kees Cook5bfce5e2013-10-10 17:18:15 -0700102 }
103
Kees Cooka653f352013-11-11 14:28:39 -0800104 if (use_i8254) {
105 debug_putstr(" i8254");
106 random ^= i8254();
107 }
108
H. Peter Anvine8236c42013-11-11 22:45:20 -0800109 /* Circular multiply for better bit diffusion */
110 asm("mul %3"
111 : "=a" (random), "=d" (raw)
112 : "a" (random), "rm" (mix_const));
113 random += raw;
114
Kees Cooka653f352013-11-11 14:28:39 -0800115 debug_putstr("...\n");
116
Kees Cook5bfce5e2013-10-10 17:18:15 -0700117 return random;
118}
Kees Cook8ab38202013-10-10 17:18:14 -0700119
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700120struct mem_vector {
121 unsigned long start;
122 unsigned long size;
123};
124
Kees Cooked09acd2016-05-06 12:44:59 -0700125enum mem_avoid_index {
126 MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE = 0,
127 MEM_AVOID_INITRD,
128 MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE,
129 MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS,
130 MEM_AVOID_MAX,
131};
132
Kees Cooke290e8c2014-02-09 13:56:44 -0800133static struct mem_vector mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_MAX];
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700134
135static bool mem_contains(struct mem_vector *region, struct mem_vector *item)
136{
137 /* Item at least partially before region. */
138 if (item->start < region->start)
139 return false;
140 /* Item at least partially after region. */
141 if (item->start + item->size > region->start + region->size)
142 return false;
143 return true;
144}
145
146static bool mem_overlaps(struct mem_vector *one, struct mem_vector *two)
147{
148 /* Item one is entirely before item two. */
149 if (one->start + one->size <= two->start)
150 return false;
151 /* Item one is entirely after item two. */
152 if (one->start >= two->start + two->size)
153 return false;
154 return true;
155}
156
Yinghai Lu9dc19692016-05-05 15:13:47 -0700157/*
Kees Cooked09acd2016-05-06 12:44:59 -0700158 * In theory, KASLR can put the kernel anywhere in the range of [16M, 64T).
159 * The mem_avoid array is used to store the ranges that need to be avoided
160 * when KASLR searches for an appropriate random address. We must avoid any
Yinghai Lu9dc19692016-05-05 15:13:47 -0700161 * regions that are unsafe to overlap with during decompression, and other
Kees Cooked09acd2016-05-06 12:44:59 -0700162 * things like the initrd, cmdline and boot_params. This comment seeks to
163 * explain mem_avoid as clearly as possible since incorrect mem_avoid
164 * memory ranges lead to really hard to debug boot failures.
Yinghai Lu9dc19692016-05-05 15:13:47 -0700165 *
Kees Cooked09acd2016-05-06 12:44:59 -0700166 * The initrd, cmdline, and boot_params are trivial to identify for
Kees Cookcb18ef02016-05-09 13:22:05 -0700167 * avoiding. They are MEM_AVOID_INITRD, MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE, and
Kees Cooked09acd2016-05-06 12:44:59 -0700168 * MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS respectively below.
Yinghai Lu9dc19692016-05-05 15:13:47 -0700169 *
Kees Cooked09acd2016-05-06 12:44:59 -0700170 * What is not obvious how to avoid is the range of memory that is used
171 * during decompression (MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE below). This range must cover
172 * the compressed kernel (ZO) and its run space, which is used to extract
173 * the uncompressed kernel (VO) and relocs.
Yinghai Lu9dc19692016-05-05 15:13:47 -0700174 *
Kees Cooked09acd2016-05-06 12:44:59 -0700175 * ZO's full run size sits against the end of the decompression buffer, so
176 * we can calculate where text, data, bss, etc of ZO are positioned more
177 * easily.
Yinghai Lu9dc19692016-05-05 15:13:47 -0700178 *
Kees Cooked09acd2016-05-06 12:44:59 -0700179 * For additional background, the decompression calculations can be found
180 * in header.S, and the memory diagram is based on the one found in misc.c.
Yinghai Lu9dc19692016-05-05 15:13:47 -0700181 *
Kees Cooked09acd2016-05-06 12:44:59 -0700182 * The following conditions are already enforced by the image layouts and
183 * associated code:
184 * - input + input_size >= output + output_size
185 * - kernel_total_size <= init_size
186 * - kernel_total_size <= output_size (see Note below)
187 * - output + init_size >= output + output_size
Yinghai Lu9dc19692016-05-05 15:13:47 -0700188 *
Kees Cooked09acd2016-05-06 12:44:59 -0700189 * (Note that kernel_total_size and output_size have no fundamental
190 * relationship, but output_size is passed to choose_random_location
191 * as a maximum of the two. The diagram is showing a case where
192 * kernel_total_size is larger than output_size, but this case is
193 * handled by bumping output_size.)
Yinghai Lu9dc19692016-05-05 15:13:47 -0700194 *
Kees Cooked09acd2016-05-06 12:44:59 -0700195 * The above conditions can be illustrated by a diagram:
Yinghai Lu9dc19692016-05-05 15:13:47 -0700196 *
Kees Cooked09acd2016-05-06 12:44:59 -0700197 * 0 output input input+input_size output+init_size
198 * | | | | |
199 * | | | | |
200 * |-----|--------|--------|--------------|-----------|--|-------------|
201 * | | |
202 * | | |
203 * output+init_size-ZO_INIT_SIZE output+output_size output+kernel_total_size
Yinghai Lu9dc19692016-05-05 15:13:47 -0700204 *
Kees Cooked09acd2016-05-06 12:44:59 -0700205 * [output, output+init_size) is the entire memory range used for
206 * extracting the compressed image.
Yinghai Lu9dc19692016-05-05 15:13:47 -0700207 *
Kees Cooked09acd2016-05-06 12:44:59 -0700208 * [output, output+kernel_total_size) is the range needed for the
209 * uncompressed kernel (VO) and its run size (bss, brk, etc).
210 *
211 * [output, output+output_size) is VO plus relocs (i.e. the entire
212 * uncompressed payload contained by ZO). This is the area of the buffer
213 * written to during decompression.
214 *
215 * [output+init_size-ZO_INIT_SIZE, output+init_size) is the worst-case
216 * range of the copied ZO and decompression code. (i.e. the range
217 * covered backwards of size ZO_INIT_SIZE, starting from output+init_size.)
218 *
219 * [input, input+input_size) is the original copied compressed image (ZO)
220 * (i.e. it does not include its run size). This range must be avoided
221 * because it contains the data used for decompression.
222 *
223 * [input+input_size, output+init_size) is [_text, _end) for ZO. This
224 * range includes ZO's heap and stack, and must be avoided since it
225 * performs the decompression.
226 *
227 * Since the above two ranges need to be avoided and they are adjacent,
228 * they can be merged, resulting in: [input, output+init_size) which
229 * becomes the MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE below.
Yinghai Lu9dc19692016-05-05 15:13:47 -0700230 */
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700231static void mem_avoid_init(unsigned long input, unsigned long input_size,
Yinghai Lu9dc19692016-05-05 15:13:47 -0700232 unsigned long output)
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700233{
Yinghai Lu9dc19692016-05-05 15:13:47 -0700234 unsigned long init_size = boot_params->hdr.init_size;
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700235 u64 initrd_start, initrd_size;
236 u64 cmd_line, cmd_line_size;
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700237 char *ptr;
238
239 /*
240 * Avoid the region that is unsafe to overlap during
Yinghai Lu9dc19692016-05-05 15:13:47 -0700241 * decompression.
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700242 */
Kees Cooked09acd2016-05-06 12:44:59 -0700243 mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE].start = input;
244 mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE].size = (output + init_size) - input;
Kees Cook3a947072016-05-06 15:01:35 -0700245 add_identity_map(mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE].start,
246 mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE].size);
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700247
248 /* Avoid initrd. */
Kees Cook6655e0a2016-04-18 09:42:12 -0700249 initrd_start = (u64)boot_params->ext_ramdisk_image << 32;
250 initrd_start |= boot_params->hdr.ramdisk_image;
251 initrd_size = (u64)boot_params->ext_ramdisk_size << 32;
252 initrd_size |= boot_params->hdr.ramdisk_size;
Kees Cooked09acd2016-05-06 12:44:59 -0700253 mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_INITRD].start = initrd_start;
254 mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_INITRD].size = initrd_size;
Kees Cook3a947072016-05-06 15:01:35 -0700255 /* No need to set mapping for initrd, it will be handled in VO. */
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700256
257 /* Avoid kernel command line. */
Kees Cook6655e0a2016-04-18 09:42:12 -0700258 cmd_line = (u64)boot_params->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32;
259 cmd_line |= boot_params->hdr.cmd_line_ptr;
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700260 /* Calculate size of cmd_line. */
261 ptr = (char *)(unsigned long)cmd_line;
262 for (cmd_line_size = 0; ptr[cmd_line_size++]; )
263 ;
Kees Cooked09acd2016-05-06 12:44:59 -0700264 mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE].start = cmd_line;
265 mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE].size = cmd_line_size;
Kees Cook3a947072016-05-06 15:01:35 -0700266 add_identity_map(mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE].start,
267 mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE].size);
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700268
Kees Cooked09acd2016-05-06 12:44:59 -0700269 /* Avoid boot parameters. */
270 mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS].start = (unsigned long)boot_params;
271 mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS].size = sizeof(*boot_params);
Kees Cook3a947072016-05-06 15:01:35 -0700272 add_identity_map(mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS].start,
273 mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS].size);
274
275 /* We don't need to set a mapping for setup_data. */
276
277#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VERBOSE_BOOTUP
278 /* Make sure video RAM can be used. */
279 add_identity_map(0, PMD_SIZE);
280#endif
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700281}
282
Kees Cook06486d62016-05-09 13:22:07 -0700283/*
284 * Does this memory vector overlap a known avoided area? If so, record the
285 * overlap region with the lowest address.
286 */
287static bool mem_avoid_overlap(struct mem_vector *img,
288 struct mem_vector *overlap)
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700289{
290 int i;
Kees Cook0cacbfb2014-09-11 09:19:31 -0700291 struct setup_data *ptr;
Kees Cook06486d62016-05-09 13:22:07 -0700292 unsigned long earliest = img->start + img->size;
293 bool is_overlapping = false;
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700294
295 for (i = 0; i < MEM_AVOID_MAX; i++) {
Kees Cook06486d62016-05-09 13:22:07 -0700296 if (mem_overlaps(img, &mem_avoid[i]) &&
297 mem_avoid[i].start < earliest) {
298 *overlap = mem_avoid[i];
299 is_overlapping = true;
300 }
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700301 }
302
Kees Cook0cacbfb2014-09-11 09:19:31 -0700303 /* Avoid all entries in the setup_data linked list. */
Kees Cook6655e0a2016-04-18 09:42:12 -0700304 ptr = (struct setup_data *)(unsigned long)boot_params->hdr.setup_data;
Kees Cook0cacbfb2014-09-11 09:19:31 -0700305 while (ptr) {
306 struct mem_vector avoid;
307
Kees Cook20cc2882014-10-01 11:36:32 -0700308 avoid.start = (unsigned long)ptr;
Kees Cook0cacbfb2014-09-11 09:19:31 -0700309 avoid.size = sizeof(*ptr) + ptr->len;
310
Kees Cook06486d62016-05-09 13:22:07 -0700311 if (mem_overlaps(img, &avoid) && (avoid.start < earliest)) {
312 *overlap = avoid;
313 is_overlapping = true;
314 }
Kees Cook0cacbfb2014-09-11 09:19:31 -0700315
316 ptr = (struct setup_data *)(unsigned long)ptr->next;
317 }
318
Kees Cook06486d62016-05-09 13:22:07 -0700319 return is_overlapping;
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700320}
321
Baoquan Hee8581e32016-04-20 13:55:43 -0700322static unsigned long slots[KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE / CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN];
Baoquan Hec401cf12016-05-09 13:22:06 -0700323
324struct slot_area {
325 unsigned long addr;
326 int num;
327};
328
329#define MAX_SLOT_AREA 100
330
331static struct slot_area slot_areas[MAX_SLOT_AREA];
332
Kees Cooke290e8c2014-02-09 13:56:44 -0800333static unsigned long slot_max;
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700334
Baoquan Hec401cf12016-05-09 13:22:06 -0700335static unsigned long slot_area_index;
336
337static void store_slot_info(struct mem_vector *region, unsigned long image_size)
338{
339 struct slot_area slot_area;
340
341 if (slot_area_index == MAX_SLOT_AREA)
342 return;
343
344 slot_area.addr = region->start;
345 slot_area.num = (region->size - image_size) /
346 CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN + 1;
347
348 if (slot_area.num > 0) {
349 slot_areas[slot_area_index++] = slot_area;
350 slot_max += slot_area.num;
351 }
352}
353
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700354static void slots_append(unsigned long addr)
355{
356 /* Overflowing the slots list should be impossible. */
Baoquan Hee8581e32016-04-20 13:55:43 -0700357 if (slot_max >= KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE / CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN)
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700358 return;
359
360 slots[slot_max++] = addr;
361}
362
363static unsigned long slots_fetch_random(void)
364{
365 /* Handle case of no slots stored. */
366 if (slot_max == 0)
367 return 0;
368
Kees Cookd2d34622016-05-09 13:22:09 -0700369 return slots[get_random_long("Physical") % slot_max];
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700370}
371
372static void process_e820_entry(struct e820entry *entry,
373 unsigned long minimum,
374 unsigned long image_size)
375{
Kees Cook06486d62016-05-09 13:22:07 -0700376 struct mem_vector region, img, overlap;
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700377
378 /* Skip non-RAM entries. */
379 if (entry->type != E820_RAM)
380 return;
381
382 /* Ignore entries entirely above our maximum. */
Baoquan Hee8581e32016-04-20 13:55:43 -0700383 if (entry->addr >= KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE)
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700384 return;
385
386 /* Ignore entries entirely below our minimum. */
387 if (entry->addr + entry->size < minimum)
388 return;
389
390 region.start = entry->addr;
391 region.size = entry->size;
392
393 /* Potentially raise address to minimum location. */
394 if (region.start < minimum)
395 region.start = minimum;
396
397 /* Potentially raise address to meet alignment requirements. */
398 region.start = ALIGN(region.start, CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN);
399
400 /* Did we raise the address above the bounds of this e820 region? */
401 if (region.start > entry->addr + entry->size)
402 return;
403
404 /* Reduce size by any delta from the original address. */
405 region.size -= region.start - entry->addr;
406
407 /* Reduce maximum size to fit end of image within maximum limit. */
Baoquan Hee8581e32016-04-20 13:55:43 -0700408 if (region.start + region.size > KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE)
409 region.size = KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE - region.start;
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700410
411 /* Walk each aligned slot and check for avoided areas. */
412 for (img.start = region.start, img.size = image_size ;
413 mem_contains(&region, &img) ;
414 img.start += CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN) {
Kees Cook06486d62016-05-09 13:22:07 -0700415 if (mem_avoid_overlap(&img, &overlap))
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700416 continue;
417 slots_append(img.start);
418 }
419}
420
Baoquan He071a7492016-05-09 13:22:08 -0700421static unsigned long find_random_phys_addr(unsigned long minimum,
422 unsigned long image_size)
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700423{
424 int i;
425 unsigned long addr;
426
427 /* Make sure minimum is aligned. */
428 minimum = ALIGN(minimum, CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN);
429
430 /* Verify potential e820 positions, appending to slots list. */
Kees Cook6655e0a2016-04-18 09:42:12 -0700431 for (i = 0; i < boot_params->e820_entries; i++) {
Baoquan He071a7492016-05-09 13:22:08 -0700432 process_e820_entry(&boot_params->e820_map[i], minimum,
433 image_size);
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700434 }
435
436 return slots_fetch_random();
437}
438
Baoquan He071a7492016-05-09 13:22:08 -0700439static unsigned long find_random_virt_addr(unsigned long minimum,
440 unsigned long image_size)
441{
442 unsigned long slots, random_addr;
443
444 /* Make sure minimum is aligned. */
445 minimum = ALIGN(minimum, CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN);
446 /* Align image_size for easy slot calculations. */
447 image_size = ALIGN(image_size, CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN);
448
449 /*
450 * There are how many CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN-sized slots
451 * that can hold image_size within the range of minimum to
452 * KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE?
453 */
454 slots = (KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE - minimum - image_size) /
455 CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN + 1;
456
Kees Cookd2d34622016-05-09 13:22:09 -0700457 random_addr = get_random_long("Virtual") % slots;
Baoquan He071a7492016-05-09 13:22:08 -0700458
459 return random_addr * CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN + minimum;
460}
461
Borislav Petkov549f90d2016-05-06 13:50:15 +0200462/*
463 * Since this function examines addresses much more numerically,
464 * it takes the input and output pointers as 'unsigned long'.
465 */
466unsigned char *choose_random_location(unsigned long input,
Kees Cook8ab38202013-10-10 17:18:14 -0700467 unsigned long input_size,
Borislav Petkov549f90d2016-05-06 13:50:15 +0200468 unsigned long output,
Kees Cook8ab38202013-10-10 17:18:14 -0700469 unsigned long output_size)
470{
Kees Cook2bc1cd32016-05-05 15:13:46 -0700471 unsigned long choice = output;
Kees Cook90168752016-04-18 09:42:15 -0700472 unsigned long random_addr;
Kees Cook8ab38202013-10-10 17:18:14 -0700473
Kees Cook24f2e022014-06-13 13:30:36 -0700474 if (cmdline_find_option_bool("nokaslr")) {
Kees Cook0f8ede1b2016-04-20 13:55:46 -0700475 warn("KASLR disabled: 'nokaslr' on cmdline.");
Kees Cook24f2e022014-06-13 13:30:36 -0700476 goto out;
477 }
Kees Cook8ab38202013-10-10 17:18:14 -0700478
Kees Cook6655e0a2016-04-18 09:42:12 -0700479 boot_params->hdr.loadflags |= KASLR_FLAG;
Borislav Petkov78cac482015-04-01 12:49:52 +0200480
Kees Cook11fdf972016-05-25 15:45:31 -0700481 /* Prepare to add new identity pagetables on demand. */
482 initialize_identity_maps();
483
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700484 /* Record the various known unsafe memory ranges. */
Yinghai Lu9dc19692016-05-05 15:13:47 -0700485 mem_avoid_init(input, input_size, output);
Kees Cook8ab38202013-10-10 17:18:14 -0700486
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700487 /* Walk e820 and find a random address. */
Baoquan He071a7492016-05-09 13:22:08 -0700488 random_addr = find_random_phys_addr(output, output_size);
Kees Cook90168752016-04-18 09:42:15 -0700489 if (!random_addr) {
Kees Cook0f8ede1b2016-04-20 13:55:46 -0700490 warn("KASLR disabled: could not find suitable E820 region!");
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700491 goto out;
492 }
493
494 /* Always enforce the minimum. */
Kees Cook90168752016-04-18 09:42:15 -0700495 if (random_addr < choice)
Kees Cook82fa9632013-10-10 17:18:16 -0700496 goto out;
497
Kees Cook90168752016-04-18 09:42:15 -0700498 choice = random_addr;
Kees Cook3a947072016-05-06 15:01:35 -0700499
500 add_identity_map(choice, output_size);
Borislav Petkov36a39ac2016-05-07 11:59:40 +0200501
502 /* This actually loads the identity pagetable on x86_64. */
Kees Cook3a947072016-05-06 15:01:35 -0700503 finalize_identity_maps();
Kees Cook8ab38202013-10-10 17:18:14 -0700504out:
505 return (unsigned char *)choice;
506}